

PROCEEDINGS
FROM THE FORUM
ON THE FUTURE OF
THE CITY OF TORONTO
MAY 27-31, 1989

Cityplan '91

City of Toronto
Planning &
Development
Department

Robert E. Millward
Commissioner

PROCEEDINGS FROM THE FORUM ON THE FUTURE OF THE CITY OF TORONTO MAY 27-31, 1989

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Preface

The Cityplan '91 Forum on the Future of the City of Toronto, held in Toronto between May 27 – 31, 1989, officially launched the two year consultative and planning process that will culminate in a new Official Plan for the City of Toronto's Central Area in 1991.

The objectives of the Forum were to:

- create public awareness of planning concerns by focussing discussion on planning issues and educating the public about planning by presenting new and creative ideas
- solicit feedback on the direction that the City should be moving in. By raising public awareness, it was hoped that the Forum would also inform and sensitize City and Metropolitan Toronto politicians to the importance of planning and urban design in their political decisions
- provide a milieu for world-wide interchange of planning ideas
- expand the horizons of the professional planning community
- provide the Cityplan '91 Task Force with opportunities to explore different options and alternative ways of dealing with City planning issues.

By all accounts, the Forum was a remarkable event, gathering some of the best local and international experts on cities to discuss their experiences and options for Toronto's future. A fascinating array of ideas, opportunities and possible directions were presented from planners, architects, environmentalists, sociologists, and academics from across North America and Europe who have addressed challenges similar to those facing Toronto.

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Public Debate on the Future of Toronto

After a period of unprecedented growth, Toronto is now said to be paying the price of prosperity. What does the future hold for Toronto? What kinds of issues should be tackled in the future and how are we to go about solving our problems? These and other pressing questions were put to debate in a special Saturday afternoon public forum as a prelude to the sessions of the following week.

Welcome and Introduction of Council's representatives on the Cityplan '91 Task Force: **Councillors Liz Amer and Nadine Nowlan** *(Co-Chairs of Cityplan '91 Task Force)*

Moderator: **Harry Brown**

Harry Brown, Toronto

Harry Brown is a well-known and highly respected media personality. Host of the TV Ontario programme 'Speaking Out' since 1977, Mr. Brown has also hosted the CBC FM talk show "Sunday Magazine" and for the period 1978-84, was host of 'Take 30', a current affairs show on CBC TV. He is the recipient of a number of broadcasting awards and has made numerous appearances as Speaker and Master of Ceremonies across Canada. He transferred to Toronto in 1968 from St. John's, Newfoundland.

The following are Mr. Brown's opening remarks as moderator at the Forum public debate. They were transcribed and edited from a video tape of the proceedings.

We are here to talk about 'Tarawna'. Each member of our panel will take us along separate paths, as we attempt to advise those whose responsibilities include putting into effect ideas about housing, traffic, development, and parks. One of the goals of the Forum is to enable Toronto's people from a wide cross section to discuss issues with our panel. These discussions will be passed on in transcript form to the professionals who will deliberate on the future of our city during the next days in Toronto.

Seven major subject areas will form the basis of discussion at the Forum. This is the preliminary, the prelude, the overture. The forum will include downtown growth and development, affordable housing, transportation, quality of life, social equity, and whether it is possible to get tickets to the SkyDome. We want the opening session to be informal. One of the great things about Toronto is its diversity. [Brown takes poll of origins of members of audience by show of hands.]

We are all Torontonians. I recall my first visit to the City forty years ago. I was stationed at RCAF Station Toronto. We were stationed on Avenue Rd. just north of Eglinton. The City of Toronto at the time had 750,000 people, and I'm sure that the term 'wasp' hadn't been invented yet, but if it did, it belonged at Bloor and Yonge. We were all convinced that Toronto was run by the ladies association of the United Church of Canada. Anything that was fun was a sin or against the law, and the bars all closed at ten o'clock on Saturday night, because everybody had to be sober enough for church on Sunday morning. Everybody was Christian, too.

People would speak to you on the streetcar, I almost said subway, and ask you directions or how are you or nice day. We were new, we put another 'g' in Eglinton. We knew how to pronounce 'Spadeena' properly. We even knew how to pronounce Balliol, until it became a part of the Imperial Oil Company.

But good old Toronto was changing forever. Canada was on its way to becoming a country of people who lived in Toronto, and people who wished they lived in Toronto. Europe and Asia and Africa and South America came to see Toronto, liked what they saw, and decided to stay. About the only person who didn't change in the forty years since then was Harold Ballard.

The Canadian joke, and since I'm a Newfoundlander I know something about that, really goes like this: why doesn't Hamilton get a professional hockey team? The answer is: because Toronto will want one, too. The same might be said about baseball, I'm afraid.

There was a young actor here whose name was Richard Gilbert, who was the BBC representative in Toronto. When asked at a party where he lived, Mr. Gilbert replied: "I live in Jarvis St.". When told by the hostess that Jarvis St. was not a very fashionable address, Gilbert replied: "My dear, Toronto isn't a very fashionable address". I wonder what he might think today.

Toronto gave the world insulin, the pressure suit for high altitude pilots, pablum, Wayne and Shuster, Marilyn Bell, and Lorne Greene. And recently we gave Calgary Lannie MacDonald. Let it not be said that Toronto isn't generous. As I said at the outset, we're here to talk about our city and the city it will become after the Olympics of '96, perhaps, and into the twenty-first century.

Re references to a world class city, I'm always puzzled when I hear 'world class city' and what makes a world class city. I don't mind if being a world class city will mean a better city, from the Latin root, which includes 'civilized' and 'civilian' and 'citizen'. A place where citizens live together and happily, we hope.

It's time for us to begin.

Jean Augustine, Toronto

Jean Augustine was appointed Chair of the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority Board of Members in September 1988, and is also a principal on special assignment with the Metropolitan Toronto Separate School Board. An individual with many accomplishments, Ms. Augustine has been Ontario's representative to the Congress of Black Women of Canada and served as its National President. The recipient of many awards for her volunteer work in the educational field and her involvement with the black community, Ms. Augustine has launched a series of initiatives at MTHA dealing with the growing problem of drugs in Metro Toronto.

Toronto is a young city by international standards. Over the past several decades it has opened its doors to people from all over the world. According to 1986 figures Statistics Canada has reported that 70% of Metropolitan Toronto's population (approx. 2.5 million) was of ethnic origin. The city's ethno-cultural heritage is proudly heralded in neighbourhood streetscapes and in a diversity of language, colour, and tradition. I am one of those people who, having recognized the tremendous opportunities offered by this beautiful city, came here some 30 years ago. I have a vested interest in the future of Toronto.

My goals as an educator and a community advocate have remained unchanged over the years, despite the steady change and increasing complexity of this growing cosmopolitan centre. I have continued to press for action to improve the quality of life for individuals in our multi-racial, multi-cultural, and multi-faceted community.

Toronto's relative youth has given us the advantage of learning from the experience of other metropolitan centres. This is typically true in the case of housing and community development. As I relate to you some of the challenges facing me now in my role as Chairman of the Board of the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority, you may draw your own parallels to your own experiences. I would hope that those parallels will yield fresh approaches for creating a safer, healthier, beautiful, and more productive quality of life in our city.

Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority communities are a micro-reflection of the socio-cultural trends we see emerging across the broader Toronto community. There are neighbourhoods peopled by single parent households, the poor, seniors and others living on fixed incomes, individuals who for one reason or another find themselves unable to secure decent affordable shelter in a prospering economy where the price of basic goods andservices is sky-rocketing. MTHA is the nation's largest landlord with more than 33,000 rental units housing more than 125,000 residents.

Our Property Managers and Community Relations Workers come face to face, every day, with the difficulties facing people who seek shelter in subsidized housing. They see mothers who work shifts, leaving their children in improvised day care. They witness children going without hot meals. They see the growing disrespect for law and order in youths paralysed by frustration and boredom.

At MTHA, we confront these issues on a daily basis. We have had to look beneath the surface to the root of the problems. The issue of quality of life in our communities is one of the most important challenges that faces our organization, and our city.

The MTHA Board has identified several key trends in social housing:

- The type of housing is changing towards smaller non-profit organizations.
- Our own buildings and equipment are aging.
- The demands for affordable housing are increasing.
- Public housing is now ending up with people who are neediest.
- Public opposition to public housing seems to be on the rise as the fixation on property value increases.
- Government is out or wants to get our of the social housing business.
- There is a need for an increase in housing stock and a need to integrate that stock into the community.
- Residents are more involved in decision making.

Not unlike the broader Toronto community, MTHA neighbourhoods comprise a cross-section of people with different cultural and ethnic origins. Our tenants follow different traditions and carry their own personal values and expectations. In short, they are individuals. Unfortunately, too often they are placed in a single, unflattering category that is unfair.

In almost every circumstance, the resident of subsidized housing is looking for the same amenities, the same services, the same opportunities we all want to enjoy. At the minimum, they want housing that is structurally sound and well-maintained. They want to feel secure and unthreatened by their environment, knowing that their children can walk safely to school. They seek privacy in their own homes without the feeling of being watched.

They want the freedom to practice cultural traditions without fear of prejudice. And, they want to have access to the same opportunities for themselves and their children as those enjoyed by the community at large.

One thing that is often overlooked in public housing is that our residents, like other residents in the community, need to feel a sense of 'ownership' in that they have a sense of stability and belonging. They need to feel secure that should their life's circumstances change, they will not be uprooted from their communities. And, finally, people need to feel that they have control over their own lives, that they are responsible for their own welfare. They want to have pride in their own homes and pride in their accomplishments.

If we start with these basic assumptions, there are many things we can do, and indeed, ***which we are doing***, to make our communities better places in which to live.

The first thing that MTHA is doing is moving the organization towards a more responsive and facilitative role — one in which we meet and work together with residents, on a regular basis, to identify their concerns and help resolve their problems.

We are establishing links to other community-based organizations in an effort to co-ordinate services to tenants, taking advantage of programs and services available in the extended community including but not limited to day care, recreational facilities, job training, and vocational counselling.

We are developing links to Cityhome and other non-profit housing groups to take advantage of a wider supply of affordable housing units. We are stepping up the presence and visibility of security in those areas where the need is greatest, and we are taking steps to improve lighting and entry security to make MTHA neighbourhoods safer places for our residents.

MTHA has undertaken to retrofit a significant number of our units to accommodate persons with physical disabilities. This has proven to be an important step in allowing these individuals the opportunity to enjoy a relatively independent and self-supporting lifestyle.

Moreover, we are pursuing plans to modernize our highrise complexes and townhouse units with up-to-date appliances, improve landscaping, and make better use of the available lands on our sites.

We are actively encouraging the formation of work groups and committees to more effectively involve residents in the decision-making that directly affects their communities. We are training our staff to be aware of and sensitive to racial and cultural differences, and we are working with the tenant groups to carry these messages to our client groups.

I must acknowledge that the single most pressing item on our agenda is to combat the rising tide of drug-related activities currently existing both inside and out of MTHA. As a landlord, our primary concerns are for the safety and well-being of the vast majority of our residents who are the innocent victims of harassment, vandalism and violence which inevitably befalls drug infested neighbourhoods. MTHA has launched an aggressive Anti-Drug Campaign aimed at eliminating both the supply of and the demand for drugs. Our best resource in this campaign is the community itself.

One final, but very important item – MTHA is working towards introducing a fairer system of rents for working households. New rent scales would remove the disincentives to employment and make the system a much fairer and equitable one.

The approach that MTHA has adopted is not a paternalistic one. It is an approach which requires individuals to accept a greater degree of responsibility for their own well-being. It demands a better informed and more active tenant voice in the decisions that are shaping MTHA communities. We need to remove the stigma that is attached to people who reside in social housing, and we need to recognize these individuals as caring and responsible members of the community.

You yourselves know the rewards of self-achievement and active involvement in the community. I believe that if the City of Toronto is to be successful in its planning, we must begin to see the people we serve in the same light. We must find solutions to the lack of affordable housing.

Robert Fulford, Toronto

Robert Fulford is a distinguished writer and columnist and co-host of the "Realities" programme on TV Ontario, who was formerly the editor of Saturday Night magazine. Recipient of the 1981 Prix d'honneur of the Canadian Conference of the Arts and appointed an officer of the Order of Canada in 1984, Mr. Fulford has also received a number of National Magazine Awards as well as being awarded three honourary University degrees. His latest book, Best Seat in the House: Memoirs of a Lucky Man, was published by Collins in 1988.

I want to begin by recalling what I believe to have been an emblematic and symptomatic incident in the recent history of the city. Just a few years ago, for the first time, the editors of *Toronto Life* magazine decided to name what they believed to be the most important and influential citizens of Toronto. They mulled over this question for a good while, they consulted a number of people they thought were authorities, and they otherwise conducted themselves as responsible journalists. Then they published a long list of names. These included some politicians of course, some journalists, a judge or two, and a long, long list of important figures in business. There wasn't one artist mentioned, or one academic. Oscar Peterson wasn't there, Northrop Frye was absent, Maureen Forrester, Michael Snow and Veronica Tennant and Robertson Davies were nowhere to be seen. There were no poets - and no architects or designers.

An innocent reader might assume, glancing over the list, that this was some oversight, a remarkable instance of editorial blindness, but no, it wasn't that at all - the editors themselves wrote that they had considered artists for their list, but, as I think they put it, no artist made the final cut because in Toronto no artist was as powerful as the people who did make the list. In the last couple of years, in *Toronto's Life's* later rankings, a few artists have appeared - but that first list is the one that sticks in my mind because it symbolized what I believe is official Toronto's - and, I'm sorry to say, journalistic Toronto's - view of the arts.

This view holds that the arts are a fringe activity, separate from the real life of the city - they interest a minority of the citizens and affect the others hardly at all. They're what the schools used to call music and painting - "frills". Commerce and politics are what matter. If business people have a little time and money left over when they've done their important work, they will generously pay some attention to the arts. And, as I say, the same attitude is reflected by my own profession, journalism. For the most part our publishing and broadcasting organization regard the arts as peripheral to the real interests of their readers. When they've covered the significant things, they'll find a little newspaper space or a little network TV time for the arts.

In a city that hopes for greatness, a city that yearns to be taken as seriously by the world as it takes itself, a city where quality of life is a permanent public concern, this attitude is self-defeating, perhaps self-crippling. For someone of my age, the image Toronto holds of itself is baffling. In my own time as an adult, which is now getting on for four decades, I've seen Toronto change from a place with a hideous inferiority complex, totally unjustified, to a place with a bloated superiority complex, also totally unjustified - and it appears that in the last ten months or so our self-image has been changing again.

Over recent times, we've often deluded ourselves. I remember that some years ago, when an art critic was retiring from *The Globe and Mail*, he said that he had found the job of covering "a world-class art scene" to be arduous. "World-class" is not my favourite term in any case, but in that instance I believe it was particularly misplaced. The *Globe* critic was referring to the fact that we have more art galleries now than anywhere else in North America, except New York. That's wonderful, I think - I love visiting them, particularly those at 80 Spadina, which by some miracle has no less than two dozen art galleries under one roof, ranging from the splendid to the dreadful. But if we could actually define a "world class art scene," what would it be like? I think it would have some of the following - at least one painter or sculptor whose work is known by the art public in Europe and American, at least one critic who is read internationally with attention, a few collectors whose donations to museums have made them renowned, a modern art museum, an art college or an architectural school of international stature, some art-book publishing with international distribution, a Renaissance collection of stature... well, of course, it wouldn't have *all* those things, necessarily, but it would have several. We haven't got any of them. On subjects such as this, we should use the term "World-class" with great care, if at all.

The reason we should be concerned about this sort of thing is that city life depends on the arts. There has never been a great city without important painting, music, theatre, architecture, literature. Politicians organize a city, but it's the artists who create a city's identity. Business keeps a city alive, but the arts give it a reason for living.

In recent years we've developed an obsessive interest in the leaders of business, and often they're fascinating enough to justify our interest. Moreover, I'm not trying to deny their importance. But so far as it affects the daily lives of most citizens, the performance of one tycoon is much like another's. If the CEO of every bank and insurance company in Toronto is replaced on Monday morning by equivalently trained executives imported from Vancouver or Montreal, few except their close associates will know or care - and the stature of the city, in its own eyes and the eyes of others, will neither rise nor fall an inch. But remove the two dozen or so most significant artists from Toronto, and immediately the quality of life in the city will begin to depreciate. Artists, including the architects and designers, establish the unique tone of a city's life. Commerce is doing all it can to make each city feel like every other city - go into a downtown mall in Vancouver and you'll find precisely the same stores you find in Toronto. Art is almost the only available antidote to this life-killing sameness.

At the same time, artists profoundly affect the economy of cities. If the people of Toronto region spend millions and millions of dollars a year on furniture imported from Sweden, that's not because Sweden's trees yield better wood - it's because Sweden's artistic tradition, nourished with great care by success governments, is so powerful that its designers simply overwhelm those of larger countries, such as Canada. At least one economist has frequently reminded us of what he calls "the expanding industrial role of art and aesthetics". J. K. Galbraith, in *A Life in Our Times*, pointed out that in some economies an artistic tradition can produce success even when the nation or the community seems otherwise unable to achieve it.

"Modern Italian economic policy", Galbraith, says, "lays no claim to excellence or even to coherence. Neither Italian engineering nor Italian management is exceptional. Italian unions are a law onto themselves and Karl Marx. Italy, nonetheless, moves from one crisis to another on an upward curve of prosperity. This is because Italian products, out of an ancient artistic tradition, set the style for all others."

It's not enough to say, as we are tempted to, that Italy had the Renaissance and still benefits from the inheritance of it, something we can't hope to reproduce. Galbraith's point is that those nations and cities that aren't favored artistically must do all they can to compensate for what history has failed to give them.

So far, we haven't listened carefully to voices like Galbraith's. We decline to take the art seriously as a responsibility of local government that's important in the way that schools are important, or roads. We have never put culture in any important place on the agenda. Over the years, we have largely ignored the needs of artists and arts organizations. Today, painters and sculptors, unless they're fabulously successful, find studio space so expensive that they're being driven from the city.

Our major ballet company has performed in an awkward and inappropriate theatre, not for a few years but for three decades, the working lives of at least two generations of dancers. Our art museum is year after year starved for operating funds. Some of our best theatre companies lurch from crisis to crisis.

In our concern for the arts, and in our financial support of them, we remain far behind Britain, and Britain in turn remains far behind continental Europe. Through what I can explain only as colossal bad luck, we are also far behind the Americans in certain crucial ways - in all our history we've developed hardly any rich people who have become great art collectors of the sort that America seems to create routinely in each generation - and that's a major reason why we lack, for instance, a modern art museum like those in Chicago, Washington, Los Angeles, or New York.

A visitor from West Germany or the Netherlands would find our methods of supporting arts organizations extremely primitive. Our system amounts to a kind of institutionalized begging, which almost always raises less than is needed and leaves many well-regarded artists living in more or less permanent poverty. A dancer who moved here from Amsterdam, for instance, would move from a professional's life with professional salary, benefits, and security into a life lived on the economic fringes. I remember the late Nathan Cohen remarking with astonishment thirty years ago that the director of the National Ballet of Canada, Celia Franca, was earning about the same salary as a union-scale reporter on a Toronto newspaper. In some ways we have made progress, and yet this week I picked up the latest report issued by the Ontario Arts Council and found the following - "A typical leading dancer with 10 years experience earns $325 a week for a 35 week season, with a senior modern dance company in Toronto - providing an income of just $10,275 a year". In the arts sector, the report says, most of the workers suffer severe economic hardship.

As a community we take advantage of them, and I believe we always have. They let us do so because they believe in their work. That says a great deal for their persistence and devotion. It says something less flattering about us as a community.

Are there ways we can improve on our record? Our answer is usually to put up more buildings – and it goes without saying that everyone involved in those buildings from the plasterers to the contractors, will make more money from them than the artists who use them. I'm not against the arts building boom as such, but I don't think it solves any significant problems.

I think, first, that as citizens we should demand that politicians running for public office demonstrate their interest in this subject, accept it as a vital responsibility in city governance, and explain how they can improve the artistic life of Toronto. And in the meantime I think we should try a couple of experiments. We should move one step toward the continental European model of the performing arts by setting up, as a test, one small municipally owned theatre company for which the city government would take total economic responsibility. At the same time, and again as a test, we should organize studio space for individual artists within city-owned buildings. In these ways we might be able to begin the process of turning our attitude to the arts in a new direction, recognizing that it must be changed if we are to mature into the city we hope to be. Thank you.

Jane Pepino, Toronto

Jane Pepino, Q.C., is a partner in the Toronto firm of Aird & Berlis, practising land development and planning law. She has been involved in a number of Boards and Commissions, including the Ontario Human Rights Commission (1980–82), the Metropolitan Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police (1982–89), where she was the first woman member and Vice-Chair, and the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (1985–present). Ms. Pepino currently serves on the Board of the Women's College Hospital Foundation, the United Way of Metro Toronto and the City of Toronto Equal Opportunity Advisory Committee. She was most recently featured in a cover story by Toronto Life – "The Most Dynamic Woman in Toronto?"

Some of the opinions that follow are my own; others are not mine, but are those which would be expected by a group of planners and municipal politicians from someone who acts for developers. The organizers of the Conference asked for some provocative and thought provoking perspectives to be laid before this Forum to generate discussion over the next few days. I expect my comments will be provocative, and intend them to be so, because in my judgment we must immediately start a dialogue between government and those it represents and the private sector, between the regulators and those who are regulated.

And make no mistake - in this jurisdiction, those who own land and wish to develop it are regulated. Many would say they are indeed over regulated. Although that may be true, a bigger problem, I judge, is the lack of either common sense or vision at the base of many of these regulations - a lack of either roots, or wings.

The biggest problem, however, is simply the relationship between the regulators and regulated. As present, it is marked by a lack of understanding about what good development can be and what good developers can do. Instead of providing positive direction and guidance to accomplish a goal or implement a policy, the approach most often taken by the regulators is one of ensuring that "those evil developers don't get away with too much". As a result, planning regulations or the way in which they are applied become erratic, become reactive instead of proactive, and can become downright counter-productive.

So, out of a host of problems to pick from, I will attempt to follow the request of the organizers of this Forum and briefly highlight three major problems. As I see it they are, first, that there is no consistency in planning policy or how it is applied. Secondly, government follows and doesn't lead, not only in planning policy but also in providing the infrastructure that development requires. Finally, there is no incentive for excellence. Indeed, there are direct disincentives.

With regard to the problem of lack of consistency, may I give a few small examples. In the mid-1970's a planning fad led to a requirement of wide boulevards as part of a strategy to make 'pleasant urban spaces'. Given the pattern of existing development and the undulating sidewalk width which this produced when redeveloping in accordance with the new rules between existing sidewalk widths, the developers warned that without negotiation of existing street patterns width it would be death to retail, which would work directly against the goal of lively and animated streets. However, many developers gave in to this requirement in order to get their projects going. I have just spent twenty-two months on an Official Plan Amendment, fully supported by municipal planners, to bring 5,000 square feet of retail out to what is, and was, the established street line, to permit the possible rental of some retail space, which in four years has never enjoyed a tenant.

Another example: In Toronto in the early 1980's, density transfers were the big thing. The principle behind these transfers assumed a total amount of density available in the Core area but allowed it to be rearranged to accomplish laudable goals such as preservation of historic buildings or maintenance of affordable housing. However, approximately two years ago, the politicians lost the stomach for density transfers and slapped on the lid. As a result, to accomplish these laudable goals we got deals to increase density to provide parkland or affordable housing. In 1983, changes to the Planning Act legislatively sanctioned these deals.

Although these erratic actions by municipal government created a great deal of opportunity for developers (and a number of headaches), it leaves the remaining question: In this type of environment, who can plan? Who can really tell the true value of land? This uncertain environment led to land prices building in the potential for the 'big bump', and created both the attitude and the necessity within the development community of 'pushing the envelope' or attempting to get as much as was possible as quickly as possible before another fad hit or the present rule changed.

In my experience, developers pay extra for certainty. They are willing to live with a level playing field in the development field, on the long term, because at base they are business people, not cowboys. It is most difficult to attempt to do a pro-forma budget when the feeling is rife that "the big hit can be had", because the rules aren't consistent, or even worse, that they are not enforceable because, at base, they represent fads and not solid planning principles worked out with the people who have to put their money on the line.

The second problem I have identified, that is that government should lead and not follow, is really a variation on the theme that consistency is desirable in both planning policy and its political implementation.

Moreover, the failure of municipalities to do so has direct implications on the provision of infrastructure for our cities. As an example, four months ago, a reporter called me for a reaction on a recommendation being debated by Metro Council to freeze all downtown development in future because garbage could no longer be disposed of.

Imagine, a proposal was being debated which would stall at least three cylinders of this region's economy because no one, for five years, had noticed that our landfill sites were getting full. Who is minding the store?

Again, this week, a recommendation was placed before Metro Council to freeze all development in a particular sewage drainage area. Again, this is not a new problem and leads to the question of who is minding the store? Is anyone out there looking forward? This is, after all, the definition of planning.

Finally, it is my opinion that there are no incentives to excellence in the present approach to planning. If the government, as the only institution which has the jurisdiction to do so, has provided the roads or provided for the roads; if it has provided, or provided for, 'hard services' such as garbage and sewage and has made provision for 'planning issues' such as provision of parks and maintenance of views, then in my judgment it should, having set those basic parameters (which implies setting reasonable densities), simply stand back. If Eb Zeidler is designing the building, surely no City planner should start messing with the location of the water element or fussing about the roof line. I have personally spent a number of meetings negotiating the details of a garbage enclosure, which held up to 400 units for five weeks, over what we began to refer to as the 'garbage gazebo'. I have had a staff architect in all seriousness suggest putting soil on the roof of a one storey building, holding it down with netting, and sowing wild flowers! I have had a client presented with a drawing for that client's project, that that client had to sell, that suggested a scheme based solely on 'urban design principles' resulting in three awkward and overly large condo units per floor.

The disincentives to excellence come with the fact that time, to a developer, is big money. Therefore, it is a rare developer who will stand on principle to defend a particular aspect of a scheme. There is simply no percentage in fighting since eventually, after lengthy delay, chances are that the matter still will not be permitted either by Council or accepted (and therefore not objected to) by the other partner in planning - the citizens. And so often, in the result, the design is compromised, and growth occurs, having been flawed by the disincentives. Surely, this is not what is meant by 'managing growth'.

I believe the proper role of government is to set principles and guidelines and, of course, certain minima to ensure that really bad things don't happen. It is also the role of government to do its share - to stop using reaction as a major management tool, and to stop turf wars over jurisdiction. At the present time, I have two projects where the only thing between vacant land and affordable market housing and social housing units in keeping with the provincial guidelines is not the local municipality, is not the lack of infrastructure and is not even, at the present time, the NIMBY syndrome. It is, instead, the inability of one Ministry of the provincial government to agree with another Ministry of the provincial government to release a portion of each site that has been declared surplus to its needs.

Government should do those things that the private sector cannot do as a result of legal jurisdiction or requirements for comprehensiveness, such as roads and transit. Put another way, the role of government should be to do those things that government must do, such as provision of sewage capacity and provision of roads and transit. But the key necessity is that government get it done. Once those matters have been planned and provided for within the context of proper planning principles and appropriate urban guidelines, then surely government's role is done.

This City must stop the planning equivalent of the fashion design industry, calling for the mini skirt, the maxi skirt, padded shoulders and then natural shoulders. The fashion industry learned, to its great distress, that consumers eventually rebelled, since the only result was that prices were driven up unnecessarily, and no clear benefit resulted.

The urban equivalent is what we are seeing beginning in this City, where some developers are fleeing to the surburbs and new investment is increasingly foreign. It is often those investors, whose return on investment comes not from the product created but rather from currency exchange fluctuations, who are, in part, filling the vacuum.

At base, the most important step to be taken as part of the development of a new City plan is the development of trust between the parties. From the development point of view, this means the ability to trust the process and the people who administer it and to be assured that regulations will be applied only where needed, and in a consistent fashion.

Eb Zeidler, Toronto

Eb Zeidler is the Partner in charge of design for Zeidler Roberts Partnership, architects. An eminent architect with over 30 years international experience, Mr. Zeidler is most noted for the designs of the Toronto Eaton Centre, Ontario Place, and Queen's Quay Terminal on Toronto's waterfront, as well as projects in the United States and Germany. In 1981, he was elected an Honorary Fellow of the American Institute of Architects – one of only two Canadians given this honour for excellence in design. In 1984, Mr. Zeidler was appointed as an Officer of the Order of Canada. He is an Adjunct Professor for Design at the University of Toronto and presently serves on the Contemporary Collection Committee of the Art Gallery of Ontario.

The Future of Toronto

I would like to begin by quoting Woody Allen who wrote: "Mankind is standing at the crossroads, one road leads towards the utter destruction of the world of all living things and the other road leads to the total annihilation of all mankind". In typical Allen fashion, he concluded: "Let God give us the wisdom to choose the right road".

Sometimes one feels this one-liner could almost be true, but I hope there is another way. I believe the citizens of Toronto are right to assume that that we can plan for a bright future. However, urban planning has ceased to be a simple technical or social task but a complex endeavour involving nearly all the needs and aspirations of humankind. Humankind has created the city and the city has changed humankind. We are never more aware of this than today as we move from the industrial era into a new one.

Allow me to quote Daniel Bell, who defined Western society as having three analytically separate dimensions: *social structure, polity and culture.* Whereas in the past they were fused into a visual unity, our post-industrial society has restructured this so that each appears to move in a different direction.

Social Structure seems to be based solely on *economizing*, i.e., a way of allocating resources according to principles of least cost.

Modern Polity, or the political structure of society, is striving towards a state of *participation* that is aiming at the ideal of the individual and the right to participate. However, without the acceptance of any common goals for humanity the attempt to have every citizen participate seems to lead towards chaos.

The last dimension, *culture*, is based on *self enhancement* or the fulfillment of oneself without necessarily considering society. This is a self indulgence that is often contrary to the aims of the first two dimensions. It is within this reality that we must build our cities. Each area greatly influences the other and any plan not considering the others concurrently will ultimately fail.

We cannot escape the fact that industrial society measures things on *economic value*. In fact, the growth of the city is based on it. However, often these values are misjudged. We know well what value can be put on individual wealth, but we know very little what value to place on common wealth. For example, there is confusion in our minds if land, and particularly urban land, should be considered a private commodity or a common good. We have nearly made a religious issue out of the sanctity of private property. However, all the regulations that we impose on land, through an unbelievable net of bureaucratic restrictions, make it anything but private property.

In fact, one of the major problems that faces us is the fortunes being made through land speculation and the consequent destruction of affordable, livable urban space. The solution is not as simple as it seems and cannot be reached by more control. Rent control is a prime example of how a simplistic approach can lead to destruction. As a result, there has not been a single rentable apartment building built in Toronto within the last year.

It is true that our society measures its social structure on *economizing*, on the allocation of resources according to the principle of the least cost. We must understand that such economizing cannot be measured with a simplistic methodology that is based only on economic factors. But even to discuss the economic factors that control the city, in isolation, we can misinterpret their influence.

In The Economy of Cities, Jane Jacobs points most poignantly to the problems facing the North American city. Her thesis is that Canadians have to recognize that the economy of a nation is not built on a so-called 'national economy' but rather on a 'city economy'. The city generates the economy. The nation divides the spoils. Because of this political disparity the economy of the city is being strangled. Just walking on the broken sidewalks of Toronto or Montreal brings this idea home. Our cities don't have the financial resources to build the infrastructure that is needed to receive individual buildings within its fabric.

Consider cities in the world that have been highly successful in providing such an infrastructure. All have a direct participation in the income tax system. Canadian cities, on the other hand, have to struggle with an antiquated property tax system that does not raise the finances necessary to build the infrastructure for the future, not even enough for its present maintenance.

Faced with this dilemma, Toronto has attempted in the last years to negotiate finances out of development deals. This has been disastrous both for the developer and the city, but mainly for the city. Unless sufficient tax funds are brought back within the city's control, I feel that urban planning will continue to operate in a field of dreams and useless discussions.

The second issue I want to discuss with you is equally important, that of *polity.* I mentioned Daniel Bell's concept that participation is the driving force in the polity of a post industrial society. Fifteen years ago, when I joined the Toronto Planning Board with a sense of anticipation and hope for a better future of planning, I believed public participation was the only answer and such an approach would wipe away all the problems that were facing urban planning. The defeat of the Spadina Expressway, the 40 foot height bylaw (which started as a joke, a fact forgotten in the bitter battle that followed), and the plan for building downtown - all were wonderful dreams, but they also showed that public participation is perhaps the most complex issue that we are faced with in urban planning.

So what *is* the problem with participation in the urban environment? It is simply that in our present process the voice of the people is only heard if it is negative. This has been very necessary as it was for example in the case of the Spadina Expressway. But this voice of the people seems to have little influence, or perhaps interest, in long-term future planning. Not that people are not interested in a better environment; they are keenly interested and vote for it by using it. Ontario Place, Queen's Quay, and Eaton Centre are examples of such urban spaces that are being used. But our urban planning process has become, in the attempt to make it participatory, a totally bureaucratic procedure and this process does not achieve better planning.

What we need is an overhaul of our methodology and a concentration on controlling the visual urban environment rather than creating more legalistic ballast. At the moment, our city is being built by the legal profession and perhaps a little bit by the engineers who design the sewers. The possible talent of architects to shape that environment is considered a peripheral frill.

The solution, however, could be quite simple. We need to have two large detailed models - one of the actual city in which we can place each new building to observe how it will fit into the existing city. In a second model the city must be pre-designed to its presently allowable densities. This way we will know what is coming and will know that what we are doing presently with allow the future to unfold. If we do this, the public *can* participate again. Presently, it is impossible for the public to assess the complex process hidden in hundreds of pages of legal and technical documents. Architecture can never be described with words in a two-dimensional legal way. Any of those attempts must, in the end, fail. The essential element we have to consider is the three-dimensional visual result. If we had these proper models, the public could determine whether the new building would fit in its form, massing and texture into the surrounding urban space. It sounds too simple to be true, but it works.

Urban planning it is mainly a *political* event. But even accepting this political reality is not enough if we forget that the issues that have to be resolved rest on complex artistic, architectural, technical and social influences. We must allow for a political system in which these factors can be resolved without interference from short-term political goals.

Our history is full of errors that have been made through such short-term views. The ballyhoo around Harbourfront is a classic example of such a mistake. Perhaps someone should record how well-meaning ideas are not enough to deal with reality. The issue is not a simple battle of developers sitting on a black horse and the public riding on the white one to the sounds of "Hi Ho Silver". In fact, in Harbourfront we had two public bodies striving for the good, or what they perceived to be the good. Yet the result was not what we wanted. Nor is the settlement that is about to be reached in any way, shape or form a guarantee that the future will be better. Again, it restricts itself to a legalistic structure rather than paying one iota of attention to urban design issues.

I would like to talk now about the third dimension of the post industrial society - its *culture*. Unlike former societies that were driven by coherent common ideals, such as religion in the medieval ages, or nationalism during of the French Revolution, our society is motivated by individual interest. We are looking for self-satisfaction and personal fulfillment.

Reading newspapers ads, we see the world of dreams beckoning us to go to Hawaii, buy a condominium, and dress like a film star in an everchanging world of fashion. If is difficult in this society to find a meaning for the City as a common goal. Yet the City not only represents our civilization and our culture, it becomes the shell of our life. The restaurant, theater, work and living spaces are all part of our culture and are contained within the City. Escape from city life is no longer possible for the majority.

I think it is essential for us to look at the City not only as a functioning element but also as a spiritual influence. The City is also an environment or an urban container that affects our being not only physically but also psychologically. Culture, ultimately, is the reflection of the self. It is the way we live, the way we see ourselves. The City is our expression.

But there is another issue standing in the way of the better urban planning that I would like to mention: I call it the *tunnel vision* of planning and the legacy that is passed on to politicians. Tom Robbins wrote a wonderful paragraph on tunnel vision that I would like to quote in part:

> *"Tunnel vision is a disease in which perception is restricted by ignorance and distorted by vested interest. Tunnel vision is caused by an optic fungus that multiplies when the brain is less energetic than the ego. It is complicated by exposure to politics."*

Calgary made the mistake of bridging its pedestrian traffic on the so-called +15 level above streets. But the mistake was *not* the *bridges*. It was that in a city with limited pedestrian movement, traffic on the bridges denudes the traffic of the street. Therefore just to say that *bridges are wrong* is tunnel vision. Having just returned from a trip to Hong Kong, I was amazed at the delight a raised pedestrian walkway-bridge system can create around the inner harbour basin there.

Another example is highrise buildings. We have to understand that highrise buildings in themselves are not bad. That statement is tunnel vision. But what *is* bad is a *bad* highrise building. I venture to say that if Harbourfront had built a series of five elegant condominium towers on a podium that would be truly related to the pedestrian activities of the street nobody would have complained about the development of Harbourfront.

What are the most *imminent issues* that we must address in urban planning? I think they are housing, transportation and the visual city.

A city existing without *housing* is not a city. Yet, we are about to a create one in which only the very wealthy or very poor can live. Affordable housing is not in existence anymore and if it is built, it is only through unbelievable subsidies that destroy the economic basis on which it is supposed to be founded. *Rentable housing* has been forgotten through rent controls kept in existence by a government that has abolished its responsibility to deal with the real issues. The single family house has been a dream since Frank Lloyd Wright imagined Broad Acres, but it also negated the post modern city. We must re-think the waste of suburban land that we accomplish under the banner of the single family house. The answer is not to pile unbelievable densities in the remaining land. The answer is a better house. London terrace housing, for example, gives the advantages of a single family house yet allows reasonable densities that afford public transit.

This leads us to the next issue: *public transit*. The city cannot be built relying solely on the car. For example, if the car were the only the means of transportation in Manhattan, the entire island would need to be turned into a ten storey parking garage before the first building could be built on top of it! It is insane, therefore, to talk of balanced transportation between cars and public transit.

But, public transit is only possible when certain densities exist. In order to have transportation and housing work together, we need transportation lines with dense development around the transit stops at each part of the line. The Spadina subway line for these reasons is not fully used. The rule is that 800 feet or a 3 minute walk is the ideal distance from the house to the subway stop. However, with the width of the open Spadina Expressway there is 800 feet of no-man's-land around each station itself, let alone the long walk from one's house. No wonder so few ride on it. By extending development at high density around the stations over the expressway, new land for housing could be created and the subway better utilized. If we look at opportunities like this, then it is not true that there is not enough land to build affordable housing.

Housing and transportation alone will not give us what we are looking for unless we also deal with the issue of the *visual city*. Walking out of my office on Queen Street West on the weekend I see throngs of people moving about, enjoying the street. That was not so twenty years ago. Someone once said that the boulevards of Paris are the living rooms of the people.

This is still true today as long as the street gives us two vital ingredients: one is ***urban activities*** - that the spaces encourage activities that people enjoy, for example, the Parisian flaneur - strolling, window shopping, sitting at sidewalk cafes, etc. This is a theatre of the street that simultaneously presents the actors and the audience that are watching the crowd moving by. All this creates City life. But like any theatre, the play also needs a stage setting and the eye has to be satisfied. There must be a pleasant ***urban space*** surrounding these activities to make the city a joyful experience.

We must create the *visual city* by a three-level approach, each different but each equally important:

Level One: Clean up the visual clutter of the city. I am talking about Hydro poles, street signs, broken sidewalks, and newspaper boxes that litter the streets like garbage. Also, there is a need for more trees and a more sensitive attitude towards them.

Level Two: Consideration for consistency and complexity of architectural detail. Modern architecture in isolation was a beautiful relief from Victorian voluptuousness and visual confusion. However, a whole city consisting of bland modern boxes has changed the saying: "less is more" to "less is a bore". The population has stood up and rebelled. There must be architectural detailing that is harmonious with its surroundings and complex enough to achieve visual pleasure.

Level Three: Creation of urban spaces. Here it is visual emotional response to urban spaces that is important and not functionalism. The aspects of cities which remain in our memories such as the boulevards of Paris, the quays of Barcelona, and the squares of Cologne have one thing in common: they are all visually beautiful and livable urban spaces.

It is a hard fact that our city grows out of political participation and lives within economic parameters. But we must also accept the city as an emotional and spiritual place. Unless we can create an urban environment that encourages us and is a joy to be in, all other efforts to plan a better city will be in vain.

Opening Remarks

Mayor Art Eggleton, Toronto

Art Eggleton was first elected to City Council as an Alderman in 1969, and at the time, was the youngest member of Council. He was re-elected in 1972, 74, 76 and 78. On each of these occasions he was also elected to the City of Toronto Executive Committee and was appointed each time, by the Mayor of the day and the Executive Committee, as budget chief, the executive member responsible for financial matters. A member of the Society of Management Accountants, Mayor Eggleton was elected to the City's top executive post in 1980. He was re-elected in 1982 and in 1985, and once again, for his fourth term of office, in 1988, making him the longest-running Mayor in the City of Toronto.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This begins an exciting new chapter in the history of Toronto. That chapter is Cityplan, the formulation of the 1991 Official Plan, a once-in-a-generation chance for us to shape the future of our City. And the exciting part is that citizens from every walk of life in our City will have the opportunity to determine just what that shape will be through an extensive consultative process - we believe the most extensive possible - beginning with the Cityplan '91 Forum on the future of the City of Toronto, here at City Hall on May 27 to 31st.

An Official Plan must be more than just a list of rules and regulations. More than a collection of planners' jargon and engineers' formulas, it must be call to action. A mission statement of how we want our City to develop… what we want it to be because an Official Plan - whether each of us realizes it or not - has a powerful effect on the life of a city, on each of our lives.

It affects the amount of green space and parks we have… the number of trees in your neighbourhood… the wind in downtown streets… even, in some cases, the amount and angle of sunlight you receive. The fact that there are stores on many downtown streets is due in a large part to our Official Plan for the Central Area. So is the fact that more people live downtown… or that sites of historic importance must be preserved… or that new buildings must meet high design standards.

Our current Official Plan for downtown, adopted in 1976, has served us well.

But the Toronto of 1989 is not the Toronto of 1976. We have a new set of opportunities and challenges - chief among them being housing, traffic and transit, development and environmental concerns… and the less easily definable, but no less vital, concern of the overall quality of life for citizens.

Defining what those challenges are... and what the opportunities are... is the agenda of Cityplan '91 and, more immediately, of the Cityplan '91 Forum in May.

The Forum will bring together some of this City's most renowned sons and daughters, (Jane Pepino - lawyer, Richard Soberman - transportation planner, John Sewell - former Mayor, Joe Berridge - planning consultant, and Jean Augustine - Chairman of the Metro Toronto Housing Authority) as well as local activists, professionals and concerned citizens from every point in our City's broad spectrum; community groups of every kind; private industry; labour and government leaders and experts from our City's colleges and universities; and planners, architects, transportation, housing and leading urban experts from throughout North America and Europe. All to focus their attention on one subject - the future of the City of Toronto.

I belive that the unique mix of participants at this forum will create a powerful and dynamic synergy. On the one hand, we will have groups and individuals with a deep and intimate knowledge of our City. On the other hand, leading urban experts from around the world wrapping their minds around our City, enabling us to learn from other urban solutions. (These experts include: William White - distinguished author and commentator on urban design issues, Dean Macris - from San Francisco, one of the best known planning directors in the United States, Joan Bosquets - from Barcelona, leading European Architect and City Planner, Josef Kleihues - from Berlin, a world leader in the design of social housing projects, Madeleine Blanchet - Canadian 'Woman of the Year' in 1980 and well known expert in the planning of community services, and Samuel Schwartz - New York City' Chief Transportation Engineer and the man who coined the expression "Grid Lock"). Together, I believe the spark that will be ignited can go a long way toward illuminating the path that Cityplan '91 must follow... the questions that it must ask... the agenda it must set.

The tone of the Forum will be set by a public debate in the City Council Chamber on Saturday, May 27, 1989, at 2:00 p.m. To me the most appealing aspect of the Forum is that it will provide the first opportunity for the *public* to participate in the formulation of the Plan.

I look forward to watching our City's most respected and thoughtful leaders exchanging views with the real experts on Toronto - our citizens.

"This is going to be a great town - if they ever get it finished". Needless to say, Red Skelton won't be at the Cityplan '91 Forum, but his line is worth keeping in mind. For it's up to us to - if not ***finish*** Toronto - ensure that it is a 'work in progress' - and, I hope and believe, a work in per*petual* progress - a liveable City to all its citizens, a City with a role to play - and a contribution to make - to the world of tomorrow.

The Cityplan '91 Forum in May will be our opportunity to begin defining that role. I am proud to be Mayor of our City during this exciting movement of opportunity, and I challenge all those who care about our City to participate in setting the agenda... the shape and texture... the essence of our City's future.



Commissioner Robert Millward, Toronto

Bob Millward, Commissioner of Planning and Development, heads one of the most visible and dynamic City of Toronto departments, responsible for land use and policy planning. Prior to joining the newly created City of Toronto Housing Department in 1974 as Director of Planning and Project Development, he held several positions with the New York City Department of City Planning. In 1979, Mr. Millward was appointed to a dual role with the City of Toronto Planning and Development Department as Deputy Commissioner and Director of Central Core and Waterfront. A member of the Canadian Institute of Planners, he holds a B.A. from the University of Rochester and a Masters in Urban Planning from New York University.

I would like to welcome all of you to the Cityplan '91 Forum. I hope that you will be able to participate in the full program of events that is scheduled for the next three days. We are interested in learning from others, and the Forum will generate new ideas and insights from which we call all benefit.

The City is commencing a two-year review process of the Official Plan for the Central Area and we wanted to initiate this process in a stimulating and public manner. The Forum will offer the exciting chance for the participants to hear and discuss with experts from around the world discussing their own experiences in other cities, as well as key planning challenges facing Toronto.

There has been a deliberate attempt to draw our 'out-of-town' contributors from the cities of Vancouver, Montreal, San Francisco, and Boston, which we felt were of similar size to Toronto and faced many comparable planning issues. However, we have also been fortunate in being able to draw upon the planning expertise of other North American cities as well as Europe. I would like to formally express my thanks to those from other cities who have made their time available to contribute to the proceedings of this Forum.

The individual sessions are all organized as follows:

The principal speaker will be a notable local planning figure presenting a written paper on a major planning topic in the City. Then the panel of out-of-town experts will respond before turning it over to members of the audience (the 'real experts') for questions and further debate. The written papers have been distributed to the panelists in advance, so they will have a bit of a head-start over you. But a collection of all the papers will be published after the Forum and made available to those of you who want copies. Also, we are aiming to provide by mid-morning on Tuesday and Wednesday a written summary of the previous day's events – so you don't have to worry too much about keeping notes.

The individual topics to be discussed at each of the sessions have been chosen to relate to the three central themes of the Plan Review process, namely (i) social equity, (ii) quality of life, and (iii) managing growth. These themes are discussed in detail in my Framework report which was adopted by City Council in March of this year as the basis for the next two years' work program. A task force was subsequently established to co-ordinate public input into the planning process.

These themes represent our vision that the Plan Review process goes beyond the traditional concerns of land use planning and the management of downtown growth. Issues and problems related to housing, transportation, and the environment cut across all such categories and require examination in a wider scope.

The City has been fortunate over the past few years in experiencing a period of sustained economic growth. Toronto has grown in size, wealth, and influence, but prosperity has had its price, particularly for the homeless, the elderly, the single mother on welfare, and the young couple who see their dream of owning a home priced out of their reach. These and other problems are real and pressing, and we must search for creative and realistic solutions at all levels of government.

I recognize that not all the problems facing the City can be completely addressed through the Official Plan. I am prepared to encourage the Plan Review to extend into areas beyond traditional land use concerns and to reach for new planning tools and powers to address these important issues. It is, perhaps, in this regard that we stand to learn the most from the planning approaches and techniques of other cities.

I will draw my remarks to a close by once again welcoming you all to the Forum and expressing my hope that you will find it a worthwhile and stimulating experience.

Guest Speaker



Richard Gwyn, London

Richard Gwyn is the International Affairs Correspondent for the Toronto Star newspaper, based in London. Born and raised in England, Mr. Gwyn emigrated to Canada in 1955. He has been a journalist with Canadian newspapers, magazines, and the Canadian Broadcasting Commission since 1957, except for the period 1968-73 when he was Executive Assistant to the Federal Minister of Communications and subsequently a Director-General in the Department of Communications. From 1973 to 1985, he was the National Affairs Columnist for the Toronto Star. Recipient of two National Newspaper Awards and a National Magazine Award, Mr. Gwyn is also the author of several books, the most recent being The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America, published in 1985. He was awarded an Honorary Doctorate of Law from the University of King's College.

Speakers always start by saying how pleased they are to be speaking to whomever it is they are speaking to. I am delighted to have this chance to speak to an audience as distinguished as this gathered to discuss, in such comprehensive and scrupulous detail, a subject as important as how to make this city a better place to live and work in. But I am also distinctly uneasy about doing it.

Uneasy, first, because I know nothing about your business. I happen, during my 30 years as a journalist, never to have covered municipal politics or urban affairs. I happen, although employed by this City's largest newspaper, a deliberately non-judgemental description of my employer, never to have actually lived in this City, except for a few months in the mid-1950's when fresh off the boat. Oh, that I had then bought a house.

Needless to say, although I know nothing, I know what I like. My own urban favourites, for whatever they are worth, would be, in alphabetical order, Barcelona, Budapest, Chicago, and Glasgow. All combine both the authentic, the gritty, the sweaty, and the creative, the imaginative, the fanciful. There is, in all of them, a THERE, there.

Needless to say, I also know what I would like. Handed the proverbial magic wand to wave over Toronto, I would use it first to build a mountain in its middle, to compact the city's centre, indeed to give it a true centre. Next, I would use the wand to build some slums. I mean, of course, affordable properties. One of your panels will address this subject tomorrow. Let me raise a particular aspect of it. A city in which all property is expensive forces all its citizens to become instant successes, to become instant commercial successes, that is. This is hard on everyone starting out. It is especially hard on artists. The creative artist, the truly innovative and original one, needs to pass through a period of success-deferred or of apparent failure. A city that denies artists a breathing and learning space risks reducing itself to an aesthetic shell where works of art, while exhibited and performed, are no longer created and produced. For Toronto, this would be especially ironic, In the late '60's and '70's, Toronto's creative artists, Dennis Lee by his 'Civil Elegies', as an example, helped create the political climate that caused this city to recreate itself. I would have one last wand, I would use it to enact a by-law making it a capital offence for anyone to employ, while within the city limits, the phrase "world-class".

The second reason for my uneasiness is that international affairs, which are my concern, are remote from your professional concerns. It's a long reach from the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway to the Gardiner Expressway. Inter-connections between the international and the municipal do exist. The golden age of urban planning of the 1940's and 1950's, golden for the planners, that is, because their work then was de-politicized, was ended principally by the Vietnam War. People ceased to be awed by experts. They realized that if some of the Best and Brightest were making such blunders abroad, others of them were undoubtedly making other blunders back home. Modern urban politics, the contemporary competition between highly-organized, highly-vocal, interest groups, can be dated from that attitudinal change, made specific by the halting of the Embarcadero Freeway in San Francisco and of the Spadina Expressway here.

A current interconnection which you are well aware of resides in the phenomenon of the internationalization of real estate. Property values in Toronto are no longer a function only of supply and demand - as was the case during my neglectful sojourn here in the 1950's - but of demand in Honk Kong and everywhere around the world where people feel themselves to be at political or financial risk or simply want to balance their portfolios. An intriguing variation of this theme is happening now in Britain. There, the real estate hot spot is, of course, the South-East. Within the South-East, the newest hot spot is in Calais. Developers there have realized that the Channel Tunnel and high-speed trains will make London just one hour's commuting distance away.

My self-ascribed mandate, therefore, will be not merely to talk loftily about the world but to try to tease out interconnections between it and your world. None of these will be as definitive as the two I've just cited. The principal reason for this is that all international developments are in flux. The old givens are gone or are going. The new givens haven't yet formed themselves. The most any follower of international affairs can hope to do is to take wing-shots at moving targets.

Specifically, I want to aim at two targets. To the first I would attach the label 'Beyond the Cold War'. It's over. We are still rubbing our eyes in disbelief at this. President Bush still half doubts it, or seems to, and certainly can offer nothing more inspirational to replace it with than, 'the status quo plus'. But it is over. It is now a page of history, except the page has turned so quickly that we have no clear idea what we are likely to find on the succeeding pages nor what we would like to find there.

My second target I would label 'Beyond the Nation-State'. We all know about the global marketplace. We have scarcely begun, though, to consider its effects upon these political institutions that, because they've been around for so long, we've always assumed would be with us forever. Unlike the Cold War, nation-states are by no means over. But they are undergoing a mutation catalyzed by the global marketplace. Their defining economic authority is being undermined. In succession, if much more gradually, their defining political authority is beginning to be undermined. The question becomes to what political institutions will we give, and increasingly so, a share of the loyalties that we now give entirely to our nation-state? One obvious possibility is the multinational coalition to which we belong, the European Community as the case example. Another possibility, to anticipate myself, is to question whether this Forum may not have been mistitled. Rather than being concerned with the future of the City of Toronto, perhaps it ought to have addressed itself to the future of the City-State of Toronto.

End of prologue. Now to begin the pot-shooting.

If I had given this speech a couple of months ago, I would have had a different speech. I would have to proceed my bald utterance - the Cold War is over - with several paragraphs of explicatory analysis. Today, to say that the Cold War is over is to utter a truism. *Time* and *Newsweek* have said it on their covers. According to the latest polls a majority of Americans no longer regard the Soviet Union as a threat. No threat, no Cold War. End of analysis.

A few hawks still cling to the doubt - cling to the hope to be more accurate - that Gorbachev may fail, thus reviving the Cold War. He may fail. I personally think not. Western skeptics conveniently forget that he's a product of the system. Rather than being an aberration to the system, Gorbachev was chosen by it, to ensure the system's survival by transforming it. Even Gorbachev's failure and fall, though, could not revive the Cold War. The Soviet Union is exhausted, financially, economically, technologically, ideologically. It cannot continue the Cold War, even under some post-Gorbachev, neo-Stalinist lead. The Soviet Union has reverted to the condition of Tsarist Russia, still intimidating in its size, still unconquerable at home but no more able to project its power beyond its immediate borders than was the ramshackle Russia of the Tsars.

I would go much further than just saying that the Cold War is over. I believe that historians, once they are freed from the need to be part-time propagandists, will come to explain the apparent suddenness with which the Cold War has ended by concluding that it ended in reality about a quarter of a century ago. Since some time in the '60's, we've been engaged, I suggest, not in a Cold War but in a non-ideological, pseudo-Cold War. Long after any actual threat of war in Europe had vanished, both sides perpetuated the illusion of a threat for their nominally-opposed, substantively similar self-interests. Those of the Soviet leaders being to mobilize their people, to justify repression and, increasingly, to justify failure. That of Western leaders being to justify force-feeding the military-industrial complex about which the person who understood it best, Dwight Eisenhower, warned against and was thereafter ignored.

The Cold War now has ended in our consciousness as well as in its substance because along has come Mikhail Gorbachev to say, in effect, that it's all nonsense - that no-one is threatening anyone. Whether he's saying this only for the sake of his own country and of his system or for those reasons and that he possess a true vision of global inter-dependence is irrelevant. All that matters is that he is saying it, and that we are now listening, and that we all know he is right.

We ought to be cheering. We have survived and surmounted the greatest threat mankind has ever faced - the threat that it might obliterate itself. We've done far more. We've marginalized war, except in those distant corners of the globe where the conditions, like those of territorial disputes and of historic rivalries or just of plan zealotry, remain the same as those that caused us to kill 60 million of each other in this century.

Yet we are not cheering. Lingering disbelief and a fear it may well be a trick are factors. Another, I would guess, is a nagging feeling the decade of the 1980's isn't worthy to have had something so wondrous happen during it. The defining hallmarks of the eighties - acquisitiveness and selfishness - may be wondrously effective economically, but they are neither heroic nor poetic. Related to this is the fact that its the other side, not ours, that has produced a leader who personifies everything that the 1980's is not. In an odd way, we've won the Cold War - and yet we don't at all feel like winners.

The substantive reason why our applause is muted is that we don't know what now lies ahead of us. We've learned to live with the costs and occasional tensions of the Cold War, much like villagers living on the side of a volcano who would rather remain there than be re-located to some unfamiliar and therefore frightening urban centre.

Now that it's over, it is possible to look back at the Cold War, if not exactly nostalgically, then objectively. It brought us benefits, although so long as it lasted, we never cared to admit this. One benefit was intangible. It defined us, most basically into "We" and "They" - they as always being wholly bad and we, to our great psychic comfort, therefore being pretty good. Suddenly, everything has gone grey. We used to think, for instance, that we possessed uniquely the aptitude for democracy; the Soviets, the Poles, the Hungarians are now demonstrating that we are not unique. Even the very words "West" and "Western" may being to lose their coherence as the dividing lines between us and them fade and blur. If I had to guess at how we will seek to define ourselves ourselves - as human beings always need to do - this will happen, an instinct tells me, by a revival of religious conviction. In the 1990's religion may re-enter public life in a way it hasn't done in decades, indeed in more than a century. The Salman Rushdie affair, I'd hazard, won't be the last of its kind; blasphemy may become, for all creeds, the abortion issue of the 1990's.

The great tangible benefit of the Cold War was that it froze Europe. Europe now is in full thaw. Already, Poland and Hungary are post-communist societies; already, they are Central European countries rather than eastern European countries in the sense we've always meant by that term.

But a sudden thaw always changes a landscape unpredictably. Thus, as Europe's division vanishes, what justification remains for the division of Germany? German reunification is probably inevitable because the cost of trying to prevent this in the absence of any Cold War justification could be very high indeed. Yet, a reunified Germany would be bound to introduce some strains and tensions into today's placid European political order. Separately, many of the old nationalist rivalries are re-emerging from beneath the Cold War thaw in Eastern Europe.

One other form of potential post-Cold War instability may loom far larger than either of these. This is that post-war American internationalism may be succeeded by American quasi-isolationism. The Cold War drew the U.S. into the wide world because it validated the need of ordinary Americans to believe that their foreign policy serves some idealistic or moralistic purpose. The question ahead is, if Americans gradually cease to perform as international missionary and policeman, who will? Ask that question in South-East Asia, where the only alternative policeman would be Japan, and you'll get in reply a long, agonized silence. Likewise in Europe. Likewise in the Middle East. Certainly in The Gulf. Everyone wants the Yanks to Go Home until they are actually about to.

We will have to anticipate a much more inward-looking America as a feature, and a destabilizing one, of the post-Cold War era. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union also is retreating into neo-isolationism. Giving up on the international class struggle means that the Soviet Union will no longer be sending troops into the Third World but also that it will be spending a lot less aid there. Indeed, who really wants all the Ivans, any more than the Yanks, to Go Home, since, because of the Cold War, they've been performing as policemen in Eastern Europe, or in that part of Europe where both world wars started.

All of this is only to state a truism about international affairs: As soon as one problem is solved, a new one gets exposed. Managing the peace where no obvious threat exists to justify all the over-armaments that, however excessive, have helped to give us four decades of absolute peace - a new historical record - will take a lot of statecraft. National clashes of self-interest won't vanish. The unexpected will always have to be expected, such as some madman or zealot acquiring The Bomb. Certainly, we do not want now to revert to the under-armament of the last era when Peace in Our Time was pronounced.

It's encouraging that, at this moment, the United Nations seems to have regained some of its effectiveness and credibility. It's encouraging that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have shown an ability not just to do arms deals with each other but to do deals to benefit third countries, such as Angola, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, at least partially. It's encouraging, lastly, that the East-West debate has begun to move on to the so-called 'fifth basket' items, that is, those concerned with co-operation on new international issues, such as the environment, drugs, terrorism.

Whatever the challenges of the post-Cold War era may turn out to be, they cannot, by even the most extreme stretch of the imagination, compare with the challenges we have survived and have surmounted - of halting the succession of world wars at two, of not obliterating ourselves. We haven't yet really realized, haven't yet allowed ourselves to realize, the magnitude of what it is that we've done. Once that realization dawns, we will experience, I believe, a sense of collective liberation, an upsurge in optimism, and a feeling that if we could by whatever accident and alchemy do this, we can do anything.

From those lofty abstractions to your practicalities is a long reach. Two interconnections come to my mind.

All the rhetoric of the post-Cold War is about interdependence and dialogue replacing confrontation and divisiveness. Just two cities that I know of have made the imaginative leap from rhetoric to concrete reality. They are Budapest and Vienna. They have done this by applying jointly, as is a first, for the 1995 World's Fair. Budapest and Vienna are a special case: co-capitals of the old empire, separated by only about 200 kilometers. But this doesn't make them a unique case. The question is whether other cities similarly seeking international spectaculars should not also twin themselves with an urban partner, and to truly make the point, with a partner in another continent on some East-West or North-South axis? The more practical question is whether cities that stick to the conventional and to the self-interested may not find themselves rejected as bidders in the way that Budapest-Vienna's rival for the 1995 Fair, Miami, is almost certain to be.

The other interconnection derives from the self-evident fact that in the post-Cold War era all countries will need to spend a lot less on defence. In the immediate, this may only mean that everyone will use the opportunity to reduce their budget deficits. Nor, given the institutional interests involved, will reductions come quickly, let alone easily. But, beyond the valley, they will be spending money in them thar hills. Relevant there is the fact that defence spending has never been used just to buy tanks and to pay the troops. It's to nurture domestic industries, to subsidize scientific research, to spur development. Politicians, who enjoy spending much as they enjoy breathing, are certain before long to consider how defence monies can be re-deployed to these kinds of national purposes. A far-sighted city manager, I suggest, should be considering what kinds of replacement mega-projects - transportation infrastructure is obvious - could best achieve the various spin-offs that have been fulfilled until now by defence spending.

Besides money being available, eventually, to be re-deployed, so also will be scientific and technical example - will gain in attractiveness. Lastly, defence spending justifies itself as a way by which a notion setting can give itself a certain international presence - our troops in West Germany, the port calls by our naval ships. Alternative ways for maintaining international cultural festivals - such as extensions of the superb one at Harbourfront - as well as what I've called international spectaculars. Start thinking about what lodestones may be found on the far side of the valley.

From what lies ahead for the world to what lies ahead Beyond the Nation-State. Here, because the separating distance is shorter, inter-connecting links are easier to tease out.

I can add nothing to what you already know about the catalytic force that is affecting the character of nation-states, namely the global marketplace. Capital, property, ownership, and production all function increasingly as if the world were a global village. My own trade happens to illustrate the phenomenon in a textbook way. On the one hand, the experts keep saying, and say so often they must be half-right, that well before the year 2,000 the international communications industry will be dominated by fewer than a dozen major transnational conglomerates - Time-Warner, Bertlesman, Hachette, Rupert Murdoch, Robert Maxwell, also Thomson and Conrad Black to wave the Maple Leaf flag, but futilely in nationalist terms since by definition transnational conglomerates have no nationality. On the other hand, the new communications systems - multi-channel TV satellites, cable systems, VCRs and the rest - are making it increasingly difficult for nation-states to regulate their media in their national interest. In short, the market now is all and everything is for sale to anyone.

In the global marketplace nation-states have, in economic terms, the shape and size of dinosaurs. To try to adapt to the changed climate they are grouping themselves into multinational coalitions, the most important pair being the European Community and the North American Free Trade Area. Within these coalitions, nation-states surrender even more of their economic sovereignty but as compensation gain greater political influence over the economic decisions of the coalition than they would have if trying to operate on their own in the global marketplace. Yet economics is politics. Most dramatically so in Europe - the process is bound to be repeated here - the political sovereignty of the EC's member states is being, if not eroded explicitly, then constrained, channelled, attenuated.

Most decidedly, the era of nation-states is not over. They command instinctive loyalties because of all the history and poetry, and blood that have gone into their making and into their maintenance. They possess the resources to command loyalties of a more pragmatic kind: A nation-state can still decide in which city to locate a space centre, with all its jobs and spin-off benefits, or which cities to favour with subsidies for international banks.

But the defining authority of nation-states, initially in economic matters but, inevitably, subsequently in political matters, is seeping away. This process has provoked, as always happens, a counter-process. Margaret Thatcher is now swinging out with her handbag at what she calls, the "super-state of Europe", or more engagingly, "the Belgian empire".

She's bound to lose eventually. But she's by no means alone in her opposition. Others in Europe agree with her but lack her self-confident ability to be unfashionable. Nor is Thatcher's criticism off the point - off her point, that is. She's realized, as many of her own critics have yet to realize, that a United Europe could threaten the unity of the United Kingdom. Scotland, as a growing number of perceptive nationalists there have realized, will be able to get from a federal Europe much of what it now gets from Britain - an assured market, financial support, and a metropolitan outlet for its talents. European integration, this is to say, could underwrite Scottish independence.

As Scotland could go, so also could go Walloonia and Flanders in Belgium, Corsica in France, Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, and, not unthinkably, Bavaria in West Germany - it being as different culturally from the rest of Germany as is Scotland from England.

Here I must add, although I hate to do so, that what could be true for Scotland and the rest, could also be true for Quebec. Relatively few Canadians have yet recognized this new challenge to national unity; many perceptive nationalist Quebecers have, like their Scottish counter-parts, recognized it.The possibility exists that nation-states may begin to decompose. If an awareness of this takes hold in the public consciousness, people will begin to consider how to redistribute their political loyalties.

One obvious possibility is the new nations, if they emerge. Another obvious possibility is the new multi-national coalitions, particularly the European Community, which has centuries of history behind it and which possesses a sense of a collective civilizing mission. I must add, though, that Brussels itself, the community's capital, commands no loyalties except those that it pays for and that there is everywhere a rooted disdain for the 'Euro-fudge' and 'Euro-stew' that most pan-European enterprises turn out to be.

A third possibility was suggested to me by Mayor Malagal of Barcelona during an interview last fall. Once Europe became Europe, he said its constituent units would revert to being the city-states that had preceded the, quite recent in historical terms, nation-states.

As a Catalan, Mayor Malagal no doubt spoke from a bias. But he spoke perceptively. To see what may lie beyond nation-states, we perhaps have to look back at what existed before them. Venice and Genoa did, for instance. The point about them being, as anyone who spends any time in Italy discovers, they still exist while Italy itself doesn't really exist. It occupies a well-defined area of the map. Everyone there speaks Italian. But Italians really only all become Italians at the time of the World Soccer Cup. The rest of the time they are Venetians, Genoese, Tuscans, Lobards, Piedmontese, whatever. The further, and more important, point about Venice, Milan, and the rest being that they are, most of them, conspicuous economic successes. The Italian economic miracle is in many respects just that, miraculous. One feature of it, though, is plain. It is built, upwards, from the natural organic units, in Mayor Malagal's phrase, of the economies of its city-states rather than outwards from the ramshackle structure, to put it diplomatically, of its national economy.

Italy, of course, is a bit of a special case, not least because it became a nation-state too late for Rome to gain the same unchallenged dominance as, say, Paris in France. Nevertheless, the question that invites itself is whether cities everywhere have become the functioning autonomous economic units of today's global marketplace. If so, they are bound to develop into city-states with some of the political characteristics of their historical predecessors.

I could scarcely be less of an authority on this subject. In analytic terms, all I can do is trot along behind Jane Jacobs. In practical terms, all of you know far more than I. Let me, anyway, toss out a couple of thoughts.

First, modern economics is, overwhelmingly now, urban economics. It is about the inter change of services rather than about extraction or about production in the sense of assembly line mass production or of food production of which the principal problem is now to curtail surpluses. The result is that cities no longer depend for their economic success upon their own nation-states. Much of the food, the raw resources, and the mass-manufactured goods that cities need is available from the global marketplace, is available, to put it brutally, more cheaply from Third World countries than from their own nation-state. Simultaneously, cities increasingly function economically within a closed loop. Either they trade service with other cities or they trade them among their own citizens - there being no more productive economic activity than taking in each other's washing. Economically, this is to say, cities have separated themselves from their nation-states.

I'm exaggerating of course. A recession that takes hold in any nation-state will spread to all of its cities. The efficiency of those cities can be affected materially by the fiscal and monetary decisions of their national government. But cities now rise or decline principally as a function of their efficiency. As international service centres cities today either offer the full range of commercial and financial and professional services, and, no less so, the full range of educational, medical, cultural, recreational services, and offer these on the basis of international competitive excellence and thereby grow in a self-reinforcing manner into true international cities, or they do not and thereby decline, likewise in a self-reinforcing manner into purely national or regional urban agglomerations.

Milan exemplifies the line of progression. It used to be a manufacturing city, somewhat like its near neighbour Turin. It is today an international centre for fashion and the international centre for industrial design. Turin, which has never evolved into more than the place where Fiats are manufactured, exemplifies the line of regression. My point here isn't to recover familiar ground about the nature of contemporary urban growth. My point is that a city that consciously sets out to turn itself into an international service centre is, if unconsciously so, detaching itself from its nation-state.

Here let me work in a local lecture because hovering just beyond reach of my lips is that dread phrase "world-class". Clean streets and efficient transportation and periodic international spectaculars do not a world-class city make. Worldliness does, and this alone. By worldliness I mean, in general, an international temper and texture to a city and, in particular, the location there of international institutions, be these commercial and financial or cultural, academic, scientific, medical, athletic. Attract those and you attract the world. Absent those and you have a city that is world-class only to itself. End of local lecture.

Cities have shown they possess the attributes of autonomous entities in a second and a quite different way. They have shown that they can reinvent themselves, as is is the ultimate proof of sovereignty. Boston with its waterfront was, I believe, the first to reinvent itself by revitalizing itself. Glasgow is the most dramatic example that I know of. Once rated by European Community as possessing Europe's worst slums, worse than Naples, it was last year designated as the EC's Cultural Capital. London is the peer example of reinvention in its broadest sense. Once the capital of an empire, it declined post-war into being merely the capital of Britain. Starting about two decades ago London has now reinvented itself into the, not just a, international service centre for finance, art, antiques, entertainment, and by no means last, for tourism. Vienna is perhaps the most intriguing example. It's had to reinvent itself, as a tourist centre, as an East-West entrepot, following the virtual disappearance of its nation-state, Austria, today having less than one-tenth of the population of the old Austro-Hungarian empire.

In the process of reinventing themselves cities have changed their social character. They have become, the best of them, not merely places to work in because one has to, because that's where the jobs are, but places to live in because that's where the full range of life's experiences is. These cities now function as sort of giant, urban theme parks offering to their residents and to visitors a complete range of attractions, from shopping and restaurants and galleries and theatres to architecture, exterior and interior design, landscaping, and on to perhaps the greatest attraction of all, the variety and texture of their street life. To the extent that cities offer the full life so do they function as city-states rather than simply as cities integrated into a nation-state.

I am not predicting the imminent demise of nation-states. Most certainly, I am not advocating it. But I find it hard to comprehend how, short of wars and perhaps Depressions, nation-states can hold on to their once all-enveloping authority. A share of that decision-making authority has already moved over the the global marketplace. A growing share, political as well as economic, is passing over to the multinational coalitions. The new shift in authority, I predict, will be to city-states, that is, to those cities that already are operating as, or have the will and ambition to become, international service centres. The process will be slowed by old, instinctive, loyalties, and by institutional interests, but it is, I believe, irreversible. Granted that it wouldn't have been politic to do so, you really should have titled this forum, City-State Plan '91.

I've cast that prediction in a deliberately neutral tone, describing both the decline in the cohesion of the nation-state and the potential rise in the authority of the city-state as resulting from objective, evolutionary forces. A comment made by Eb Zeidler during the public forum on Saturday inspires me to sortie beyond my prepared text into choppier waters.

Zeidler's point was that the existing tax base of Canadian cities is so narrow that urban planning is, in his phrase "mostly dreams and useless discussions". A most perspective point, and a potent one. Indeed, while the distinction between a city and a city-state is in part a state of mind, it clearly involves in practice a city possessing a property tax base, specifically some access to income taxes.

Now, I've no idea whether Toronto itself aspires to become a city-state rather than a city. The analysis I sketched out earlier, though, leads to the logical conclusion that any city that functions as an international service centre, as Toronto palpably does, has, if unknowingly so, already set its sights upon becoming a city-state. The doing of this in Canada will be impossible [illegible] have no constitutional provision for city-states, unlike say Frankfurt and Hamburg in West Germany. Indeed, constitutionally, cities do not exist in Canada.

But in politics, saying that something is impossible is merely a way of saying that the actual doing of it will take a lot of will, of smarts, of muscle. A case example of this process exists. In the last couple of decades, the two senior levels of government have redistributed massively the tax load between themselves. This didn't happen because the new system is more efficient than the old one or because some white-bearded guru said thou shalt have these taxes and thou those ones. It happened because certain governments - Quebec and Alberta specifically - set out to make it happen by exercising political will.

The battle itself would be bruising. An explicit declaration by Toronto of its desire to become a city-state would be described as a threat to national unity. In a sense, the direct opposite would be truer. As I've argued earlier, national wealth today is generated preponderantly by its cities; the national government then redistributes a share of this wealth to the rest of the nation-state. To the extent that a city functions sub-optimally in economic terms because it cannot properly manage and plan itself because it lacks the tax base to do it, so will it generate less surplus wealth for the national government to redistribute.

Let me finish by returning to my first theme of Beyond the Cold War. I may be over-optimistic, I may be allowing wish to father my thought, but I am convinced that we've done it, that the Cold War is over. If so, we really can do just about anything. When I suggested at the start of my talk building a mountain in the middle of Toronto, many of you smiled. Except that Franz and Judith Weber recently proposed, as a solution to Switzerland's urban sprawl, building artificial mountains - hills rather - with tight-packed, medieval-type towns on the top and all the parking, services and year-round recreation facilities sited inside the mountain. Okay, I know this can't be done here. But it does show that these days almost anything can be done. It's a great time to be in the business of creating, or of improving, or of revitalizing, or just of being ambitious. Thank you.

Session 1

Downtown Planning Experiences in Four North American Cities

This session is designed to shed light on how four North American cities have approached the planning of their downtowns. San Francisco, Vancouver, Boston and Montreal have each adopted different strategies in response to their problems and aspirations. Their experience will be of direct relevance to the City of Toronto's three main themes of promoting social equity, improving the quality of life, and managing growth.

Moderator: **Paul Bedford** *(Director, Community and Neighbourhood Planning, Planning and Development Department, City of Toronto)*

Larry Beasley, Vancouver

Larry Beasley is Associate Director, Central Area, for the Planning Department of the City of Vancouver. Before becoming an Associate Director of Planning in 1987, Mr. Beasley was a Senior Area Planner and then Manager of the Vancouver Legacies Programme, a special initiative of capital sponsorships and improvements. A graduate of Simon Fraser University and the University of British Columbia, Mr. Beasley has also advised Ottawa's National Capital Commission and Toronto's Royal Commission on the Waterfront.

As I see it, our job in this first panel this morning is to set the stage for the more focussed discussions that will follow over the next few days. And so, for my part, I want to give you an overview of Vancouver's experience with inner city planning and development. with an emphasis on general themes, goals, and images rather than technicalities or a lot of historical detail or by concentrating much on our new neighbourhood mega-projects that have captured so much attention recently.

As a context, let me begin by telling you several very basic things about Vancouver that say a lot about what we are about:

- We have a provocative natural setting. Our situation of water, mountains, green forests, and rain affects everything we do – the natural setting is gutsy, demanding, beautiful, and loved.

- We are very Canadian. The cultural and social context of our national identity is very central to our local identity. I say this to our non-Canadian visitors here, but perhaps also as a reminder to us all that the unique sense of community, fair play, tolerance, sharing, and world view that is Canada gives every Canadian city a strong and special planning direction.

- Vancouver is just now coming of age. We're a small city growing up. As a smaller community statistically middle class, our City has technically and socially worked very well – we've sidestepped some big-city problems and we've been noticeably improving over the last decade, if you ask our citizens. But one can now feel the growth pains and opportunities – over 1000 acres of our inner city are in transition and there is both excitement and fear of this.

- And, of course, we have zany policies. One noted Torontonian, after returning from British Columbia, observed that we have a "fantastic" political culture – but we look on it with humour and informality and we've made sure there is widespread access to the political process, at least at local level.

With this context in mind, let me tell you about our planning.

Ironically, while Vancouver has had relatively ordered growth and development, we have never enjoyed a highly systematized planning framework based upon formally adopted, regulation-based plans. Our most influential plans haven't been plans at all, in the traditional sense, but strategic ideas and they haven't been politically 'adopted'. They have influence by virtue of their basic simplicity that everyone can understand and basic reasonableness that most people have agreed with. They have enjoyed high consensus.

I think of:

- The 1975 *Downtown Plan* – this provided our discretionary zoning system and set the essential shape and size of downtown.
- The 1976 *Livable Region Plan* – established the concept of an interdependent network of employment and residential town centres, with downtown as the premier town centre.
- The 1980 *Goals for Vancouver Statement* – a citizen-based initiative that emphasized our attachment to the environment and care about people and a human scale.
- The 1986 *Vancouver Strategic Plan* – illustrated the relationship between employment and residential growth and transportation investment and impacts. It articulated the notion that we must balance employment and residential patterns or else spend a fortune on new movement systems.

This approach to plan making has provided:

- wonderful flexibility to incorporate new planning ideas and mechanisms and to foster innovation in the creation of our City; and
- a frustrating fragility – making it hard to transcend the trends and stave off the bad ideas.

The reason things have gone relatively well so far in Vancouver is that our planning has been founded upon and has reflected some very simple propositions about cities that most Vancouverites agree upon. Our question now is whether these ideas will remain relevant for our future.

Even so, let me highlight several of these simple propositions:

1. We have chosen to manage growth – not particularly foster it, certainly not to stop it. We've pushed for some deflection and we've done some preservation of Vancouver's character, but serious anti-growth policies haven't fared well. At best, we've tended to tolerate growth control as a 'future option', if things go badly wrong. What we have done is use growth to leverage those things we want in the quality of Vancouver living.

   I can't say this approach hasn't served us well, but it is leading to some worrying realities for the future:

   - crowding and a loss of privacy, increase in noise, pollution, and traffic;
   - we're loosing affordable housing and housing prices are too high for many Vancouverites, since we haven't gone after new housing capacity and stock throughout the City;
   - we've had a somewhat vague performance in our economy and unacceptably high unemployment; and
   - we're losing significant aspects of our heritage resources.

2. In the downtown, we're residential friendly. We prefer housing over other uses; we are protecting and assisting inner-city communities; we are building new inner-city communities that will ultimately house over 40,000 people; and we're slowly attacking the bastion of single family neighbourhoods that steal so much of our space and resources.

   This has been good, but we have not done nearly enough about our non-market and semi-market housing stock or family housing needs.

3. We've said no to freeways and yes to transit. We've built no Vancouver freeways and very few major roads or streets over the past 15 years, but we've installed both skytrain-rapid transit to get people in town from the eastern suburbs and seabus-ferries to get people over from our harbour's north shore. The emphasis has been on managing our street system, but we have probably been somewhat too ambivalent, since traffic jams are among the public's greatest woes about downtown.

4. We've been committed to streets for people. We've limited grade-separated pedestrian networks/malls/plus-15 systems; we've forced retailing onto our streets for animation; and we've instituted urban design requirements to shape streetscapes as imageable, meaningful places. Yet, we may have stretched our retail capacities too thinly to get the benefits retailers appreciate from clustering, and we may have blunted the competitive edge downtown shopping once unquestionably enjoyed. But to experience Vancouver is to experience people on foot, on the streets, in crowds, and there is real, vivid excitement.

5. We have fostered social diversity. Vancouver is rich in our ethnicity and a diverse array of income groups. We've invested in multi-culturalism, and we're protecting neighbourhoods, especially ethnic neighbourhoods. At this point, we've started to feel a worrisome racist backlash, since our attention to integration has been less persuasive than our interest in accommodation.

6. In Vancouver, neighbourliness is everything and we've put public consultation processes in place that can match those anywhere in the country. We cause buildings and public improvements to be reshaped to fit their setting like a glove, and we force all proposals through a sometimes gruelling public review. Some say we may be stalling new things, but others emphasize that we're getting a very informed electorate and very satisfied citizens.

7. We are aggressively responding to our natural setting. We're reclaiming our waterfronts for people-oriented uses; we're implementing a unique waterfront walkway system that ultimately will stretch over 25 miles; we are implementing new inner-city parks; and we've been sculpting our building skylines to protect mountain views. Yet, in reaching out to the natural setting, we haven't paid nearly enough attention to the urban public realm. From another angle we've watched our inner-city industrial base, and the blue-collar jobs it provides, shrink.

And finally,

8. We have been firmly committed to 'small is beautiful'. This late in the 20th century, we still only allow a relatively small scale of development – our highest buildings must stay with 450 feet, and most are well within the 150-350 foot range or even lower; our maximum density anywhere in 12 FSR (floor space ratio – the comparison of site area and building floor area) and the downtown averages are more in the order of 4 to 6 FSR. We have a pushy allegiance to human scale, in urban design terms, which makes things feel even smaller than they actually are. In Vancouver, only the mountains and sea have been allowed to be our 'big gestures'. Indeed, we may have foregone

> too completely the grandness of place or program that would fit our new 'world relevant' view of our density.

Because of some of the concerns I've expressed, Vancouver has now embarked on a fresh process to create a Central Area Plan. Over the last year, we've enjoyed a wide public dialogue about our future. I can't yet say where it will lead, but it has allowed us to form seven new goals that I can share with you.

While I quickly outline these goals, let me use this opportunity to give you some taste of the flavour of the City with several slides. Remember, our little peninsula is surrounded by waters of False Creek, English Bay, the Harbour, and tipped with splendid Stanley Park.

- Our first goal is AN ALIVE DOWNTOWN – a place to shop, live, work, and play together around the clock.
- Our second goal is for the core to be THE ECONOMIC GENERATOR – the focus of head offices and tourism for the whole region but without such growth outstripping the ability of the rest of the City and region to cope.
- Thirdly, we want the centre as a place FOR ALL PEOPLE – not just an 'executive city' but for the entire social spectrum and especially for families with kids.
- Next, Vancouverites want us to preserve our special SPIRIT OF PLACE – our character ares, skyline symbolism, heritage, and high livability must have extra attention.
- Fifth, we remain all for the NATURE-LINKED DOWNTOWN - in B.C., we call it "super natural", with greenery and open spaces as the primary scenes of urban life and with cars secondary to pedestrians.
- And finally, Vancouverites call for CONTROLLED COMMUTING – a downtown that is accessible without strangling our street system or damaging outlying neighbourhoods, with a system founded upon expanded public transit.

In closing, as I've walked around Toronto over the past few days and enjoyed yesterday's tour, I've seen our similarities, but I've been more especially struck by how different we are, as populations and as cities. I've asked myself what we, a smaller city way away in the west, have to offer the great City of Toronto toward Cityplan '91.

Our planning tools are interesting, but others in this room can show you the state of the art on this; and our situation is not especially parallel, as those who are here, especially from the east coast cities, probably can share more your specific woes. But, perhaps a useful contribution we do have to make is that of our attitude about cities and how they should grow.

I want to commend to you – our touch of skepticism about the notion that somehow "bigger" is "better".

I want to commend to you – our informality, flexibility of systems, and attachment to simple planning concepts.

I want to commend to you – our concern about people, neighbourliness and the sense that everyone should be included in a humane, decent public planning and development process.

And, most of all, I want to commend to you – our attachment to tried-and-true City patterns and building on what you have and from what you have.

I think Toronto is still miraculous, in world terms, and you can go a long way on that legacy.

Peter Dreier, Boston

Peter Dreier is Director of Housing at the Boston Redevelopment Authority and housing policy advisor to Boston Mayor Ray Flynn. Before joining Mayor Flynn's Administration in 1984, Dr. Dreier was Assistant Professor at Tufts University. During 1980–81, he served as a 'public service fellow' with the National Science Foundation. He has written widely on urban politics and housing policy and is currently on the board of the National Low-Income Housing Coalition.

Downtown Planning, Neighborhood Improvement, and Social Justice: Boston's Experience

Like most U.S. cities, Boston's social and economic life is very much a creature of changing federal government policies and priorities. Cities – their problems and opportunities – have not been at the top of the national agenda for over a decade – and really not since the late 1960s. So long as Washington turns its back on the cities, our ability to deal with 'social issues' – poverty and unemployment, the housing shortage, health care, our aging infrastructure, our polluted harbour – is limited. Because of their limited legal authority and fiscal constraints, cities lack the resources to adequately solve these fundamental problems.

In Boston we have not thrown up our hands in frustration and simply waited for a better day to come in Washington. Instead, we've rolled up our sleeves and sought to devise new policies and planning tools to promote *economic justice* as well as to *manage economic growth*. Boston today is a booming city. But we recognize that this general prosperity does not necessarily 'trickle down' to the poor and working class families. In fact, some people can become worse off in a growth economy – victims of gentrification, displacement, low wages, and job insecurity. So, in addition to our efforts to manage the *physical* growth of Boston – to preserve its historic fabric, to insure a walkable, liveable city, and to promote a 24-hour downtown neighborhood – we also strive to promote economic justice.

Some say that the solution to poverty and injustice is simply to promote economic expansion. They often use the analogy that 'a rising tide lifts all boats'. Well, some people don't own a boat – they don't have a stake in the economy. The elderly on fixed incomes. The handicapped and disabled. The unemployed and the underemployed.

In our view, the role of government – and of planning – is to guarantee that the benefits of prosperity are shared with everyone. This was the vision and the agenda that propelled Ray Flynn into the Mayor's office in November 1983, which helped re-elect him overwhelmingly in 1987, and which led to his hiring of Steven Coyle as Director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority to oversee this ambitious agenda – at a time when the federal government was no longer a partner in the effort to renew our cities.

When Ray Flynn became Mayor in 1983, there existed in Boston considerable mistrust among the city's residents towards the power of both government and the corporate sectors. People in Boston have long memories – and the history of Boston's planning and development efforts is not an unambiguously happy one. Things are much improved now, and Boston's residents have renewed confidence in our efforts to shape the future of the city and its neighborhoods.

So, today I would like to discuss *three* topics:

1. A brief history of Boston's development
2. Our current downtown planning efforts under Mayor Flynn and Steven Coyle
3. Our policies to manage growth and to link downtown development with neighborhood revitalization.

History [slides]

In the early 1600s, Boston was a skinny peninsula. In the 1700s, Boston was a major shipping area, a centre of trade, a wealthy city. In the mid 1800s, Boston expanded through various land fill projects – like the Back Bay. Major hills around the city were torn down to provide the fill for warehouses and piers for Boston's maritime shipping industry. By the mid-and late-1800s, Boston was a bustling city, a centre of trade and commerce, and education.

Today, Boston is a city of 600,000 people. It is in a metropolitan area of 3 million people – in other words, only one-fifth of the region's population. Boston is only 40 square miles. The downtown is only 2 square miles. The current downtown area is three times the land are of its original settlement, through land fill.

As Boston grew, as immigrants poured in from across the world, Boston became a centre of industry and manufacturing. Planners like Frederick Law Olmstead helped shape a vision of the city inherited from the Transcendentalists like Thoreau and Emerson. The Emerald necklace of parks and open space was a masterpiece of city planning – a pastoral setting in the bustling city. Created in the late 1800s, it was viewed as a relief from the congestion of city life, part of the public realm. It was a place for the classes to intermingle on common ground – even if they returned to economically segregated neighborhoods.

By the 1920s, Boston was an economic wasteland. Industry had gone South and overseas. Boston's Depression came 10 years early, but it didn't recover in the 1940s and 1950s. Its manufacturing base disappeared. Banks wouldn't invest in Boston. Only two office buildings were constructed between 1930 and 1960. The tallest downtown building was the old Custom House Tower.

The federal urban renewal program gave Boston's business community and politicians a chance to rev up the development engine. But they blew their first opportunity – the West End. Beginning in 1960, they razed the entire neighborhood. It was very divisive. It has become a classic of bad planning, immortalized by Herbert Gans' book, ***The Urban Villagers.***

The West End was an ethnic neighborhood near the downtown. A neighborhood of immigrants – Italians, Irish and Jews – adjacent to Beacon Hill. To the business leaders, the media, and the city planners, the West End was considered a 'slum'. Laundry hanging out. Corner street life. Two and three-storey tenements.

The City's urban renewal plan called for the demolition of the West End – to replace it with what was called 'higher and better' uses – high-rise apartments, government offices, and so on. Other neighborhoods – Charlestown, the North End, the South End, Chinatown, and Roxbury – were also slated for large-scale demolition. But the experience of the West End ignited protest in these neighborhoods and they resisted the wholesale destruction of their communities.

The West End in 1960, right before the bulldozer came, looked much like it did in 1900. But the bulldozer came. 10,000 residents were displaced. Most were not rehoused in affordable housing, despite promises by city officials. A friend of Mayor Hynes got the rights to build a complex of luxury high-rise apartments and a commercial shopping centre. The honky-tonk district (Scollay Square) was torn down and replaced by Government Center, where City Hall sits now.

Today, the old West End is a memory. The high-rises overlooking the Charles River are a scar on its history. The design is alienating. The old residents have scattered, but they sponsor occasional reunions to remember the old times in the old neighborhood. One vacant parcel remained empty for almost 30 years (Lowell Square). Two years ago, the BRA had a competition to develop it as affordable housing; the Archdioceses of Boston will soon begin construction of a 220-unit mixed-income, limited equity cooperative.

Between 1960 and 1980, Boston's economy was transformed from a manufacturing economy to a service-oriented economy. 80% of the growth took place in the 2 square mile area that included the financial district and the Back Bay. It was high density. It led to the destruction of much of the historic fabric. Moreover, most of the new jobs in the downtown office towers created by Boston's revival went to suburban commuters, making traffic congestion a serious problem.

The Prudential project was first major office tower in Boston in the 1960s. Back then, we needed to give away tax breaks to get development. In 1965, the city eliminated all height limits (then 155 feet) to attract development. Regulating aesthetics, issues like historic preservation, and microclimate were not considered to be within the jurisdiction of the public sector. Many large – too large – buildings were built during this period. Many historic buildings were demolished.

New Planning Directions [slides]

Now, our dilemma is how to control growth, not how to entice it. Let me provide a brief profile of our city's economy.

Boston is now a centre of commerce and finance, high technology, education, and health services, and – of course – tourism. It is the birthplace of the mutual fund and home to 11 firms that collectively manage over $100 billion in mutual funds. Boston attracts over 9 million visitors a year – we have a new convention centre and many new hotels. Boston has 31 hospitals. There are 65 colleges and universities in the area and 250,000 college students. Because of these hospitals and colleges, as well as the many federal, state, and local government buildings and park land, one-half of Boston's property is exempt from taxation – which imposes fiscal constraints. Service sector jobs now represent 57% of Boston's overall employment.

The past decade has seen a dramatic expansion of capital construction and investment by both the public and private sectors. Private commercial development investment added over 16 million square feet since 1975 – or five times the amount in the previous 35 years. The city now has 49 million square feet of office space – of which 35 million is Class A, renting for an average of about $35/square foot. New office construction scheduled to be completed in the next three years is expected to add over 6 million square feet in 19 buildings. Total employment increased by over 100,000 jobs in the past decade. Now we're adding over 13,000 new jobs a year – a growth rate of about 1.5% annually. Unemployment, which reached 12.8% back in 1975, is now about 3% – a few points below the national rate. About one-fifth of Boston's population have incomes below the official poverty line. Boston has 20 percent of the region's overall population but over 40 percent of its low-income population.

Boston's population declined by one-third between 1950 and 1980 but has since begun to climb. During the day our population doubles, as commuters enter the city by car, bus, subway, and water taxi. In fact, we're now experiencing a labour shortage – due in part to the high cost of housing.

One of the first initiatives under Mayor Flynn and Steven Coyle was to rezone the entire city, including the downtown. The zoning plan was 25 years old. It had to be updated. Zoning was viewed as a tool to deliver on our concerns about physical planning and social justice.

Rather than a top-down planning process, we have engaged in a comprehensive, bottom-up, community-based process. Altogether, it will take five years, although it is half-completed now. New zoning and development controls are done on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis in all 24 neighborhoods. Neighborhood residents have been appointed into neighborhood-specific 'zoning and planning advisory committees' (PZACs). It is done block-by-block. Looking at all uses – housing, open space, commercial. Transportation and environmental impacts are being studied to preserve and promote each neighborhood's characteristics. New height limits are established. All this is a time-consuming process,lots of meetings, but there are no short-cuts.

Part of our planning effort in downzoning the downtown is to revitalize neighborhood economies – neighborhood commercial districts, housing, park and recreation areas: areas like the Charlestown Navy Yard, the site of former Boston State Hospital in Mattapan, the Parcel 18 and Dudley Street areas of Roxbury, the Fort Point Channel area, the East Boston Piers, the Allston Landing site, and the old rail yards in the Reedville section of Hyde Park, and elsewhere. These are large and underutilized areas, near transportation nodes, where we can foster job creation, housing, and recreation uses.

Our pipeline of downtown projects continues to grow, reflecting our strong economy. But we carefully monitor development to avoid over-building. As a result, we have one of the lowest office vacancy rates in the country – under 11% right now.

The Downtown rezoning effort reflects these goals of managing growth. The downtown was divided into 11 subdistricts. New height limits and FARs were established for each subdistrict. Gone are the days of the 500-foot tower. Heights are restricted in some areas to 65 feet, in others to 100 feet, in others to 155 feet, and in a few, select areas, to 400 feet.

Each area was analyzed on a block-by-block basis with expensive citizen participation. The BRA will have design review over every development. Several hundred historic buildings will be preserved. This crazy quilt zoning map is our new downtown plan. It is the result of hundreds of meetings. 10,000 copies of the preliminary plan were distributed as part of the public discussion.

The (Ballet) Midtown Cultural District is one of these areas. It consists of 28 city blocks. We expect to add about 7 million square feet in this area in the next decade. The new zoning plan calls for emphasis on arts and cultural uses, including new theatres and performance spaces for the 50 performing arts groups. It also includes mixed-income housing, office and street-level retail. All new office buildings must include space for child care centres. The new cultural district will also help eliminate Boston's red light district, the infamous 'Combat Zone' of peep shows, adult book stores, and strip joints.

This is a computer-generated bird's-eye view of several development alternatives for this Midtown Cultural District. This was done by Skidmore, Owens and Merrill of Chicago to help us in our planning. We hire a wide range of planning consultants.

This is an aerial view of Central Artery, an elevated highway. It was built in 1954 to move traffic within the city and between the city and suburbs. It cut a large swath out of the heart of the city. It became part of the interstate highway system. But it has outlived its usefulness and is in bad physical shape. Several years ago, the decision was made to enlarge and rebuilt it – but to do so ***underground – and to construct it while the elevated highway continues in use.*** This will be the largest public works project in Boston's history – funded primarily by the state with matching federal funds (thanks to help from former House Speaker Tip O'Neil of Boston). It will take 12 years and cost $4 billion. Over that period it will create about 4,000 construction jobs each year.

When the elevated highway is taken down, 40 acres of surface land will become available – one and one-half miles long. We have begun a planning process to determine how to utilize this land. One idea, which we prefer, is for a boulevard and park, surrounded by affordable housing.

Another tool we use in planning is a model of the downtown. We have full-time model shop with 4 full-time staff. It would cost several hundred thousand dollars for this operation if it were contracted out. You can see the elevated Central Artery here.

This is an aerial view of Charlestown Navy Yard. Started in 19th century, it was a major Navy ship building and repair facility until 1970s. President Nixon closed it down in the mid-1970s. The BRA purchased it. For a number of years it remained virtually empty. Mayor Flynn and Steve Coyle envisioned it as an opportunity to create a new waterfront neighborhood, preserving the old buildings, while building new ones within a low density. It will include 4,000 new housing units, at least one-quarter set-aside for low and moderate income. The primary commercial use is for office space and research facilities, particularly for bio-medical research and technology. It includes public parks, restaurants, and boating facilities. A new state-of-the-art New England Aquarium – the largest in the country – will be relocated to one of the piers at the Navy Yard.

Rowes Wharf is on the downtown waterfront. The old planning is in evidence – 40-storey Harbour Towers luxury condominiums next door. Rowes Wharf was designed by Adrian Smith of Skidmore. It respects Boston's history. It has a ceremonial arch, reflecting the new values of public access to the waterfront. It is part of a 7-mile harbour-walk. It is the landing site for a new system of water-taxis – within the harbour, to the airport, and to the suburbs – to complement other public transit.

Rowes Wharf was also one of the first downtown projects to fall under the city's new 'linkage' policy, adopted in 1984. (jobs policy, too). These are policies developed to channel benefits of downtown growth for Boston's low-income and working class residents.

Linkage

Before Mayor Flynn took office, Boston voters felt that the city's economic boom was passing them by. In fact, the new office towers and the new jobs were putting extreme pressures on the housing market. Housing prices were soaring, gentrifying neighborhoods, pushing out the poor and even the middle class. Boston's housing prices more than doubled between 1973 and 1983 – by 1984 they were the highest or second highest in the country. The city was losing much of its affordable apartments to condominium conversion. There were over 10,000 low-income families on the waiting list for our 18,000 units of public housing – but President Reagan had eliminated any funds for new public housing units. Homelessness became a visible problem in the early 1980s across the country. In Boston, our first homeless census in 1984 found about 3,000 individuals – and surely there were many more 'invisible' homeless doubled-up in overcrowded apartments.

Linkage was one policy designed to 'share the prosperity' of downtown development with neighborhood residents. The formula is simple: developers of commercial projects are required to contribute $6 for every square foot over 100,000 square feet. Payment – made over 7 years – begins at construction. The funds are placed in a Neighborhood Housing Trust, which allocates the money based on a competitive process. Following are three projects that have been the recipients of 'linkage' funds:

The first is *Tent City*, a 271-unit mixed-income apartment complex in the South End, an integrated neighborhood adjacent to downtown. In 1968, residents of the South End – then a low-income area with many rooming houses – established a 'tent city' on a large vacant site to protest the gentrification of their neighborhood by urban renewal. For over 15 years, City Hall ignored their protests. When Mayor Flynn took office in 1984, he pledged to help make the neighborhood residents' vision a reality. The residents set up a non-profit Tent City Corporation and the BRA designated this group the developer of the parcel. The project broke ground in 1986 and residents began moving in two years later. It is built over an underground parking facility constructed by the developers of the adjacent Copley Place, a very upscale retail complex. Tent City is also surrounded by luxury condos selling for $300,000 and up. The $33.4 million development is mixed income. One-quarter of the apartments are reserved for low-income renters; one half for moderate-income renters; and one-half for market-rate renters.

The project was financed through the State of Massachusett's rental development program along with 'linkage' funds and a city write-down of the land. It was designed by Joan Goody of Goody, Clancy architects. It has won several design awards for its sensitivity to the South End context of brick, bow-front townhouses. It has common space for residents' meetings and an interior courtyard. It is clearly quite a contrast to the public and subsidized housing boxes constructed in the 1960s and 1970s.

The other two projects were sponsored by an unusual group set up by two unions – the Bricklayers and the Laborers. In many cities, the craft unions are not strong advocates of affordable housing. In Boston, they are among the many community groups, church groups, senior citizen groups, unions, and other non-profit groups that have become – through the Flynn Administration – housing developers, most of them on land owned by the city. These two unions created the Bricklayers and Laborers Non-Profit Housing Corporation. Their first project – 17 units – was built in South Boston on a city-owned parcel. Their second project – 50 units was built in the Charlestown Navy Yard. Their third project – 165 units – is now under construction, in the Mission Hill Neighborhood.

In the first two projects, union builds the housing – two and three bedroom, brick, bow-front townhouses – and sells it for the cost of construction – about $75,000–90,000. We impose deed restrictions to limit wind-fall profits and keep them affordable for subsequent buyers. The typical buyer is a young family earning between $20,000 and $30,000. The 165-unit project, under construction now, is a mixed income development; one-third of the units are sold at market-rates at $150,000–200,000. The profits from these units subsidize the one-third of the units for very low-income residents. The other one-third are moderate-income, working class families.

There are at least 40 non-profit groups in Boston, who have built and are building thousands of units of affordable housing. Although it is not a substitute for a real federal housing policy, linkage has helped make this possible. So far, over $50 million in linkage funds has been committed. Over $20 million has been allocated. This has helped to create over 2,300 units of low-income and moderate-income housing, including limited equity cooperatives, SROs, condominiums, and apartments.

Originally, many developers worried that 'linkage' would hamper development in Boston. They worried that it would "kill the goose that laid the golden egg". Well, linkage has been in place now for five years and it hasn't even ruffled the goose's feathers. The list of developers lining up to build in Boston is longer than ever. Our office vacancy rate is among the lowest in the country. Office rents for Class A space are high. Linkage has worked. It has survived a legal challenge in the courts. It now has the support of the development community, neighborhood activists, and the trade unions. It is now simply part of the cost of doing business in Boston.

Parcel to Parcel

A cornerstone of our economic development program is a new and innovative policy we call 'parcel to parcel' – a policy designed to link downtown commercial development with neighborhood commercial development. The city owns a 2 acre site in the middle of Boston's prosperous financial district. Two years ago, we invited major local and national developers to submit proposals to build a 900,000 square foot office building on this site. But the proposal included a number of important provisions:

- The development team selected to construct the downtown office building would be required to build a $200 million, 800,000 square foot office, hotel, and retail complex on another 10-acre city-owned site at the edge of Roxbury, Boston's largest minority neighborhood. The site is located next to a new subway line – 10 minutes from downtown Boston – that makes it a perfect location for office space.

- Both the downtown project and the Roxbury project must incorporate 100 child care slots.

- At least 30% of the development team – as well as the subcontractors – must be minority-owned business enterprises.

- The combined projects will generate over $8 million in 'linkage' to be used for affordable housing development. The Roxbury project alone will generate 1,500 construction jobs and 2,200 permanent jobs – catalyzing the revitalization of this low-income neighborhood.

- About $10 million in profits from the combined projects will be targetted for a ***community development fund*** to be used for neighborhood-based non-profit housing and social service groups.

Last year, the city selected a development team consisting of a consortium of Boston-area minority entrepreneurs and the Chicago-based Metropolitan Structures, a subsidiary of the insurance company Metropolitan Life. The combined project is scheduled to break ground later this year.

Inclusionary Housing

Boston's strong real estate market has put quite a bit of spare change in the pockets of many housing developers. No one begrudges them their sports cars and European vacations. But we believe that builders who construct profitable market-rate housing for the affluent owe something back to the poor and working class residents of the city as well.

Our *inclusionary housing* initiative means that residential developers are expected to set-aside *ten percent* of their housing units for low-income and moderate-income residents. These affordable units are incorporated into the market-rate development. Initially, some developers worried that the presence of poor and working class families might hurt their ability to sell or rent the market-rate units. That hasn't happened. Nor has it dampened the profitability of the projects or developers' enthusiasm to invest in Boston. Good policy is good business.

Tenants' Rights

Boston is a city of renters. About two-thirds of our 600,000 residents live in apartments. These are the people most vulnerable to displacement from rising rents, condominium conversion, and gentrification. To guarantee that Boston's prosperity does not displace poor, working class and elderly residents, Mayor Flynn has long been a strong advocate of tenants' rights. So while we're busy building more housing,we have also instituted strong protections for renters and for rental housing.

We have a rent control law that limits rent increases to the inflation rate.

We have a condominium conversion law that requires absentee owners to obtain a permit from the city in order to convert an apartment building or rooming house to condominiums. The city will only grant a permit if more than *half* of the tenants want to purchase their units. This gives the city substantial bargaining power to get a lower price. Otherwise, the building continues as rental housing.

Late last year, we extended these tenant safeguards to include over 10,000 units of federally subsidized housing. Across the country, apartments built with federal subsidies are in danger of being turned into market-rate housing – because owners can pay off the mortgage after 20 years. In Boston, we have told owners that if they pre-pay their mortgage and withdraw from the subsidy program, their buildings will fall under the city's rent control and condominium conversion safeguards. As a result, most owners will remain in the subsidy program – while others will sell their developments to non-profit groups or tenant co-ops at 'bargain basement' prices.

Boston Jobs Policy

The *Boston Jobs Policy* is another tool in our policy arsenal to guarantee that Boston residents share in Boston's success story. I mentioned earlier that, in the past, nearly two-thirds of the jobs in Boston were held by non-residents. That meant that Boston residents – who are disproportionately people of colour and low-income – were not enjoying their share of our expanding economy.

The Boston Jobs Policy requires downtown construction projects to redress that imbalance: 50 percent of the construction jobs are targetted for Boston residents; 25 percent for minorities; and 10 percent for women. We forged an agreement with the building trade unions to expand their apprenticeship programs to include these groups. And we forged an agreement with developers to comply with these requirements as a quid pro quo for continued economic growth.

We are now working hard to get the State government to implement the jobs policy to the thousands of jobs created by the depression of the Central Artery and the construction of a new harbour tunnel from downtown to Logan Airport. (And let me add that Mayor Flynn is a strong supporter of union organizing efforts, particularly in the low-wage service sector. Let me give you an example. Two years ago, the management of the posh $195-a-night Copley Plaza hotel posted a notice informing the hotel's 44 maids to turn in their mops and wash the bathroom floors with cleaning rags on their hands and knees. The hotel workers union filed a grievance. Women's groups held a rally inside the hotel and presented the hotel's management with a gift box of wash-rags. And Mayor Flynn – whose mother had been a cleaning woman – pulled his scheduled inaugural ball out of the hotel to another site. All this bad publicity forced the hotel management to back down. The maids got their mops back.)

Light Manufacturing Zone

Commercial development can be like the 'monster that devoured Cleveland' – gobbling up everything in its path. Without strong zoning protections, office buildings, hotels, and other commercial uses could gobble up land and buildings that could otherwise be used for housing, open space, or manufacturing. These are an important part of any city's economy and lifestyle, but they are not as profitable as commercial development.

We have created zoning safeguards to protect residential and open space. But perhaps our most innovative zoning initiative was the creation of a ***light manufac-***

turing zone to preserve blue-collar jobs from the encroachment of commercial development. Land values, development uses, and investment opportunities will reflect these new zoning guidelines. As a result, in several parts of the city – along the waterfront and in other neighborhoods, including several city-owned industrial parks – the new *light manufacturing zone* will guarantee that Boston blue-collar economy will not go the way of the water buffalo.

Conclusion

This is Boston's story. By any yardstick, I believe we have made considerable progress in fashioning a development policy that is comprehensive, compassionate, and effective for managing growth. We all recognize, however, that cities can not control their entire destiny. There are many things that we cannot control – the national economy and interest rates, among them – that affect what we can do in our cities.

What works in Boston may not work in other cities. We have the challenge of managing economic growth. Some cities are desperate for any investment at all – and are willing to give away the kitchen sink to get it. As a nation, in other words, we do not have a *level playing field*. We need a federal urban policy – a housing policy, a transportation policy, an education, a health care policy – that helps cities help themselves.

We must change national priorities – to redirect federal resources from the Pentagon toward the urgent human needs for housing, health care, and education. That would give cities the resources and tools to improve the quality of life in their neighborhoods. But we also need a vision – to know how to use those resources and tools. It's no good to have a hammer and nails if you don't know what you want to build. I believe that in Boston we have that vision, and we have the tools, but we could use a few more nails and plywood to help us rebuild our city.

Our cities our 'ticking time bombs'. Poverty, drugs, homelessness, environmental devastation. No one wants the cities to explode as they did in the 1960s. Nor do they have to. As a nation, we have the resource, we have the skills, we have the human ingenuity to solve our problems. It is simply a question of having the political will.

Michele Jodoin, Montreal

Michele Jodoin is Assistant Director of the City of Montreal Housing and Urban Development Department and President of an inter-departmental task force on transportation in Montreal. Educated at Marie-de-France College and the University of Montreal and holding a specialization in transportation at the University of Washington, Seattle, Mrs. Jodoin was previously Vice President of the Quebec Planning Commission and principal consultant to the de Cotret and Picard Committees on the economic development of the Montreal area.

From Plans to Planning

Early Planning History

A retrospective look at the development and growth of Montreal's downtown indicates a rather particular approach to planning. Planning, up until the election of the Montreal Citizen's Movement (MCM) in 1986, was a piecemeal process which examined projects individually without considering a more overall picture. It was not until after the 1986 elections that the approach became more global in nature and encompassed the concepts of strategic planning and consensus. Montreal, currently in a transition period, is moving away from plans and towards planning.

Founded in the 17th century on a miniscule headland,Montreal reached its current size of 175 km² by annexing neighbouring municipalities over the years. The necessity of controlling land use was therefore felt early on and in fact the innovative idea of preparing a masterplan for the Montreal region was first suggested at the beginning of the century.

Montreal, without waiting for this plan, adopted its first zoning by-law in 1920. The by-law laid out strict controls for land uses. In 1929 the city authorized a floor area ratio (FAR) of 12 in the downtown. This event was to signal the beginning of a generally destructive period of permissive zoning which would eventually ravage much of the city's housing stock and architectural heritage.

The first municipal Planning Department was created in 1941 and immediately started work on a first master plan whose primary objective was to rationalize the development occuring in the recently annexed municipalities. These preliminary efforts culminated in 1949 with the publication of the regional plan prepared by the celebrated French planner, Jacques Gréber who was also responsible for the plan prepared for the National Capital Commission. One of Gréber's objectives was to illustrate the possibility of expanding the Montreal agglomeration to accomodate some 5 million inhabitants. However, in the absence of a metropolitain planning body with the power to implement the plan, this vision never came to fruition.

Jean Drapeau and the vision of "grand design"

The municipal elections of 1954 brought Jean Drapeau and his party to power. Drapeau administered the city with an 'iron hand' for almost three decades with little or no opposition. Betting on Montreal's expansion as both a national and international pole, he favoured three major development concepts:

- the creation of a new, modern downtown;
- the development of a high capacity transportation system;
- the attraction of prestigious socio-cultural and institutional facilities.

At the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's, downtown Montreal was still without both a master plan and a comprehensive zoning by-law. It was during this period that many large-scale projects came into being. Examples are the construction of Dorchester Boulevard (now René Lévesque Boulevard) which was to facilitate access into the new downtown; the construction, on Dorchester, of the new head office for Hydro Québec, which had recently been acquired by the province; construction of the prestigious Place Ville Marie which, with its 47 floors and 180 000 m^2 of floor space, became the prototype for many similar large-scale North American buildings.

With the arrival of Place des Arts in the eastern, francophone sector of downtown, these projects were all 'planned' or rather imposed on a piecemeal, ad hoc basis without an overall vision of what downtown could or should be like. This period is commonly known as the 'grand design' era of the Drapeau régime.

Despite this series of events, at the beginning of the '60s the Planning Department had the wind in its sails as it had recruited experts from Montreal and elsewhere to prepare the well-known regional master plan 'Horizon 2000', which predicted that by the year 2000, Montreal and its region would grow to a population of some 7 million persons.

Unfortunately this period did not last for long and the planning department lost many of its resources and responsabilities and entered into a phase of decline which was to last until the 1986 elections. During these years, information regarding development in the downtown, where an FAR of 12 was still permitted, was gained by referring to regional plans where the downtown area was considered as little more than a terminal point for various regional transportation networks.

Up until 1968, the permissive zoning in place continued to cause damage; the most prestigious streets in the downtown as well as certain areas near Mount Royal were the sites for developments which did not fit into the existing fabric. Montreal finally decided to take action and adopted height limits for the first time, to protect the view towards the mountain and the stately mansions located in proximity to it.

At the same time, and very rapidly (largely because of Expo 1967), new infrastructure and projects sprouted up in the downtown. These projects which include the metro, the University of Quebec, and the CBC head office were to have an important catalyst effect on the downtown.

Unfortunately government policies encouraging highway construction and subsidizing the construction of housing in the suburbs, combined with Drapeau's actions led to the decline of residential activities in the downtown area.The creation of the Montreal Urban Community (MUC) in 1970 liberated and limited the city's planning department to dealing with local issues, specifically within the limits of downtown.

The demolition of the Van Horne mansion on Sherbrooke Street in 1973 marked a turning point in the Drapeau administration's policy of grand design. Public opposition to the demolition of this heritage building was so strong and well organized that the administration was forced to extend the restrictive height limits to the western section of the downtown.

Growth in the 1970's

Montreal, whose growth never reached the levels predicted by previous studies, proved to be very vulnerable to changing economic trends. From the beginning of the 70's, and principally towards 1975, Montreal was faced with a certain decline in activities as compared to Toronto which was rapidly becoming the country's number one metropolis. The exodus, to the west, of head offices as well the diminishing central-city population reduced revenus for the city in the downtown and weakened the administration's capacity to intervene. The result was a disjointed downtown where skyscrapers were located next to parking lots. In fact the downtown was made up of 3 compact development poles, each one isolated from the others. These three poles were the Central Business District to the west; the public/institutional axis to the east (Place des Arts, Complexe Desjardins) and, to the south, that of Old Montreal centred around the old financial district along St. Jacques Street.

The end of the euphoric period of the 1976 Olympic games signalled a new phase for Montreal. Investment into the downtown area declined and municipal efforts were concentrated in other neighbourhoods.

The Site Development Plan Approval Process

Since 1972 the City of Montreal had had at its disposition a planning tool known as article 612.a or approval by Site Development Plan (plan d'ensemble). This is a discretionary technique which allows approval of large-scale projects on an ad hoc basis. Access to this procedure was based on the site area of the proposed projects; a minimum of 8,000 m^2 (86,200 ft^2) was required. Up until 1979 this process remained largely unutilized. However in 1979 article 612.a was modified and the required floor areas were reduced; 2,000 m^2 (21,500 ft^2) for residential projects and 4,000 m^2 (43,000 ft^2) for projects involving commercial and office uses. From 6 projects adopted between 1972 and 1979, the number of projects approved by this procedure increased to approximately 50 per year in the early 1980's to 100 per year over the last few years. In fact, the majority of recent projects in the downtown were approved in this manner.

The Beginnings of a Global Vision

In 1980 the Planning Department proposed an overall strategy for the redevelopment of the downtown. This was based on a new zoning by-law, but above all on the increasing importance of the Site Development approval procedure. These proposals were greeted without enthusiasm by the business community who, in the middle of the economic recession, were reticent about any form of control and favoured a laisser faire approach which in theory guaranteed investors more freedom. The proposals were never adopted by the administration.

The emerging crisis between the business community and the Drapeau administration came to a head in 1984 over the development proposed for McGill College Avenue. The project, for which the Cadillac Fairview Corporation was the developer, proposed construction of an office tower integrating a new concert hall for the Montreal Symphony Orchestra and a commercial gallery similar to the Eaton Centre located on Yonge Street here in Toronto. Public opposition to the project was strong not only because it was felt that the proposed off-street commercial uses would threaten the vitality of Ste. Catherine Street but also because the design of the project involved the blocking of certain views towards Mount Royal.

Ever stubborn, the Mayor resisted the public's unanimous demands to hold public hearings, which despite his resistance were held anyway by the business community in association with the opposition Montreal Citizen's Movement. Following the public hearings, the project was abandonned but became one of the event's leading up to the 1986 Economic Summit. In addition the intentions of the MCM were becoming increasingly clear. With the coming to power of this party in 1986, the 'grand design' policy was clearly left behind to make room for a profound revision of planning policies for the downtown.

New Directions in Planning

In June 1986 the city organized the first Economic Summit. This forum was remarkable because for the first time participants from every sector of the community discussed the planning and development of Montreal's downtown. The particpants agreed on the need for guidelines for the development of the downtown core which would make it possible to integrate various development projects, to consider specific requests within a cohesive framework. and to stimulate its activity by diversifying the core's functions. The quality of planning was considered to be a key factor in any economic development. Finally the discussions insisted on the necessity to consult the population about the plan.

In November 1986 the new municipal administration, headed by mayor Jean Doré, was elected. Part of the party's pre-electoral program was a commitment to prepare and adopt a master plan for the city as a whole with priority being given to the downtown. In 1987 the new administration set up a team in the Housing and Urban Development Department and gave it the mandate to prepare a master plan for the downtown and its adjacent areas — the Central Area.

Planning Statement for the Central Area

The first phase in the preparation of the plan was the elaboration of a 'Planning Statement for the Central Area'-. This document, which was published in March 1988, identifies the Central Area's major planning issues and proposes various interventions. The proposals are grounded on three basic principles:

- that planning should be people-oriented;
- the reinforcement of Montreal's identity;
- the promotion of the city's economic growth.

The proposed development concept is also made up of three elements:

- consolidation of the Central Business District and its expansion into certain well-defined areas;
- organization of development along two separate, but complementary street networks;
- identification of the type and intensity of development which should occur in various parts of the Central Area.

In addition to the planning principles and development concept, the document includes an analysis of the main urban functions, the proposed land uses and examines 5 priority themes identified during the 1986 Economic Summit — urban design; heritage; public spaces; accessibility; as well as cultural, community and institutional facilities. The document also provides a preliminary analysis of the various districts which make up Montreal's Central Area.

The objective of the Planning Statement was not to offer definitive solutions to planning problems in the Central Area but rather to raise questions regarding future orientations and suggest possible alternative solutions which would then be submitted to a public forum for debate.

For example one key issue raised centred around the expansion of the underground pedestrian system and its impact on street-level shopping. Other issues included the promotion of housing in the Central Area, the preservation of Mount Royal's dominant role in the Montreal skyline and the respect of heritage buildings.

A significant phase in the preparation of the Planning Statement were 15 round table discussions involving more than 200 key participants. Major issues to be dealt with in the master plan were dicussed and basic orientations were recommended. After publication, the Planning Statement was submitted to an extensive consultation process which involved both informal information meetings and more formal public hearings before a consultative committee. During the public hearings some 150 briefs were submitted for consideration. The consultative committee's report was published in November 1988.

Interim Period

One of the universal dilemmas faced by planners during the preparation of their plans is how to manage the growth and development which occurs during the planning process prior to adoption of the plan. In the Central Area two major planning tools are being used during this interim period. They are:

- an interim down zoning by-law;
- an approval procedure for major projects.

The interim zoning by-law, which was adopted in the fall of 1987 limits heights to either 4 or 12 stories depending on the nature of the proposed development. In addition, a modification to the City's charter makes it possible for any project to take advantage of article 612.a. This modification was adopted for the duration of the preparation of the Central Area plan.

As mentioned previously, the approval procedure for major projects is based on article 612.a of the City's charter. Though this process has been available to developers since 1972, the publication of the Planning Statement has modified its application to some degree. Firstly, since publication of the Planning Statement all development in the Central Area must conform to its principle orientations and objectives.

Secondly, developers are now routinely required to submit studies analysing the project's impacts on such variables as local traffic patterns, parking demand, existing green spaces and sun and wind patterns.

Managing development during an interim period is not always an easy task but may provide opportunities for testing new measures or tools. In Montreal one example of such an experience was the 'Overdale project'. This project served as a test case for compensation measures dealing with social equity.

The project proposed the construction of 2 39-storey residential towers on a site which was occupied by 2 and 3 storey rooming and town houses. When the existing tenants were threatened with eviction and demolition of their housing they demanded compensation from the developer and the administration. After much heated and bitter negotiation between the two sides an agreement was reached. The developer agreed to supply new housing units, in proximity to the existing housing, for all those tenants who were interested. These new units have now been constructed. The developer was also required to incorporate some of the existing buildings into the project. Construction on the project has yet to get underway.

Preparing the Master Plan for the Central Area

Since the publication of the Consultative Committee's document in November 1988 work on the plan has continued. Based on the Committee's findings, as well as various other complementary studies, the planning team is in the midst of preparing a preliminary version of the plan. The consultation process has resulted in the elimination of some elements included in the Planning Statement and demonstrated which areas are of most concern to the population.

The preliminary version of the plan identifies three major priorities for downtown development. Firstly, the downtown should be developed as the regional pole for office and commercial activities. The plan predicts that office space should increase at an annual average rate of 1 million square feet over the next 20 years based on trends over the past three decades. This new development will be directed along four major streets. In that which concerns commercial development the plan proposes the consolidation and development of the downtown's role as the major regional commercial pole. Measures will be proposed to ensure the integration of street-level and underground shopping areas.

The plan's second priority is to increase the number of housing units in the Central Area. Based on an evaluation of existing vacant land, outside the CBD, it is estimated that there is a potential for some 15 000 new units (estimate based on the existing densities) which represents an increase of fifty percent to the existing stock. Various strategies are proposed to meet this objective. Some include the use of municipally owned land while others involve partnerships between the public and private sectors.

The development of cultural and university activities in the Central Area is the plan's third priority. Projects such as the concert hall for the Montreal Symphony Orchestra, the Science and Technolgy Museum, and the Canadian Railway Museum will be added to the existing concentration of facilities in the Central Area. In addition, the plan hopes to capitalize on the presence of major universities in the downtown and encourage their expansion into research and development-related fields. The preliminary version of the plan is due to be published in the fall of this year.

Consultation with the local population — District Advisory Committees

In addition to the introduction of formal public hearings into the Montreal planning arena, the Doré administration has most recently initiated a forum for consultation at a more local and informal level. These forums are known as District Advisory Committees. For planning and administrative purposes, the City has been divided into 9 planning districts (arrondissements). Each of these districts has a District Advisory Committee which is made up of the local municipal councillors.

Citizens are encouraged to participate and express their views on a wide range of planning issues including zoning modifications, approval of major projects, demolition of buildings and, eventually, the proposed master plan. During the planning process these monthly meetings serve as an important barometer to the administration regarding those issues which are of most concern to the citizens.

The Planning Process in Montreal

These days, Montreal is an exciting place to be for planners. Since the new administration has been in office the Housing and Urban Development Department has been given a new lease on life and a multitude of new mandates. One indicator of the importance of the department is the fact that since 1986 a multitude of planners has been hired. (This contrasts sharply with the previous ten years where only a handful of new planners were recruited.) In addition to completing the plan for the Central Area the Administration is now ready to undertake the preparation of a master plan for the entire city. Preparation of this plan not only involves resources from the Housing and Urban Development but seeks to ensure a coherence between all of the various municipal departments. For example, the plan will influence the activities proposed by Public Works as well as those of the Department of Community Development. The plan should facilitate coordination between the different departments and serve as a guideline for all municipal policies and actions.

A major consideration in the preparation of the plan is the involvement of the general population as well as specialized groups and organizations. In concrete terms — what is the process?

The plan for the city is to be composed of three main elements:

- an economic development plan;
- policy statements concerning such topics as housing, transportation, open space and cultural development;
- planning at a neighbourhood level in which major local issues and possible solutions will be explored.

As mentioned previously, the City has been divided into 9 planning districts, one of which is the Central Area. The population of these districts averages about 100,000 residents. For each of these districts a Planning Statement will be prepared. Preparation of the Planning Statement involves consultation of the local population at various stages both informally and formally. Results emerging from the economic development plan and the various policy statements will be integrated into the work being done in each planning district.

The culmination of these efforts will result in the master plan for the City. The plan will be accompanied by a new, revised zoning by-law. Both of these documents should be ready for adoption by the administration in the year 1992 which, by coincidence, is the year marking the 350th anniversary of the founding of Montreal.

For the first time in its history Montreal will have a plan which is truly global in nature. It is a plan which, in theory, will be the result of concerted efforts by all members of the community not a document conceived behind closed doors by a handful of bureaucrats. The city is embarking on a new voyage, which though it involves certain unknowns, should result in a product unlike anything that has come before it.

Dean Macris, San Francisco

Dean Macris is Director of the Department of City Planning, City and County of San Francisco. Mr. Macris spent 10 years with the City of Chicago Development and Planning Department before moving to San Francisco in 1968 to become Assistant Director of the Department of City Planning and head up the Department's programme for revising the City's Master Plan. Serving as San Francisco's first Director of Community Development, and then Associate Executive Director of the Association of Bay Area Governments, Mr. Macris was appointed Director of San Francisco's Department of City Planning in 1981. In 1989, he received the National Public Service Award.

San Francisco with its own special climate perhaps offers the best example of the extent to which larger American cities in recent years have used planning authority and regulation in a tough minded way to shape growth and change. The other day I read a travel article extoling San Francisco. It said the city is perhaps the only one in America that gives the appearance of being physically complete - that is, built out and nothing more need be done. That of course is not the reality - but in one sense it does have some broad meaning in helping to understand the city's attitude toward development.

San Francisco does look and feel tightly developed, exhibiting a functional and visual coherence with few apparent signs of urban decline. It is an aesthetically gratifying city, and seems as though, through the generations, to have been maintained for the pedestrian, a city to see and use on foot. And, for many, San Francisco now seems to be developed at a scale and density that appropriately corresponds to the city's purposes or reasons for existence. It remains a supremely livable place with a significant and vital economy.

San Francisco's economic base, by the way, seems eminently suited for the 80's - depending a great deal on international commerce, tourism, communications and personal services, and a considerable underpinning of small service industries and even some garment manufacturing. The City over the last several decades, through fortunate happenstance, avoided negative forces, such as the relocation of manufacturing jobs to the suburbs or overseas, largely because San Francisco never has been much of a manufacturing centre.

More importantly, San Francisco historically has been a city where residents really want to be, to experience its livability and personal advantages. It is safe to say that a great number of San Franciscans like the city as it is. Many prefer that it remain as it was the first year they were introduced to it. They view change, however necessary, with reluctance and a healthy skepticism. The belief is that, perhaps, in the end tampering will only detract from the city's immensely desirable qualities.

Feelings about the city are inordinately intense. To many San Franciscans, for example, nothing is more annoying that a new building seemingly out of place, one that doesn't appear to fit the urban texture or carry forward the city's architectural traditions, however loosely defined they may be. Apart from social issues, demographics, and other traditions, such as a celebrated tolerance for a variety of human activities, these common public feelings that literally embrace the city - and a relatively thriving economy - have much to do with San Francisco's development and political setting. They help set the widespread public support for managing change in the physical environment.

Here I should mention that, compared to other American cities, there is little that is considered feeble about the San Francisco planning process. Great reliance is placed on the planning process to evaluate and meditate physical change. And through the years the City Planning Commission has been given increasing authority to endorse or reject changes in use of space and the appearance of buildings. By City Charter the Commission has the sole responsibility for the preparation and maintenance of San Francisco's Master Plan. That's not surprising. But you may be surprised to know that the San Francisco City Charter does not require the Board of Supervisors (the local legislative body) to endorse the Plan.

Responsibility for preparing the Master Plan has particular meaning in California because, even in home rule charter cities such as San Francisco, the courts require zoning regulations to conform with Master Plan policies. In San Francisco significant changes in land use are governed by the issuance of a conditional use permit requiring City Planning Commission action. Whether the Commission approves or disapproves the project, the decision can be appealed, under certain conditions, to the Board of supervisors.

Now, that's not so unusual, *except* the Board is required by law to secure eight of its eleven votes to overturn the Commission's decision. It is a rare circumstance when an elected body is required to muster a two-thirds vote in order to overturn the decision of an appointed body.

Perhaps the Planning Commission's most unusual authority is the process of discretionary review, meaning that proposed projects, regardless of their conformity to zoning code provisions, may be reviewed by the Commission. Under this authority pending projects can be altered to deal with some problem not addressed or resolved by the code. I should note that Commission decisions under discretionary review can be appealed to the city's Board of Permit Appeals. But to overturn a Commission action, four votes are required from that five member body.

Discretionary Review has become a routine practice and, many people involved in development believe that, because of this process, building as a matter of right has little meaning in San Francisco. While these public perceptions and local planning practices seem expressly fitted to San Francisco - and as some in the building industry would hope, confined to San Francisco - the thing to realize, I believe, is that cities all over the United States are increasingly intervening in the process of urban change, both in terms of citizen involvement and governmental actions. There is a growing recognition that urban trends need not be accepted as a city's destiny.

To most observers, San Francisco remains least civicly shy, when problems of change or some unwanted trend compel some unique governmental action. Not long ago, public action was taken to prevent new construction from causing additional shadows on public parks. And, since 1984, when the law came into effect, no new buildings have been permitted to do so. The city now has an ordinance that prevents the demolition or conversion of residential hotels because they are considered a valuable moderate and low income housing resource. San Francisco in several neighbourhood retail districts restricts *by law* the number of restaurants, bars, fast food outlets, and banks, because they tend to elevate rents and drive out local services, such as laundromats, shoe repair and hardware stores.

On Van Ness Avenue, a major north-south thoroughfare in San Francisco, zoning policies were changed permitting new commercial development to proceed only if three square feet of housing is built for every square foot of retail. In Mission Bay, a 300 acre former railroad yard just south of Downtown San Francisco, Santa Fe Pacific, the owner of the property, has given the city more than $2 million to plan the site. This unusual arrangement enabling a public agency to plan private property was agreed upon because, in San Francisco, it is assumed that a planning process managed by the public is likely to be a more successful means of achieving development.

Let me also say that the city not long ago took a rather bold action imposing moratorium on demolition of single family homes because they were being replaced by structures considered out of scale with the character of the existing neighbourhoods.

This willingness to provide authority to plan and explore innovative methods in managing development does not come from the insistence of zealous city planners. These approaches have evolved in recent years through a public insistence, often voiced through highly articulate special interest and neighbourhood groups.

San Francisco's Downtown Plan, published in 1983, was a response to a massive public sentiment. The city's future had become an issue because the public had perceived change as moving too quickly with the present seemingly overwhelming the past. Ultimately between 1978 and 1985 San Francisco would add 23 million square feet in office space and over the same eight years - over 7,000 new hotel rooms were authorized - nearly all in the city district.

In American cities a great deal of commentary has been offered from various points of view about the plan, which is now law in San Francisco. There are opinions that the plan gives too much authority to planners - a rather refreshing thought if you are in the practice - or that the provisions place too many constraints on architects and architecture. Bob Campbell, *Boston Globe*'s architectural critic, says this argument seems very much like saying that tennis would be a lot more fun if only it weren't for the *net*, the *court*, and the *rules*. The truth is, he says, that constraints are a necessary condition for creativity.

An often heard comment about the Downtown Plan is that you can't legislate architecture. To that Spiro Kristoff says, "This is a strange assertion, to put it gently". Throughout history urban form has been legislated. The much-admired medieval Siena had a rigidly premeditated form - down to the shape of windows and the forceful use of brick. The design prescriptions that controlled Haussmann's Paris extended to the smallest details. Plasters on facades could not be more than 10 cm in depth. Balconies used to have official permission and even so could not project more than 80 cm.

When the Downtown Plan was presented to the Board of Supervisors in 1985 as an ordinance for action, it contained provisions that cut the potential for development in the central area roughly in half compared to previous zoning policies. The Downtown Plan in essence is designed to accomplish - through rules rather than incentives or loosely worded guidelines - five basic strategies:

a) shift growth when it occurs to more logical locations downtown;

b) preserve the best buildings, whole blocks and frontages if desirable, by legally preventing their demolition;

c) give priority to urban design considerations and to the visual coherence of the city's centre rather than to the design of individual buildings as architectural statements at any cost;

d) create exactions as a means of channeling private resources to help solve public problems;

e) manage growth through square foot limits, thus creating a city-wide competitive process for developers of new office space.

Let me comment on the first strategy.

The Plan creates a means for shifting growth of office space downtown by constricting new construction in overbuilt areas and by encouraging it in a more logical location. A part of this shift is accomplished by designating 250 existing structures as untouchable in the largely built-up downtown core where, despite high land costs, the desire to build still remains strong. The designation means that the demolition of these buildings is for all practical purposes impossible. This action is coupled with the creation of a special development district in another part of downtown where construction would be more acceptable, sites more adaptable to change.

Another important element of this growth shift strategy enables a developer to buy and transfer development rights from a building designated as untouchable in the core area. In turn, the developer can use these rights in the special district where development is encouraged through more liberal height limits and other regulations that control the size of buildings.

So, with these policies in effect, three goals considered worthy in most planning circles are achieved:

- overbuilding is prevented;
- older significant buildings are preserved; and
- new construction goes where it is believed most desirable.

Let me turn to the Plan's second strategy - preserving significant buildings. Although San Francisco had a landmark designation process since the 1960's, it was considered weak, with procedures inadequate to the task of keeping elegant and noteworthy buildings. In downtown San Francisco, architecturally significant buildings were being lost at the rate of six to seven a year. Frontages containing a collection of harmonious buildings were being changed by alternations or insensitive new development.

Consequently, from the outset, a major strategy of the downtown plan was to preserve these significant structures. A comprehensive survey was undertaken in co-operation with a private preservation group. Over 500 buildings were judged against architectural, historical, and contextual criteria. Slightly over 250 of these buildings, now called category I structures, were selected for mandatory preservation and six downtown areas were designated as conservation districts. In these six districts, older buildings, not individually significant but judged supportive of the district's architectural character, are encouraged to be preserved. We call them contributory buildings. Alterations and new construction in each of these designated conservation districts are carefully evaluated by the City to ensure continuity with the area's established architectural character.

Now, regarding the third strategy - urban design. The Plan contains provisions for fostering visual coherence, for emphasizing pedestrian comforts, and for strengthening the city's recognizable physical image. While the height of these buildings become an issue, so did the uncompromising mass of the box shaped towers. As skyline features they collectively form a rather harsh composition. Their flat tops seemingly fight the more gentle silhouette of the San Francisco hills and the delicately scaled older buildings in nearby districts. At the street level, the new buildings of the last decade or so frequently ignored their neighbours and offered little in qualities that give scale and visual richness to the street.

In the 1960's, San Francisco adopted a bonus system modeled on New York's zoning ordinance. Under the system in exchange for amenities such as plazas, accessibility to transit, and view terraces, developers were allowed to exceed limits on building size. As it turned out, many plazas are vast expanses of stone or brick, with little or no attraction to people. Plazas are often located to the north of the tower, casting them in shadow for much of the year. Situated at the base of a tower the wind whips across these plaza expanses at high velocities. The view terraces, located on the upper floors of high-rises as a public amenity, are inaccessible and frequently serve exclusively as executive balconies. So, what seemed clear is that the bonus system, in effect, succeeded in creating settings for larger towers with little or no contribution to the elements that make up a livable city or an appealing urban experience.

To bring about change in these building patterns the bonus system was eliminated, and new standards and policies are now in place which elevate civic considerations in design to the rank of first priority in the development process. Height limits enacted in earlier years were dramatically lowered in the downtown core. So too were floor areas ratios that control a building's bulk and mass. In the city's downtown retail district new height limits are set at the prevailing heights of existing buildings to reinforce the consistency of the existing streetwall as well as to retain the open, sunny environment that exists there now.

Open space is a required provision. Office developers must provide some form of open space, either on site or nearby (but no more than 800 feet away), if locating the space at the building site is unworkable. The rule is one square foot of open space for every 50 square feet of office building planned. Shadow studies are mandated by the plan for all major building proposals to establish a design that will reduce shadows to the maximum extent possible without foregoing good architecture. Similarly, wind studies are required now of all major buildings to keep ground-level speeds from exceeding eleven miles per hour.

A good deal has been said by architects about the Plan's provisions governing building mass and tops of high rises. These provisions compelling some design consideration of the structure's contribution to the skyline are not a gesture toward some architectural post-modernism. They are intended to off-set the visual impact on San Francisco's skyline, caused by extensive cluster of international styled buildings constructed in the last 15 years - all at similar heights. But more important, the Plan's provisions for tapering new buildings as they rise are intended to give priority to street level comforts, enabling sun and sky access and softening the overbearing quality that excessive scale can cast on a street. To a great extent the plan's provisions gently compel the architect to observe the necessities of the unique San Francisco physical context.

The Plan's fourth strategy deals with private exactions. In the initial stages, these exactions were described in some rather uncomplimentary terms. Polite terms like blackmail or banditry come to mind. The Downtown Plan and accompanying ordinances impose a series of fees on office development to help offset the effects of added growth. So now, sponsors of office buildings over 25,000 square feet are obliged to pay the city the following fees:

a) slightly over $5.00 per square foot of office space for building housing;

b) $5.00 per square foot for transit improvements;

c) $2.00 per square foot for the creation of a downtown park;

d) $1.00 per square foot for childcare if space is not provided in the project;

e) plus 1% of the total construction cost of the project must go toward accessible public art.

The two questions most frequently asked by other cities about San Francisco's exaction program are: does it work? and does it chase away development that would otherwise build in the city were it not for the fees? Although predictions were made, no evidence has appeared suggesting excessive fees have had a chilling effect on building - nor have developers announced that a building at one time planned for San Francisco is now scheduled for construction in the suburbs or in Los Angeles. True, several major corporations have chosen to build 'back office space' in suburban areas for functions not requiring a central location. But decisions to do so are the result of high San Francisco land costs, the difficulty of assembling properties big enough to construct buildings with large floor plates, and higher rental costs for existing space compared to suburban rent schedules.

These factors exist in other central cities and major corporations with large space needs for data processing and other similar functions have made the same decision to build or rent outside the city. Consequently, the belief is, as noted earlier, that neither developers or users of space have opted to abandon the city as a result of San Francisco's extensive fee program. This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that, despite the city's rather high office vacancy rate, developers continue to request city approval for the construction of additional space with the understanding that all five fees are now law.

From the city's point of view the fees are successful. In recent years developers have contributed over $30 million to housing and over 3,000 housing units have been made available through this program. The city, incidentally, has collected nearly $60 million for transit improvements.

The Plan's fifth strategy perhaps offers the greatest departure from past practices. San Francisco now limits the amount of office space approved for construction annually. San Francisco - and now Seattle - are the only sites to do so as a means of managing the potential for congestion and to balance growth with the city's ability to provide the necessary infrastructure in support of new jobs. As it now stands, office growth is limited by law in San Francisco to 475,000 square feet annually. That figure can be raised only by the electorate, which in San Francisco is not an unusual procedure, considering that nearly every election includes some sort of planning initiative.

The downtown plan ordinance gives responsibility for selecting who builds under the limitation system to the City Planning Department and Commission. The annual office limitation program, or as it's called by some - "The Beauty Contest" - has been in effect for little more than three years. Experience is limited but the program already has had substantial impact. For one, it has created a rather fierce competition among office developers for space available. Since adoption of the allocation system two competitions have been held and a third one is underway. In 1986, the first year, all three competing buildings were rejected as not needed or lacking in architectural merit.

The Plan ordinance sets out seven criteria to be used in evaluating project submissions. They range widely - from conformance to the city's Master Plan to degree of employment opportunities presented by each project in the completion.

Two of the criteria, not surprisingly, turned out to be especially controversial. In essence, they require the Planning Department and Commission to determine:

- whether the city actually needs office space; and
- whether the buildings under consideration possess architectural merit.

What's important to note here is that both criteria place city government in areas heretofore considered unnecessary - even undesirable. The criterion on need for space, for example, involves local government in determining the sponsor's ability to lease the building proposed.

Including architectural merit as a means for determining the desirability of a building is not an attempt to legislate architecture nor is it intended to be a means for introducing what Prince Charles recently called, "Community architecture". The Prince has got off some good one liners lately. He said, for example, the new Birmingham library did not look like a place to store books. It looked like a place to incinerate them. The architectural merit criterion was included on the idea that San Francisco deserved sensitive designs that fit the San Francisco character. Again, as Bob Campbell of Boston Globe expressed it recently: "Buildings should be thought of not as elegant objects but as pieces of the city - pieces that join together to shape something much more important than themselves".

Having commented on San Francisco's unique style for addressing the urban condition, I am not suggesting that planning initiatives make sense in their entirely for other cities. Clearly, these strategies - shaped to deal with the San Francisco's livability and sensitive cityscape - flow from the city's own political context and collective values. The premise underlying these San Francisco actions, however, is that city government needs to be an assertive force for good development - not just passive or a reactive participate to private initiatives. The premise necessitates innovation and the ability to introduce new concepts in public management to guide desirable urban patterns and to reverse trends that the public clearly sees will not add up to a livable city.

San Francisco's program to manage growth and change does provoke questions for other cities to contemplate and debate. At least three come to mind:

- To what extent should cities help to decide on the location of new building projects or manage the growth rate of new space - both of which in the past have largely been left to market forces?
- Just how persistent should the public be in insisting that new construction and alterations be consistent with publicly established urban design and preservation policies?

- To what extent should cities require the private sector to share the costs of building affordable housing or improved transportation or sharing child care costs - all of which are considered essential to the support of growth and change?

Paul Goldberger, the *New York Times'* distinguished architectural critic, has said that cities must continuously struggle "to balance the public's right to a coherently planned, civilized place - with the private sector's right to develop and profit from land as it sees fit. There is no formula that can quantify this balance for us, any more that there is an easy way to say just what a city should look like".

To a great extent San Francisco has defined this balance, at least in its central district. San Francisco has advanced policies that give public officials the unique authority to determine whether the development is needed, precisely where it should be located, and whether the design proposed adds to the city's architectural character. In recent years we have been learning as a city how to exercise this new authority prudently and modestly. We are applying planning policies with a full understanding that San Francisco must adapt to the changing needs for space in order to maintain its status as an international centre of commerce.

I offer my best wishes to Toronto and its Cityplan '91 effort - to what should be viewed as a productive struggle to find a proper balance for this city. I must say that any city that has managed to keep its street cars through it all and has confidence enough to build a stadium with only 500 parking spaces - is indeed on the right track.

Session 2

Addressing the Major Tensions Associated with Downtown Growth

Toronto's recent ambivalence with the consequences of urban growth is based both on perceptions and realities. Any resolution must understand the global and local context of the downtown, not only economically but in cultural and social terms. To fully enjoy our city, new attitudes are needed to planning, housing, traffic, architecture, economic development and the role of government in the city, attitudes that place the city as our best, and most loved, cultural achievement.

Moderator: **John Gladki** *(Acting) Director, Policy and Strategic Planning Division, Planning and Development Department, City of Toronto.*

Joe Berridge, Toronto

Joe Berridge is a principal of Berridge Lewinberg Greenberg Ltd., a Toronto - based planning and urban design consultant firm. Educated at the Universities of Sussex and Toronto, he worked from 1973 -78 as a manager in the City of Toronto's Planning and Housing Departments. Prior to founding Berridge Lewinberg Greenberg, he was a partner in the firm of Coombes/Kirkland/Berridge for eight years. Recently he was appointed to the Advisory Committee of the National Capital Commission in Ottawa and to the Mayor's Committee on Transportation in Toronto.

Are We Screwing Up?

In preparing for this session I spent a long time thinking about this impossible title I've been dealt. There's a more succinct way of addressing this same issue, that 'Toronto Life' used last year, "Are We Screwing Up?"

Everyone in this City over the past year has been aware of a great sense of disenchantment, worry, ambivalence, and fear about the state of our urban life. While no one has more precisely set out the concerns than that 'Toronto Life' issue, or John Sewell's famous bicycle ride, or the ruminations of the Premier on the "divisiveness, intolerance, meanness" abroad in the City, or the worries lurking behind the 'Toronto Star' poll, the charge is that the worm is in the apple, that we are cast out of Eden, and that Toronto the Good, that exemplar of North American cities, is now Toronto the mean, Toronto the homeless, Toronto the racist, Toronto the ugly, the congested, the mediocre, the illiterate, the preserve of the rich, the cruel bane of the poor. And, with 3 o'clock in the morning City Council meetings, Toronto the sleazy.

Such a view was clearly shared by the electorate and to their credit the less than a third who voted put in a new Council. And this new Council has to create a new downtown plan. But free-floating anxiety doesn't make policy and cannot be an adequate basis for the future. The course of action for the City for the next ten years must be based on some more substantial analysis, on an understanding of the sources of our discontent and what we really can do about them, one that speaks to our most basic relationships to this our city. Before continuing I want to establish some context and a caution.

First, the context. By any of the objective standards that one can choose, in the company of major world cities that we now keep, Toronto is still an urban heaven on earth; socially, racially, economically the city functions with greater harmony, peace and equity than any other major world city I can think of. We somehow integrate 100,000 new immigrants to the Toronto region every year, give them a job and an education, and we do that in a community that while not without its racial tensions is, within a global context, relatively free of discrimination. We still have single-class and open access health and education systems. We can still walk the streets and the crime figures are relatively low. We have one of the lowest unemployment rates of any major city. Now I can feel everybody itch within their hair shirt, so I won't dwell on our virtues. But they are still there, backed by the basic good common sense of the Canadian body politic, for which we should be thankful.

For the past ten years I've gone almost weekly to the U.S., and I think the single most distressing thing is not the dismal overturned garbage cans that most of their cities have become but the collapse of the democratic and governmental process that might correct them. Peace, order, and good government are still just about alive in Toronto and Canada. In the States they're down to the pursuit of happiness. Unsuccessfully.

Second, the caution. We make our own cities, but not entirely as we please. Cities are the reflection in physical form and community structure of the economic and social forces at play in the world. It's a truism, but an important one, because the forces that determine who lives here, works here, how much they're paid, when and who they marry, how many children they have, what food they eat, how much their houses cost, in other words, all of the elements of a city's basic character are increasingly set by market dynamics and cultural changes that are global in nature.

Let me give you a brief example. Every night, the New York Life Insurance Company loads all of its claim sheets received that day onto an Aer Lingus jet and sends them to Dublin, where they are assessed and processed by labour that is not only significantly cheaper but actually available, and the processed data returns in a trans-Atlantic fibre optic squeak to Manhattan.

I don't subscribe to the conservative view that there is nothing you can do in the face of trends of this magnitude, trends that are accelerating everyday, but I do know that we have to use our limited leverage as a city and our limited financial and human resources sensibly and not waste them in vapid gestures. When the communards took over Paris in 1871, they shot out all the clocks to end the monstrous tyranny of time. It was one of history's great symbolic acts, but time's winged chariot kept rushing on. No more can we, or should we, isolate ourselves from what's happening in the wider world.

So, let's look at these concerns, these worries, and understand what we can do about them. What's immediately obvious is that very few of them have any direct relationship or coincidence with land-use regulation, the downtown or even the City of Toronto government as presently structured.

In fact, the last thing we need now is to put all our productive energies into generating a more exquisitely sophisticated version of the Central Area Plan. While we probably do need such a revision, any reasonably competent group of people ought to be able to knock it off in a few months. John Lennon had a wonderful line, "Cities are what happen while we're making other plans".

Well a lot's been happening lately, so this next round of planning should be about the future, not the past. The primary concerns are not about land-use and will not be solved by regulation. We have to shake off that cultural exhaustion and make a more comprehensive, imaginative leap into the future of our city.

The Creation of an Underclass

The most serious thing that can happen to a city is to lose its concern for the underprivileged. Torontonians are still affected, confused, and angry, when they step past the homeless person in the street. Few in other world cities are anymore. These emotions are fragile, however. If we go on without responding organizationally, the iron will enter our urban soul. We still have a social security system, but if we continue in our progressive choking of its funding and with unproductive policies denying people a healthy economic and social engagement with the city, then people will give up on that, too.

We can clearly see our future in every other city. The steady impoverishment and marginalization of the poor, the undereducated, the handicapped and those discriminated against inevitably results in the emergence of an underclass with no stake in the city. And when that underclass is infested with drugs, as inevitably happens, the plague of petty and not so petty crime that results is destabilizing to all the best urban values. The sense of security throughout the city is replaced by fear. Generosity is replaced by guardedness, public interest by private defence. The open becomes closed, feeding the alienation that segregates the underclass, leaving them little outlet but drugs and crime.

For all our worries, we have barely started down this path. But we are not immune from what has happened in New York, Miami, Los Angeles, Amsterdam and London. 83% of those arrested for any crime in New York City test positive for cocaine. Half the murders in Washington D.C. are drug-related.

Because we can see this awful future looming we can do something about it. There is only one protection: strong families, of all kinds, within an inclusive community and economic structure. All our efforts must be directed at achieving such a goal.

We have all the reports and task forces indicating that direction. What is needed is coordinated action.

We must applaud the prompt implementation by the Province of the Social Assistance Review Committee policies for over-hauling the welfare system to create positive opportunities for those trying to emerge from poverty and dependency.

What we need in addition are the child care facilities directed at those in most need that would support the positive aspects of this welfare reform.

We need creative adoption of the Sewell-type ideas for public housing to break down their unitary and adversarial environment, to create the mix essential for healthy urban tissue.

We need comprehensive community-led renewal for those neighborhoods most in need, most urgently in the Metro suburbs.

We need enthusiastic adoption by the police of affirmative action and community outreach programs.

We need an educational system that provides the positive reinforcement necessary to reduce one of the highest high school dropout rates in the developed world.

What is interesting about such a program is that its implementation is primarily dependent not on so much on finding money but on changing governmental policies and attitudes. There is no alternative. The policing experience in every other city indicates that the best police in the world cannot control drugs. Society controls drugs, or fails to. We must not allow that waste of life and hope so characteristic of American cities to occur here.

I think it is on this issue more than any other that people want to see action. But at base, what we have is a question of civic culture not of governmental programs. We must not stand frozen by the politics of inertia, self-interest and inter-governmental blame. This is our city; we are all responsible for making it the place we want.

The Smart Economy

The best instrument of social equity and community cohesion in the city has always been and will always be a good job. So, the second major issue in the future of the city is the state of the urban economy and ensuring its continued change and growth. The remarkable social peace and tranquility in Toronto in the face of such massive and diverse immigration is almost solely due to the extraordinary ability of the local economy to give everyone a job. And that incredibly energetic immigrant class, all those huddled masses yearning to be free traders, has in turn created so many more jobs that we now consider it almost a problem.

I strongly suspect it is the vigour of the immigrant population which is the primary dynamic of our extraordinary rate of growth, for the fact that while every other city in the western world, New York, London, etc. is in a distinctly cooler development phase, Toronto keeps charging on. If that is the case, then those growth forces will continue for some time yet.

Is all well with the local economy? I don't think so. I think there is a legitimate concern about the type and breadth of the economic base we are creating and about the growing competition we face from other cities. To appreciate this one has to understand the situation of the city within a global economy, the forces that fuel that Aer Lingus jet. There are no countries and no distance any more, only cities.

The only future for the growth of Toronto's economy is one based first on an aggressive export of goods and services of increasingly higher value and sophistication and second on an increasing dominance of our North American region. When we start to compare with other cities, unsettling worries emerge about the shape of Toronto's future urban economy. We have been coasting on our boom. We have not been investing in the future.

The economy lacks substance both at top and bottom. At the top, because we do not have many of the large multi-national corporations that characterize our competitor cities. Pittsburgh, substantially smaller than Toronto, is home to eighteen Fortune 500 companies, while Toronto has perhaps only three or four of comparable size. These mega-companies, although not the most dynamic element of the economy, nonetheless give it stability and strength. They foster the institutional ties between public and private sectors, between industry and university that we sorely lack in this city.

At the bottom, the problem is far more serious. We are not creating the higher value-added jobs that are the prerequisite of the new urban economy. And this is largely due to the chilling void both of advanced education, research and development and of good general standards of literacy at the high school level. It is not an exaggeration to say that education is the single most important determinant of economic growth in the developed world.

With the possible exception of some areas of medical technology, we are at the leading edge of next to nothing in this city. We have no universities or technical or cultural institutes that begin to compare to the great centres and laboratories of the U.S. and Europe.Without such institutions, no city will survive, let alone prevail, in the intense and global inter-city competition that is the essence of the post-modern economy.

Here again, the course we must take has been excellently charted, in the Premier's Council report, 'Competing in the New Global Economy'. But while the problems in primary and secondary education with proper leadership could be addressed largely by restructuring, correcting the pathetic state of the universities needs both radical restructuring and cash. Realistically, that money is only going to come from the private sector.

This past decade has seen the emergence of some huge fortunes in this city, fortunes that to a significant extent have been created by this city during its boom. We have in fact a completely inequitable surfeit of billionaires and millionaires. As part of their recent survey of the global mega-rich, Fortune Magazine did a fascinating comparison of the size of these contemporary fortunes with those of past plutocrats. By that standard we have in Toronto right now John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, Mayer Rothschild, and perhaps a dozen assorted Mellons, Guggenhiems, Fricks, Pierpoint Morgans, and the like. Think of the extraordinary contributions those great fortunes have made to the institutional and cultural life of their cities.

The rich are always with us. We just need to put them to some productive work. We need their energetic commitment to re-invest in the city that made them. The single most significant commitment would be towards a centre of educational excellence of world standard.

Many other cities have creatively involved their corporate and institutional elite in the planning of their futures. One thinks of the Houston Partnership, the Denver Partnership, the Allegheny Conference in Pittsburgh, and similar groups in Baltimore, San Francisco, Boston, and New York. Perhaps because the quality of municipal government in the U.S. is so bad, these public/private groups have been more urgently required to fill the vacuum. We should not, however, miss the opportunity here out of stultifying suspicions between the public and private sector. The alternative is to wait for government which is both unnecessary and a long wait.

The plutocracy has successfully put together a SkyDome and, happily, a Ballet Opera House. Its next project must be a major institution of medical technology, of bio-chemical engineering, aerospace technology, or even urban planning. Because, if you look at the funding of the great U.S. schools, the Harvards of the south, they are effectively privately financed. Again, there is no alternative. The gap between what governments are willing or able to pay for higher education and what is required is so vast that it requires the mobilization of new and major resources.

Aggressive Regionalism

While we're waiting for that to happen, there are some more prosaic but smart economic development moves we could make to improve our regional position within the continental market of North America. The largest part of our economy is based on the service sector, and this will continue to be the case. Our problem is that, as major North American cities go, we have a relatively small and underpopulated area to serve with Lake Ontario on one side and the Canadian Shield on every other.

One [illegible] things we need to do is to move rapidly across the border and grab as much of the Western New York, Northern Pennsylvania, Eastern Ohio region as we can. Everything that's closer to us than to New York, Pittsburgh and Cleveland. Which is a lot. We have to make Buffalo a Canadian colony and move on into Rochester, Syracuse, Toledo, Erie, and even the bigger cities.

So, the Economic Development Departments must focus not only on the big international picture but coordinate an assault on an incredibly lucrative and largely passive market that lies directly south. We need to make this aggressive structural response to the free trade opportunity because beyond the easy pickings are some serious cities: New York, Chicago, Pittsburgh. You can already see that in banking, brokerage, insurance, the law, advertizing, entertainment, retailing, and the like they are advancing very rapidly on us.

So what, you say, who needs to grow, who needs to compete? Well if the bloom goes off our economic boom, look out. There is no more depressing, and potentially explosive, social mix than continuing immigration and rising urban unemployment. Nothing would be so demoralizing to Canada as to see its major city economically and culturally emasculated. Nearly all of the cultural, social, business, and financial institutions of English Canada have their base in this city. It's not a responsible option for the future of the country, let alone the city itself, for Toronto to muddle its way to regional marginality. No, the task is much more sophisticated. We have to grow, but grow smart.

But can the city sustain more growth? What about the cost of housing, the traffic congestion, the quality of the urban environment? I think the city can both continue to grow and be a better place as a result of such growth, but we will need very different attitudes to its physical environment, just as we must rethink its community and economic culture.

Build City Not Housing

Let's look at housing first. For the past two decades, with increasing crescendos, a continual atmosphere of crisis has animated everyone concerned about housing. It is not being callous to say that in any large city with reasonable growth, there always will be a 'crisis', because of the inevitable lag between new demand and new construction. What the nature of that crisis is and will be in the next decade as the baby boom moves through is, frankly, much less clear. Yet everywhere around, one hears the stampede towards action without any clear or comprehensive policy framework.

The Minister announces enormous housing targets. The Toronto and Metro Housing Commissioners become the best funded developers in town, and political pressures force them to build at the height of an inflationary boom, creating a super-heated market in 'affordable' land. Councillors compete to extract higher and better affordable housing shakedowns from developers. In our rush to meet the affordability crisis, we are in danger of losing sight of the objective in housing, not just to provide units but to provide good places to live.

Structurally, the Metro region increasingly consists of a dense New York core and a sprawling Los Angeles fringe. The tensions between these physical disparities that occur in times of rapid growth erupt into an incredible surge of housing prices. As long as we continue with that pattern, wasting raw land in the fringe and freezing the existing built city in place, we will lack the ability to respond to these great rushes of demand.

The fact remains that Metro and its region have immense land resources to provide good housing for all, if reasonable levels of intensification are encouraged, if mandatory requirements for affordability are established, and if a coherent regional planning strategy were defined.

You don't build housing, you build city. Housing is not units on a score card. It is the basic element of the future city. Toronto's greatest housing problem is that it lacks the diversity of stock, particularly of row housing and mid-rise apartment buildings, that provides such depth and flexibility to Boston, Montreal, and San Francisco. What we are building now is the stock of the 21st century, and in neither public or private housing are we building the quality or environment a long-term view demands.

Excess of zeal in low-income housing has never served us well in the past. It is very chic for us downtowners to frown at the tacky suburban boxes in the regions, but, frankly, since St. Lawrence the quality or living environment of much of our subsequent public affordable housing is not impressive. We have major challenges ahead in St. Lawrence Square, the Bathurst/Spadina neighborhood, and perhaps in the Port. The first thing we should do is throw away the proposed densities, the unit targets, and the affordability percentages, start from the kind of city and neighborhood environment we want and stop trying to solve in Toronto the housing problems of the region.

Transit and Traffic

Traffic. First of all by any measure of cities of comparable size and economic activity there isn't a traffic problem in the city. Second, the cures are all worse than the disease. Third, I long for the day when we have level of service F at every intersection, so people will stop trying to do something about it. Congestion is the appropriate and only urban cure for all traffic problems.

There is, however, a major transit problem. We are failing to build the transit infrastructure we so desperately need for the combined reasons of lack of direction and lack of cash. So much of our energy has gone into deciding which are the proper alignments. It matters much less where you build than that we aren't building at all. Spadina extension, Sheppard line, inter-centre GO, airport link: we need them all, now.

The recent Provincial announcements don't even begin to approach the level of transit committment necessary. Without that commitment, we can never have the kinds of development patterns and the equitable access to mass transit essential for mixed, dense, and healthy communities in the suburbs, to say nothing of meeting the app-roaching need to restrict gas-powered auto use for environmental reasons. Over the next decades private automobile driving is going to go the way of cigarette smoking.

It is very clear that we are not going to get the public transit system we need if we depend on present public financing sources. We are building less and less at this, our time of greatest growth. We need to look very carefully at some new ideas for transit financing if we are not to dribble along.

We have to involve the private sector in the building, financing, and potentially operation of new sections of the transit system. If you look at the great urban transit systems of the world, New York, Paris, London, they were all privately financed before they became public utilities, and in the next century they will probably move back into private hands because – and I am a pragmatist not an ideologue on this – that is where the money is and that is how the public services of the future will increasingly be best run.

I think we need to open up debate as to why we shouldn't put a direct airport rail link out to tender right now, when we can tender a third airport terminal. Or why Lavalin and Bombardier shouldn't be competing in a design/build/finance contract for the Sheppard line. I see absolutely no reason why we shouldn't be offering private trunk sewer concessions. Why shouldn't we be licensing a lot more express buses and doubling the number of taxis? More people go to work in Manhattan by taxi than by car. The taxi in its many forms is the most underestimated mode of public transit.

I am also a strong advocate of road pricing. I've never understood why you pay for transit, but the QEW, 401, Gardiner, Don Valley, etc. are free. In the age of the micro-chip, one can have the most sophisticated electronic toll gate that distinguishes between trucks, cars, senior citizens, and lead-free gasoline and bills you like a phone bill. And to control for any regressivity, it becomes a tax deductible expense. We have to get into road pricing for environmental reasons as a steadily increasing pollution tax, if we are to address the sustainable development issues. The substantial receipts from road pricing can be directed at transit investments or other infrastructure projects. Indeed, in a delicious urban irony, the Gardiner Expressway could pay for its own demolition.

Toronto the Beautiful

So, Toronto the caring, Toronto the smart, Toronto the affordable, Toronto the transit. One might think that enough. But could we not also have Toronto the beautiful. Toronto the funny? Toronto the light on its feet?

We talk about the Manhattanization of Toronto in such disparaging terms. From the social and political dimensions, that might be fair. But we omit the other side of it and other world cities: the pace, wit in a taxi cab, fear, excitement, love in the afternoon, anger, an apprehended moment of tranquility, exhilaration, the surprise around the corner, the celebration of the human spirit driven to excellence in the city. Nowhere do we need the expression of that spirit more in Toronto than in our attitudes to its physical qualities, to the design of its buildings and places, to all its public arts.

Neither God nor history has been kind to Toronto. As a city, we have no age, no extended history brought forward in fine buildings of the past, no natural features but the great, grey glooming lake and some dank ravines. If we want this to be a city of beauty, we must make it ourselves. We must be as much sculptor as social worker or businessman.

Beauty. Have we become as ideologically nervous about commenting on the aesthetic quality of our city as post-feminist man now is in complementing a well-dressed, beautiful woman on her style and looks? Or vice-versa? Well, welcome to the nineties. The fundamental things apply. There are some urban civilities we badly need.

One of the reasons our architecture in this city is so mediocre is because of this fear of beauty. We find every reason for minimizing its importance. Most of the people involved with the building of our city care little or nothing for beauty. The engineers and the developers justify their utilitarianism or consumerist pragmatism on the pretext that beauty is at best a matter of taste, at worst a willful interference with their bottom line view of the world.

The Left has no great eye for beauty, either. For them, the aesthetics of the urban environment are subsumed within the programmatic, social virtues or vices, the measures of quality being its degree of affordability or the presence of day-care.

Even the architects and planners have lost their nerve and judge in terms of context and fit, producing an apologetic architecture, where the best building is that which steps back, sets back, cowers down, looks old and, if possible, pretends not even to be there.

There is another view, a view as old as cities. A view that establishes the city not as an enemy, as a hostile battleground, but as our noblest and most challenging cultural creation. A love for the physical form of the city not just in grand actions but in the affectionate creation of a myriad small gestures is, with the fundamental social re-orientation and economic management of which I spoke earlier, the crucial third element in creating a Toronto worth living in.

The quality of city life is both infinitely resilient and unbearably fragile. Somehow, one can close Bay Street for two years or effectively shut down the Gardiner and people adjust, life goes on. Even the SkyDome, one suspects, will have far less impact in operation then it does under construction. But, hack holes in trees for Hydro poles, change the resonant rust and cream colours of streetcars to an obvious red and white, increase the decibel level of police sirens, and we lose yet more of the texture and reward of everyday life.

It would be a terrible omission, if we succeeded in regaining social and economic direction for the city but forgot our obligation to the future of the enduring city itself. At an essential level there is only one city, a universal city that we all know when we are there. A city of streets and conversation. A city of firmness, commodity and delight. A city that demonstrates man's pleasure in labour and in life. It is that city that must be our goal, not just a timid community of communities, neighborhood of neighborhoods.

I happen to like cities, and in my exactly 20 years in Toronto I've never been sure whether the mass of Torontonians do. For the most urbanized society in the world, Canada holds a strong streak of anti-urbanism, as if there is a fundamental contradiction between the 'Idea of the North' and the enjoyment of urban life. Listen to Margaret Atwood in her most recent novel, 'Cat's Eye'. It is Elaine, her protagonist, recently returned from Vancouver to Toronto, her birthplace:

> *"I've never believed either version, the dull, the world class. Toronto was never dull, for me. Dull isn't a word you'd use to describe such misery and enchantment, ... Underneath the flourish and ostentation is the old city, street after street of thick red brick houses, with their front porch pillars like the off-white stems of toadstools and their watchful, calculating windows. Malicious, grudging, vindictive, implacable."*

It's fascinating to contrast this view with the new voices of more recent immigrants, the writers Michael Ondaatje, Joseph Skvorkecky, Neil Bissoondath, for example, and listen to the city of words they are building. They share the misery and the enchantment, the vision of shiny skyscrapers and dirty little houses, but behind that is a tender bewilderment, affection, and wonder at this gangling, still adolescent city so innocent of the world outside, its passions and its cruelties.

Have we screwed up? Yes, that innocence is gone. Which is, perhaps, as it must be. Innocence, like cleanliness, is a minor virtue. But gone must also be "malicious, grudging, implacable, vindictive." Which are, after all, only minor vices. We're in the grip of major urban passions now. We need the strong virtues: courage, generosity, daring, fortitude, imagination and love. And the greatest of these must be love, love of this city, love of all its citizens. Let's not be afraid of it, love it.

Session 3

Managing Commercial Growth in the Downtown Core

The City of Toronto is today faced with the question of how it should control the pace of downtown development. This session will concentrate on issues associated with formulating policies to manage the growth of office space in the Central Area, including questions such as: How should we conceptualize the land development process? Can a municipality develop an "optimal" plan when faced with the strategic responses of the private land development industry?

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Commercial Growth and The New Toronto Plan [1]

Introduction

This paper is written as a contribution to Toronto's Cityplan '91, a planning exercise being undertaken by the new City Council that took office in December 1988. The aim of the exercise is to produce a revised Official Plan for the City of Toronto, one that by 1991 will replace the current Plan.

A planning framework has been established by Council and is described in a document issued by the Planning and Development Department [2]. This framework identifies the central area as the geographic focus of the new Plan and describes certain issues of general concern. Among these issues are the need to establish a "new relationship between transportation capacity and cumulative development potential" and an exploration of "developmental control strategies for managing the amount and/or rate of development." It is these particular areas of concern to which this paper is addressed.

For almost twenty years, the City of Toronto has had an equivocal attitude towards central area commercial development. On one hand, office growth has been regarded as both a manifestation of and a contributor to the city's wealth. On the other hand, the rising downtown employment accompanying this office growth has resulted in more commuting and in demands for new and expanded road and transit facilities to serve the central area. The threat of such new facilities and the existence of congestion and pollution damage, caused especially by automobiles, are perceived to be in conflict with residential and neighbourhood life in the city.

Since downtown residential neighbourhoods are undoubtedly the single most important ingredient of Toronto's relative success as a city, this conflict has resulted in past efforts to limit central area office growth. In spite of this, growth in recent years has continued at a pace that reflects the generally buoyant provincial and national economies. This has led to renewed concerns about the limited capacity of commuting facilities and about automobile traffic. Interest in establishing more effective limits on commercial growth has again emerged.

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[1] I am grateful to my wife Nadine Nowlan and to Greg Stewart of the City's Planning Department for having read and provided helpful comments on the first draft of this paper.

[2] City of Toronto, Planning and Development Department, Cityplan '91: A Framework for Preparing the 1991 Central Area Plan, January 6, 1989 (adopted by City Council on March 10, 1989).

In order to comment on these concerns, it is helpful to review briefly the current Central Area Plan, approved by City Council in 1976, and to look at recent experience in Toronto with central area office growth, employment and traffic flows. These are the topics of the next two sections.

Following this review, the relationship among office space, residential population and commuting travel is examined more carefully. The conclusion of this examination is that the growth in residential households in the central area since 1976 has had the effect of reducing significantly the flow of commuters below the number that would be expected on the basis simply of employment or office growth over the period. Recent experience is used to develop an relationship linking office space, households and commuters. From this relationship, a set of consistent objectives for the new Plan is derived.

Given the likely magnitude of downtown office space growth over the next ten to twenty years, the possibility of off-setting the resulting demand for commuting travel by increasing the central area housing stock is analyzed. From this analysis, it becomes clear that the encouragement of housing must be not just an element of social policy but a major component of the Plan's resolution of the land-use and transportation concerns, that the framework document has identified.

Since housing policy alone may not be sufficient to resolve the tension between commercial development and transportation constraints, the penultimate section of this paper discusses policies for the control and monitoring of commercial growth. Some traditional approaches are less effective than frequently assumed, because of strategic behaviour on the part of land developers. A concluding section briefly summarizes the principal results of the paper.

The 1976 Plan

In the early 1970s, there was a strong reaction in Toronto against the pattern of commercial development and transportation planning that had characterized the previous two decades. Office growth was heavily centralized in the core of Toronto. The City's zoning by-law, which is the principal legal instrument constraining and controlling property development, allowed floor area ratios ('densities') of 12-times lot size over most of the financial core and a substantial part of the midtown commercial area just north of the core. Toronto's 1969 Official Plan provided no deterrent to central area growth. In fact, it allowed commercial floor space that was, overall, about 25 per cent above the zoning by-law limit. The transportation plan of Metropolitan Toronto was focussed on the provision of major facilities to serve the central area.

One of the components of Metro Toronto's transportation plan was the Spadina Expressway into downtown Toronto. Opposition to this facility led the province in 1971 to refuse funding for it. This damaged the Metro transportation plan beyond simple repair and required the municipality to turn its attention to the development of a new transportation plan and an Official Plan, which could be used as a vehicle to express policy towards commercial development throughout the Metro area.

Energies unleashed in the City during the Spadina fight were directed to the issue of excessive central area commercial growth. A new Council was elected in December 1972 with a mandate to control downtown office growth. A 'Core Area Task Force' was set to work and by early 1976 new zoning and Official Plan by-laws had passed Council. With some revisions, these by-laws were subsequently approved by the province.

This 1976 Official Plan establishes policy "to promote the deconcentration of office employment within the metropolitan area." It also calls for an expansion of the residential function of the central area and "the avoidance of unacceptable levels of congestion on the transportation system."[3] These policies contrast strikingly with those of the earlier 1969 Official Plan which declared that "The heart of the City is the functional centre of the Toronto region ... It is the policy of Council that ... this situation shall continue." In the 1969 Plan, it was policy "to encourage the location in the Central Area of the City of establishments which serve the entire region ...[and to encourage] the development of the transportation system to provide convenient, rapid access to the Central Area ...".[4]

The City's 1976 policy in support of office deconcentration is echoed in Metropolitan Toronto's Official Plan which received provincial approval in 1981. The Metro position was reached following a major study of many combinations of land-use configurations and transportation facilities. The most efficient of these proved to be an option that required the encouragement of employment subcentres at several locations within Metro Toronto, accompanied by restrictive targets on office and employment growth in downtown Toronto.[5]

With citizen sentiment and planning philosophy in the 1970s both oriented towards restricted central area commercial growth, the practical questions emerged of how to achieve slower growth and how to justify any particular target number for either growth rates or for future development levels.

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[3] City of Toronto Official Plan Part I, Office Consolidation, August 1987, paragraphs 1A.3 and 1A.4.

[4] Official Plan for the City of Toronto Planning Area Part I, Office Consolidation, 1969, paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2.

[5] Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review, Summary Report: Choices for the Future, vol. 64, January 1975.

There appeared to be no feasible way of deciding upon the optimal balance between the benefits of scale economies associated with concentrated development and the congestion cost accompanying such concentration. However, armed partly with the results of the Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review in support of deconcentration and partly with the conviction that additional commuting facilities would harm downtown residential neighbourhoods and inhibit central-area population growth, the City decided to aim for a downtown employment level that would result in commuting travel no greater than current transportation facilities could handle.[6] This employment level was, in turn, translated into office space, using assumptions about space occupancy per employee.

Since there is no single number that describes the capacity of a transportation facility to deliver commuting workers to jobs in the morning and retrieve them at the end of the day, a range of capacity was estimated. The lower boundary of this range was used to set an amount of office space that became, approximately, the maximum floor space that the 1976 zoning by-law allowed in the central core. The upper boundary became the amount of space that would be allowed under the Official Plan with re-zonings.

About 18 million square metres of commercial office space would have been allowed in the central core under the zoning by-law in effect up until 1976.[7] Based on lower-bound estimations of commuting capacity into the central area, City Council reduced this total in the 1976 zoning by-law by about 60 per cent, to 6.55 million square metres.[8] Allowable commercial densities in the financial district were reduced from 12-times coverage to 8-times coverage; in other areas, some properties previously allowed to have 12-times coverage were reduced to as little as 2-times coverage.

The Official Plan, as passed by Council in 1976, established an upper limit for office space in the central core at about 8.2 million square metres. This approximated the calculated maximum capacity of the existing commuting facilities and permitted the zoning by-law to be amended upwards (or site-specific by-laws to be introduced) as circumstances warranted. The additional amount in the Official Plan included 0.54 million square metres for the anticipated development of the Railway Lands south of Front Street.

[6] The proposal to restrain development potential to the capacity of the transportation system came originally from the Core Area Task Force. See Core Area Task Force: Report and Recommendations, June 1974. Detailed estimates of capacity and related employment levels were made by Tom E. Parkinson in An Examination of the Capacity of the Existing and Committed Transportation System Serving Central Toronto, City of Toronto Planning Board, July 1975.

[7] Based on my estimates in 'Land Policy in the Central City: A Toronto Perspective', in Canadian Council on Urban and Regional Research, The Management of Land for Urban Development, Conference Proceedings, April 1974.

[8] The actual zoning allowed for somewhat more than this, but 6.55 million square metres was judged to be the effective maximum office space that could be built under the new law. For details of the calculation see City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, 1986 Quinquennial Review: Review of Transportation Planning in the Central Area 1975-1986, Background Paper No. 8, March 1987.

Since 1976, the amount of office space allowed as-of-right in the central core has risen to 9.85 million square metres. About 1.3 million of the increase was established by the Ontario Municipal Board in 1977 as a condition of its approval of the new by-laws and the rest, another 2 million square metres approximately, has been added by subsequent Council decisions, with the largest single increase being the 0.6 million square metres approved for additional office development in the Railway Lands.[9]

In 1976, when the City went to the Ontario Municipal Board with its new Plan and zoning by-law, there existed about 4.52 million square metres of built office space in the central core.[10] Net growth during the preceding ten years had been between 0.2 million and 0.3 million square metres of office space annually. The concerns over excessive central area office concentration and downtown congestion were principally concerns about the rate of growth of commercial development, but few, if any, municipal policy instruments are available to influence growth directly. The zoning by-law can set the maximum allowable densities and the Official Plan can establish an ultimate upper limit on commercial office space, but neither instrument provides direct control over growth rates. There might, nonetheless, be an indirect effect of zoning on growth, and it was the presumption of such an indirect effect that led planners and Council in 1976 to adopt down-zoning as a way of reducing commercial growth.

If allowable densities are reduced in the face of continued commercial growth, then these lower densities must ultimately have the effect of ensuring that the amount of office space is less than it would be under the prior, higher densities. The problem is that this effect on office space might appear only after a long time. The short-term effect on office space growth of reductions in allowable densities could be negligible. In fact, density reductions could even have the effect of speeding up commercial development and office-space growth in the short run. This is discussed in a paper I prepared on development control policies written for the City in 1975.[11] In general, attempting to lower the growth rate of office space by reducing allowable commercial floor-space densities is like trying to keep bread dough from rising by increasing the atmospheric pressure; except under extreme pressure, there may not be much noticeable effect.

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[9] Approved zoning limits in 1976 and the specific projects that gave rise to the changes are reviewed in two City of Toronto, Planning and Development Department, documents: Cityplan '91: A Framework for Preparing the 1991 Central Area Plan, January 1989; and 1986 Quinquennial Review: Overview Report, December 1986.

[10] City of Toronto, Final Report of the Downtown Employment Study Steering Committee, April 1988, Table B-1.

[11] Development Control Policies: Their Purpose and Economic Implications (Toronto: City of Toronto Planning Board, 1975). This paradoxical outcome of more rapid short-term growth in the face of density reductions could occur if, under the prior, high-density zoning, developers had been holding property for much later development at high densities. With allowable densities then lowered, and assuming that developers believed that these lower densities would continue to prevail and not be overturned by a subsequent Council, the most profitable use of the land might then be to develop earlier at lower densities. If enough properties were affected in this way, the net result would be more rapid short-term office growth than would have occurred under the higher-density by-law. My conclusion was not that this had to occur, but only that it could occur and that the economic forces that explained the paradox also helped explain why the short-term effect of down-zoning on commercial growth was likely to be modest.

In a study for the City in 1976, I estimated the most probable growth path of commercial development in the central core under the new Official Plan restrictions and compared that path to the growth that would likely have occurred, if the Plan had not been changed.[12] These projected growth paths along with the old and the new zoning and Official Plan restrictions are shown in Figure 1. Projection A is the likely path of commercial development in the core with the pre-1976 zoning; projection B is the likely path with what was then the 1976 Plan proposal. My conclusion was that built office space in the central core in the year 2001 (which was the horizon year most often looked at) would be about 7.2 million square metres, or less than 10 per cent below what it would have been had the pre-1976 zoning by-law remained in place.

Offices and Commuting

What has happened since the 1976 Plan was adopted? Built space in the central core, as shown in Figure 1, has closely followed the projected path. At the end of 1988, 6.03 million square metres of office space were built, which is about 42 per cent above the 1975 level. Occupied office space was 3.88 million square metres in 1975 and is now 5.76 million, a rise of 48 per cent. Full-time office employment within the central area cordon[13] has risen 50 per cent since 1975 and is now about 223,000.

Office employment and office space has grown by 50 per cent, or a little less, since 1975. Surprisingly, the number of people commuting into the central area in the morning rush hours has grown by a much smaller proportion, and by much less than the rise in the number of office employees.

Taking the three-hour period from 7 a.m. to 10 a.m. as the broadest definition of the morning 'rush hour', traffic-count figures show that the number of people in private or public vehicles (i.e., not including those who walk or bicycle) crossing the central area cordon in the morning rose by only 23 per cent between 1975 and 1988. Because the use of public transit has increased, the number of automobiles crossing the cordon rose by only 16 per cent over the same 13 years, while persons arriving by automobile increased by only 8 per cent. In absolute terms, the number of full-time office jobs rose by about 74,000 while the number of persons crossing the cordon rose by only 61,000. The significance of this difference is

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[12] See Property Redevelopment in Downtown Toronto (Toronto: City of Toronto Planning Board, 1976).

[13] There is a confusing welter of geographic areas used when referring to the central part of Toronto. I have used five already in the paper. Since the various background documents for Cityplan '91 have several maps showing these different areas (see, for example, the Downtown Employment Study, p.5), I need not create another. But it might be helpful to remind readers that the 'central core', to which the office-space numbers typically apply, lies between Jarvis St on the east to just beyond University Ave on the west, and from the waterfront to just north of Bloor St. The 'central area' is larger, mainly in an east-west direction: it runs from the waterfront up to the CPR tracks north of Bloor, and from the Don Valley Parkway in the east to Bathurst St in the west, except that south of Queen St it branches out to Dufferin in the west and Woodbine in the east. The 'central area cordon' is approximately the same as the 'central area' except that south of Queen St its boundaries continue right to the waterfront and do not include the extended wings to Dufferin and Woodbine.

FIGURE 1

Office Space in the Central Core
Zoning Limits, 1976 Projections and Amount Actually Built in 1988



Note: Projection A is a projection of built space in the central core based on the pre-1976 zoning; projection B is based on the densities allowed in the 1976 Official Plan

reinforced by the fact that the number of part-time office employees increased over the period. Non-office workers who, along with part-time workers, have a more varied commuting pattern appear also to have increased in number during the 1980s after declining in the late 1970s.

Although office development was more or less evenly spread out over the period, the greater part of the increase in in-bound commuters occurred between 1975 and 1981. In 1988, persons crossing the central area cordon between 7 a.m. and 10 a.m. were only 7 per cent above the 1981 total, while occupied office space was 20 per cent above its 1981 level. Tables 1 and 2 show the actual numbers year-by-year from which these percentage change figures have been calculated. Figure 2 illustrates the relative growth of various indexes, with 1975 = 1.00. Figures 3A and 3B show the changing level of office space and employment and of commuting between 1975 and 1988.

Clearly, something unexpected has happened. The tight linkage between central area office growth and travel demand that is such a fundamental concept in the 1976 Official Plan has not occurred. This has not gone unnoticed by our planners. The Downtown Employment Study pointed out that between 1975-1981 "the expected relationship between floor space and trip growth roughly held up. ... In the 1980s, however, the picture appears very much different and only a very weak relationship between floor space growth and increases in employment and peak-period trips can be discerned." [14] Similarly, Metro planners report, in their 1988 review of the central area, that "there does not seem to be a direct correlation between cordon count trends and employment statistics." [15] The recently released 1989 central area review confirms this conclusion.[16] In the next section, the effect of central-area population and housing growth is looked at as a reason for the surprisingly modest growth in central-area commuting trips.

A New Planning Relationship Involving Housing

Office space limits in the 1976 Official Plan and zoning by-law were based on the calculated capacity of existing transportation facilities serving the central area. Each increase in the original limits has been accompanied by demands for more road and transit capacity into downtown Toronto, on the continued assumption that the demand for commuting is immutably linked to the growth in office space. Although the existence of that linkage has now been questioned, the absence of a satisfactory alternative explanation for commuting levels has meant that a belief in the invariant linkage theory has been slow to abate.

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[14] Final Report of the Downtown Employment Study, pp. 28-29.

[15] Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Central Area Monitoring Program: Second Annual Report, June 1988, p. 51.

[16] Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Central Area Monitoring Program: Third Annual Report, April 1989. The results of the 1988 speed/delay study also demonstrate the significance of parking prohibitions and optimized traffic-signal cycles. Because of these factors, average vehicle speeds were "frequently higher during the peak periods" than in off-peak periods. Ibid., p. 49.

Table 1
Office Space and Office Employment, 1976 to 1988

	Central Core Area				
Year	**Built-space (year-end)**	**Occupied Space (year-end)**	**Built Space (mid-year)**	**Occupied Space (mid-year)**	**Central Cordon Full-time Office Employment**
1975	4.26	3.88	N/A	N/A	149,000
1976*	4.51	4.05	4.39	3.97	156,500
1977	4.71	4.26	4.61	4.16	164,000
1978	4.73	4.42	4.72	4.34	171,500
1979	4.77	4.57	4.75	4.50	179,000
1980	4.83	4.74	4.80	4.66	186,500
1981	4.9	4.79	4.87	4.77	194,000
1982	5.18	4.91	5.04	4.85	191,000
1983	5.48	4.94	5.33	4.93	194,000
1984	5.72	5.04	5.60	4.99	202,000
1985	5.72	5.16	5.72	5.10	201,000
1986	5.79	5.34	5.76	5.25	207,000
1987	5.85	5.65	5.82	5.50	217,791
1988	6.03	5.76	5.94	5.71	222,937

Sources: Year-end office-space figures for 1976 to 1988 are from City of Toronto, Commissioner of Planning and Development, "Tracking Office Development in the Central Core," Memo to the Land Use Committee, February 9, 1989, Table 2; 1975 figures are from Final Report of the Downtown Employment Study Steering Committee, op. cit., Table B-1. Mid-year figures are simply averages of the year-end numbers. Employment data for 1975 and 1981 to 1987 are from Final Report of the Downtown Employment Study Steering Committee, op. cit., Table B-1. Figures for 1976 to 1980 are linearly interpolated; the 1988 figure is obtained by applying the 1988 growth rate in central-area full-time office employment (from Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, "Metro Toronto's Employment Picture 1983-1988," January 1989) to the 1987 central core figure.

Table 2
Central Area Cordon Crossings, 7 a.m. to 10 a.m.

Year	Total Persons	Persons in Autos	Percent using Autos	Number of Autos
1975	268,123	107,137	40.0%	81,485
1976*	*273,536	108,781	39.8%	83,021
1977	278,948	110,425	39.6%	84,557
1978*	283,229	115,220	40.7%	87,177
1979	287,510	120,015	41.7%	89,796
1980*	297,941	115,034	38.6%	87,756
1981	308,371	110,052	35.7%	85,716
1982*	307,406	111,185	36.2%	86,500
1983	306,441	112,317	36.7%	87,285
1984*	303,492	112,927	37.2%	88,496
1985	300,542	113,537	37.8%	89,706
1986	322,177	120,924	37.5%	96,324
1987	317,333	113,206	35.7%	92,472
1988	329,842	116,261	35.2%	94,940

Sources: Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Central Area Monitoring Program: Third Annual Report, April 1989. Data were not collected for the years with asterisks. The figures in the Table for these years have been linearly interpolated.

FIGURE 2

Indexes of Occupied Office Space, Office Employment, Commuting Trips and Automobile Commuters



Note: "Office Space" refers to occupied office space in the core; "Office Employment" refers to full-time office employment within the central-area cordon. "Person Trips" and "Persons by Auto" refer to crossings of the central-area cordon between 7 a.m. and 10 a.m.

FIGURE 3A

Office Space and Office Employment, 1975-1988



Source: Table 1

FIGURE 3B

Central-area Cordon Crossings, 1975-1988



Source: Table 2

For example, the City's 1986 Quinquennial Review, while observing that "the future relationship between increasing demands for office space and the growth in central area peak-hour work trips" is an "area of uncertainty", also maintains that "there can be little doubt that at some future point additional road and transit capacity will be required to adequately serve the permitted level of development potential." [17] Whether this conclusion is valid or not, it certainly can no longer be regarded as self-evident. The experience of recent years has shown that there are intervening factors mitigating the previously assumed inflexibility of the linkage between office growth and commuter trips.

It is worth focussing considerable attention on this matter, because the key land-use and transportation components of the new 1991 Plan will have to be based on one view or another of the linkage between potential office development and work-oriented travel demand. If the Plan is based on the view that additional road and transit capacity is needed to serve permitted levels of commercial development, and if that view is wrong, then the Plan mistakenly will either restrict development potential excessively, to the detriment of the economic well being and the social programs of the City, or it will call for unnecessary but costly additions to the road and transit network that will undermine the growth of City residential neighbourhoods and ultimately work against the deconcentration objectives, which both the City and Metro still hold.

Clearly it is important to try to understand better the determinants of central area work trips, so that a relationship in which there is more confidence can be used to underpin the Official Plan. Some of the explanations that have been offered for the failure of the growth in work trips to track the growth in office space have pointed to the changing nature of the central area work force, in particular the declining relative importance of non-office workers and the growing number of part-time employees, as the reason for the absence of the expected relationship. Increasing floor space per worker has also been suggested, as has the possible inability of fully congested transportation facilities to handle more commuter trips.

None of these explanations, however, adequately accounts for recent experience. It is not just an expected relationship between office space and peak-hour travel that is missing; it is also the case that commuter travel to the central area over an extended three-hour rush period has not been increasing by the amount of increase in full-time office employees. Thus, explanations based on changing floor space requirements or a growing number of part-time employees or congested peak-hour facilities do not appear to be adequate. As well, the number of non-office jobs in the central area has remained more-or-less constant during the 1980s, so the relative decline in the non-office sector does not seem to hold the key either. However, there does appear to be a factor that, in combination with the amount of occupied office space in the core, can explain quite well the level of commuting trips year-by-year since 1976. This factor is the change in central area housing stock and residential population.

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[17] 1986 Quinquennial Review: Overview Report, pp. 64-65.

Table 3
Population and Dwellings within Central Area Cordon 1971 to 1988

Year	Dwelling Units	Population	Year	Dwelling Units	Population
1971*	44,385	125,560	1980	53,754	113,520
1972	44,507	121,111	1981	55,390	115,230
1973	44,945	117,570	1982	57,010	117,344
1974	45,662	114,882	1983	58,577	119,806
1975	46,621	112,991	1984	60,054	122,559
1976	47,785	111,840	1985	61,404	125,548
1977	49,117	111,374	1986	62,590	128,716
1978	50,581	111,536	1987	64,021	131,658
1979	52,138	112,270	1988	65,558	134,818

Source: Census figures for 1971, 1976, 1981 and 1986. Data between census years have been interpolated using a cubic spline curve. 1987 figures were obtained by applying the rate of growth in assessment population to the 1986 figures, and 1988 figures are estimates that show a 2.4 per cent growth, which is based on the expectation of continued strong central area population growth and recent actual growth rates.

From 1975 to 1988, the residential population within the central area cordon has risen by 19 per cent. Most of this growth has occurred since 1981, coinciding with the period over which commuting trips and office growth were least related. Occupied dwelling units (or households, which by the census definition is the same thing) have risen by 41 per cent since 1975. Table 3 shows dwelling units and population within the central cordon back to 1971. These data are illustrated in Figure 4. It is evident that the growing housing stock and the rising population are phenomena of the last ten years. In large measure, they are the result of policies to promote central area housing in the 1976 Plan.

FIGURE 4

Population and Dwelling Units within the Central Area Cordon 1971-1988



Source: Data from Table 3.

Data for the years from 1976 to 1988 may be used to estimate the separate effects of changes in office space and changes in population, or housing stock, on cordon-crossing trips. Because there are three variables involved, it is difficult to visualize the relationship among person trips, office space and population or dwellings.[18] However, an impression of the apparent interaction among these variables may be gained from Figures 5A and 5B. These are scatter diagrams of the actual, measured levels of person trips (on the vertical axis) [19] plotted against office space and population in Figure 5A and against office space and dwellings in Figure 5B. In each diagram there are thirteen points, shown by the small pyramids, each of which represents the particular combination of person trips, office space and population (or dwellings) observed in one of the thirteen years between 1976 and 1988, inclusive.

From these scatter plots, it is possible to see the general relationship among the variables: as office space increases while population or dwellings remain constant, person trips rise; as population or dwellings increase with relatively constant office space, person trips go down. That in itself is a useful observation and confirms a growing belief in the trip-reducing effectiveness of central area population. But for planning purposes, it would be nice to be able to quantify the effects of office space and population on cordon crossings.

These effects can, in fact, be quantified by estimating statistically the relationship that best fits the observed data. Using standard estimating techniques, the following two equations can be shown to be the best ones to explain person trips across the central area cordon on the basis of central core occupied office space and central cordon population or dwellings. The first equation involves population and the second dwelling units. The asterisks in the equations mean "times" or "multiplied by".

A. $$\textbf{Person Trips} = 178{,}050 + 41{,}750 * \textbf{Office Space} - 0.652 * \textbf{Population}$$

B. $$\textbf{Person Trips} = 150{,}540 + 45{,}570 * \textbf{Office Space} - 1.22 * \textbf{Dwellings}$$

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[18] In this analysis, "person trips" means the number of in-bound people crossing the central-area cordon by all transportation modes between 7 a.m. and 10 a.m.; "dwellings" means the number of occupied dwelling units (households) within the central area cordon; "population" means the size of the residential population living within the central area cordon; and "office space" means the amount of occupied office space at mid-year within the central core, measured in millions of square metres. The actual figures used are those shown in Tables 1, 2 or 3; sources of the data are given with each table. Mid-year rather than year-end office-space figures are used (indeed, they were calculated for this specific purpose) because the cordon-crossing numbers are derived from mid-year surveys.

[19] The vertical axis is deliberately truncated at 260,000 person-trips, and not continued down to 0, so that the effects on trips of office space, population and dwellings will be more obvious.

FIGURE 5A

Persons Crossing Central Area Cordon 7 a.m. to 10 a.m.
vs
Population and Office Space
1976-1988



FIGURE 5B

Persons Crossing Central Area Cordon 7 a.m. to 10 a.m.
vs
Dwellings and Office Space
1986-1988



These equations fit the observed variables extremely well. In fact, they explain slightly over 90 per cent of the actual variation from year-to-year in the cordon-crossing observations. Equally as important, the coefficients attached to the office space, the population and the dwellings variables are consistent with our expectations based, on independent surveys.[20]

Equation A says that the number of people crossing the central area cordon in the morning three rush hours can be explained by some constant number, 178,050 (which could represent non-office workers or people passing through the central area), plus 41,750 times the amount of occupied office space in the core minus 0.652 times the size of the residential population. In other words, every million square metres of occupied office space results, on average, in an additional commuter demand of 41,750 people; and every additional person living in the central area reduces demand for commuter trips by 0.652 of a trip.

The coefficient of 41,750 attached to the office space variable is equivalent to 24 square metres of space per worker. This is a little lower than, but close to, the 25 or 26 square metres of space per worker derived from recent surveys of downtown buildings.[21] The coefficient of -0.652 on the population variable implies that 65.2 per cent of new residents in the central area work in the area (and thus substitute for trip-demand across the central area cordon). This too is consistent with recent surveys showing that 66 per cent of the resident labour force in the central area works in the area, and that approximately 85 per cent of new residents are in the labour force.[22]

Equation B, relating housing and office space to commuting trips, is similarly consistent with independent evidence. The implicit area per office worker in this equation is 22 square metres, which agrees well with survey data, after taking into account the adjustment described in footnote 21. The coefficient of -1.22 on dwellings is consistent with the -0.652 associated with population in equation A. According to census figures, the net increase in population per additional dwelling unit between 1981 and 1986 in the central area was 1.9. We would, therefore, expect a new dwelling unit to be more effective in reducing commuting demand than the addition of one more resident. During the late 1970s, dwelling units were increasing in the central area, while net population was relatively constant. However, rising participation rates meant that the work force was growing, even though the population was static, and the dwelling unit coefficient in equation B is also reflecting this work-force increase throughout the 13-year period.[23]

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[20] Multicollinearity — the movement together of all variables through time — is always a problem for time-series estimations. However, equations A and B seem to be well-specified, with low serial correlation among the residuals. Thus, the R2 of 92% for A and 91% for B are impressive. First-order autocorrelation for A is -0.203 and for B, -0.081. The Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.3 for A and 2.2 for B (with 13 observations each). The t-ratios for office space are 4.547 in A and 2.366 in B, indicating high significance on the coefficients. For population and housing, the t-ratios are lower at -1.153 and -0.727. Thus, while the coefficients are the best unbiased estimates of the real effects of population and dwellings, it is helpful to have the sort of independent confirmation of their magnitudes that is discussed in the next several text paragraphs.

[21] Occupied office space in the equation does not include office space outside the central core but inside the central area cordon. The amount of such space is about 10% of the total. Thus, we would expect the office space coefficient to be about 10% higher than it should be, and the implicit floor space per worker to be about 10% lower. With this adjustment, the office-space coefficients in both equations are remarkably consistent with the floor-space-per-worker surveys.

[22] The Downtown Employment Study Steering Committee, in its Final Report, estimated the possible reduction in commuter trips, and therefore in transportation-facility costs, of additional central area housing. Its analysis was based on an assumed 85% labour force participation rate of new residents and an assumed 66% in-area work rate, based on a survey showing that, on average, 66% of central area residents work in the central area. On the basis of these assumptions, we might have expected a coefficient of -0.561 in equation A, rather that -0.652. The difference again is within the range of statistical error, but it might also be explained by the fact that the in-area work rate for new residents over the 1976-1988 period was higher than the 66% average rate assumed in the Final Report. The assumption of an 85% labour-force participation rate is consistent with the 1981 and 1986 census data, which show a marginal participation rate in the central area of 83% between the two years.

The two equations, A and B, in fact describe flat surfaces lying in the three-dimensional space of Figures 5A and 5B. For example, the surface described by equation A is shown in Figure 6. If equation A represented the true relationship between person trips, on the one hand, and population and office space, on the other, then all observation of these variables would lie on the surface illustrated in Figure 6. In fact, because of random and unexplained factors, the observations shown in Figure 5A, do not all lie precisely on the surface. Some lie above the surface and some below. But they all are within 1 or 2 per cent of the surface. With reasonable confidence, this surface can be projected beyond the range shown in Figure 6 so as to represent possible office space and population combinations for the future. From this extended surface, the effects of these possible combinations on commuter demand may be estimated. In the next section, an extended surface representing equation B for office space and dwellings is analyzed to see what help it can give in setting commercial space and housing policy in the new Official Plan.

The possibility that growth in downtown housing and population might be among the explanations for the weak relationship between commuting and office growth has been recognized in various places, but the full force of housing growth as an explanation of thepuzzle has not been understood, partly because it is only with the recent publication of the 1986 census data that the extraordinarily rapid growth of central area population since 1981 has been highly visible to analysts.[24]

[23] The Downtown Employment Study, Final Report, Appendix C, assumed only 1.44 persons per housing unit. This combined with other assumptions yielded a trip-reduction coefficient of only -0.800 for each additional central-area dwelling.

[24] The 1986 Quinquennial Review, published before the availability of the census data, acknowledged that "there are clear transportation advantages associated with the policy of encouraging residential development in the Central Area"(Overview Report, p.70), but the post-census Downtown Employment Study went much further in asserting that "the impacts of increased Central Area population are already being reflected to a degree in the recent levelling out of the number of peak-period trips crossing the Central Area cordon" and that "the future rates of Central Area population and labour force growth will be key factors to monitor in the future when assessing the area's transportation needs"(Final Report, p.33). Based on a 1986 survey of central area residents, the 1988 Central Area Monitoring Program: Second Annual Report concludes that "recent residential growth in the Central Area ... has been accompanied by an increase of roughly 20% in the proportion of Central Area employees who walk to work. An increase in walk trips has a favourable impact on road and transit congestion, and continued downtown residential development will help offset the need for additional transportation capacity, although in terms of total commuter travel, its effect will be relatively small," p. 42.

FIGURE 6

Plane Surface Representing Equation A



This is not to say that the general desirability of reducing transportation infrastructure requirements by promoting a balance between jobs and homes in localities throughout Metro Toronto is a new thought.[25] In 1974, the Core Area Task Force understood that more housing and more people in the central area would reduce the demand for commuting trips, and the estimates of the capacity of the existing transportation facilities that were at the heart of the 1976 Plan included a modest amount of additional "walk to work trips." [26] But housing promotion has been regarded essentially as a social policy. It is now time to appreciate more fully the significance of housing for land use and transportation planning.

Alternatives for the 1991 Plan

The analysis of this section will be better focussed, if it is based upon some preliminary set of goals for the 1991 Official Plan. With this in mind, let me assume that, from a land-use and transportation perspective, the following goals will motivate the new Plan: 1) congestion and pollution should be reduced by minimizing the growth of commuter trips, especially automobile trips, into the central area; 2) housing production in or near the central area by both public and private sectors should be encouraged; and 3) commercial office growth should occur at a moderate rate. With respect to this third goal, a "moderate rate" is one that is high enough to ensure that commercial property-tax revenue will increase reasonably and predictably and high enough so that office availability and office prices in the core will allow some reasonable mixture of office uses, but not so high as to interfere with the commercial-deconcentration objective of the Metro area.

Is it possible to set out in the Plan a set of feasible and mutually consistent objectives that are compatible with respect to these different goals? That is the question on which the analysis of this section is focussed.

There is a simple but fundamental relationship to which the land-use and transportation components of the Plan must adhere: more office space downtown will generate more commuter traffic into the central area, while more housing and a greater central area residential population will reduce commuter traffic. Using recent experience, this relationship is quantified in equations A and B. Since policy is likely to be focussed on the determinants of housing, and only indirectly on population, it will be simpler to work with equation B, which involves housing within the central area cordon.

Equation B describes a relationship that could be regarded as the basic central area planning relationship. Just as equation A was shown as a surface in Figure 6, this relationship involving commuters, office space, and dwellings is drawn as a surface in Figure 7. In Figure 7, equation B has been extended beyond the office space and dwelling unit amounts that were actually observed between 1976 and

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[25] It is, for example, the focus of one of the chapters in the critique of the Metro Toronto transportation plan that my wife, Nadine Nowlan, and I wrote in the late 1960s: The Bad Trip - the Untold Story of the Spadina Expressway, new press and House of Anansi, January, 1970.

[26] See City of Toronto Planning Board, Central Area Plan Review Part 1: General Plan, October 1975, p. B1-71.

1988 to embrace values that we might expect to observe over the next twenty or more years. It is very likely that, no matter what policies or approaches are chosen for the 1991 Plan, we will remain on, or close to, this basic planning surface.

Future office development in the central core will clearly receive a lot of attention in the formulation of the 1991 Plan. If, in the absence of a major policy change, possible future amounts of office space in the core could be projected to lie within some limited range, then the analysis of various transportation and land use alternatives required to meet the Plan goals would be more tractable.

In fact, office space, occupied office space in particular, can be projected with some degree of confidence, because its growth is related to underlying economic forces. Clients or tenants will not automatically occupy whatever amount of office space might be conceived or built, as a glance at the wide swings from year-to-year in Toronto's office vacancy rates will affirm, and developers will not erect space independently of market conditions, unless they are trying to second-guess future policy directions of a City Council. Excess development in one period leads to lower market prices for space and to reduced development the next period, and vice versa. A corollary of this relationship of office development to basic demand is that changes in density limitations through down-zoning or up-zoning should not be expected to have a dramatic effect on the rate of office growth, except when the limitations are close to the existing amount of built space.[27]

One of the most soundly based projections of central area office space may be derived from the local area projections of office employment undertaken by the Research Division of the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department. These projections have the particularly attractive feature that they take into account employment elsewhere within Metro and beyond, so that office employment overall conforms to some reasonable projection of expected total employment. The latest projection from this source shows office employment in the central area (called PD 1 by Metro) rising to an amount in the year 2001 that is 12.7 per cent above 1988 levels, and to an amount in 2011 that is 22.0 per cent above 1988 levels.[28] If these percentage increases are applied to the 1988 level of occupied office space in the central core (on the assumption that office space per employee will not change), amounts of 6.42 million square metres and 6.95 million square metres are projected for 2001 and 2011, respectively. A new projection of local-area employment is currently underway and may yield somewhat higher office-employment figures for downtown Toronto (and therefore higher amounts of office-space), largely because of recent approvals for greater commercial development on the Railway lands.

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[27] A complete restriction on further as-of-right development would be an extreme example of a zoning restriction that was 'close to' the existing level of development.

[28] See Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Metropolitan Plan Review: Central Area Transportation Issues, Report No. 6, 1988, Exhibit 4.

FIGURE 7

Basic Central Area Planning Surface



A second projection of central core office space is my 1976 projection illustrated in Figure 1. This was a projection of built space, based on an analysis of office development since 1962. The density limitations of the 1976 Plan were assumed. From 1976 to 1988, this projection tracked actual built development very closely. For the future, built amounts of 7.16 million square metres of central core office space in 2001 and 7.79 million square metres in 2011 are projected. Allowing a vacancy rate of 5%, this is equivalent to 6.8 and 7.4 million square metres of occupied office space for the two future years. Here too, recent approvals for commercial development on the Railway Lands would lead to an upward adjustment of this projection.[29]

Since the central commercial core of Toronto plays a significant role in the national economy, a rough check on these projections may be made by looking ahead at forecasted levels of national economic indicators and calculating the amount of office space that would exist if the recent relationship of office space to national indicators prevails. For example, there is currently a little less than 13,000 square metres of central-core occupied office floor space for each billion dollars of GDP, measured in 1981 prices. This number has drifted slowly lower from a level of about 13,700 square metres in 1975. If the downward drift continues, we might expect about 11,900 square metres of central office space for each billion dollars (in 1981 prices) of GDP in 2001, and about 11,200 square metres in 2011. Combining these with the latest national economic projections from the Institute for Policy Analysis at the University of Toronto yields a projected central-core occupied office space of 7.41 million square metres in 2001 and 8.65 million square metres in 2011. If, instead of GDP, one links office growth in the core to the forecast growth of the total employed labour force in Canada (the two have been moving more-or-less in proportion since the mid-1970s), the projected level of occupied office space is 6.9 million square metres in 2001 and 7.31 million square metres in 2011.[30]

If the City adopted no major change towards commercial development in the central core, these various projections suggest that we should expect to see between 7.0 and 8.5 million square metres of occupied space in the year 2011, and between 6.5 and 7.5 in 2001. The more refined projections give the lower numbers, but these may be raised somewhat, upon further analysis. One may easily quarrel with any of the numbers or projection techniques, but even the crudest of them is far better than the all-too-common practice of calculating the maximum allowable development and then using the resulting number as a basis for planning.

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[29] But Railway Land development cannot simply be added to the projection, since commercial development there will to some significant extent substitute for development elsewhere in the central core.

[30] The projected Canadian GDP in 1981 prices is $623 billion in 2001 and $773 billion in 2011. Employed labour force is expected to grow by 21% between 1988 and 2001, and by 28% between 1988 and 2011. These national projections are from Peter Dungan, David Fujimagari and Thomas Wilson, National Projections Through 2013, PEAP Policy Study 89-1, Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, January 1989.

As a first cut at land use and transportation alternatives for the new Plan, it would not be unreasonable to assume that 8.0 million square metres of occupied office space will exist in Toronto's central core by the year 2011 in the absence of any major change in policy towards commercial development. The amount could be a little more, but is more likely to be a little less. In terms of meeting the goal of continued but not excessive commercial growth, this number seems quite satisfactory. It implies an average annual increase in occupied space of about 100,000 square metres between 1988 and 2011, which is less than the average since 1976. Actual growth might be faster in the early years and slower later on.

The question is, how does this projected amount of office space relate to the other goals of housing production and stabilized or reduced commuting, especially automobile commuting? Can feasible objectives be set that would allow all goals to be satisfied? The relationship among housing, occupied office space and person trips across the central-area cordon was shown in the basic planning surface of Figure 7. To the extent that this surface accurately represents that relationship, it can be used to tell us, for example, how much housing would be required in the central area to provide an offset for the commuting that future office growth would otherwise entail.

This is most easily seen by taking cross-sections through the planning surface. The result is a chart such as Figure 8, which shows the effect of central area housing on person-trips across the central area cordon for four different levels of future occupied office space in the central core: 7.0, 7.5, 8.0 and 8.5 million square metres. The thin horizontal line shows the existing number of cordon crossings.

From Figure 8, it can be seen that if the amount of commuting (i.e., number of cordon crossings) were to be kept at the present level in the face of 8.0 million square metres of occupied central core office space, then the number of central area dwellings would have to rise to about 150,000. Starting from the present housing stock of 66,000 dwellings, this would require an additional 4,000 units a year to be built and occupied, between now and 2011. Certainly, this amount would satisfy the goal of significantly increasing Toronto's population and housing stock, but is it feasible? That is a question for the planning process to answer. If it is feasible, then the three goals will have been met by consistent objectives that can be written into the new Plan.

Of course, 8.0 million square metres may not be the right figure for occupied space in the year 2011, and there may be considerable uncertainty about the feasibility of some desirable housing objective. Figure 8 shows the effect on commuting levels of different assumptions about housing stock and office space, while Figure 9 shows the combinations of space and dwelling units that would be consistent with both present commuting demand and with increases of 10 per cent and of 20 percent. For example, if there are 8.0 million square metres of occupied office space in 2011, but only 125,000 dwellings (rather than 150,000), then Figure 9 shows that commuting levels would likely rise by 10 per cent. If there were only 100,000 housing units, cordon crossings would rise by 20 per cent.

FIGURE 8

The Effect of Housing Units on Cordon Traffic for Different Amounts of Office Space



Lines 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent respectively 7.0, 7.5, 8.0 and 8.5 million square metres of core-area occupied office space.

FIGURE 9

Dwelling Unit and Office Space Combinations Compatible with 1988 Cordon Crossings



Given the gradual rise in the proportion of commuters using public transportation, generated in large measure by the rapid increase in the use of GO Transit services, it may be reasonable to concentrate Plan objectives more on reducing or stabilizing automobile commuting than on stabilizing total commuting by all transportation modes. The effect of a reduced automobile modal split can also be examined using the framework of equation B.

FIGURE 10

Surface Showing a Constant (1988) Number of Commuters Using Autos



Note: The upper, flat part of the surface represents combinations of dwellings and office space for which the *proportion* of people using automobiles could rise above the current level of 35.2% with no change in the *number* of people using autos.

From equation B, a new planning surface can be derived showing the various percentages of commuters using automobiles (the automobile 'modal split') that would be required to ensure that automobile use did not rise, given different combinations of office space and housing. This is shown in Figure 10. Combinations of office space and dwelling units that would not require a reduction in the current modal split of 35.2 per cent [31] are on the flat portion of the surface.

Figure 10 shows, as would be expected, that if the amount of occupied office space increases while the housing stock does not, then the only way for the number of automobile commuters to remain constant is for the automobile modal split to decrease, with a smaller percentage of commuters using cars and a larger percentage using public transit. On the other hand, if the housing stock rises sufficiently, then commuting in general will fall, and a constant number of automobile commuters would be consistent with a rising automobile modal split.

FIGURE 11

Constant Number of Automobile Commuters with Different Modal Splits



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[31] This is the percentage of commuters using automobiles (including taxis) who crossed the central area cordon in-bound between 7 a.m. and 10 a.m. in the 1988 survey.

Clearly, if the goal of the new Plan is to achieve an upper limit on commuting by automobile at the present level, rather than capping commuting by all modes, then a lower automobile modal split can substitute for additional housing stock in the face of any given level of future office space. This effect is shown in Figure 11. If 35.2 per cent of commuters between 7 a.m. and 10 a.m. (the current percentage) continue to arrive by automobile, then Figure 11 shows that 8.0 million square metres of office space will require 150,000 dwelling units. This is just our previous result. But if the automobile modal split were to fall to 30 per cent, then a housing stock of only 100,000 units (approximately) would be required to offset the effects of the 8.0 million square metres of office space; and if the modal split were to be brought down to 25 per cent, there would be no additional housing required. Commuting levels would be going up, but automobile use would be staying constant.

This analysis shows, among other things, how powerful the effect can be of lowering the automobile modal split and raising the public transit modal split. This observation also bears on another issue that has not been directly addressed in this section. What would be the effect, with respect to the City's goals, of housing intensification outside the central area but within the City?

This question cannot be answered directly by the model used in this paper. Equations A and B were built from experience since 1976 that included commuter crossings of the central area cordon. These figures do not differentiate between a commuter from Markham or Pickering, and one from a block outside the cordon. An automobile driven by either a long-distance or a short-distance commuter has the same effect on downtown congestion, once inside the cordon. However, from the point of view of transportation facilities needed to serve commuters, the length of the commuting trip is highly significant and the relevant measure for policy analysis is vehicle-miles not cordon crossings. The closer to their downtown jobs that people live, the lower the drain on transportation infrastructure and the less the overall congestion and pollution.

The City's housing policies will naturally aim to achieve housing intensification in more locations than just the central area. If housing and population increases elsewhere in the City can be accompanied by concerted efforts to provide better public transportation to the central area and a lowering of the automobile modal split, then the above analysis would imply that housing elsewhere could substitute for housing in the central area. This assumes that the commuting goal is to stabilize automobile commuting, not total commuting.

From the recently published results of the 1986 Transportation Tomorrow Survey,[32] there would appear to be scope for improving the transit modal split to the central area from other parts of the City. The percentage of people in the City commuting by car to work in the central area is higher for some City districts than for the surrounding regional municipalities. This is quite astonishing and indicates either that automobile congestion levels in the core are less than supposed and not a deterrent even to those who have reasonable, public transit alternatives or that public-transit service is inadequate in many parts of the City and improvements should be studied. If the City can identify specific ways of reducing intra-City automobile trips by improving public transit, it should either work with the Toronto Transit Commission to introduce such improvements or seek the necessary legislation to allow the City to undertake its own public transportation services.

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[32] See Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Central Area Monitoring Program: Third Annual Report, April 1989, pp. 37-47.

Controlling Commercial Development

The analysis of the previous section led to the conclusion that if occupied office space in the central core reached 8.0 million square metres by the year 2011, then housing stock in the central area would have to increase to 150,000, if in-bound commuter trips were to be kept to no more than their present level.

This housing stock represents an annual rate of production of 4,000 units. Even if such a pace of housing development were thought to be possible, there is bound to be some uncertainty about its feasibility. And that is not the only source of uncertainty. Recent experience with commuting that enabled equations A and B to be derived may not be precisely mimicked in the future, with the result that more or fewer housing units may be needed to have the desired effect on commuting demand. The best-estimate projection of office space may be wrong, and 8.0 million square metres, although seemingly on the high side, may prove to be too low.

In some measure, these uncertainties can be handled within the tolerances of the objectives of the Plan. For example, if the Plan aimed to achieve 4,000 housing units a year but, in fact, only 3,000 were produced, the result would be, as shown in Figures 5 and 6, that commuting levels in 2011 would be higher by 10 per cent. This might be deemed, at the time the Plan is created, to be within the tolerance of the commuting objective. If so, some uncertainty about the ability to achieve the housing target may be acceptable. Similarly, if the focus of commuting concern is on automobile commuting, then the possibility of increasing the proportionate use of public transit (as has been happening in recent years) may provide some leeway for misjudging in the Plan, either the pace of office growth or the ability of the public and private sectors to create housing.

After taking into account the various uncertainties that necessarily exist in setting Plan objectives and the acceptable tolerances in those objectives, there may remain a concern that can only be resolved by addressing directly in the Plan the rate of commercial office growth. This was the route taken in 1976 and is likely the response that most people have in mind today, when they think of central area issues of traffic, congestion and office development.

The 1976 Plan dealt with these same concerns by down-zoning the commercial potential of the central core. In fact, this down-zoning had little effect on the actual path of office growth. Especially with the opening up since 1976 of the Railway Lands for commercial development, the amount of office space that Toronto is likely to have in the central core in 2011 will not be much different from the amount that would exist, had the pre-1976 zoning remained in place. As I've argued above, and in other papers, fine-tuning the commercial zoning limitation for the purpose of controlling the path of office growth is essentially ineffective. The results of the 1976 Plan have been relatively satisfactory, not because that Plan altered the pace of office growth more than minimally, but because it successfully promoted central area housing, which in turn reduced what might have become an excessive commuting burden.

The pace of office growth could be lowered through the Official Plan and zoning by-laws, if down-zoning were introduced to such an extent that the zoned potential became very close to existing development. Current office space in the core, either built or in advanced approval stages, is between 6 and 7 million square metres. The current zoned potential is a little under 10 million square metres. Since two-thirds or more of the zoned potential is built or committed, the only way to introduce short-term restraint on commercial development would be to down-zone undeveloped, or underdeveloped, lands to extremely low density limits. In essence, the City would have to undo the Railway Lands zoning.

Suppose that the new Plan were to introduce an extreme reduction in allowable development and, as a result, the City discovered in a few years that office development was reduced below the amount required to meet the goal of steady (but not excessive) growth and that commuting levels had not risen unacceptably. Presumably, the reaction then would be to raise the allowable zoning. In fact, it might even be thought desirable to build that reaction into the new Plan; if office growth were to fall below some specified amount, or some amount to be determined from time-to-time, depending on commuting levels or other indicators, then allowable zoned density limitations would be raised.

In fact, contemplating the possibility of monitoring indicators of concern, such as housing stock, commuting levels or office growth, leads one to consider the inverse of a policy of initial down-zoning with subsequent discretionary up-zonings. This inverse would initially retain the present zoned potential but signal the possibility of down-zoning, if warranted by the monitored events.

In the face of uncertainty about the future unfolding of events of concern, such as the housing stock or commuting levels mentioned above, it seems quite reasonable to plan to monitor these events and then to adjust policy from time-to-time, in order to correct for unwanted deviations. In fact, this type of 'event planning', as opposed to a fixed-period plan that remains unaltered during its life, has received considerable analysis and support in the planning literature.[33]

There is, however, a problem with the event planning approach. A municipal official plan must be built upon some understanding, whether implicit or explicit, of the reaction of the private sector to its policies. For example, the zoned densities and development potential set out in an Official Plan will bear some relationship to the expected levels of actual development, determined by analyzing the reactions of the development industry, the land owners, to the Plan policies. If land owners seek to maximize the value of their land, which is a sturdy assumption, then a careful study of building technologies, market forecasts of rental prices, and zoning limitations could lead a planner to reasonable conclusions about the size and the timing of the development or redevelopment of particular lands or areas within the City. A change in the zoning limitation would, in general, lead to an expected change in the timing or size of a development.

It is the apparent logic of this ability to link policies to outcomes that underpins the event planning approach. If monitored events are not turning out satisfactorily, then the event plan calls for a retuning of Plan policies to achieve a better outcome. This approach depends fundamentally on being able to analyze and predict the responses of the private agents to these changes in the Plan policies.

The difficulty is that the theory of event planning rests on the assumption that the private agents, the developers say, will react passively to whatever the prevailing Official Plan or zoning policy happens to be. This is an assumption unlikely to be true. Developers are much more likely to ask themselves whether a change from current policies might be expected and then to base their plans, not just on prevailing policies, but on their expectations of changes to these policies. In other words, developers react strategically; they consider current policies and politics and then think ahead to any changes that are likely.[34]

[33] For a recent theoretical discussion, see Michael D. Intriligator and Eytan Sheshinski, "Toward a Theory of Planning," in Walter P. Heller et. al. (eds.), Social Choice and Public Decision Making: Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

[34] The problem for public policy-making of strategic reactions by private agents has been recognized in the 'rational expectations' literature. See Robert E. Lucas, Jr. and Thomas J. Sargent, "Introduction," in their edited volumes Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice, vols 1 and 2, University of Minnesota Press, 1981. An early analysis of the problem is Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, "Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, 1977.

How does this bear on the new Official Plan? It works against the efficacy of an event driven Plan, one that would either set the initial commercial zoning extremely low in the expectation that it would be raised, if monitored events unfolded satisfactorily, or one that left zoned potential at its present level, in the expectation that commercial land could be down-zoned, if events turned out to be unsatisfactory.

If initial zoning is set low, the event driven Plan assumes that developers will continue their normal development activity, only now constrained by the low zoning. If this zoning is raised in some subsequent year, the assumption is that developers will then react to the new, higher zoning. But it is far more likely that developers, faced with the low initial zoning, will think ahead and realize that this zoning will be raised, especially if they do not undertake development. So value maximizing development that would have been predicted to take place with the new, low zoning will not take place, and planners and Council will be forced to up-zone, because the path of commercial growth has slowed below acceptable limits.

If developers think that the re-zoning is still below the level likely to be adopted by Council in the future, they will still wait and so force another up-zoning. If the up- zoning is expected to prevail or even to be adjusted downwards in the future, developers will rush in with their building applications, planners and Council will suddenly see an excessive rise in commercial space, and event-driven down-zoning will be precipitated.

If one starts initially with a high zoning, say the prevailing zoning, but with an event-driven Plan that says that this will be lowered if events are unsatisfactory, then a similar cycle of strategic reaction is introduced. If developers calculate that a down-zoning is likely, they will undertake inefficiently early development, which itself will assure that the down-zoning occurs. When it does occur, development will be stopped, until the next event driven up-zoning takes place. This cycle of policy changes works against efficient development at a regular pace, and thus defeats one of the goals of the Plan.

What are the alternatives? One is to stick with the present level of zoned potential, set a reasonable horizon period for the Plan,[35] and work hard at making other policy instruments effective at producing housing and reducing the incentives to use automobiles for commuting trips.

Another alternative is to down-zone the allowable potential development, but then release on a regular basis rights for development above the as-of-right minimum. The size of the rights releases could depend upon the results of the event monitor-

[35] This would be a period not too short, so that developers would not profit from waiting until the end of the period, if an up-zoning was expected in a new Plan; but not too long, so that a new Plan could be introduced within a reasonable time period, if projections proved to be wrong. The year 2001 for the new Toronto Plan might be about optimal for this kind of Plan. The point is that the new Plan must be adhered to through to the end of the Plan period (or at least, it must be believed by the relevant agents that it will be adhered to).

ing, but the Plan could set at the outset a maximum level on the annual release. These rights could be purchased at annual auctions and could even be transferable, so that a market in development rights would be created, with owners registered with the municipality. The Plan could provide for some upper limit on the total development that could occur in any given area, even with the use of rights. Revenue from the sale of rights could be used to the subsidize housing and public transit.

Such a scheme would minimize the likelihood of strategic developer reactions that would undermine the Plan, since there would be no incentives to delay acquiring rights for development, unless they believed that the whole scheme would be overturned next year, or by a subsequent Council. Given the revenue generating capacity of such a scheme, however, it seems unlikely that it would be abandoned, once introduced.

A sister scheme to the sale of development rights, and another alternative, is the imposition of a levy on new central area office development, either on all such development or only on development above some maximum for each assembly. The effect would be roughly the same as the effect of a development-rights auction, but the price of the levy would not be sensitive to the market value of the rights. Because of this, the levy scheme would be somewhat less efficient than the rights-auction scheme.

Both the sale of rights or the imposition of a development levy affect new developments only. This is advantageous in that it allows finer tuned control over the pace of new development (by altering the size of the levy or of the annual rights issue), but it has a drawback, as well. Levies or rights issues will, in general, reduce the rate of new office growth below what it would otherwise be and thus press upwards the market price of all downtown office space. This results in a windfall gain to existing building owners or to those who hold long term leases. A fairer scheme might be to introduce a consumption or rental tax on all downtown office space. The revenue from such a tax could be used, as with the other schemes, to subsidize the production of housing or of improved public transit.[36] The tax scheme is not, however, as sensitive an instrument as the others for controlling the pace of new development.[37]

[36] In its 1989 budget, the Province of Ontario introduced a 'commercial concentration levy' of $1.00 a square foot, effective January 1, 1990, on all commercial property in the Greater Toronto Area (which includes the regional municipalities of Durham, Halton, Peel and York as well as Metropolitan Toronto). See the 1989 Ontario Budget, May 17, 1989. According to the Provincial Treasurer, this levy is intended to help offset additional infrastructural costs of growth throughout the area. If population could be intensified in the central area of Toronto, there would be a reduced need for new infrastructure. If there were an additional levy on central area commercial space, it would make sense to earmark the proceeds for the support of central area housing.

[37] Both the auction of development rights and the imposition of an office-space consumption tax were analyzed in greater detail in my 1975 study for the City of Toronto Planning Board. See D. M. Nowlan, "Development Control Policies: Their Purpose and Economic Implications."

Conclusion: Housing is the Key

The City's Framework document has identified transportation, commuting, and cumulative downtown office development as among the principal concerns to be addressed in the planning process leading to a revised 1991 Official Plan. These have been the focus of the analysis in this paper. In order to make some headway with the issues, I have assumed that the following will be among the goals of the new Plan: steady but not excessive commercial office growth in the core; an increase in the level of housing stock and population, especially in the central area; and minimal or no increases in commuting trips to the central area, especially automobile trips.

These might appear to be goals in conflict, ones that require a careful balancing of trade-offs among competing objectives. In fact, if past experience is an adequate guide, there may well be a high measure of compatibility among the goals. The level of office development that meets the requirement of "steady but not excessive", combined with an aggressive housing-promotion policy that would double or more the number of dwellings in or near the central area by the year 2011, are together compatible with maintaining the current level of commuting from outside the central area.

If the relative use of public transit continues its current rate of advance, through the further development of GO transit or better intra-City public services, then automobile commuting levels into the central area could be kept at or below their present levels, even if the central area housing target is somewhat less.

These are encouraging conclusions. They spring from recent experience in Toronto that has shown the enormous attractiveness of living in the central area for those who work there. My analysis suggests that, for every 100 new people living centrally, the transportation system at the central area boundary is relieved of 65 trips by commuters; and every 100 new dwelling units relieves the system of 122 cordon crossing commuters. These numbers have then been used to estimate the amount of additional housing needed to offset the commuting demands of expected additional office space in the central core.

Thus, the key to formulating a successful new Plan, from the perspective of commercial and transportation policy, is, paradoxically, to have an aggressive and successful housing plan. The most probable pace of office development under the existing development limits is likely to be satisfactory if, and only if, central area housing and residential population continue to grow. If there is doubt about either the projected path of office growth or the feasibility of achieving housing targets, then more direct controls over office development may be desired. As I have discussed in the previous section, some forms of development control are more effective than others.

To create successfully the amount of new housing that will be necessary to achieve a consistent Plan, attention will have to be paid by the City to more than just housing policies and programs. Consideration will have to be given to the planning necessary successfully to achieve a major degree of population intensification. An improved environment, the need for better public transportation, and better pedestrian and bicycle circulation, both within the central area and throughout the City, and the adequacy of recreational facilities are among the matters that are important aspects of a housing intensification policy. They must be part of a package that has, as its central component, effective programs for the delivery of the required additional housing.



Ed Logue, Boston

Ed Logue is Chief Executive Officer of Logue Boston, a venture capital limited partnership formed in 1987 to pursue real estate development opportunities in Boston and elsewhere. A graduate of Yale College and Yale Law School, Mr. Logue was Director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority from 1960 to 1967. Prior to founding the Logue Development Company in 1976, Mr. Logue was President and Chief Executive Officer of the New York State Urban Development Corporation. He has extensive teaching and lecturing experience and is currently Senior Lecturer in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Land for Housing - Where to Find It?

My task is to respond to a very significant research paper authored by Professor David Nowlan entitled 'Commercial Growth and the New Toronto Plan'. Our general subject is 'Managing Commercial Growth in the Downtown Core'.

That subject is a major challenge today, particularly in Toronto, San Francisco and Boston and, of course, many more. It was certainly not the case in Boston in 1960 when I arrived there at the invitation of a newly elected Mayor, John F. Collins, to create and then carry out a comprehensive planning and development program for Boston. There had been only four office buildings built in Boston's central area between 1930 and 1960. The present problem is no less difficult but more satisfying.

I take as my starting point Prof. Nowlan's main thesis which I shall summarize. What follows thereafter is my responsibility. Allowable office density was reduced by one-third by the 1976 Plan. Office growth between 1976 and 1988 increased by 50% nonetheless. Unexpectedly, vehicle trips across the Central Area cordon increased by only 23%. Private vehicles increased by only 16%. Those are very pleasing and positive numbers which would seem to vitiate the need for substantial capital improvements in transportation services.

Why did this occur? How can this pattern be maintained through the next stage of commercial growth in the Central Area? Professor Nowlan concludes that the basic reason is a much desired but again somewhat unexpectedly large increase in the Central Area in housing and in occupied dwelling units, 19% and 41%, respectively, in the same time period.

He then goes on to suggest that to maintain this very good experience Toronto needs to create 4000 new housing units a year in the Central Area from now until 2011. Detailed tables and graphs support his conclusion.

He concludes by raising the question "Is it feasible?" His response: "That is a question for the planning process to answer".

As an imported expert with the false confidence that a day and a half can give one, I attempt some possible answers to this question. I believe that the creation of this stock of housing intended to serve the Central Area is a very desirable social and planning goal. I assume it will contain an adequate mix of affordable housing.

First, some quantification. To be conservative, though not disagreeing with Professor Nowlan's estimate of need, we reduce the housing program to 3000 units a year. We assume a unit size of 100 gross square metres. Make it higher or a little lower, if you choose. But remember it does not include related amenities structures such as schools, libraries, stores, etc. 300,000 sq. metres of buildings required each year.

Assume a building density of three times ground area. Low density housing in Toronto is lower, usually. Go higher, if you like, but remember - we have not included streets, sidewalks, private yards, playgrounds or parks. And we all do know by now that the affordable units for families should not have elevators or, perhaps, even common hallways.

Therefore, every year, this program will require 100,000 square metres of land, in unified ownership, cleared and ready to build. That requires expropriation on the acquisition of public lands. (There may well be some opportunities for rehabilitation or adaptive re-use.) Thus, the requirements, 10 hectares of 10 square kilometres of land in the Central Area for housing, each and every year, the program continues. That is a daunting assignment. It seems prudent to begin immediately to replicate the St. Lawrence Market development at St. Lawrence Square as is planned.

If our task is to find 10 hectares or 10 sq. kilometres a year to meet the housing program, it is prudent to assess our capabilities. In situations like this, I have learned to ask myself a series of questions, seven in number, and then propose answers. You can set the same result in your own way.

1. Comprehensive Plan

Will Cityplan '91 provide clear, specific though general guidelines for a Central Area balanced housing program settled with the other major components of Cityplan '91?

2. Financial Program

Sources and uses. What will the Central Area housing program cost? Where will the funds come from? Almost surely the Centre, the Province, Metro Toronto, the City, private finance, pension funds, private savings, mortgage loans, will all be required.

Give linkage a try as long as you realize it is a drop in the bucket. Better to figure out a housing surtax that applies to all existing high-rise commercial developments. An ordering of investment priorities suggests that putting the expressway in the Central Area underground will drop off the priority list.

3. Staff Capacity

The preparation of Cityplan '91 is one kind of exercise. Carrying it out is quite another task. Admiring as I am of what I have seen of the present staff I have to ask is it strong enough, creative enough to do the job? In most American cities I know the answer is "no".

4. Delivery System

Is there in place or even on the horizon a delivery system which has enough of the authority and responsibility to direct and carry out a plan which has received all necessary approvals? The answer in nearly all American cities is "no". His Worship, The Mayor of Toronto, in his welcoming remarks stated bluntly that overlapping jurisdictions, diffused responsibility, and uncertain mandates were very much the order of the day.

A price is paid, in my view a heavy price, for organizing such important public business in such a chaotic way. There are ways, in which accountability is strictly observed. Perhaps a study of the London Docklands would be illuminating.

5. Planning and Development Administrator

Will anybody be in charge of this tremendous enterprise or will authority be diffused as is usually the case in the United States?

6. Community Participation

From my earliest days in the city-building business I have preached and tried to practice community participation. I do not believe there is any right system. In my view it all depends on the willingness of the politicians and the planning and development professionals to share power with the community in a meaningful way. I am confident Toronto will pass that particular test with flying colours.

7. Political Support

> Cityplan '91 is a major piece of public business. Its successful implementation will depend heavily on the political support it receives through and after adoption. I am impressed with the reaching out that is part of the process of making the plan. I hope it will continue. I have no idea whether the required political support for implementation will be available.

If you test Cityplan '91 by the questions like this, or use your own version, you will come, I believe, to a clearer understanding of what the prospects are.

In conclusion, I have some specific suggestions of where to find the land for housing that is so clearly defined. From a quite superficial knowledge of the Central Area I conclude that it will not be easy to get the 10 hectares a year that is needed. The first step in the process once a program has been established is to determine what lands might be available through the renewed process or by a change in the use of potentially available public lands. Obsolete industrial and port lands should have priority.

A second option is to consider and price the option selected many years ago by Stockholm and Helsinki. In these two wonderful cities the local authorities determined that the central area should continue to be the prime office centre. Recognizing a housing need for central area workers, Stockholm built Vällingby and Farsta, and other developments as commuter communities beyond the settled areas with a very high level of amenities, a broader economic mix and direct commuter rail service to the central area of Stockholm. Tapiola performs the same function for Helsinki. They are worth a careful study tour and a careful cost benefit analysis. I was strongly influenced by these new communities when we started new towns outside Buffalo and Syracuse.

Another idea which has great appeal and great potential is filling in shallow areas of the lake near the shore. Toronto along with Boston, New York, New Haven, and Bombay and many other cities around the world were importantly shaped by filling.

One can choose to get scared off by environmental concerns which place the welfare of birds above that of affordable housing for people who desperately need it. It is clearly worth a thorough and dispassionate study. I would not recommend just extending the existing centre city shoreline. That would be too disruptive. So I visited the Canadian Map Company at 211 Yonge Street and for $11.20 purchased a navigation chart of Toronto Harbour, C Chart #2085. If you look at such a chart you will find many possibilities. The view from the CN Tower will confirm that opportunities are there.

Looking at the chart the Main Harbour Channel and the Outer Harbour Channel seems ideal. There would be no interference with commercial shipping or pleasure boating. In an area with an average water depth of only five metres a rough measurement tells me that 10 years supply of housing and new community land could be made available on the Outer Harbour East Headland and the shallow waters surrounding it with no human disruption or relocation.

Fill is readily available from the lake bottom. People love to live in island communities with views of their city. Years ago the filling we did on the New Haven waterfront created a successful industrial park. Roosevelt Island is an award winning new community in New York City's East River. Its residents enjoy their privacy and easy access to the city.

Why not give it a run here? No displacement. An absolute course to be sure, but a fun project to boot.

Linda Hausrath, San Francisco

Linda Hausrath is an urban economist and President of Recht Hausrath & Associates. Educated at the University of California (Berkeley), Ms. Hausrath specialises in analysis of growth-related issues, downtown planning, and linkage programmes. She has extensive experience in economic impact analysis and played an on-going role as technical advisor on economic analysis to the Department of City Planning during the preparation of the current San Francisco Downtown Plan.

The following is an account of Ms. Hausrath's presentation at the Forum. It was transcribed and edited from a video tape of the proceedings.

First, some reactions to the challenge posed by Professor Nowlan. His analysis points out some of the same relationships that we have observed from data based on the San Francisco Bay area. Our situation differs in that San Francisco is a smaller part of its region. There are more jobs in San Francisco than the city's employable population. While 85% of San Francisco's residents who work are employed in the city, they hold only about half of the jobs.

The more housing built in the city, the higher the percentage of jobs held by city residents with lessened demand on the transportation facilities. That relationship has been borne out by our analysis, too. The analysis does pose very good goals to shoot for, if not always to achieve.

A few issues in our analysis are slightly different from Professor's Nowlan's analysis of demographics and trends. In addition to real estate market, population numbers, or job trends, there are demographic issues that are evident here, as well. Looking back ten to fifteen years, the increasing female labour force participation rate, the baby boom moving into job market, and postponement of child rearing have influenced the relationship between jobs and housing.

We found greater increases in the employed population, compared to the population overall, while household size dropped. The population groups that provide more workers are groups that have a strong preference for centre city living. A large increase in workers can occur without adding housing units. The increase in workers in the population was more significant than the increase in housing stock.

The demographics will change. The relevant trends and factors include slower rates of increase of female labour force participation, the post baby boom cohort having much smaller impact on the labour force, more families with children, and potentially stronger preference for suburban low density housing. Also, there are more dispersed work centres, and multiple worker households will base their residential locations on midway points between locations of employment. This suggests that it will take more housing in the future to accommodate job growth than in the past. Centre city housing may have to increase to satisfy job growth. The match-up will be more difficult.

Regarding San Francisco's linkage program, the linkage program works toward the overall goals in a small way. The goal of the program is to provide funds for housing households generated by office growth that the market wouldn't otherwise provide. Our goals were to achieve a realistic scenario without a goal framework, rather a mitigation of impacts that would otherwise occur. The linkage program is not designed to achieve a broad goal, rather a portion of what would otherwise occur.

San Francisco's success is partly due to its strong economy. The combined effects of the various policies designed to manage and direct growth will have some effect on the amount of growth that will take place. The effects haven't occurred yet, partly due to market conditions. It won't be the disaster predicted by the developers.

Ignoring the annual development limit, the policies described by Macris include actions that reduce and redirect the location of major office development which affect building size and site feasibility, policies that affect building standards, such as design and appearance, plus art and open space, which influence building cost and, thirdly, three financial exaction ordinances for housing, transit, and child care services. The results have been very successful.

Over the long term, these policies will have negative effects on office growth in the next ten to fifteen years, compared to prior zoning. The reasons include substantial reduction for building opportunities in the most preferred locations and added cost imposition as the market tightens. Some potential tenants will look elsewhere for space, reducing demand downtown. The developers and bankers are still waiting to see how the market will react to offices in more outlying locations. A number of the policies will have more effect on peripheral areas, where the rents are lower. As the cost of space increases, tenants will use space more intensively with the indirect result of less demand for downtown space.

The downward effect of all of these factors could be a 15-30% reduction in development, compared to the former zoning, by the year 2000 or 2005. There are trade-offs and feedbacks, of course. The effects haven't occurred yet, partly due to the last minute rush of approvals just prior to imposition of the new rules. There was a net decline in office employment during 1980-85 period. Reduced demand freed up some existing office space, while large amounts of new space came onstream, so there have been no effects to date. While these events are not considered typical, the result has been to delay the effects of the new policies. We still have a 12-14% office vacancy rate.

The annual development limit was overlaid on the other policies as a response to the public perception that the growth management policies weren't doing enough to limit growth - partly because of the large number of projects approved just prior to adoption of the Downtown Plan. Added to the plan at the very last minute, the initial limit was set at 950,000 square feet per year for three years. In November 1986, the voters established a permanent limit under Proposition M, which in effect halved the 950,000 square foot limit, subtracting at the rate of 475,000 square feet per year all office space approved in the prior two years.

The result is a limit of 475,000 square feet per year through the year 2000, because there was so much space approved. 75,000 square feet is reserved for small projects, leaving 400,000 square feet for large projects, a figure smaller than some of the individual developments approved just before the policies came into effect. There is no doubt that the limit has slowed the rate of approvals, but to this point it has not slowed the rate of economic growth. It will take until at least the mid 1990's before the vacancy rate falls to the 5% level, where there will be some interaction between supply and demand. Then, there will be pressure to change the limit.

The current office space limit has no relation to growth capacities, having been a political response, and does not achieve any goals of managing growth. In some cases, the limit has reduced the effectiveness of other plan policies. The base of existing space is quite large. If employment density changes by 2%, one third of the additional space forecast will be absorbed by the existing stock. The implication is that office construction reductions will be accompanied by proportionally lower reductions in employment growth and accompanying housing and transportation requirements.

Edith Netter, Boston

Edith Netter is a land use attorney who heads a land use law and consulting firm in Boston. Ms. Netter was formerly an Assistant Director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority, responsible for the ordinance establishing the Boston Civic Design Commission, co-ordinating the neighbourhood rezoning process, and the creation of the Boston linkage programme. A former editor of the Land Use Law and Planning Digest, she has published and lectured extensively on land use law topics and has a special interest in downtown zoning and development.

The following is an account of Ms. Netter's presentation at the Forum. It was transcribed and edited from a video tape of the proceedings.

I'd like to focus my remarks under two different headings. First, I'd like to complement the City of Toronto for some of the work that has been done. Secondly, I'd like to give my response to Professor Nowlan's paper. Please keep in mind that I am a lawyer, not an economist.

Toronto's emphasis on child care is very encouraging, both provision of facilities and operations, such as salaries and low income subsidies. Seeing that Toronto has staff whose sole effort is to work with developers for the provision of child care is a lesson that American cities can learn. The child care facility I visited in the industrial King-Spadina area was extraordinary, a facility to be proud of. American cities are just beginning to focus on child care through development negotiations on facilities, not operations.

The efforts in affordable housing by nonprofits and public sector is striking to me. The no-equity co-operatives incorporating housing for different income levels are absolutely extraordinary. The use of expropriation powers to take industrial land for the St. Lawrence housing project is also wonderful. By contrast, in Boston and around the U.S., in the face of federal funding cutbacks the efforts are directed at getting private developers to set aside some of their units for low and moderate income families. The principle method for assuring longterm affordability is deed restriction. The deed restriction process is much more cumbersome, inefficient, and open to question about long-run effectiveness, by comparison.

Returning to the King-Spadina area, the mixture of back-office data processing, garment industry, and broadcasting in King-Spadina impressive, not seen in American cities, where extraordinary efforts are made either to preserve industry or it's going to be office development. Finally, the work of the Safe City Commission on gender and safety issues, such as making parking garages safe for women, ought to be copied by American cities as well.

With reference to Dr. Nowlan's paper, I don't see transportation as the most important constraint or catalyst for urban planning or central area planning efforts. I question the extent to which any city can predict, based on past practices or demographics, the necessary relationship between commercial and housing or the relationship that's necessary in order to minimize commuter trips. If past demographics are going to be used as predictors of the futures, then the data will have to be disaggregated on the basis of income and gender, perhaps race as well.

It's going to be very difficult to understand and be able to predict the locational behaviour of businesses. I'm told that many corporations are moving outside of the city and are luring professionals outside of the city. Clearly, that's going to affect commuter patterns, most of whom are men. Again, the data needs to be disaggregated in order to get figure out the future trends.

I know a little more about housing in context of regulation. I think that social planning is very critical to any city's central area effort. Let's assume for argument's sake that housing is the most important social planning concern. The concept of affordable housing must be added to Professor Nowlan's equation, which was implicit in his general remarks. The question then becomes how the housing can be produced in the downtown. I agree with Ed Logue that taxation is fairest method. Why impose these costs on developers, who ultimately will pass on the costs to new residents? Why single out new residents to bear a cost that should be borne by society at large?

More important, taxation will result in more money. In American programs and I assume in Canada as well, linkage programs and development fees can only mitigate effects of commercial development. The reality, certainly in Boston, is that linkage programs do not generate very much money. It's really a drop in the bucket. Linkage programs are viewed in American cities as a panacea for housing problems. In fact, they are not.

Despite Peter Dreier's statements yesterday, there is considerable tension in Boston between the goal of managing commercial growth in the downtown and the goal of producing housing. There are downtown height limits, but the reality of zoning in Boston is that there are extraordinary opportunities for creating exceptions to those height limits. There are a number of other ways to avoid the height limits, including planned unit development and economic development areas. In reality, there are no formulas for trade-offs between density and public benefits. Height limits have effectively downzoned much of Boston's downtown, but the process is very much a negotiated process because of all the possibilities for exceptions. So, there is a tension between the desire for fees for affordable housing and the desire to limit growth.

While linkage was established in order to set forth a series of ground rules for the development/negotiation process, at $5 per square foot for housing and $1 per square foot for jobs, the reality is that linkage payments are just the first step in the process. There are many other informal linkages that are negotiated on a project-by-project basis. Linkage in Boston is not slowing growth nor was it intended to do so. While some suburban communities in the United States are using development fees or impact fees to slow growth, I believe that some kind of phased growth or rate of development by-law should be used. Don't do it indirectly through fee requirements.

Secondly, whereas in Boston the development review process is still discretionary, in reality it is much less discretionary than it was five or ten years ago. The general perception is that the process is one that has the same ground rules for the negotiation process. In Boston, there is no concern that all of the deals are being cut in the back room. The public perception is that there is no political graft or corruption involved in the linkage program.

While less effective than taxation, linkage is politically expedient. It's generally easier to impose taxation on newcomers than on the city's established population. Because it is expedient, linkage is much better than no program at all. Linkage is not being perceived as a panacea for Boston's housing ills. It complements a broad range of city and state policies which together work to promote affordable housing. There really is a change in the public perception in the development negotiation process. The bottom line is that with the development review process Boston is no longer viewed as selling its land to the highest bidder.

I commend to your attention Boston's neighbourhood housing trust. It is an entity created by the city, but it is separate from the city. It is a public-private partnership, in which there is community participation in the process by which the funds are allocated. Again, there is no perception of political corruption and graft, because the process the allocation process is very open and working quite well.

Finally, I'd like to talk about some of the development techniques through which cities can manage growth. Nowlan's paper talked about the sale of development rights, rent controls, and levies. Whatever techniques are chosen, to the extent Toronto has a clear vision for its Central Core, the most important lesson from the United States is that a mandatory system is the preferable system. The reason is that everybody knows what the rules of the development game are up front and the development review process is not an insider's game.

Some of the techniques used by American cities to promote housing or affordable housing are rezoning areas of the city to residential, which is very difficult politically. Cities like San Francisco, Seattle, and Hartford have by-laws that prohibit housing demolition or replacement. San Francisco and Boston are using the housing priority area concept, commercial developers being required to include residential in portions of their buildings.

Boston's system is part mandatory and part discretionary or incentive oriented. The incentives, generally density bonuses, are used in areas where a city wants to encourage development, an appropriate use of density bonuses. In those areas of the city where development should be slowed or where the economy is very strong, the mandatory approach is the way to go.

Boston's most interesting and exciting planning and regulatory effort is the Midtown Cultural District. The city has a variety of competing goals, like theatre preservation, affordable housing, height restrictions, small businesses, health and social services. The goals are laudable, but the much of the district is incentive based. The problem is that the trade-offs between the additional density and the desired public benefits are not spelled out. There are no formulas that describe the density for amenities up front. The city is proposing a nonprofit midtown cultural district corporation. Its board will represent both public and private sectors. Its role will be to receive and manage theatres. It will be an interesting experiment, similar to the neighbourhood housing trusts. Seattle has had the most successful experience, as its zoning is explicit about the public benefit/density trade-offs. The desired public amenities are actually mapped.

Toronto has a striking challenge. My impression is that Toronto's planning is very highly regarded. Its periodic monitoring and evaluation is not done in United States. The role of regulation is much stronger in the United States. Public sector and nonprofit initiative in housing in Canada is preferable. Use your public land to provide affordable housing.

Session 4

Creating Affordable Housing Options for the City

Toronto has been losing far more low and moderate income housing than it has been gaining through new construction. At the same time, the cost of housing in Toronto has risen alarmingly. Such factors threaten the City's continued social and economic health. This session seeks new and innovative solutions to the affordable housing crisis within the context of existing government and funding constraints.

Moderator: **Dan Burns** *(Commissioner of Housing, City of Toronto)*

John Sewell, Toronto

Born and educated in Toronto, John Sewell previously worked as a community organiser in downtown Toronto urban renewal areas for the Toronto Community Union Project before serving as an Alderman for the Toronto City Council. Mayor of the City of Toronto from 1978 to 1980, he was an urban affairs columnist for The Globe and Mail newspaper for three years before becoming Chairman of the Metro Toronto Housing Authority (1986–88). He is currently teaching law and social sciences at York University.

Summary

It makes little sense to estimate housing need by specific municipality in the Toronto urban area, since those in need are willing to locate almost anywhere affordable housing can be found within the Greater Toronto Area. Disagreements about the degree of need are virtually irrelevant, since even the lowest estimates of need have not been met in the last two decades.

There are several important constraints to supply: NIMBY, the exclusionary value associated with suburban development; a fear of government intervention, given the unacknowledged problems with public housing; the difficulty of making profits developing affordable rental and ownership housing. The underbrush of regulation is not a significant inhibiting factor in the supply of affordable housing.

Governments cannot be relied on to be effective agents in securing affordable housing. At best, governments will follow, but it is most unlikely they will lead. Instead, to resolve the supply problem reliance should be placed on market forces working in conjunction with those who have exhibited a strong commitment to increasing affordable housing.

Effective action will occur and the barriers to increased affordable housing supply will be overcome if the following initiatives are encouraged:

- create a bridge between profit and non-profit housing companies
- bring together latent community support
- explore how the private sector, in conjunction with the non-profit sector, can provide affordable rental housing
- encourage those wishing to redevelop existing sites within Metro, particularly public housing sites
- challenge continued traditional suburban development.

Determining what must be done to ensure sufficient affordable housing in Toronto involves an exploration of four issues: need, explanations for the current shortfall, methods of provoking change, and a plan of action. Each will be addressed in turn.

1. The need for affordable housing.

The only serious arguments about housing need in the Toronto area are over details. Everyone agrees there isn't nearly enough housing available for those with lower income. The disagreements are over the degree of need and even those are not of great significance in the long run.

There are two strands of thought quarrelling with the notion of a housing problem, and they should be cleared away right at the beginning. The late Hans Blumenfeld argued that on a per capita basis Torontonians have a great deal of residential space and thus the housing problem is over-estimated. But this is hardly an answer for those who have very little space or none at all, save the space of a city park. It is difficult to live in 'housing in general'; it is a most specific commodity. Others argue that on the basis of demographics the problem we now face won't be here in a few years; time will get us out of the mess. The argument that time will resolve problems and heal wounds has suffered a rough ride this century. It is better to address problems now than foolishly hoping that progress or change will resolve them, come the millenium.

One indicator of the housing problem is the number of households on the waiting list for Metro's public housing agency, the Metro Toronto Housing Authority. The list now exceeds 12,000 households, of which almost 11,000 are families with children. The average income of these families is approximately $15,000 which is below the poverty line, according to any index generally recognized in Canada. Three years ago, there were less than 5500 families on the list. Longer waiting lists are common for other social housing providers: Cityhome, the Metro Toronto Housing Company Limited (Metro Council's non-profit company), and various non-profit and non-profit co-op suppliers.

Vacancy rates for Metro area apartments continue to hover at seven or eight per thousand units. New condominium units have often been purchased by investors and rented out, but these units have been available only at substantial rents beyond the means of traditional tenants. While rents of these units are coming down as oversupply looms, they will never descend to a level that will be affordable for most tenants. Only a small percentage of new units constructed each year for the last decade have been rental available to traditional tenants.

The cost of ownership housing continues to rise; early in 1989 the average Multiple Listing Service price broke the $250,000 mark. Ownership prices in the Toronto area have averaged a 7 per cent increase during the last three decades, so there is little reason to believe that the dampening of prices in purchase housing this Spring will result in any real decrease in price by the end of the year. Twenty years ago, one in ten families could afford to buy a new house in Toronto. Now, the rate is about one in fifty.

Affordability figures show that more tenants in Ontario are paying more of their income for housing. Over one quarter of Toronto tenant households now pay more than 30 per cent of incomes for housing; by any standard these households would be considered to have an affordability problem. Everyone agrees the 17 per cent of households paying 40 per cent of income for housing have an affordability problem.

It would be possible, although time-consuming, to arrive at a single set of figures on housing need applying just to the City of Toronto. It would also be possible to make accurate estimates of the exact number of households with affordability problems in the City of Toronto and in each political jurisdiction within the Greater Toronto Area. But neither exercise would be of much value. Housing need does not respect political boundaries set forty or more years ago. Households with housing needs appear ready to be satisfied anywhere in the urban area, provided family concerns can be satisfied - transportation, schooling for children, health related matters, and so forth. It makes no sense to localize housing need by municipality within the Greater Toronto Area.

As well, the need is so great and so far from being satisfied that it makes little sense to spend a great deal of time arguing over detailed nuances of housing need. It's better to take one set of generally recognized figures and use them as a jumping off point. While some will quibble about several percentage points, the chance of answering one half of the lowest recognized need seems remote, if the last decade is any indication.

Accordingly, this paper starts with figures on housing need supplied by the Ontario Ministry of Housing. Household income for the 30th percentile in the Toronto CMA is $29,400. Roughly speaking, this means 360,000 households have annual incomes under $30,000 and can afford $740 in monthly rent. While many tenant households now occupy 1 and 2 bedroom units rented for this amount, those which become available have rents that are almost always over $800 per month.

Even assuming 90 per cent of these households are well housed (a wildly optimistic assumption), 36,000 households still need affordable housing. It is probably more realistic to double that figure to 72,000 to reflect the real situation, but it hardly matters. Supplying even 36,000 affordable units in the near term will represent a considerable change in direction.

Household income for the 60th percentile is estimated by the Ministry to be $52,700, and a family with that income can afford $1320 monthly for housing. Such a family could afford to pay almost $150,000 for a home, but there are almost no homes available in that price range. Thus, even those whose incomes are in the upper ranges find they can't purchase a home without considerable strain on their financial situation. Assuming just 10 per cent of families with this income wanted to purchase a home, 72,000 homes at $150,000 would be required. It is apparent the need for affordable housing - whether for rent or for purchase - is very, very great.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the above. First, in the Toronto area there are at least 36,000 households in need of affordable rental housing, and probably double that number. For those households rents must be in the $500 - $750 range and for some - such as those receiving welfare, where rent allocations are half that amount - even lower. There is an equal number of households looking for affordable purchase housing at prices in the $150,000 range.

The total annual production of new units in the Toronto area is about 35,000, almost all ownership. To satisfy affordable rental and ownership demands, two years' production targetted only to this part of society will be required. This represents a significant change.

Second, the satifaction of housing needs should not be segmented, municipal boundary by municipal boundary. What happens in each municipality within the Greater Toronto Area is obviously important, but no one municipality can resolve the housing problem on its own. Each must take effective action inside and outside its boundaries. Any strategy to address housing need must be directed to Toronto area municipalities, both individually and collectively. Accordingly, strategies must be found which will help significantly refocus housing supply in the Toronto area.

2. Why isn't more affordable housing available?

Several factors have led to a decline in the number of affordable units in the existing housing stock. On one hand, affordable units are literally disappearing as buildings containing several units are collapsed into fewer larger units. The best example of this phenomenon is the disappearance of rooming houses downtown, but the same fate has happened to small apartments in houseform buildings. This trend is well documented and has resulted in the loss of 10,000 or more units in the past decade in Toronto.

Second, the price that can be obtained for what were once inexpensive units downtown has shot up in the past few years. Homes that in mid-decade would fetch $150,000 now are offered for not less than $250,000. Similar trends were observed in the market for more expensive units, but they were never close to being affordable. The great damage was done to the least expensive units, which have increased most in price. The supply of new affordable units has not even kept pace with the affordable units that have been lost. Thus, the housing situation for those with low incomes has indeed become worse over the last decade.

It should be noted that there is a general shortage of housing of all kinds - which helps explain increasing housing prices, generally, in Toronto. But the supply problem regarding affordable housing is particularly pressing, and special constraints seem to apply to this sector. The following factors deserve attention:

a) There's an exclusionary feeling in the air. Residents are hostile to the idea of less expensive housing being built in their neighbourhood, and they ensure their political representatives act accordingly. The least perjorative explanation of this trend is that the exclusionary feeling is a value which is part and parcel of the urban form now being constructed; exclusiveness comes with the landscape. Certainly when Don Mills, Canada's first corporate suburb, was built, the main marketing device pursued was that this new community was only for a select, exclusive group of people. That was the message in the carefully designed homes, the enforced colour co-ordination, the looping, curvy street design, and the modern house form. This first corporate suburb was successfully marketed because it was exclusive. Its progeny, which has littered the Canadian urban landscape ever since, plays strongly on that value.

The Greater Toronto Area now has a land mass 90 per cent of which is occupied by a descendant of Don Mills. Exclusivity has become the dominant characteristic of the urban area, and the Not In My Backyard lullaby is frequently sung to consistent applause. This value is applied to any kind of housing or other intrusion suggestive of anything other than elitism. Countering this value is extremely difficult, since it is woven into the very fabric of most of the Toronto urban area. The notion that residents can be 'educated' out of this value is ludicrous.

A social explanation of the NIMBY syndrome is that it reflects significant insecurity about personal worth and meaning in a quickly growing city. The idea of 'neighbourhood' came into respectability only half a century ago through the work of planners such as Clarence Stein, and it serves as a very useful perimeter in the contemporary city. It creates a spacial and social dimension in which the individual is recognized to have meaning and worth. In the rest of the city the individual is a stranger to almost everyone, but in the neighbourhood s/he is a distinct person, worthy of respect. Thus perceived control over the neighbourhood - a control exercised by restricting the bounds of the permissible - is an exercise in self-definition.

This explanation of NIMBY treats the neighbourhood not as static but as vaguely dynamic. Entry is permitted to those deemed respectable enough. It is on this basis that social housing producers have found varying degrees of success negotiating with communities for the approval of afforable housing projects. Unsuccessful negotiations may result from an exclusionary interpretation of NIMBY.

A selfish explanation of NIMBY is that owners try to keep low income housing as far away as possible, since lower priced housing affects property values. No evidence has been produced to substantiate this widely invoked position. It may be nothing more than an unsophisticated expression of the exclusivity principle.

b) A fear of governments. The last serious entry of governments into the supply of housing was the public housing movement of the 1960's and early 1970's in Canada and several decades before that in other parts of the Western World. While government agencies hired the 'best' planners and architects they could find, the award-winning projects produced - whether in Canada, United States, the U.K., or France - have provided some of the most impossible living spaces ever devised. Public housing projects have their own cachet which directly relates to design: a lack of public streets, a blurred definition between public and private spaces, a surfeit of no-man's land, and uncontrollable interior space.

Public housing was produced with the best of intentions and the worst of results. The public has good reason to fear governments will not be influenced by the obvious failure of public housing - a fear reinforced when governments reject any kind of reasonable reform or change to those projects - and they oppose new government intrusion, since they assume it will result in similar disasters. One might note that in Ontario the public has little opposition in principle to government intrusion in other important areas - health, for instance. The opposition to intrusion in housing is based on experience.

c) Affordable housing is not profitable. Private developers find it impossible to build housing which is affordable by the lower 30 per cent - perhaps the lower 60 per cent - of society. Apart from land, the cost of constructing a one bedroom apartment unit and operating it requires a rent exceeding $1000 per month. Once land is added in, the minimum rent that must be obtained to cover costs is $1250 per month.

The situation is not quite so severe when it comes to ownership housing, at least in the suburbs. It seems entirely possible, given a reasonably sized lot and a reasonably sized house on it, to put a house on the suburban market for $150,000. That price would appeal to households in the 60th percentile. However, approvals for such units are not readily forthcoming. Further, developers find it easier and more profitable to market houses in the suburbs in a much higher price range. When housing will demand a higher price, why sell low?

Toronto has seen the rather strange situation of condominium developers offering units for very low prices, only to see original purchasers resell the units before construction is completed for substantial profits. Any reasonable developer would decide to increase prices and take that profit for himself. There's no morality in selling low. Thus, the private sector does not supply affordable housing, because raw costs are far above affordability levels and because profits are amply available supplying higher priced housing.

d) The underbrush of regulation. The amount of restraining regulation that must be cleared away to build affordable housing is significant and has been documented many times. For building non-profit housing it begins with allocations and moves through initial funding, Maximum Unit Prices, design guidelines, draws, and all the bits and pieces of approval involved in each minute phase.

What should be the simple act of creating additional units in existing housing is an almost impossible task: there are significant barriers in zoning bylaws (and often Official Plans), then servicing matters, and building codes. These same barriers are often present for less expensive new units which might be on smaller lots or have smaller gross floor areas than standard suburban housing - and they are made even more difficult by servicing questions. In both cases the NIMBY syndrome seems at the root of the roadblocks.

For the City of Toronto many of these regulatory barriers are described in 'Living Room II', the report of the City Housing Department which was carefully reviewed by City Council several years ago. For the province generally, those barriers are set out with some care in the report 'More than Just a Roof', prepared by the Committee on the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless. The profit making sector, particularly through the Ontario Home Building Association, has prepared several reports on red tape standing in the road of less expensive housing.

It makes little sense to repeat the specific complaints outlined in these reports. The general conclusion is clear: less expensive housing faces a discouraging birth. Those who talk about getting more housing of an affordable nature usually just talk about removing disincentives - sort of like making a level playing field.

Every kind of project initially faces a blur of regulatory restriction. The success of projects backed by public and private support breaking through the red tape should not be missed. Toronto's Skydome, for instance, faced significant barriers: the city's mayor did not like a downtown location; the province's own committee which recommended against a downtown location; the desired site provoked massive servicing problems including the need to move the city's main water pumping plant; the city's parking requirements as suggested in planning control guidelines could never be met; the cost was far in excess of what political bodies suggested could ever be supported; the timetable was impossibly tight. But, of course, the Skydome is set to open in early June. The underbrush of regulation was simply blown away by a powerful public-private lobby which wanted it to happen.

The point is a simple one: the underbrush only becomes important when there's not much desire to see something happen. Clearing the underbrush away in the hope that something desirable might come along is mostly a waste of energy. It's in the nature of bureaucracies, both public and private, to establish rules stopping things from happening, and those rules only get removed when there's a clear to desire to allow a project to proceed.

Asking city staff to work harder, or be smarter, or be more lenient with the rules won't solve problems. With very few exceptions, government staff do their jobs in exemplary fashion. What's required is not a more malleable bureaucracy. What's required is a raging pressure to make something happen. In conclusion, clearing away the underbrush of regulation in the abstract, in advance, serves little purpose.

3. Options for promoting change.

Two different kinds of people seem to get things done: those committed to ensuring something happens and those who see an opportunity to make money from the enterprise.

Our economic system assumes an appropriate supply of goods and services will emerge because of opportunities to make profit. There has been considerable renewed support in the last decade for market systems, even from command state economies such as the USSR and its Eastern Block allies. Offering the prospect of profits, the market system attracts as many entrepreneurs as think they have something to gain and, to that extent, it can usually manage to respond to demand.

The market system is not an unrelieved success; many instances of its shortcomings can be cited, such as creating environmental problems. It also fails to supply goods and services for those with limited means, means insufficient to cover the cost of production, let alone any profit. That, of course, is readily apparent in the Toronto housing market. Rather than simply toss out the system lock, stock, and barrel because of these failures, it makes more sense to review instances of failure to see what can be done to improve the situation.

The inability of the market to supply housing for lower income households is a result of a number of factors apart from those of the cost of production: zoning ordinances, which make it exceedingly difficult to construct no-frills housing; servicing requirements set at levels that discourage lower-cost housing; delays in obtaining approvals, thereby increasing costs; the rent review system claimed by landlords to discourage rental investment; and so forth.

One other problem relating to market failure requires comment. A great deal of raw land on the outskirts of the city is held by a relatively few companies and individuals, permitting those owners to virtually set the rules of what will be built and when. These individuals have a canny ability to purchase land served by large trunk sewers which permit the development of this land. They also have ready access to the resources needed to hold land over long periods and then obtain planning approvals when required. Some individuals have a greater ability to obtain necessary local government approvals than others.

These aberrations in the market system certainly increase the cost of raw land and probably the cost of the building itself. In the 1940's, the suburban approach to house-building was advocated, since it was assumed large companies and large sites would surely create an economy of scale which would bring down prices. That assumption has not been realized.

There have been times in Canada when the market system was much better at producing affordable housing than now. Thirty years ago, one in three working Canadians could afford to buy a new suburban house. Twenty years ago, one in ten Canadian families could afford to buy a new suburban house. Today, only one or two in fifty Canadian families can afford such a house.

There are large profits to be made in housing development. That more developers are not trying to capture that profit and at the same time building more housing suggests there are barriers to effective participation of more investors. If there were not, then surely the market would be saturated by an increased supply of housing with decreasing prices. A market operating effectively provides perhaps a powerful method to answer demand; that truth applies fully to the housing market in the Toronto area. The difficult question is identifying and removing the barriers to the operation of that market.

Committed people seem to get things done. There are some people - but never enough - committed to one's own cause. Indeed, the number of people committed enough to anything in particular to ensure it comes about is surprisingly small, even though the strongly committed seem to have an incredible influence, Mother Teresa being one example.

The non-profit co-operative housing movement is an excellent example of the power of commitment to affordable self-managed housing. The movement has grown from but a handful of units across the country twenty years ago to 20,000 or more in Ontario alone. The strong and unrelenting determination of a few has produced widespread benefits for many.

Commitment is needed to provide a spearhead to new approaches. As the new moves into the mainstream, it can tend to lose its appeal and be seen as somewhat mundane. People no longer jump on the bandwagon, thinking it is the wave of the future, when examples of what it looks like surrounds them and they discover that it is human, all too human.

Thus, the power of commitment moves through stages: from a new compelling idea, to an experiment, to a new program, to a growing trend, to an instititutional response which has all the appeal of the ordinary. The drive to implement the idea is slowly submerged by acceptance. There's an inbuilt limitation to how far successfully implemented commitment can carry reform. Sooner, rather than later, the new initative seems to run out of steam.

For continuing problems - poverty and housing are good examples - committed individuals provide new initiatives, but the depth of the problems often seem to overwhelm the initiatives. The ideas are good, but they never seem to be backed by enough muscle to be implemented with appropriate breadth. A most troubling political question for reformers is how commitment can be turned into broad change that overturns the deepseated problems they were meant to address.

Of interest in this regard is the continued expansion of the non-profit and non-profit co-operative movement. The co-op movement has managed to attract a constant or growing number of unit allocations most years since the program was established in the early 1970's. While program details have changed, those within the movement have shown an excellent ability to respond in an imaginative way. The movement continues to face critical limitations, however: unavailability of capital with which to buy land; numerous approval levels (and traps) set by various governments; and significant strictures on important details of built form.

Further, the movement's strength has also been its weakness. Commitment cannot be bureaucratized; it cannot be passed down through various levels of command. Thus, central organizations of necessity have remained small and are made up of highly motivated and talented individuals. For a while, low rates of compensation are no problem, but after a while, money limitations means that staff are stolen away by other organizations, both public and private, which can offer much greater remuneration. The co-op resource groups are continually being stripped of good people, and the movement is in a state of continually being reborn.

This turn-over brings in new energy, but it has also meant that the movement's ability to influence government and its institutions has not been as significant as it should have been, given the sector's success. Annual struggles with various levels of government for acceptable levels of unit allocations seem increasingly ritualized.

Those involved in non-profit housing, apart from the co-op sector, also show how commitment can be effective. Many social service agencies sponsor housing projects for their clients or constituencies. However, in many situations the participants recognize the sizable amount of energy needed to bring one small project to fruition and second projects are rarely ventured by the same group. It is clear that this sector can answer very specific needs, but it is not able to offer reasonable continuing responses to the demand for affordable housing.

It should also be noted that some profit-making firms have become involved in non-profit projects. These firms recognize that building non-profit housing eases the approval process for other housing, satisfies social objectives (the question of commitment again), and could produce a construction or land profit to boot.

Can governments be expected to get things done? Governments are not in the business of making profits and accordingly could not be expected to supply housing for that reason. As for commitment, that is a rare commodity at the bureaucratic level. The nature of the organizational hierarchy is to regularize transactions and reduce risks; bureaucracies (whether public or private) don't like to take chances, and they don't like to put themselves in positions where they might be criticized. The organization itself usually squeezes commitment from those caught in it.

Some politicians enter political life with a great deal of commitment to get something done. But institutional pressures, combined with what's seems to be a natural tendency to soften views once in power, often makes a mockery of initial commitment. Most of us are familiar with these characteristics in politicians and public bureaucracies.

Government may be an effective regulator and when pushed it can provide climates and infrastructures of both the hard and soft variety, but it rarely succeeds when it plays the role of entrepreneur. It can create the milieu for entrepreneurs to flourish and for the committed to accomplish objectives, but not much should be expected of it in the way of housing supply or any other supply objective. In those cases where government has been a successful entrepreneur, it has usually been through the establishment of a large independent company with a clear mandate and protection from both political winds and the bureaucracy. One such example was the Ontario Housing Corporation in the middle 1960's.

Toronto City Council has had some solid achievements through its housing company, Cityhome. The company's strongest period was during the reform era of the 1970's, when a powerful commitment at the political level was exceptionally evident. It is not unfair to suggest that Cityhome activity will not again expand until a similar level of commitment at the political level is apparent.

In summary, there are only a few ways in which to expect things to get done: one is through the market system, even with its limitations; another is through committed leaders and the organizations they spawn. It is unrealistic to expect governments to be able to address problems of housing supply with much alacrity.

4. Taking effective action.

Solutions to the affordable housing crisis will be found in helping to strengthen the hands of those with commitment as well as trying to make the provision of affordable housing a profit-making venture. Together or seperately, these two forces could be powerful enough to overcome the barriers which now stand in the way of low-income households being better housed.

Unleashing the pressures of these two forces is far and away the most effective way of overcoming barriers. These two forces have shown themselves to be powerful enough to deal with the strongest of opponents, be they politicians or bureaucracies. And, while the market can become distorted and can be captive of a few players which use it for their own ends, committed individuals have shown themselves able to pressure public bodies to help re-orient errant private sector forces. The best way to strengthen these forces is to provide them with adequate resources - here meaning funding - to actually create the coalitions need to sweep away barriers. The following kinds of intiatives should be supported:

a) Those devoted to creating a bridge between profit and non-profit housing companies. These two sectors have shown an increasing ability to work together for their mutual benefit. As large sites become more available for redevelopment - for example shopping centres and under-used industrial sites (although this raises very contentious questions about economic policies) - it is entirely reasonable to expect a mix of tenures and incomes to be a planning requirement as well as a marketing tool. In such situations, it will be important that each sector knows what can be expected of the other so both can work together. There are difficult questions to resolve apart from those of finance, such as what kind of diversity should be encouraged in a community and how it might be achieved, and questions of building form.

Further, many profit-making developers are concerned about the lack of affordable housing and would be interested for reasons of perceived social responsibility to work out arrangements with non-profit developers subject to certain conditions (an increase in density has been a common demand). Non-profit providers, particularly co-ops, can be expected in return to press for support for greatly expanded unit allocations. It is important that these sectors know about each other, so they can form consortia - combining market pressure with commitment - powerful enough to get affordable housing built.

b) Those devoted to coalescing latent community support for housing solutions. While there are many individuals whose first response is the NIMBY syndrome, those same individuals and their neighbours often also agree in the abstract on the need to create more affordable rental and ownership housing. This is particularly the case when those individuals are sat down with school principals, religious leaders, business leaders, and social workers who can talk knowledgeably about the effect of the lack of affordable housing on families.

These groups need not be based only on geographical factors; they can also consist of people who share common interests, such as seniors, artists, trade unionists, social workers, and so forth. Bringing together broadbased groups can have a very positive effect. These groups can look at housing needs in certain parts of the city, make proposals which will increase affordable units, support developments which create new affordable housing (both profit and non-profit), and generally speak up for more affordable housing.

For reasons already discussed, these groups should not be organized on a neighbourhood level. Instead, the area where the group focuses its attention should be much larger - East Toronto, for instance, or North Toronto - where traditional boundaries are crossed and blurred and where the success or failure of the group does not depend on a single councillor. It will take some energy to put these groups together - and to make them effective - probably a quarter of the time of an experienced facilitator working over 12 or 18 months.

c) Those devoted to pressing governments and other bodies for ways in which the provision of affordable rental housing can be provided by the private sector, either alone or in conjunction with the non-profit sector. The private sector is virtually unanimous in arguing against rent controls in Ontario. Many tenants complain about the levels of bureaucracy which seem to expand every few months to run a rent review system that grows increasingly out of touch. But removing rent review without creating many new rental units is unthinkable; too many tenants would be adversely affected for that move to be politically feasable. It is in everyone's interest that the supply of affordable housing be substantially increased.

Something must be done in both the long and the short term. Solutions will come from landlords, tenants, and possibily others working together to devise proposals which will benefit both and then finding out how to put the muscle on government to enact such solutions. This kind of process cannot be government driven; the recent example of that resulted in the changes to rent review regulation, which seems to have been a serious blow to tenants and an administrative nightmare for landlords. These parties must come together freely to work out something in their own interests, rather than trying to meet the expedient needs of government. Such initiatives should be strongly encouraged.

d) Those which press for redevelopment of existing land within Metro Toronto. The Central Area Plan marked the city's interest in development throughout Metro Toronto. The plan tried to direct office uses away from the Financial District to other centres within Metro, specifically to the North York Centre and to Scarborough City Centre. City Council recognized that office development patterns outside its boundaries had a significant effect on land use and form within its boundaries.

The same principle applies with respect to residential uses. To reduce commuting needs and to ensure increased affordable housing opportunities, it is in the city's interest to encourage the redevelopment and intensification of existing developments in the older suburbs. Intensification projects not only make better use of existing land but do so in an environment where transportation, recreation, education, sewage and water services are already in place and often have excess capacity.

The projects most likely for intensification are those built in the 1960's and 1970's. Public housing projects - there are 23 within the city and a further 87 elsewhere in Metro - are likely candidates for this kind of redevelopment, particularly since residents, neighbours and politicians recognize they are failures which need to be changed. Studies done two years ago for the Metro Toronto Housing Authority indicate that an average of 200 new units can be added to most projects. Accordingly, it is not unrealistic to think that using public housing sites alone, some 25,000 new units can be added to Metro's housing stock (at least 5,000 of those in the City of Toronto), much being affordable for low income families. The Ministry of Housing has a limited interest in pursuing these opportunities, but as noted above it would be unrealistic to expect a public bureaucracy to be an entrepreneur in this regard.

Private developers own sites with design characteristics remarkably similar to those managed by the Metro Toronto Housing Authority, and these too can be redeveloped in an intensified form. If, as suspected, private developers own twice as many sites, then the opportunity to build an extra 50,000 units should be pursued with vigour. Private developers are showing interest redevelopment possibilities, particularly shopping centres and gas station. They should be encouraged to also review existing residential projects (particularly to include a large component of non-profit housing), and appropriate linkages should be made to make these ideas a reality.

e) Those which challenge traditional suburban development. Suburban development proceeds apace, gobbling land at densities of five or six units per acre in the most homogeneous style imaginable, lacking any of the playfulness and interest that diversity - of form, style, housing types - can create. This new development considerably stretches the urban form, consuming not only good farm and recreational land but also massive amounts of public dollars for new services.

It also creates transportation needs and patterns which are not in Toronto's interests. It drains transit subsidies which should be devoted to improving service on high density routes, rather than being sunk into routes which serve relatively few people. These new communities almost invariably consist only of expensive housing - almost entirely freehold, with very limited amounts of less expensive condominiums - with the word 'exclusive' writ large.

Traditional suburbs aggrevate Toronto's housing problems and have a deleterious effect on questions of urban form. Yet, almost no one objects during the approval process. It is in Toronto's interest to support those who would attempt to mount pressure to introduce diversity to plans of subdivision to ensure densities are increased and to increase affordable housing there.

Conclusion

The creation of a reasonable supply of affordable housing won't be done by government tinkering here and there. The serious barriers will only be removed once the powerful push of market forces and committed individuals are harnessed together.

To that end, these kinds of intiatives should be supported by the city. These forces will create an environment which will produce a great deal more incentive and pressure for the development of affordable housing generally in Toronto, Metro, and the surrounding regions.

If the city provided leadership, there's every reason to believe that all kinds of people in the development industry, both profit and non-profit, and those from the myriad of social agencies will want to take up these questions. What's not needed are more studies or more staff. What is needed is the determination to encourage these forces to come together to deal with the problems. Helping those with a real interest in creating the groups which can crack the Gordian knot of affordable housing will have a substantial impact. There's no more potent weapon than helping those with commitment to work with those trying to make the market work more effectively.

Peter Dreier, Boston

Peter Dreier is Director of Housing at the Boston Redevelopment Authority and housing policy advisor to Boston Mayor Ray Flynn. Before joining Mayor Flynn's Administration in 1984, Dr. Dreier was Assistant Professor at Tufts University. During 1980-81, he served as a 'public service fellow' with the National Science Foundation. He has written widely on urban politics and housing policy and is currently on the board of the National Low-Income Housing Coalition.

The following is an account of Dr. Dreier's presentation at the Forum. It was transcribed and edited from a video tape of the proceedings.

There is a lot to cover about housing, and let me do it in two different ways. First, let me give you some differences between our [U.S.] housing system and your own. Then, I'll talk about some of the lessons of our success, but, frankly, the lessons of our failures are as interesting and useful. In many ways, the Canadian housing system and what you're doing here in Toronto are far in advance of what any American city is doing to provide housing for poor and working class people. I am very impressed with the work that is going on here. There are lessons in social planning that we could learn from you in terms of housing, health care, and transportation planning.

In terms of the American system of housing, we have many of the same problems that you face: a widening gap between housing costs and wages, and difficulty in attracting labour to inner cities and suburbs, where housing costs are seven to twelve times wages. My study published in the Harvard Business Review last fall addressed the growing problems faced by business in finding workers, partly due to this rising ratio of housing costs to wages.

Over the next ten years, the American business community will increasingly find itself as advocates for low and moderate income housing, not out of a sense of civic responsibility or charity but from a sense of bottom line economic self interest. Hopefully, we will have a housing system that reflects some of the values of your country, not because it is in the American character but because it is in the American profit motive to see that the development interests in the United States and the larger employers may not have common purposes, when it comes to housing.

The federal housing system has been basically dismantled over the past eight or nine years, which is not to say that when it was 'mantled' it was doing very well. As a system of providing subsidies for low and working class people, the system has been turned around. In 1983, as a country we were spending $33 billion in housing subsidies. Last year, the [U.S.] federal government spent only $8 billion in the entire country for assisting low and moderate income housing through a variety of housing programs.

In 1980, at its peak, the federal government was subsidizing about 220,000 units of low income housing a year. Last year, the Congress appropriated enough money to subsidize about 15,000 units for the entire United States. In 1980, the American government was spending money on military to housing at a ratio of 7:1. By 1987-88, that ratio had increased to 40:1, forty dollars on defense spending for every one dollar on housing. In fact, 48 cents of every American federal tax dollar goes for defense. Only one third of American low income families, those with $12,000 incomes or less, have any housing assistance whatever. The rest are left to fend for themselves in the private market.

There's one other kind of subsidy aside from food stamps for housing, that is, the tax system. Last year, the homeowner tax and mortgage interest deduction came to about $40 billion in tax expenditures, 4.5 times larger than the entire housing and urban development budget. Its regressive nature is that about one third went to families earning over $100,000 per year. The poor who don't have enough income to pay income taxes don't get any benefit at all.

Those are the constraints under which we're operating. When the federal government turned off the spigot, some of our states and some of our cities tried to fill the gap in funding for new housing production and for subsidizing existing housing that had been private. In no state and in the aggregate all states together has there been enough money to fill the gap between what was spent in the late 1970's and what is being spent now. The wealthy states, such as Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Maryland, or New York, who are doing the most in innovative housing policies, together are not spending what the federal government stopped spending during that time.

Cities have tried to fill some of the gap, but cities do not have the revenue base to do it, either. For example, in Boston, half of our land is exempt from taxation because of the large number of hospitals, hotels, parks, religious institutions, and government offices. Our tax base is relatively limited plus in 1980 the Massachusetts taxpayers imposed a tax limitation of property tax on the entire state, though Boston taxpayers voted against it, so we can't raise taxes more than 2.5% of total value. The state government has been unable to fill the gap in local aid.

There are three major reasons for the high cost of new housing in the United States: the cost of land, the cost of financing, and the speculative profits made from the resale of housing over time. The solutions are easy but the political ability to impose those solutions is not. The solution to the high cost of land is very strict zoning and the use of public land for the development of housing. The solution to the high cost of financing is a combination of low interest or no interest government subsidizing of mortgages and government intervention in the banking system to require low, specialized credit for lenders.

In the past few years, we've had the opposite. The banking system has been deregulated, and the savings and loan thrifts must be bailed out to the tune of $150 billion over the next ten years. In terms of speculation in the resale of market housing, the obvious solution is more reliance on limited equity and nonmarket forms of housing.

We have tried to deal with all three in Boston, given our limited financial resources and legal authority. We have 20% of the population of the Boston metropolitan area, but already we have about 45% of the region's subsidized housing. This poses a problem for business, because the jobs are not concentrated in the central city. It is difficult for them to find workers for the industrial jobs, such as back office jobs and other low wage kinds of employment, located out in the suburbs.

In Boston, we have a good year when we have built 3,000 housing units. In the early 1980's, Boston was building only 700-800 units per year, despite a hot housing market. Now, we are building between 3,000-4,000 units per year, half of which are assisted in some way, but that is far short of the need in Boston. Certainly, we are unable to deal with the problems of building housing in the entire metropolitan area because of the fragmentation of local government. As a central city of 600,000 in a region of 3.5 million, Boston cannot solve the problems of the suburbs who are unable or unwilling to provide housing for low income and working class people.

As Sewell pointed out, this is longterm NIMBY or snob zoning. One partially successful solution is an anti-snob zoning law passed in Massachusetts in 1970. Any Massachusetts community must approve zoning for high density, low or mixed income housing that includes subsidies. For example, a developer wants to develop high rise house, meaning townhouse clusters. If the local Zoning Board does not approve the housing and the community does not have at least 10% of its units subsidized for low and moderate income families, then the State can override the local zoning and require the city or town to change its zoning requirements to permit the development. If the municipality refuses, they will be unable to take advantage of other State programs. The problem is that some wealthy suburbs don't want the State programs. So, there is a carrot; there is not always a stick. The stick has been useful enough to produce about 35,000 units under the anti-snob zoning law known in Massachusetts as Chapter 774.

Boston has something less dramatic, a rezoning emphasis on creating higher density clusters to allow for lower income families. The need for higher densities is due to the absence of subsidies. For the most part, these are two, three, and four storey buildings clustered so as not to look like the old public housing boxes. We use public land for housing. Since the public land is scattered throughout the city, we have a great deal of public involvement in the planning process, but we do not allow community groups to have veto power over zoning that promotes low income housing or group homes or shelters. The discussion is about design and traffic, but when it comes to affordable housing on public land, we draw the line on giving community groups the veto.

The inclusionary housing policy that requires developers of market rate housing to set aside 10% of those units for low and moderate income has had a somewhat depressing effect on land values. In terms of the nonprofit sector, we are far behind Canada though far ahead of other American cities. We are supportive of limited equity, nonspeculative housing that will not increase the cost of existing housing. If we're going to put public dollars into housing, we want that housing in perpetuity. That was a problem created by a federal program that permitted housing to be converted to market housing after twenty years. We are trying to close that loophole in our own state and city housing programs.

Nonprofit housing is the backbone of our housing policy in Boston, and we try to increase the capacity of the nonprofit groups by providing grants to church groups, community development corporations, unions, and tenant organizations to build low and mixed income housing. Our success rate is better if the projects are well designed and done by neighbourhood based nonprofit groups who have the interests of the community at heart.

One problem with our nonprofits, in addition to lack of resources, is the complexity of the financial deals. There are no more Section 8 cookie-cutter programs. Recent scandals have created credibility problems for government housing programs and have made it easier for the Federal government to get out of the business. Nonprofit groups don't have the aura of political favouritism. There are five to seven layers of subsidies. The back door approach to subsidies through the taxation system is not a viable way to produce large numbers of units by nonprofit groups.

No two housing projects are alike. Every one is a ship in the bottle that has to be carved out and created, almost as if new. We have set up a technical assistance program for nonprofit groups, so they're not reinventing the wheel. Large consulting firms do the financial packaging for them. There is large turnover in the staff of nonprofits due to burnout and relatively low wages. We have businesses that adopt nonprofit groups. Large corporate-funded charities provide funding.

With reference to Boston's linkage program, linkage is a form of tax on downtown developers to get resources for low and moderate income housing. Despite its success, with $50 million committed, $20 million spent, and 2,300 units built in the last 4 years, in my opinion linkage is not a substitute for a broad-based commercial tax on commercial property. Our linkage is necessary as a symbol to link the downtown with the neighbourhoods, done in part to create a pool of City-controlled funds directed in a trust fund manner, channeled directly into housing and not lost in the general revenues of other City priorities, such as police and fire protection. Because of Proposition Two and A Half, because Boston lacks the ability to raise taxes on its own without going to the State legislature, we cannot take advantage of our booming real estate market. It would be more equitable to tax our entire commercial sector to provide general revenue for housing. Linkage has been a substitute.

Linkage is not a substitute for a federal housing program. This is not to say that with a federal housing program there should not be a local housing program to generate funding for special projects. Certainly, you cannot solve an ocean of problems with a teacup of linkage, though we would recommend our program to other cities. We also have rent control, eviction, and condominium conversion laws, the latter requiring consent of half the tenants. My hidden agenda goal is that rent control will provide the leverage to depress the value of rental property and allow tenants to buy it as co-ops. To date, we have only 1200-1500 co-operative housing units in Boston because of the banks' skepticism about co-op housing and the absence of state and federal programs that encourage cooperatives.

As for the ability of cities to do housing policy, in the United States the cities' legal power is primarily that of zoning. The cities do not have the revenue or the legal authority to carry out the programs or assemble parcels as is possible in Canada. We have to rely much more on private sector initiatives.

Finally, we are doing something extremely progressive in Boston, called empowerment. Dudley St. in Roxbury looks like Dresden after the bombing in World War II. There are many uses for land in Roxbury, but we think that housing is most appropriate. Most of the land is owned in a crazy-quilt pattern of private owners who have abandoned and demolished their buildings. There are 15-20 acres vacant and abandoned. A neighbourhood group called the Dudley St. Initiative came to us with development desires but lacked ownership. We delegated the authority to a neighbourhood organization to take [property] by eminent domain, who over the next ten years will build about 500 housing units, trying to recreate the commercial core of Roxbury and trying to create a community centre.

For the first time in the United States, we have delegated the planning and implementation authority to a neighbourhood group with oversight, so they don't abuse the authority, while recognizing that they need the technical and planning assistance we can give them. They are the developers of that 20 acres, taking the parcels by eminent domain, with foundation support. There are legal, fiscal, and planning questions but we are willing to take the risk. We're very proud of it, and we'll know the outcome in about five years.

Boston is one of the leaders in the United States, but I recognize that in many ways Canada has much to teach us. Toronto has more to teach Boston than the other way around. I commend you for what you are doing, and I commend you more for your foresight in trying to develop a master plan and a long range plan that builds on your successes instead of resting on them.

Ann McAfee, Vancouver

Ann McAfee is Associate Director, Overall Planning at the City of Vancouver. From 1974 to 1987, Dr. McAfee was Housing Planner for the City and responsible, until 1980, for the City's social housing programme. Dr. McAfee has a doctorate in housing planning from the University of British Columbia and has served on the Federation of Canadian Municipalities Housing Task Force.

Affordable Housing in the Central Area Options and Prospects: A Perspective from Vancouver

On my office wall is a poster listing the stages of a project: *Exultation* as the project starts, *Confusion* and *Disillusionment* as it progresses, *Search for the Guilty and Punishment of the Innocent* as deadlines are not met, and finally *Distinction for the Uninvolved*.

Thank you for inviting me during the first, exhilarating, phase of Cityplan. At this stage we can dare to dream. As other speakers have suggested, we can demolish the expressway to open access to Harbourfront. We can fill in the harbour to create more land near downtown jobs. Later, when the price tags are added, the hard choices must be made and your 'outside experts' will be long gone. In the meantime, we all can enjoy the fun phase of plan making.

My comments on affordable housing in the downtown are in three parts:

- An overview of housing initiatives recently adopted by Vancouver;
- Recognition of three differences from past housing policy directions, resulting largely from broad social and economic trends affecting all cities; and
- Three new directions, in response to changing times, which may be applicable elsewhere.

City of Vancouver Affordable Housing Initiatives

As in Toronto, declining vacancy rates and the demolition of affordable housing have led to increased housing costs and significant changes to established neighbourhoods. In response, Vancouver City Council recently embarked on a Four Point Affordable Housing Program. I call it the "Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue" Program. The general directions are to:

- Continue to use city resources to provide affordable housing for those most in need (something old);
- Moderate price rises due to the scarcity of zoned land by adding significantly to the multiple housing zoning capacity (something new);
- Help people to help themselves by encouraging seniors to develop new neighbourhood based housing and by permitting owners to add suites in existing homes (something borrowed from the Ontario Suite Program); and
- Establish public-private partnerships, involving the City as a contributing partner, in the provision of affordable market rental housing (this is an initiative of Vancouver's Mayor, Gordon Campbell, to establish a 'blue chip' investment for affordable housing).

Vancouver's Housing Initiatives

1. Something Old: The Provision of Land for Non-Market Housing

Vancouver has had a long standing program of providing city land through lease, often at less than market price, to non-market housing providers. Land for non-market housing is provided from the city land bank and through negotiations with large developers for a portion of the site. While diminished after two decades of use, the City land bank, acquired over the years for a variety of public uses or through tax sales during the 1930s, still provides some sites.

Similar to Toronto, over the years the City of Vancouver has provided sites for almost 20,000 units of non-market housing. This represents about 10 percent of the city housing stock. In contrast to Toronto, the City has retained management of less than a thousand non-market units, preferring to make land available to non-profit and cooperative housing groups. This has an advantage in that tenants are, for the most part, directly involved in the management of their own housing. The disadvantage is that the City has less control over who lives in non-market housing, and applicants must register on several waiting lists in hopes of obtaining affordable housing.

In addition to using city lands, the city has been negotiating a portion of major residential redevelopments for non-market housing. Generally, the target has been for 20 percent of units on sites exceeding several acres in size. The largest size currently under negotiation is the 200 acre, waterfront Pacific Place (site of EXPO '86).

My understanding of the very active Cityhome housing program in Toronto suggests that Vancouver's land programs are in many ways similar to your initiatives. Other than recognizing similarities, there are probably not many new ideas for you from our land lease programs.

2. Something New: The NIMBY-PIMBY Dilemma

In 1985, Vancouver Council considered *The Vancouver Plan.* The City strategy for managing change recognized a serious imbalance between the excessive amount of land zoned for office development, the shortage of land zoned for housing, and the costs of transportation improvements to commute people from suburban residences to city jobs. Regional plans to encourage decentralization of offices to suburban locations are not materializing was fast as expected. As a result, the demand for housing close to central city jobs, as in Toronto, has resulted in significant price rises.

The Vancouver Plan strategy is to increase housing capacity in the city in areas with existing services and where there is minimal displacement of existing residents. If this strategy does not work, then the Plan recommends transportation investments, and, as a last resort, reduction of office space. Generally, the direction taken by Vancouver's city strategy for managing change is similar to that of Toronto, without the benefits of the quantitative analysis you have through the work of Dr. David Nowlan.

Implementation of the housing capacity program has been reasonably successful in the central city, where older, underutilized industrial lands are being recycled into housing. A word of caution to Toronto: we are recognizing the soil pollution problems associated with the transformation of industrial lands. I expect both cities can share information on mitigation measures.

Outside the core, we have been less successful in adding more housing choice. As in Toronto, we are experiencing NIMBY (Not in My Back Yard). One new direction the city is pursuing to change NIMBY to PLIMBY (Please in by Back Yard) is to undertake two demonstration programs to assist seniors to help themselves to provide alternate housing in their familiar neighbourhood.

Most of Vancouver's single-family areas were built just after World War II. Thirty years later, older owners are looking for opportunities to move into smaller dwellings in their neighbourhood. They have the assets to afford alternate housing. However, few opportunities exist. A City program will assist two neighbourhood based groups through the site selection and rezoning process to build small seniors housing developments. Working committees, including representatives from neighbourhood, seniors, development, and mortgage lending groups, will participate in the process. The objective is to demonstrate what can be done to provide housing through people helping themselves.

Decisions to rezone lower density land to higher density centres will be some of the most difficult any Vancouver Council has had to face during the past few decades. The tendency may be to focus rezonings on older industrial areas, where public opposition is less. The caution for Vancouver and Toronto is to ensure that, before significant chunks of industrial land are alienated from around the city centre, adequate provision is made for city-serving and 'back-office' uses.

I am interested to see that a Toronto report on Industrial Land Use Policy, May 26, 1989, raises many issues similar to a Vancouver report which will shortly be before our Council. Both reports are recommending review of the future demand for land to accommodate growth in non-manufacturing, city serving sectors. Sharing information gathered through these studies should benefit both cities in planning for industrial areas.

3. Something Borrowed: Looking to Ontario and Toronto for Ideas on Suites

Another way people can help themselves is by making more effective use of existing houses through the provision of suites for family members, household support persons, and as 'mortgage helper' revenue. During the past decade, most single-family houses built in Vancouver have been designed with the potential for easy conversion to create a second dwelling unit. Until recently, use of this second unit as a self-contained suite was illegal.

Recently, Vancouver changed the zoning in all single-family areas to permit a suite for an immediate family member or household support person. The City is discussing with each neighbourhood whether residents also support rezoning to permit revenue suites.

The Ontario government has provided a considerable amount of information about the potential for suites and programs to encourage suites. This information has been very useful to Vancouver in our review of suites. Similarly, the City of Toronto Housing Department booklets on suites provide good examples for other cities to follow.

4. A 'Blue-Chip' Public-Private Rental Housing Partnership

On May 29, 1989, the Mayor of Vancouver announced a new public-private venture, with an immediate goal of providing 2,000 units of affordable rental housing. Details of the proposal are attached. In summary, the proposal involves the creation of a private company (VLC Properties Ltd). The company will have broadly based ownership, including pension plans of major British Columbia employers, B.C.-based trusteed union/management pension funds, and the City of Vancouver. The proposal is for the City to purchase 25 percent of the shares, at a cost of about $7 million.

City lands will be made available on a 60 year lease. The economics are designed to provide rental housing with a monthly rent of about one dollar per square foot or $650 to $800 per month, which is a third to a half less than the economic rent for new units. At 30 percent of income, this will be affordable to modest income households with incomes of about $25,000 to $30,000. The program is not intended to replace social housing programs, which will continue to be targeted to those most in need. Annual rent increases will be limited to the cost of living (there are no rent controls in B.C.). To provide security of tenure, tenants will be offered a life-time lease.

Social housing subsidies will not be used. However, housing built by the company will be eligible for a recently announced Provincial lower interest mortgage for market rental housing and Provincial Municipal Incentive Grants for the provision of rental housing. The proposed public-private partnership for the provision of rental housing is, in the Mayor's words, designed to provide "privately built housing with a social consciousness". This initiative may well be the kind of proposal suggested by John Sewell and one which Toronto may wish to monitor for ideas.

Overview: New Vancouver Program

Vancouver's four point housing program, (which I have termed the "Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue" Program), was adopted on May 8, 1989. We, like you, are in the 'exultation' phase of planning. This program requires continued resource commitments and agreement to change some long established city policies. We will see over the next few months whether the 'marriage' will survive the difficult days of 'confusion' and 'disillusionment'.

Rethinking Past Directions

Looking at experiences in Vancouver, what have we learned from past experience and what are we doing differently? John Sewell raised several idiosyncrasies of the housing market. During the past decade, the housing market has been paralysed by the 'ME' generation. The most frequently asked questions about housing initiatives were: "Why Me", "Not Me", "Who Me?".

Why Me

In the early 1970's, when house prices took a dramatic jump, I recall the focus of activity was a search for local villains. People asked why price rises were happening in their area. In Vancouver, rent controls, red tape, and the imposition of an agricultural land reserve were variously described as the salvation and the damnation of the housing market. A lot of time was spent debating the impact of local actions.

In retrospect, we now recognize that the forces which affected the housing market during the past two decades were much broader than local regulations. The impact of demographics as the baby boom entered the housing market, increased personal mobility, senior government deficits, and the internationalization of the housing market, with Canada being seen as a 'good buy' by investors from Europe and Asia, resulted in demand exceeding the supply of housing. Prices rose.

In the face of increased demand, among the few actions a city could take were to 'speed up' processing of applications, make more efficient use of existing housing through secondary suites, encourage infill housing in areas with existing services, and ensure there was adequate land zoned for housing. These actions flew in the face of existing residents, seeking to preserve their neighbourhood, who countered with the "Not Me"- NIMBY response.

Not Me

The NIMBY syndrome has been strong enough to resist increases in housing capacity. Existing single-family neighbourhoods have remained intact. By contrast, nearby apartment areas are experiencing rising rents and demolition of purpose-designed older apartments to make way for new condominiums.

Looking back at the NIMBY movement, it is worth asking whether the processes used to generate plans during the past decade need rethinking. In the 1950s planning was 'Top Down' with little input from affected communities. Reaction against urban renewal, and other "top down" plans resulted in new 'bottom up' planning processes emerging during the late 1960s.

I may be overstating the case for effect, however. If one combines several neighbourhood plans into a city plan, we would find that we had a city with no choice of housing types, lots of parks, no through roads, no garbage disposal sites, and no taxes. With neighbourhood generated plans not taking into account broader city needs, the public has looked for ways to provide housing choice (often in someone else's neighbourhood).

Who Me

Reluctance or inability of local governments to pay for public needs, such as social housing, has led to a search for 'costless' solutions, such as transferring costs to developers and 'removing red tape'. Vancouver has tried several 'solutions' to provide affordable housing using the Zoning by-law as an incentive or a stick, none of which has been overly successful.

We provided bonus density for affordable housing. At the densities communities were prepared to accept, developers were unwilling take the chance of the development having a 'low income' stigma for the few units they could provide. Few bonus units were built.

We downzoned several areas to try to keep affordable housing. As you found in Cabbagetown, the houses have been renovated. It made little difference to low income renters whether the bulldozer or the renovator came; the end result was the same. Units are no longer affordable.

We have encouraged senior governments to have rent control, and we have encouraged them to remove rent control. Neither action has resulted in an increase in the stock of affordable housing. The response to these initiatives from those who build and rent housing is "Who me?". They ask why they should bear the brunt of providing affordable housing.

Moving Toward New Directions in the Search for Affordable Housing

Looking back at past solutions we focused on searching for local causes to problems, adjusting our by-laws to provide a stock of affordable housing, and searching for others, whether the builder or senior government, to pay. The new directions Vancouver is taking focus on what can 'we' do, the 'we' being the city and its residents, given our resources and powers.

1. Rethinking the Public Planning Process

It is not clear that either 'top down' or 'bottom up' planning processes hold realistic solutions. Some better process is required to ensure that neighbourhoods contribute to meeting city goals but in a way which reflects neighbourhood choices.

This will require 'top down' planning in establishing where housing will be located combined with a 'bottom up' process for determining, for example, how funds are spent. In the face of NIMBY, it will not be easy for Councils to gain the confidence to implement city-wide decisions. To provide information for Council when faced with a rezoning, Vancouver staff have done several studies of concerns raised by residents to find out whether fears are justified.

Several years ago, the Vancouver Planning Department studied neighbourhood responses to higher density housing. We hoped that we would find that, given time, multiple developments would 'fit' in lower density neighbourhoods providing more housing choice. Unfortunately, this was not the case.

The *New Neighbours* study found that concerns usually raised by existing residents – more and different people, increased congestion, and decreased property values –

did not, in fact, occur. Generally, the higher density units housed people who had moved from larger houses in the area.

Proximity to the development has little or no effect on the overall tenure pattern and property values in the neighbourhood. Nevertheless, though neighbouring residents concede that pre-construction concerns have not materialized, higher density housing is still not seen to 'fit'. They would oppose any future multiple housing in the area.

This places politicians in a difficult position. On one hand, some residents are seeking alternatives to high priced, single-family dwellings. On the other hand, existing residents say, "Not in my Back Yard".

Vancouver developed a fiscal impact model to test the impact of increasing density, mixing non-market and market housing, and housing families and adults. Costs varied by density and user group, generally costing more to house families with children. However, under all scenarios the increase in housing resulted in a net increase in revenue. In most cases, the returns were sufficient to consider using some of the increased revenue to upgrade services in the area.

A decision to increase density may be seen as 'top down' if done in the face of NIMBY opposition. Providing some revenue for residents to determine which amenities to upgrade in return for the increased density is one means of providing 'bottom up' input to improving the neighbourhood.

2. Ride the Wave: Focus on programs which build on socio-economic trends

Several opportunities are on the horizon which may help the next generation of families find housing. As the baby boom ages, we can expect them to be looking to trade up to better homes. We can expect a large stock of 'starter homes' to be freed up. Since the next generation of families is considerably smaller in size than the boom years, the supply of starter homes should exceed demand and, for other than the lowest income, affordable choices should be available without deep government assistance.

We are already seeing the aging of post World War 11 homeowners. Many are moving from their post-war bungalows. These, being small by todays standards, are being demolished and replaced by larger houses. One positive side to this replacement is that the newer houses are large enough to meet a variety of future needs.

We saw the large homes at the turn of the century changing over the years from single-family houses to rental suites to upgraded condominiums, as needs changed. On the negative side, new large houses are causing considerable stress, as they are located next to the small homes of yesteryear. Looked on the positive side, these large houses provide sufficient space to respond in a more flexible way to meet a range of future needs.

The large number of people entering the years when they will be putting a significant portion of their income into retirement funds will result in money being available for longer term investments. The Vancouver public- private rental housing company is an example way to use these funds to finance rental housing.

3. Reuse Planning Tools Which Work

Looking back over the past decade, we have identified some planning tools which have not performed as well as we might have wished. We also see that some ideas have worked well. Generally, regulations which are based on a sound behavioural and technical foundation will stand the test of time. I recall some guidelines Vancouver did in the mid-1970s for designing housing for families living at high densities. At the time, the guidelines, which involved interviews with families, were reasonably expensive to generate. Fifteen years later, the guidelines, with minor modifications, are still found to be relevant.

After trying a variety of zoning carrots and sticks to provide housing for those most in need, the conclusion I have reached is that there are no 'quick fixes' to provide housing for low income people who require a combination of housing and support services. This is a public responsibility which requires some deep subsidies and ongoing assistance.

Recognizing that few funds are likely to be available from senior governments, cities need to seek alternate revenue to meet social objectives. Several speakers have suggested that the general tax base should be used to provide funds for social housing. Differential tax rates, for example, to tax offices in the core offers a more equitable means than linkage programs to provide a source for funds to mitigate housing and transportation costs resulting from core office employment.

The Role of Cities

While I would prefer not to end on a note of disagreement with John Sewell, I fear that I must do so. I am much more optimistic than John about the leadership role cities can play in finding workable solutions. We need only look at St. Lawrence in Toronto and False Creek in Vancouver to see city-initiated examples of new, mixed income, inner city communities. In both cities, the private sector has now recognized the potential to house people near jobs and has responded.

John Sewell raises the suggestion of new public-private partnerships. Vancouver is already experimenting with this idea. We have heard from other cities, where public-private partnerships are emerging. From experiments by cities willing to try new directions will come a better response to the provision of affordable housing. I look forward to sharing these new directions, when we meet to develop Toronto's Cityplan 2001.

William Witte, San Francisco

Bill Witte has recently become Principal in The Related Companies of California. Previously, he was the Acting Executive Director for the San Francisco Housing Authority and Deputy Mayor for Housing and Neighbourhoods. Educated at the University of Pennsylvannia, Mr. Witte has worked in Washington, D.C. for the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Listening to the earlier speakers, and having gone on the tour on Sunday, it is clear that we from other cities have as much to learn from you in Toronto about housing as you do from us. In particular, your success in achieving a mixed-income neighbourhood in St. Lawrence, and your non-profit co-operatives are models for us all. I am also struck by the similarities in the market dynamics of Toronto and San Francisco: a growing service-based economy centered around financial services; concern over a 'job-housing' imbalance; a growing immigrant population, particularly from Asia and the like.

San Francisco is a city of some 750,000 people contained in a mere 49 square miles. Surrounded by water on three sides, it has little room for growth. Not surprisingly, housing costs are among the highest in the U.S. I was both comforted and chagrined to hear from John Sewell that the 'N.I.M.B.Y.' syndrome is alive and well in Toronto; in San Francisco it has been refined to a higher art form.

This is in part a piece of the most fundamental problem in housing in the San Francisco area: there is grossly insufficient land devoted to residential (vs. commercial) use. All the creative financing programs in the world will not materially improve the housing affordability problem until and unless that land use question is addressed.

Local government can intervene in the housing market in two ways, in land use policy which is the most common means, and in financial assistance. San Francisco's experience over the last eight years is instructive in this regard, both for what we have accomplished and also for what we have not.

Land Use Policies

San Francisco has sought to make more land available for housing, and to control land prices, by a series of rezonings of neighbourhoods close to downtown. These include Rincon Hill and Rincon Point-South Beach (also a redevelopment area), which were underused warehouse districts in the path of commercial office development, and the Van Ness Avenue corridor, a major north-south retail/ commercial artery. About 3,000 new apartments have been built or are under construction in these areas over the past four years. Relatively few, however, are 'affordable', since the absence of publicly-controlled sites in these areas has eliminated land write-downs as a means of subsidizing affordability.

The City has also successfully instituted a policy of utilizing surplus public land for affordable housing. On several sites, including vacant redevelopment land, surplus school sites, and other surplus city-owned property (even air rights over public parking garages), the City has donated the land to developers (both for profit and non-profit) in return for guarantees of affordability on at least two thirds of the housing units constructed. The affordability is then maintained, or controlled, over time, by placing a 'silent' second lien on each lot/unit, the amount of which equals the appraised value of the donated land. If a moderate-income home buyer, for example, sells a unit to another income-eligible buyer, the second lien remains silent; if he or she sells it on the open market, the lien must be repaid to the City upon sale of the unit (Example: An 'affordable' unit is sold to a moderate-income buyer for $110,000. In actuality, the true market value of the unit is, say, $150,000. The second lien is thus $40,000 - the effective value of the donated land. As long as the unit remains in the possession of an income-eligible buyer, no payments are due on the $40,000. If not, the total amount is due and payable.) Further, the City maintains a right of first refusal, enabling it to 'buy back' an affordable unit and resell it to an income-eligible buyer.

San Francisco has offered density bonuses for affordability from time to time, but this method has proven of little practical value because the City's densely built-up character and the resultant neighbourhood resistance to more density has made it difficult to achieve politically even *allowable* densities.

Preservation of the existing stock of affordable housing is a major priority. The City has a moratorium on the conversion of residential (or single-room occupancy) hotels to tourist use, since 'S.R.O.' units house 12% of the City's low-income population. In addition, ***demolition*** of almost ***any*** housing is virtually impossible, unless the same number of units is replaced, and at pre-demolition rents. Most apartments are also under a rent stabilization ordinance, wherein tenants in place are protected by rent control and strict eviction controls. Once vacated, however, rents can be raised to market levels. The issue of controlling rents on vacated units is now being hotly debated. Finally, the City limits condominium conversions to 200 per year and to buildings with 6 units or less in which half the purchasers must be owner-occupants.

Financial Assistance

San Francisco has been a pioneer in the use of creative financing to develop affordable housing. In 1981, the City instituted the first 'linkage' program (the Office Housing Production Program), requiring developers of office buildings greater than 50,000 square feet to build or contribute to housing. Since that time, over $35 million has been contributed, and over 4,500 units of housing, over 75% for low and moderate-income people, have been financially assisted. In fact, since the program's inception, nearly 40% of ***all*** housing built in San Francisco has been assisted by the program, which speaks both to the program's success as well as the relatively low overall rate of housing production in the City.

Our linkage program has been premised on getting the office developers' money directly to the affordable housing developer (rather than passing through to the City) in order to insure a timely result. In addition, unlike Boston's program, all the money is due up front. While a multi-year pay-out system works on paper, what happens if the office developer fails to pay one year? The City then has a lien on the office building but little else, and you can't underwrite a housing project unless the necessary stream of subsidy payments is irrevocably guarantied.

In 1986, the linkage fee was set by ordinance at $5.34 per square foot of office space, to be adjusted annually (currently it is approaching $6.00 per foot). The housing fee has had no discernible effect on the demand for office permits, or on office rents. Once the requirement became known, it was factored into the cost of construction and probably deducted from the price of land, which is always a residual.

Perhaps our most innovative program was one which combined several land use and creative financing initiatives. In 1982, the City sold $60 million in tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds to finance low-cost mortgages for moderate-income first-time home buyers (though this financing is not applicable in Canada, the following program could still work, using whatever mortgage instrument is available). The $60 million in mortgages were combined with $5 million in linkage fees to produce a 'shared appreciation' mortgage pool to further reduce monthly cost to eligible buyers. For example, assume a buyer seeks to purchase a home on which mortgage payments would be $1,500/month, but can only afford $1,000/month. The pool contributes the $500 (but never more than 35% of the total), and the buyer increases his monthly payments by 5% per year until the subsidy is paid off. Upon sale of the unit, the buyer would 'share' with the pool a pro-rata portion of any appreciation (but never more than 50%, and nothing if there were no or negative appreciation - we always erred on the side of the buyer), based on the original amount of assistance. We then combined this financing with our surplus public land program and financed affordable housing on 11 publicly- owned sites.

Programs like this, in which multiple subsidies are employed, are essential to closing the 'affordability gap' in high-cost cities like San Francisco. The sad truth is that, without assistance from our state or federal government, even these programs generally only benefit working and middle-class people, so great are the subsidies needed. Without the federal government, which has effectively withdrawn from the housing scene, it is impossible to produce new housing for *low*-income people, the truly needy (Peter Dreier described well the withdrawal of the feds from housing over the past 8 years in the U.S.).

Under Mayor Art Agnos, San Francisco is also creating an annual affordable housing fund of $10 million, funded from property tax increments generated in redevelopment areas (California and a number of other states permit what is known as tax increment financing in certified redevelopment areas). This technique allows cities to float bonds backed by the projected increase, or increment, in property taxes in these areas. The proceeds can be used for public improvements, affordable housing (a minimum of 20% is required in California - San Francisco is proposing 50%), economic development, etc.

Until the land use question is addressed, until we in San Francisco begin to acknowledge the regional nature of the housing problem, and until more politicians are willing or able to stand up to the N.I.M.B.Y. syndrome, however, we'll be fighting a losing battle on housing as an *economic development* problem. Indeed, in San Francisco, Boston, New York and other cities, many businesses have either moved or are thinking about it, in part to permit their employees to be closer to affordable housing. As cities confront this reality, perhaps more action will be forthcoming.

Session 5

Responding to Transportation Congestion

Transportation congestion is a world-wide phenomenon in large urban centres. In Toronto, considerable public anxiety has been expressed over the fear that more commercial development inevitably entails more rush hour congestion. This session will look [illegible]hat an appropriate planning response to these worries might be and how other cities have addressed this fundamental issue of urban growth management.

Moderator: **Reg Lewis** *(President and General Manager, The Parking Authority of Toronto)*

Richard Soberman, Toronto

A graduate of Dalhousie University and M.I.T., Richard Soberman is Director of the University of Toronto-York University Joint Programme in Transportation and has recently been appointed Chairman of the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Toronto. Dr. Soberman formerly served as Director of the Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review, Director of Research for the Canadian Transport Commission, and a member of the National Capital Commission in Ottawa.

Introduction

Although traffic engineers have developed a science for measuring and dealing with congestion, in practical terms, congestion is really nothing more than the worst we have to deal with – as pedestrians trying to cross a busy street, as transit riders stranded in a subway car between stations, as motorists watching their engines overheat because traffic is not moving, as airline passengers waiting to check-in or as telephone users trying to direct dial on Mother's Day. Congestion results in delay, frustration, short tempers, accidents, wasted energy consumption, deteriorating air quality, higher costs of doing business, anxiety, and a widespread increase in the use of profanity and obscene gestures. Moreover, congestion can even create severe personality disorders; under extreme conditions, law abiding citizens become lawless, civilized gentlemen become boorish, and even cultured ladies often act in a very unladylike manner.

Congestion is, of course, relative. Whereas visitors from Kingston or Regina might find congestion in Toronto unbearable, Bostonians or New Yorkers would probably think things run pretty smoothly (unless they arrive at the airport, which is another story).

Congestion is particularly frustrating, because everyone who experiences it is confident they know how to deal with it, and because they cannot understand why 'obvious' solutions are not implemented. The typical road user, for example, doesn't understand why 'they' make road repairs or why trucks are permitted to load and unload on major arteries during the day instead of at night, why new roads cannot be constructed, or why commuter trains and subways cannot run more frequently. To most users of transportation, solving the congestion problem appears to require nothing more than common sense, a belief which only furthers their exasperation.

Users of Toronto's transportation system are not alone in their frustration. Specialists, professionals, and bureaucrats who deal with these problems complain about a wide range of factors that prevent them from effectively dealing with congestion. Such factors include the inadequacy of funding, interference from elected officials, the militancy of citizen organizations, interagency and intergovernmental rivalries, jurisdictional disputes, and even the failure of users to behave according to projections. Deep down, however, real professionals suffer the frustration of knowing that it is neither economically nor politically feasible to provide transportation services that are congestion-free one hundred percent of the time. As a result, they know that it will be impossible to fully satisfy either their constituents or their political masters. They also know that in dealing with congestion, they are essentially dealing with symptoms, as opposed to causes, with the result that cures are almost always of a short term nature rather than of lasting significance.

In dealing with these symptoms both in Toronto and elsewhere, a wide variety of cures has been proposed to alleviate urban (and more lately, suburban) travel congestion in cities throughout the world. Given the universal financial, community, and environmental problems associated with simply expanding the network of road and transit facilities, increasingly, emphasis has been placed on greater use of public transportation and greater efficiency in the use of existing roads as the principal means of alleviating congestion. In fact, the Institute of Transportation Engineering has recently produced a 'tool box' for alleviating congestion. These tools include reserved lanes for high occupancy vehicles, one-way street systems, incentives for car pooling, staggered work hours, and better traffic control and enforcement. The usefulness of such techniques, of course, depends upon the specific conditions that exist in a particular community. For this reason, it is useful to begin with a brief background on the context within which congestion is experienced in Toronto today.

Background

The existing system of transportation which serves Metro Toronto and its municipalities basically reflects a number of factors that are uncharacteristic of most comparable size urban areas in North America. Relative to similar size cities elsewhere in North America, Metropolitan Toronto is a compact urban area that has developed under a reasonably successful set of planning guidelines, which, in turn, were derived from a number of serious attempts to develop comprehensive plans for land use and transportation.[1] In addition, during the first decade following the establishment of Metropolitan Toronto, strong public support emerged for expansion of the transit system, largely as an outgrowth of local pride in Toronto's first subway and the successful development of a highly integrated network of buses, streetcars, and subways. Compared to other cities in North America, public and political support for sustained development of the transit network gained additional impetus from the successful implementation of the region's first experiment with commuter rail and the eventual emergence of provincial subsidy policies, which strongly favour public transit over roads.

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[1] In the late 60s, for example, the provincial government produced a planning concept known as ***Design for Development – The Toronto Centred Region Concept*** which emphasized decentralization and, in part, fostered development of the existing commuter rail network. Subsequently, in 1974, following heated debate about Metro's expressway network, the ***Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review*** favoured the development of concentrated sub-centres such as the North York and Scarborough City Centres as one means of alleviating transportation pressure on the downtown.

Much of the success of Toronto's transit system results from average land use densities that generate high numbers of trips per kilometre of service, employment concentrations (particularly in the Central Area) that are more easily served by transit (that is, a predominance of many origins to one destination as opposed to the 'many to many' patterns characteristic of other cities), basically sound transit management that places a strong emphasis on cleanliness, maintenance, and reliability, and the absence of serious concerns about the personal safety and security of using transit in off-peak periods, so often a major deterrent in many large urban areas. [2]

To place these characteristics in perspective, some simple comparisons of the transit service provided in two similar size areas by the Toronto Transit Commission and the Regional Transit District of Denver are interesting. The TTC serves a population of about 2.2 million within an area of 240 square miles, or an average population density of 9200 persons per square mile. The Denver RTD serves a population of about 1.8 million in an area of approximately 2300 square miles, for an average density of 780 persons per square mile. In relative terms, average incomes in Toronto are considerably higher than the national average, whereas in Denver, now considered to be an economically depressed area, average incomes are considerably lower than the national average. Thus, the TTC service area is more densely developed and more affluent than Denver's. Differences in operating characteristics that result under these circumstances are considerable. The TTC carries about 1.5 million passengers per week day, averaging 162 transit rides per capita annually, and recovers 71% of its operating costs from the fare box. The Denver RTD carries about 173,000 passengers per week day, or an average of 28 transit rides per capita annually, and recovers about 21% of its operating costs from the fare box. [3]

Both Metropolitan Toronto and the City are well served by public transportation in terms of major rapid transit facilities, the commuter rail network which serves long distance centrally oriented trips, a relatively dense grid of inter-connecting surface transit routes, and an overall operation, which is generally perceived to be one of the best in North America. By contrast, the network of expressways which serves the City is relatively modest in comparison with comparable size cities elsewhere. The net effect is that modal split achieved is the envy of many other jurisdictions; in 1986, for example, about 62% of peak period trips to and from Planning District 1 were made by transit, compared to 34% by automobile.

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[2] Very recent surveys by the *Toronto Star*, however, suggest that personal safety on transit is now becoming a major concern in Toronto, as well.

[3] These crude measures, of course, do not tell the entire story. For example, with its extensive network of subways and streetcars, the TTC operates a more capital intensive system which produces significant operating economies whereas in Denver, the entire transit system is comprised of buses operating in mixed traffic. The much higher capital intensity of the TTC system is attributable to the level of public support for rapid transit and the undeniable fact that from the standpoint of the TTC, capital is basically free (under current subsidy policies). In fact, it is only now for the first time, that the availability of additional capital for expansion of the rapid transit system is uncertain.

Exhibit 1

Major Transit Facilities Serving the City of Toronto


City of North York
City of Etobicoke
City of Scarborough
City of York
City of Toronto
Borough of East York
Hwy 400
Hwy 401
Hwy 409
Hwy 404
Hwy 427
Richmond Hill Go-Line
George Town Go-Line
North York Centre
Yonge Line
Allen Road
Black Creek Dr
Don Valley Pkwy
Yonge/ Eglinton
Yonge/ St Clair
Spadina Line
Scarborough RT
Scarborough City Centre
Kennedy/ Eglinton
Lakeshore East Go-Line
Kipling/ Islington
Bloor - Danforth Line
University Line
Milton Go-Line
Queen Elizabeth Way
Gardiner Expwy
Lakeshore West Go-Line
LAKE ONTARIO
Railway Cordon
Commuter Rail
Subway RT
Expressway

Nevertheless, there is a common perception that congestion within the City of Toronto is rapidly reaching unacceptable proportions. This perception may derive from an increasing number of vehicles and persons attempting to use existing road and transit facilities, a deterioration in the efficiency with which existing facilities are being utilized, or some combination of both factors. For the case of increasing volume of vehicular traffic, possible solutions include building new road facilities, using existing facilities more efficiently, redirecting travel patterns away from the Central Area, and diverting more automobile passengers to public transportation. For the case where increasing congestion can be attributed largely to decreasing efficiency in the use of existing facilities, then solutions clearly lie in using those facilities more efficiently. In both cases, achieving greater efficiency in the use of existing facilities stands out as an obvious solution.

Context

As in any large urban agglomeration, transportation and congestion within the City of Toronto must be viewed within the context of the larger environment that impacts on the City. The City itself is the focus of a wide variety of travel originating within the City, within Metropolitan Toronto, and from the surrounding regional municipalities which comprise the Greater Toronto Area (GTA).

Exhibits 2 and 3 provide typical projections of population and employment growth for Metropolitan Toronto and the adjacent regional municipalities.[4] In terms of population growth, these figures imply that Metropolitan Toronto itself may have reached its population capacity. (However, it may also be argued that the rapid increase in population anticipated in the outlying areas basically reflects nothing more than the search for affordable housing, which could be alleviated by increasing zoning densities within Metropolitan Toronto.) In any case, there is a considerable lag between projected employment growth outside of Metropolitan Toronto and the projected growth in population. In other words, what Exhibit 3 shows is that while the most significant component of recent and projected growth in population and employment *in relative terms* appears to be taking place outside of the City (in fact, outside of Metro Toronto), Metropolitan Toronto continues to maintain its dominance with respect to employment potential *in absolute terms*. Even though the *relative* importance of the City as an employment centre *within Metro* may be declining, intuitively these figures do suggest a sustained, if not increasing, volume of travel across the City's municipal boundaries as well as within the Central Area which is likely to continue for some time into the future.

This intuitive conclusion is not entirely supported by available data. According to one study, for example, the number of vehicular trips crossing the TTC's 'Railway Cordon' during the AM peak period (7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.) did not increase appre-

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[4] Various planning agencies within the GTA frequently change their demographic projections on the basis of the latest data and information. Nevertheless, the figures reflected in Exhibits 2 and 3 are illustrative of generally perceived trends.

Exhibit 2

Projected Population Toronto Region – 1981-2001



Exhibit 3

Distribution of Population and Employment Growth
Toronto Region – 1981 to 2001

Total Population Increase = 878,700



Total Employment Increase = 590,000



ciably over the period 1960 to 1985.[5] Although vehicular trips during this period did increase by about 5% over the 25 year period, there is no discernable trend. Other studies such as the 1987 *Metro Cordon Count Program* and the 1989 *Central Area Monitoring Program* do show increases in vehicular traffic across other cordons within the City of Toronto. However, although trends in vehicular traffic during peak periods may be inconclusive, there are definite trends that show increases in person trips, decreases in vehicle occupancy rates, and increases in the proportion of all trips made by public transportation.[6]

On a *daily* basis, however, there is fairly general agreement that twelve hour, two-way vehicular trips have been increasing. From the standpoint of congestion, this trend may account for the increasing perception that congestion is now worse during off-peak periods than during the traditional 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. peaks.

Other factors also account for the perception that congestion within the City of Toronto is reaching unacceptable proportions. Woodward's study, for example, suggests that the gradual substitution of professional workers for clerical workers has raised a greater awareness of the problems of congestion. Presumably, an increasing proportion of professionals who are not as tied to the traditional 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. work day may be more sensitized to off-peak congestion. However, it is more likely that the changing nature of downtown employment, accompanied by large relative growth in the service sector, has increased congestion attributable to parking, a large increase in the number of service vehicles, and the widespread use of couriers. For the casual observer, both service vehicles and couriers appear to be totally unregulated in terms of their use of available road space, a fact which adds considerably to automobile congestion and, equally important, to congestion and delay experienced by transit vehicles.

In addition, although many of the new employment opportunities being created within Metropolitan Toronto are emerging at subcentres outside of the City, the Central Area still remains the single most important focus for work trips generated from the regional municipalities adjacent to Toronto. In these regions, available transit service is well below the level provided within Metropolitan Toronto, and the role of the automobile is more dominant. Exhibits 4 and 5 show, for example, the broad distribution of origins for 1986 daily work trips to Planning District 1. Exhibit 5 illustrates the significance of long distance travel and modal split from the outlying regions of the GTA. According to recent results reported in the *Central Area Monitoring Program*, for example, over the period 1981 to 1986, of the 24 hour work trips destined to Planning District 1, those originating within

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[5] Stephen Woodward, *The Transportation/Land Use Relationship Within the Central Area, 1960-1985*, University of Toronto, Masters Program in Planning, April, 1989. The railway cordon isroughly the same as Metro's Central Area Cordon shown in Exhibit 1.

[6] There is also some evidence that total ridership on the TTC subway system has barely increased and, in some cases, even decreased. In part, these observations may reflect the fact that ridership has reached the capacity limit of these facilities (which may even have declined as a result of aging fixed plant and equipment). Alternatively, some of the traditional TTC traffic may also have been diverted to commuter rail services which have expanded considerably throughout the last 20 years.

Exhibit 4

1986 Distribution of Daily Work Trip Origins from Metropolitan Toronto to Planning District 1


PEEL
YORK
DURHAM
HALTON
HAMILTON-WENTWORTH
5,000
TRANSIT TRIPS
0
5,000
AUTO TRIPS
0

Exhibit 5

1986 Distribution of Daily Work Trips Origins from outside Metropolitan Toronto to Planning District 1


9
8
7
10
3
2
11
4
DESTINATION
1
12
5
6
13
16
14
15
5,000
TRANSIT TRIPS
0
5,000
AUTO TRIPS
0

Metro declined from 84.2% to 80.6%, while those originating outside of Metro increased from 15.8% to 19.4%. These centrally oriented travel patterns influence both the City's transportation needs and the level of congestion experienced.

Key Issues

Aside from a number of specific transportation issues discussed below, two basic problems are encountered in attempting to deal effectively with congestion (whether perceived or real) within the City of Toronto. One relates to finance, the other to politics, although in the final analysis both are political.

The financial problem essentially concerns increasing competition for limited funds. Overall, of course, there is increasing competition for provincial and municipal funds from other than the transportation sector. Health, education, and welfare programs are just a few examples of increasing pressures on provincial and municipal budgets, which preclude large infusions of new funds to deal with transportation problems.[7] Within the available provincial funding for transport improvements, however, there is also increased competition and pressure to allocate a relatively higher proportion of budgets to the outlying regional municipalities. In those areas, transportation needs may be more pressing than the needs of either Metropolitan Toronto or the City of Toronto. As evidenced by the current controversy over funding for the expansion of the TTC subway network, major spending within Metropolitan Toronto may pre-empt the provincial government's capability for accommodating the needs of other GTA constituencies which are generally more poorly served by transportation facilities.

Even if sufficient funding were available, transportation solutions that involve new road and transit improvements still face considerable political opposition, either on grounds of their localized community impacts, or doctrinaire ideas on restricting automobile use. Despite any major improvement to the road system over the last twenty years, for example, proposed road improvements such as the Leslie Street extension, local road widenings, and traffic engineering improvements still encounter considerable community and political opposition. Even transit improvements, such as the LRT link between the new Harbourfront LRT and the Bloor-Danforth Subway, also face serious opposition from community groups and elected officials concerned with the preservation of existing neighbourhoods. By contrast, in the regions competing with Metro (and the City) for limited funds, the need for improved transportation is more generally accepted and less controversial. As a result, there may be some additional attraction for the Province to commit funding in areas where it is appreciated.

In more specific terms, probably six key issues relate most directly to dealing with the problem of congestion within the City of Toronto. These include: capacity of the

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[7] Both municipal road and transit improvements are highly dependent on provincial funding; 50% of the capital cost of roads, 75% of the capital cost of transit, and 50% of transit operating losses are covered by provincial subsidy programs for municipal transit.

Yonge Subway, expansion of the commuter rail system, opposition to road and transit improvements, planning concepts that may take pressure off the central city and/or reduce the need for commuting, and the inefficient use of street space. In addition, there is an attitudinal issue, probably best described as a 'mind set', that results in an environment which is not particularly receptive to innovative concepts or conducive to experimentation and demonstration.

Yonge Subway

The Yonge Subway is currently the principal focus of the transit system, which serves Metropolitan Toronto as well as a wide variety of interregional transit services that concentrate on its most northerly terminal at Finch Avenue. Due to high volumes, (at the rate of 30,000 to 35,000 passengers per hour per direction for short periods) averaging about 27,500 passengers per hour during the peak period, the Yonge Subway currently operates at or near its maximum capacity. (By contrast, the parallel Spadina Subway carries considerably lower volumes.) Crowding and congestion on the Yonge Subway is considered unacceptable, particularly south of the Bloor station, where major transfers take place between the Bloor-Danforth Subway and the Yonge Subway. Moreover, recent analyses of travel demand in the GTA suggest that this corridor will continue to be the most important transit route serving the Central Area, both for trips originating within Metropolitan Toronto as well as those originating within the Region of York.

For a variety of reasons related to the existing signal system, performance characteristics of an aging vehicle fleet, turnaround facilities at terminals, the relatively short station spacing within the Central Area, and lengthy dwell times at the Bloor station, the maximum frequency of train service presently possible is limited to about 28 trains per hour. Recent studies by the TTC and others suggest that additional capacity could be provided through a number of operational and capital improvements that would permit frequencies of about 35 trains per hour, or a capacity increase of some 20 to 25 percent.

The cost of such improvements, however, would be considerable, possibly $165 – $200 million;[8] there would also be considerable disruption of service during the implementation period. Aside from those technical and cost considerations, there is certainly some concern that any expansion of Yonge Subway capacity could encourage further urban sprawl to the north by improving the attractiveness of long distance commuting.

Commuter Rail

Much of the increase in transit travel to the Central Area from outlying regions can be attributed to expansion of the commuter rail network, which is focused almost entirely on Union Station. According to the *Central Area Monitoring Program*, for example, passenger arrivals at Union Station between 7:00 and 10:00 AM have increased from about 12,500 in 1977 to about 27,500 in 1988. On five of the seven routes currently in operation, however, ridership potential is seriously restricted by service which is limited to peak periods only and, in some cases, relatively low frequency during these periods (as in the case of the Bradford service which operates only one train during peak periods). There is general consensus that these limitations on train frequency significantly detract from the full ridership potential of the market areas served by these routes. However, GO Transit, the provincial government agency that operates these services, has a relatively poor bargaining position with the railways that own these facilities. As a result, increases in train frequency can only be achieved at considerable cost, including additional operating costs as well as capital investment to expand the railways' facilities. Due to the long distances generally involved, rolling stock utilization is frequently low and, due to the problems and high cost of acquiring time slots on the railways, some services are very equipment rich.[9] Increases in train frequency are also impeded by track availability within Union Station.

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[8] Some proposals suggest that compared to the present 28 trains per hour, frequencies could be increased to 30, 32, and 40 trains per hour for investments of $1, $164, and $353 million, respectively. Certainly, adding two trains per hour for an investment of $1 million in signalling seems like a bargain.

Clearly, expansion of service on the network of commuter rail services could do a great deal to alleviate congestion within the City of Toronto by diverting automobile passengers as well as transit users who now contribute to congestion on the Yonge Subway. However, the costs involved are considerable and for any affordable expenditure pattern, establishing priorities is complicated by a variety of political factors and considerations of regional equity. In addition, difficulties related to fare integration and service coordination as well as equitable fare policies within the GTA, though now receiving serious attention, represent important impediments to be overcome.

Opposition to Road and Transit Improvements

As noted above, there is still serious opposition to both road and transit improvements that are likely to increase the accessibility of the City of Toronto or encourage additional commuting to employment within the Central Area. Aside from opposition to system expansion, that is, *new* road and transit improvements, there are even examples of actual impediments introduced to harass motorists. These include barricades, speed bumps and the indiscriminate use of four-way stop signs, all oriented to increasing circuitous routing. With no improvement in alternative routes, these measures do little to reduce congestion in local neighbourhoods. They do, however, result in increased fuel consumption, higher levels of air pollution, and increased accident frequency. The adoption of such measures is generally more prevalent in subareas where local political influence is greater and on facilities which fall under the jurisdiction of the City of Toronto, as opposed to the Metropolitan government. Although such measures are usually limited to local streets that do not really affect the capacity of the downtown road system, they are symptomatic of broader issues and attitudes that do affect policies for dealing with congestion.

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[9] In other words, because of the high costs of returning (or 'dead heading') inbound trains to suburban terminals during the morning peak, some trains are used only once in the inbound direction.

Subcentre Concepts

Both Metropolitan Toronto and the City of Toronto essentially endorse the concept of regional subcentre development for a variety of urban planning reasons, including relieving some of the pressure on centrally oriented transportation facilities. Encouraging the development of these subcentres, as in the case of the North York and Scarborough City Centres, requires long term investment in transportation facilities in order to improve the general accessibility of such locations from a wide variety of points throughout the GTA. Faced with congestion on existing centrally oriented facilities, the dilemma faced by all three levels of government (provincial, metropolitan, and city) is how to allocate limited funds for satisfying existing needs while simultaneously using funds to stimulate development that is consistent with longer term objectives, where present travel demand is modest.

The current controversy over the proposed Sheppard Avenue subway is a case in point. Metropolitan Toronto has determined that the construction of this subway has the highest priority from the standpoint of development plans for the Metropolitan area.[10] Given the limited availability of funds, however, other governmental agencies view extension of such centrally oriented transit facilities as of the Spadina and Yonge subways, construction of an Eglinton West rapid transit facility, and expansion of the commuter rail network as higher priority projects for accommodating the significant increase in travel demand across Metro's western and northern boundaries. Under these circumstances, compromises eventually reached in the political arena may be less than optimal from the standpoint of either short term or longer term considerations.

Inefficient Use of Road Space

There is little doubt that much of the perceived congestion within the City of Toronto today can be attributed to the inefficient use of available road space. Contributing factors include parked vehicles (automobiles, couriers, service vehicles, and trucks), which obstruct the flow of traffic and which reduce capacity by some 600 to 700 vehicles per hour per lane, turning movements at strategic locations that, in addition to obstructing traffic, delay transit vehicles and increase the costs of bus and streetcar service, declining automobile occupancy rates, and general driver behaviour that, under congested conditions, eventually leads to the infamous 'gridlock'. The cumulative effect of reductions in street capacity resulting from these factors throughout the City exceeds, by far, the additional capacity that might be gained if all road projects on the books were to be implemented.

The inefficient use of road space derives from both outdated regulations and poor enforcement. For example, historical parking regulations during peak periods are no longer appropriate for changing travel patterns and longer peak periods. [11] Increasingly, they are almost totally ignored. Streetcars worth $2 million, each carrying perhaps 30 passengers, sit in traffic behind $7000 automobiles with one or two persons turning left at major intersections like St. Clair and Avenue Road. Through traffic on two lane roads is entirely blocked by one vehicle turning left and another turning right at intersections well known for their high pedestrian volumes, and inconsiderate (or day dreaming) drivers enter intersections which they have no chance of clearing. Meanwhile, limited traffic enforcement personnel are ticketing parked cars at expired meters and ignoring vehicles blocking major streets and intersections. Thus, there are problems related to the appropriateness of current regulations, priorities for enforcement, and the lack of political will to implement obvious solutions.

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[10] In this regard, official positions of Metropolitan Toronto on transportation are confusing. Arguments in favour of the Sheppard Subway related to conformity with land use objectives are basically inconsistent with Metro's long standing endorsement of construction of the Spadina Expressway.

Mind Set

It is not really possible to discuss transportation problems of the City without understanding both the professional and political environment within which possible options are examined. By and large, Toronto is generally perceived to be a highly liveable large city by North American standards as well as a highly successful experiment in Metropolitan government. The airport (a federal responsibility) notwithstanding, Toronto continues to receive international praise as an efficient municipal administration. Much of this praise is attributed to its commitment to high quality public transit. In the light of this high and well deserved standing, neither the established bureaucracy nor the body politic is particularly receptive to new ideas whose time may have come.

Simply stated, there is a strong predilection within this area to respond to most transportation problems with solutions that require massive capital investment in infrastructure, such as subways and expressways. The financial constraints and increasing taxpayer concerns which Toronto and the surrounding area are likely to face for a long time to come have been insufficient, as yet, to force more serious consideration of alternatives that are more modest in terms of their capital needs.

Within Metro, for example, very little consideration has been given to expanding the network of rapid transit services by means other than subways, generally perceived to be the preferred technology on the basis of past experience. In much of the current dialogue on future transportation needs, there is an explicit assumption that the subway network will continue to be expanded at a constant annual rate of investment. Subway construction, however, is a very costly business and, in terms of implementation, expansion of the subway network generally proceeds at a relatively slow rate. For many of the priority transit corridors identified in various studies, including Metro's *Network 2011*, potential volumes are such that intermediate capacity forms of rapid transit such as LRT or busways may represent a more cost effective means of spreading available capital over a larger geographic area.

[11] Recently, in response to recommendations of the Mayor's advisory group on congestion, no stopping regulations in the central area were extended or altered from 7:30 to 9:30 am and from to 3:30 – 6:30 pm. This is clearly a step in the right direction, but there is still a need to extend these regulations well beyond their current geographic limits and achieve greater compliance.

Other examples of alternatives to large scale capital investment which have been reasonably successful in other Canadian and U.S. cities have never found much favour within Toronto. These include express (and sometimes premium) bus services, exclusive transit lanes on freeways, and more productive utilization of street space through preferential treatment for high occupancy vehicles. There are some particularly successful examples of high occupancy vehicle lanes in Houston and Washington, D.C. In addition, institutional barriers, subsidy policies, and political attitudes in the region have basically precluded opportunities for using the capabilities of the private sector for providing a variety of paratransit services that could increase transit use. Essentially, the basic issue here involves a conflict between a continued commitment to relatively slow, incremental, high quality expansion of the existing transit system based on past traditions and experience and the willingness to consider other alternatives for obtaining the greatest value for increasingly limited funds.

Prescriptions for the Future

Dealing with congestion in the City of Toronto involves three basic inter-related approaches. One involves ***reducing the number of vehicles entering the City*** by encouraging greater reliance on public transit for trips originating in outlying regions,[12] through incentives for higher vehicle occupancy and by supporting policies that encourage development of regional subcentres so as to reduce transportation demand within the City.[13] In other words, this approach involves reducing travel demand to the central city, diverting more of the remaining demand to transit, and for the residual automobile traffic, ensuring that available road space is used more intensively.

A second approach involves attempting to establish ***a better balance between housing and employment within the City itself,*** perhaps by tying approval of new development proposals for offices and commercial activity to the provision of a housing component for these developments. Over the long run, presumably, such controls would lead to situations in which more of the inner city employment opportunities are filled by residents of the city who are more likely to use transit. This approach could also be extended to other areas of Metro, where strip commercial development located on major transit arteries could be developed more intensively by incorporating more housing within redevelopment proposals.

The third approach concerns ***using existing roads and streets more efficiently,*** both to increase their carrying capacity and to increase the speed and reliability of transit services, as well. Existing road space is an extremely valuable resource, and some tough decisions are required as to the best use of this limited resource.

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[12] Modal split for Metro based work trips to the Central Area is already high (about 62%) compared, for example, to less than 18% of work trips to the central area originating in the Region of York.

[13] In the light of the encouragement being given to new office commercial development within the central city, however, it is not entirely clear that achieving this objective is possible.

The remainder of this paper concentrates on approaches designed to increase modal split and improve the utilization of existing facilities. Land use approaches (emphasis on regional subcentres and increasing the housing component of new development) are better left to those more experienced in the preparation of official plans and the approval process for new development applications. Moreover, such approaches are generally well accepted and less contentious, at least until specific cases are handled. It is really the more controversial decisions with respect to new transportation investments and management of existing transportation facilities which ultimately force elected officials to take clear positions on one side or another of specific issues. These decisions basically concern transportation investment, regulation, and enforcement.

Transportation Investment

As noted previously, modal split, or the proportion of trips made by public transit to destinations within the central city, is already at an enviable high, at least for those downtown trips originating within Metropolitan Toronto. In the case of trips originating from the Regions of Peel and York, there is considerable room for increasing the percentage of trips taken by transit and thereby reducing vehicular volumes. With the rapid growth in residential development within these adjacent suburban regions, there are ample opportunities for influencing the travel habits of these commuters *at an early stage* by supporting the expansion of commuter rail services, particularly on the Milton and Georgetown routes, which serve the Region of Peel, and on the Richmond Hill and Stouffville routes, which serve central York Region and Markham. Moreover, recognizing the strong travel demand along the entire Yonge street corridor from the waterfront to Richmond Hill, increasing the capacity of the Yonge Street subway remains the highest priority means of alleviating traffic congestion in the central city. At the same time, every opportunity for reorienting Yonge corridor demand to the less intensively used Spadina Subway should be exploited. In fact, both the Yonge and Spadina subways should basically be considered as a single channel serving the North York City Centre and Toronto.

Metropolitan Toronto's experience with transit, however, shows that the real strength of the transit system relates not only to peak period trips but to the general ability of the transit system to accommodate a wide variety of trip purposes over other periods of the day, as well. The likelihood of achieving improvements in general, area-wide transit accessibility will clearly be enhanced through major east-west rapid transit services which serve as distributors to a network that is now basically radial in nature. As an important by-product, over the long term, major east-west distributors along Eglinton (west of Spadina) and somewhere between Highway 401 and the north Metro boundary will also support development of regional subcentres and ultimately reduce, at least in relative terms, centrally oriented travel.

These 'mega projects' – increasing Yonge Subway capacity, expanding service on GO Transit commuter rail service, and constructing new east-west rapid transit distributors – obviously do not fall within the jurisdictional responsibility of the City of Toronto. However, the City does have a number of avenues for influencing decision-making at the Metropolitan and provincial levels through representation on Metro Council and through direct approaches to the Minister of Transportation. In addition, decision-making at the political level often responds to proposals developed by the bureaucracy. For this reason, the City has a large stake in ensuring greater involvement of its professional staff at the planning stage and more cooperation with agencies of the metropolitan and provincial governments than has traditionally been the case.

In considering some of these large scale and costly long term solutions, it is also important to recognize that the time may be right for considering how the rapid transit system can be expanded in a more cost-effective manner by considering *the full range of transit technology*. There are technologies other than subways for providing rapid transit at lower costs per kilometre, particularly where potential volumes are far below the ultimate capacity of a subway. Examples include exclusive transit lanes and busways with priority treatment at intersections as well as a number of other 'higher order' transit technologies that have been successfully applied in many other cities. Aside from saving in construction costs, such technologies can usually be implemented more quickly. As noted previously, consideration of more innovative approaches to expansion of the transit system, particularly in the case of east-west 'suburban' distributors, do require some fairly serious attitudinal changes.

With respect to road investment, there is clearly a need to redress the large imbalance between road and transit spending and proceed with a number of road improvements, such as the Front Street extension and various road widening proposals that have been developed on the basis of sound principles of traffic engineering. In addition, if we are serious about today's congestion, a larger component of available transportation funds should be earmarked for accelerated maintenance and rehabilitation to reduce the time and disruption of traffic required for these needed repairs.

Traffic Regulations

Given the austerity conditions under which all levels of government operate, the rate at which major improvements can be made to the transit system is relatively slow (five years, for example, to extend the Spadina Subway from its current terminal at Wilson to Sheppard Avenue at a cost of some $180 million). As a result, beneficial impacts on congestion will take a long time to materialize. In the interim, there are a number of common sense actions and priorities that need attention, if we are to begin to deal with congestion now.

Traffic regulations that can be used to reduce congestion relate primarily to on-street parking, prohibitions of turning movements, rules of the road with regard to intersections, the designation of high occupancy vehicle lanes for both transit vehicles and automobiles, and the application of sound principles of traffic engineering.

The need for changes in on-street *parking regulations* relates to both major arterials and adjacent local streets. With the more flexible starting and quitting times characteristic of the professional and service employees who now dominate Central Area employment, parking and stopping restrictions (7:00 to 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 to 6:00 p.m.) adopted in the 1950s are really no longer appropriate for the travel patterns and expanded peak periods that have emerged since the formation of Metropolitan Toronto. In fact, congestion within the City is actually worse during 'shoulder' times around 9:00 a.m., 3:00 p.m., and 6:00 p.m., when even a single parked vehicle greatly reduces the capacity of a particular street or intersection. Moreover, even on minor streets (such as Asquith, immediately north of Bloor and East of Yonge) parked vehicles (legal or otherwise) greatly increase congestion on arterial roads, as turning vehicles, unable to make a graceful exit from the arterial road, effectively block the entire lane. Clearly, there is a need to expand parking restrictions on both arterial roads and local streets which affect operations on these arterials. As noted previously, the City (but not Metro) has recently taken some initiatives in this direction.

Turning movements have obvious implications for transit vehicles, other vehicular traffic, and pedestrians. Because of the hierarchy of responsibility for Metro and City roads, regulations and prohibitions related to turning movements represent one area where the City can take a more proactive stand and work in cooperation with the Metropolitan Toronto Department of Roads and Traffic. For example, while St. George Street, which runs through the middle of the University of Toronto, is not considered as an arterial road, traffic levels are reasonably high during peak periods. With the heavy volume of pedestrian activity at St. George and Bloor, two vehicles simultaneously turning right and left greatly increase queuing and delay and essentially reduce the capacity of the street to a few cars per signal cycle. Often, spill-over effects are experienced at nearby intersections which are the responsibility of Metropolitan Toronto. Where the need for turning movements is clearly identifiable, it is possible, of course, to introduce separate signal phases but, in many cases, the net effect is to reduce intersection capacity and increase congestion.

To most people, the term 'gridlock' symbolizes a picture of cars intertwined in a fine mesh, as pedestrians step from bumper to bumper. Whether such conditions arise from inconsiderate or inattentive drivers, experience elsewhere demonstrates that strict *rules of the road* against blocking intersections together with the generous application of painted zebra stripes can go a long way in reducing the occurrence of this phenomenon.

Improvements in the efficiency with which available street space is used can also be achieved through careful consideration of designated ***high occupancy vehicle lanes*** as well as lanes designated for use by transit vehicles only. Transit vehicle lanes are particularly appropriate in the case of streetcars, where interference from other vehicular traffic (including turning vehicles) increases operating costs, reduces productivity of these very expensive vehicles, and results in average speeds which are unlikely to attract new ridership. On sections of some streets, such as St. Clair Avenue, there is ample road space to allow for exclusive transit lanes. Obviously, care must be exercised in selecting the locations of exclusive transit lanes because, ultimately, ***it is the people carrying capacity of a street that should be maximized.*** Other means of preferential treatment for high occupancy automobiles, too numerous to discuss here, can also be used selectively to encourage more efficient use of available street space, with corresponding reductions in congestion.

Finally, at the risk of alienating societies for the prevention of cruelty to neighbourhoods, it is really time that traffic engineering professionals exercised some leadership with regard to the matter of ***traffic control devices.*** Methods of traffic control have emerged over the years as the basis for alleviating congestion (with all the related effects on energy conservation and air pollution) and reducing injuries and fatalities due to traffic accidents. Tormenting drivers through the indiscriminate use of four-way stop signs, the creation of traffic mazes, and the installation of speed bumps and other physical barriers are all measures that may pander to the politically influential, but they achieve little, in real terms, to alleviate traffic within neighbourhoods. Transportation professionals have been too quiet on those matters.

Enforcement

Measures described above for alleviating congestion will, of course, have little impact without effective enforcement. Recognizing that police officers have more serious problems to address, there are still opportunities to use whatever resources are available more effectively. Within the hierarchy of perpetrators who contribute to traffic congestion, some deserve more attention than others. Enforcement agencies should concentrate on these. In Exhibit 6, for example, parked vehicles A and B are more deserving of attention and immediate justice than vehicle C (whose nuisance value may exceed its impact on intersection capacity). Vehicle D is also a good candidate for extreme action. It would be far more effective to have parking control officers concentrate their attention in these zones of real congestion than to spend their time waiting for meters to run out, as in the case of vehicle E. And it can be left to the reader's discretion whether the $10.00 earned by the courier parked at F justifies the costs and delays to the transit vehicles and automobiles backed-up as far as the eye can see.

Exhibit 6

Some Examples of Enforcement Priorities



Clearly, traffic and enforcement agencies should cooperate in establishing priorities and concentrating resources on the most important offenders, as opposed to the easiest targets. Moreover, there must be an end to the preferential treatment given to commercial vehicles (couriers, service vehicles, and delivery trucks) over automobiles, at least until such time as formal recognition is given to the rights of one group of road users over another. The courier driver stopping on Yonge Street for a take-out coffee should be treated no differently than the automobile driver stopping to use a bank machine. As to the needed resources, better enforcement can be a real money maker and easily cover the costs of additional staff required. Presumably, many of these issues will be considered by the recently created Parking Enforcement Sub-Committee.

Conclusion

For a variety of reasons, there is a common perception that congestion within the downtown has reached unacceptable levels from the standpoint of users, businesses, negative community impacts, and air quality. While data related to traffic movements to, from, and within Toronto's downtown are inconclusive with respect to the magnitude of traffic increases, for many years to come, the Central Area of Toronto is likely to remain the focus of increasing work trips generated throughout the entire Greater Toronto Area. Any significant decline in the absolute volume of vehicular traffic attempting to enter the downtown as the result of regional dispersion of employment opportunities is ruled out by most analysts.

Aside from increases in volumes, perceived congestion within the City can be attributed to a number of other factors. These include: the inability of some transit expansion programs to keep pace with growing demand, the more widespread dominance of couriers and service vehicles that reflect the changing character of downtown employment, deterioration in driver behaviour and enforcement of traffic laws, the inadequacy of funding for road maintenance and rehabilitation which lengthens the period over which repairs are made, the spreading of peak periods beyond the traditional rush hours, a general decline in automobile occupancy rates, and the inadequacy of traffic control regulations and enforcement.

In order to deal with congestion, perceived or real, there are a variety of steps that should be taken to divert more of the centrally bound traffic to public transportation. Over the longer term, the greatest potential for increasing the use of transit for centrally oriented trips lies in increasing capacity of the Yonge subway, network changes that support greater use of the Spadina Subway, and expanding service on radial commuter rail routes that serve the outlying areas from which Toronto's employment is drawn. East-west rapid transit distributors along Eglinton (west of Spadina) and north of Highway 401 (somewhere between Sheppard and Steeles) are important means of generally increasing the overall accessibility of public transit for a wide variety of origins and destinations throughout Metropolitan Toronto. In addition, there are a number of road extensions and widenings within the City as well as accelerated maintenance and rehabilitation that should be funded on the basis of their contribution to reduced congestion and more efficient flow of traffic.

Over the near term, steps should also be taken that will increase the efficiency with which existing street space is used by eliminating some of the unnecessary impediments to freer traffic flow. What is required is a systematic review of the appropriateness of on-street parking regulations, prohibitions related to turning movements, and opportunities for designating high occupancy vehicle lanes for both transit vehicles and automobiles. In this regard, there are opportunities for greater cooperation between the City and Metro traffic departments to ensure coordinated approaches. More attention should also be paid to developing restrictions and controls based on principles of sound traffic engineering and accident reduction, particularly in the case of traffic control devices, such as stop signs, rather than in response to parochial objectives designed to persecute already beleaguered drivers.

Finally, the whole question of enforcement and enforcement priorities needs serious attention. A wide variety of felons is involved in the traffic maze, and while incarceration of all may be the ultimate solution, traffic enforcement agencies should concentrate first on the types of violations which contribute most to congestion without discriminating among automobiles, couriers, service vehicles, and trucks. Although there are some important vested interests at stake here, clearly, there will be no gain without pain. The true measure of political will to deal with congestion over the long term will be reflected in some of the decisions that have to be taken here and now.

Lawrence Dahms, San Francisco

Larry Dahms is Executive Director of the San Francisco Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC). Educated at San Diego State University and Sacramento State University, Mr. Dahms was previously Director of Planning and Research and then Acting General Manager for the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART). Prior to becoming Executive Director of the MTC in December 1977, Mr. Dahms worked as a consultant and Deputy Director of the California Department of Transportation.

The Toronto Cityplan: Dealing with Congestion

Richard Gwyn's global economy impetus for re-emergence of the City states Jane Jacobs, "The City generates the economy, and the nation divides the spoils". The concept puts in bold relief an argument we have used to combat the U.S. natural policies that sometimes seem to be anti-city. It raises several questions, however, one of which has to do with defining what the modern day city is.

Sunday, you heard an impressive description of the San Francisco Planning Commission activities by its Director, Dean Macris. Dean was justly commended for exuding his pride in the City - his City. As a one time resident, current neighbour and metropolitan planning partner of San Francisco, I too applaud Dean, his work and his City. But is the City of San Francisco an emerging City state as a unique economic unit - or is it a vital part of a larger city state which embodies the entire metropolitan community?

Consider these measures of San Francisco's place in our community. It is not the traditional City centre as is a New York, Chicago, or other traditional large American city. It is not even the largest city in our region. San Jose's population now exceeds that of San Francisco, each having just over 700,000 population. Together, however, they are not dominant in a metropolitan area having 5.5 million. San Francisco has a robust economy it added 100,000 jobs in the 70-80 decade. But Santa Clara County, the home of our computer industry or Silicon Valley, gained 300,000 jobs in that same decade. And, finally, the San Francisco addition of 100,000 jobs happened without any increase in population.

While Linda Hausrath indicated last night that job growth can exceed housing or even population growth given the emergence of women in the work force, most of San Francisco job growth was made possible by the people carrying capacity of regional transit carriers - the BART (rail system delivering workers from the south and east) and by commuter rail buses and ferries operated by four other regional carriers.

These facts suggest at least that our City state leaves Metropolitan or regional scale extending beyond the limits of San Francisco. This does not suggest, however, that San Francisco should not engage in the kind of planning activities described by Dean. They must in order to be conducted at a scale relevant to that vibrant community. Their planning, however, must explicitly take into account the regional planning which must also occur, as we jointly attempt to improve our community and while our evolutionary process sort out the importance of nations and states and emerging City states.

Dr. Soberman's reference to the benefits of increased commuter rail service and the potential for additional commuter service to relieve Toronto city centre congestion reveals that a similar Metro-City Planning partnership is required here. His revelation of potential investment trade-offs of capacity expansion in the City versus system expansion to encourage sub-centre development also dramatizes the City-Metro partnership dilemma. As these choices are being sorted out, Dr. Soberman's presumption of more reliance on transit and more efficient use of road spaces and conclusions that are hard to fault.

We share with you the impediments to implementing these seemingly obvious solutions. Dr. Soberman explains that these impediments fall into two categories: politics and finance. In this forum, a third impediment has been forcefully described. 'Vested interests will deny realities'. While the vested interests usually seem obvious, it is not so easy to define reality.

Your Toronto Cityplan will represent a long step in the right track if it is able to recognize, and accept, the constraints of reality while reaching to the limits of your community. Each of us has attempted to integrate our experiences with what we know of yours. On a pragmatic basis, I have long been an admirer of the preference Toronto has given to its transit systems and the benefits you have derived from that commitment.

At another dimension, I found in one of your prominent documents an expression which I would hope truly reflects the heart and soul of Toronto. We are told:

> *"It is important to understand that Toronto is a mosaic, not a melting pot. Cultural and ethnic differences are accepted, appreciated and celebrated".*

I agree, for that expression of community certainly provides the basis for your plan and your future. Thank you for inviting me to share in a small part of it.

Michele Jodoin, Montreal

Michele Jodoin is Assistant Director of the City of Montreal Housing and Urban Development Department and President of an inter-departmental task force on transportation in Montreal. Educated at Marie-de-France College and the University of Montreal and holding a specialization in transportation at the University of Washington, Seattle, Mrs. Jodoin was previously Vice President of the Quebec Planning Commission and principal consultant to the de Cotret and Picard Committees on the economic development of the Montreal area.

Montreal's Approach to Traffic Congestion

Long blessed with high residential densities and low car ownership, Montreal is presently undergoing the pangs of urban sprawl. Its roadways are becoming congested at rush hours, transportation infrastructure and services are sometimes used beyond capacity, and projections do not foresee any alleviation of the problems.

Congestion is symptomatic of a larger underlying problem for which there is no easy solution. Action, however, can and must be taken at provincial, regional, and municipal levels of government to relieve the symptoms in the short term and act on causes in the long term.

Background

The Island of Montreal is tied to its suburbs by 17 bridges. The greater metropolitan area is made up of 105 municipalities, 29 of which are located on the island itself and make up the Montreal Urban Community (MUC). Populations of the City of Montreal, the MUC and the Greater metropolitan area are: 1,015,000, 1,753,000 and 2,892,000, respectively. Areas are 176 km^2, 493 km^2, and 3330 km^2.

The metropolitan area of Montreal is an off-centre spearhead of the province's economy with 45% of Quebec's population living in this region. But where Ontario has a dozen or so medium-size cities to support Toronto's ranking, the province of Quebec has only four. Thus Montreal, which is not even a capital city, has a more fragile hinterland. Still, this is where business and technological exchanges take place, new methods, products, and services emerge, and greater opportunity in terms of markets, financing and services exists. Regionally, Montreal also serves as a drawing card for new industries locating in municipalities outside the city who wish to provide their employees with the advantages of a large city and the quality of life of a smaller community. One way or the other, accessibility to the heart of the metropolitan area and efficient transportation infrastructure within are prerequisites to regional development.

Since the post-War period of 1945, the industrial backbone of the North American economy has shifted from urban centres toward the suburbs, drawing in its wake the manufacturing base. Montreal has been late in responding to this trend. Nevertheless, with the development of a highway network that encouraged greater mobility (see Map 1), the 1976 Census revealed a population exodus for the first time from Montreal to the suburbs. Between 1971 and 1981, the City of Montreal lost a total of 235,000 inhabitants.

Urban migration is costly to both local and provincial governments. The new, unserviced sectors require infrastructure such as roads, sewage systems, schools, libraries, and other services, while in the abandoned sector, similar infrastructures are closed or under-utilized. More importantly, increased use of the automobile - a concomitant of urban migration - places an additional strain on transportation infrastructure and services. Fortunately, this trend stabilized in the ensuing years between 1981 and 1986. The economic realities of the 1970's: the oil crisis, inflation, chronic deficits at both government levels, and an increased awareness of the cost of urban sprawl to society began to set in.

It was in this context that the Government of Quebec brought in its 'preferred development option' for the region of Montreal in 1978. This plan gave priority to mass transit and the consolidation of urban development in the central areas of the MUC, of Laval to the north, and of Longueil to the south. Its three main objectives were:

- To consolidate urban development within the existing built-up and serviced areas;
- to give priority to the redevelopment of older built-up areas;
- to place particular emphasis on improving the quality of life on the island of Montreal.

In addition, the plan was accompanied by a moratorium on new highway construction in the Montreal region and the implementation of an Agricultural Zoning Act.

During the same period, the Montreal Urban Community was working on its regional development plan and bringing forth proposals on the creation of three sub-centres, well served by public transit, intended to structure suburban economic activities, as well as to relieve downtown Montreal of some of its second-tier activities and the unnecessary traffic they generate.

The MUC development plan has yet to prove effective in this respect because it has only recently been approved (February 1987) and, in many areas, is still waiting on the development plans of its member municipalities in order to be fully implemented (conformity principle of the Quebec Planning Act).

On the government end however, the 'preferred option' has had time to affect the Montreal region's pattern of development. The 'Option', it may be recalled, favoured mass transit, agricultural zoning, and urban consolidation as checks against sprawl.

Population and household figures for the 1976-1986 period point to a weak growth in the centre of the island (see Graph 1 and Map 2). Yet, if this ten-year period is broken down into two smaller periods (1976-1981 and 1981-1986), the figures tell another story (see Graph 2 and its accompanying tables). Serviced areas have now gained twice as many new housing units as unserviced areas, and population loss seems to have been momentarily checked.

The same does not hold for overall employment figures. In 1971, 80.6% of all employment in the metropolitan area was concentrated in the MUC; by 1986, this figure has dropped to 69.2%. Likewise, employment in the MUC centre has decreased from 61.5% to 43.3%. Manufacturing employment has been decreasing (see Graph 3 and Map 3), but tertiary activities, especially basic as opposed to non-basic, have been quite strong (see Graph 4 and Map 4). After 1981, the 'Option' appears to have had a positive effect on stemming the flow of population off the island of Montreal and consolidating urban development to existing built-up areas.

In 1988, the Quebec Ministry of Transport announced its new transportation plan for the next decade. Although the plan states that the 'Option' will figure in the implementation of its plan, the overall laxity with which it has been applied in recent years foretells of a new, more lenient approach to sprawl.

The Transportation Network and Its Users

In 1986, the population of Greater Montreal was 2,892,000, 60% of which or 1,752,258 inhabitants, lived within the Montreal Urban Community.

Population density of the greater metropolitan area is 889 per square kilometre or 2,300 per square mile. Within the territory covered by the Montreal Urban

Community and served by its transit system (the Island of Montreal), density figures more than quadruple: 3,600 per square kilometre, or 9,310 per square mile. This is comparable to the population density of the territory serviced by the TTC: 9,200 per square mile.

This population is served by a well-developed transportation network: three subway lines, one of which goes to the South Shore; two train lines and two terminal stations; a bus service to the South Shore which uses a reserved bus lane over the Champlain Bridge; an inter-city bus terminal (Voyageur); and the Montreal Urban Community's extensive bus network (see Map 5).

Use of public transit in Montreal seems comparable with figures for Toronto: 50% of all trips to Montreal's central area are made by transit, while at morning peak hour, this figure increases to 66% (see Map 6). Bi-modal transportation, the combined use of car and public transit, still figures only marginally with 2% of commuters availing themselves of this option.

In absolute terms, over 650,000 commuters a day in the greater metropolitan area of Montreal rely heavily on the MUCT's public transportation system. Another 227,000 commuters use other bus networks. These figures do not include return trips.

The Central Area is the destination point of 500,000 persons a day, with employment being the main purpose for this large influx of people. In fact, more than 52% of all commuters report employment as the purpose of their trip. Other destinations include school trips (15%), leisure activities, and shopping (9% each).

With Montreal's declining birthrate, the drop in young transit users is expected to have a dramatic impact on transit ridership over the next decade, since over 2/3 of them are transit users. Also, as we have seen, 15% of trips to the Central Area are made by students. Moreover, the growing tendency by manufacturing industries to move away from the centre and by service industries to follow population distribution could initiate another wave of sprawl. Public transportation will have difficulty maintaining efficient service over an increasingly large territory, as even more commuters turn to the automobile as their main means of transportation to their place of work.

Traffic Patterns

Average traffic conditions are generally good in Montreal*. But congestion is already prevalent on many arteries. Between 1969 and 1987, in-bound traffic volume on bridges has increased from 500,000 to 1,000,000 vehicles per day, and during the morning rush hour, there are already strings of traffic 2-3 kilometres

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*Average downtown arterial speed including delays: 20km/hr
Worst averages: 17km/hr, a.m. peak, southbound; 16km/hr, p.m. peak, northbound

long. The main east-west axis, the Metropolitan Autoroute, is blocked most the day with passenger and commercial vehicles, and parts of the subway systems are having difficulty meeting current demand at the peak of rush hour.

Traffic Planning Solutions

A distinction must be made between solutions pertaining to accessibility to downtown, internal mobility, and downtown parking per se. Within this framework here are some measures that Montreal has, or will soon, be implementing:

a) Accessibility to Downtown

Downtown Montreal is still growing and, over the years, trips will be increasing in numbers. If present tendencies continue, feeding arterials and streets are bound to get clogged. Furthermore, mass transit installations will be supported by an ever diminishing number of patrons. To alleviate congestion, car commuters must be swayed towards a public transit system that can provide reliability, speed, and comfort.

The subway system provides such a service. However, some of its branches are presently over-used, especially during the morning rush hour. As it would presently be too costly to decrease the interval between trains, thus increasing capacity, improvement in the bus service becomes a solution.

Buses share streets and roads with cars and other vehicles; their present average speed is approximately 16km/hr. To improve service, reserved bus and taxi lanes are being planned, and as testing becomes conclusive, more will be added.

The first experiment will be made next fall on a 10km north-south axis, linked to the subway system. In order to prevent interference with right-hand turns and in order to improve average speed, the reserved lane will be set in the middle of the street, and buses will travel alongside a central strip. Waiting passengers for both directions will be sharing the amenities of an eight-foot wide central strip and step on buses traveling counter-flow to traffic, since their doors are on the right side.

Another improvement recently tested and planned for on a comprehensive scale is that of park-and-ride facilities. In the coming years, a systematic effort will be made to set up parking facilities at the head or along high-capacity transit lines at a possible rate of 1500 places a year over the next three years.

b) Internal Mobility

Contrary to downtown accessibility where installations and amenities give priority to mass transit, mobility within the Central Area requires an even treatment of all modes of transportation supporting its economic activities. This includes pedestrians, who are responsible for over half of downtown inner trips.

First, in order to increase traffic flow and safety, seventeen arteries within the Central Area have been identified as tow-away axes (see Map 7). At rush hours, illegally parked vehicles are being systematically towed away from these arteries and their owners are sent a $70 fine. Stopped vehicles are fined $35.

These arteries will later be given priority treatment in order to channel traffic flow through them. This entails such means as:

- preferential traffic light synchronisation;
- doing away with sidewalk protrusions;
- eliminating flow conflicts with taxi stands and activities such as loading and bicycling;
- where loading docks do not exist, using metered parking spaces for loading at set times of the day.

Secondly, in order to improve pedestrian safety and comfort, the following steps will be undertaken.

- adapting traffic light sequences to pedestrian cross times;
- promoting direct access to subway stations;
- reducing conflicts with pedestrian flow and comfort on heavily-walked streets from such causes as truck routes, bikeways, and unnecessary sidewalk encumbrances;
- ensuring the cleanliness and safety of streets and sidewalks in all seasons;
- controlling future micro-climatic conditions when issuing building permits.

c) Parking

> Even when well serviced by public transit, a downtown area must provide sufficient parking space to support its economic and cultural activities as well as the needs of its residents. It is not so much the number of parking units that create a problem but rather their unnecessary long-term freeze by a clientele that does not need a car to contribute to Central Area activities.

In order to rationalize the offer and usage of downtown parking space, the following steps are being envisaged in the Central Area Development Plan:

- easing the present parking by-law requirements (1 parking unit per 230 square metres) to take into account the location and functional activities of building projects;
- promoting cheaper rates for short-term parking by increasing the cost of permits for private facilities and changing the parking fare structure in municipal lots;
- ensuring the complementarity of parking clienteles from day-time (office) to night-time (recreational or residential) users;
- developing an interactive information system on available parking units aimed at cruising motorists;
- promoting the construction of high-capacity parking facilities, in areas where major expressways feed into the downtown street network. (One such project is underway municipally with the construction of 600 parking units under the World Trade Centre.)

An overview of Montreal's transportation network would be incomplete without reference to the sharing of financial and management responsibility. The Montreal region is served by a number of public transit authorities, each covering a specific territory: the MUC, Laval to the north of Montreal, and part of the South Shore. Other areas are served by small municipal and inter-municipal commissions or companies.

For a transit system to be truly effective, local transit authorities must be united under a regional umbrella group endowed with the necessary decision-making power to manage transportation for the entire region. Such a regional authority is presently being discussed and would be charged with developing incentives to win the pubic over to mass transit and, more particularly, with solving the problem of cost-sharing among many transit system authorities. This authority would also be responsible for co-ordinating the interface of services throughout the region.

Urban Planning Solutions

If a transportation plan is to succeed in orientating urban development, it must be able to influence modal split and must also be part of an overall development plan. This plan should provide the regional transportation authority with the necessary framework to achieve its objective. A few guidelines follow.

- Assign priority in public spending to mass transit development and improvement.

  This will ensure the necessary infrastructure to consolidate serviced areas and maximize the use of existing public installations.

- Assign priority to highway construction that completes the existing network.

  This will ease the transportation of goods and services within the urbanized area thus promoting its development, diminishing the need for more access roads and bridges and reducing traffic on residential streets. The completion of the Ville-Marie auto-route is a case in point.

- Improve living conditions in central districts.

  Districts within this area have high-quality, already paid-for public equipment. Furthermore, they can support a good mass transit network because of their high density of origins and destinations.

- Increase densities where possible outside central districts.

  This will take pressure off the inner areas, maximize use of already serviced sectors, and ensure a more even distribution of population throughout the urban areas.

- Develop sub-centres to take the pressure off downtown.

  Sub-centres will reduce transportation demand within the city. They should be planned, however, as a means to consolidate and organize out-of-centre activities, not to compete with downtown.

Montreal is at a crossroad. Population densities are still relatively high and the quality of mass transit is quite good. However, with population dispersal and the decreasing number of unmotorized young people, ridership on public transit systems is on the wane. With rising car traffic, the environment is becoming more polluted and quality of life is being eroded.

Coordinated public intervention and organization are necessary at the regional level. For its part, Montreal will be making a case to its future partners for the importance of mass transit, better traffic flow, and improved living conditions in order to promote more evenly balanced regional development.

Map 1


Gouvernement
du Québec
Ministère des
Transports
Service des
relevés techniques
ÎLE DE LAVAL
ÎLE DE MONTRÉAL
LAC DES DEUX-MONTAGNES
ÎLE BIZARD
ÎLE PERROT
LAC ST-LOUIS
FLEUVE ST-LAURENT
CIRCULATION SUR LES PRINCIPALES ROUTES
RÉGION DE MONTRÉAL
DÉBIT JOURNALIER MOYEN D'ÉTÉ
1987
AUTOROUTE & ROUTE EXPRESS
ROUTE À CHAUSSÉES SÉPARÉES
= STATION PERMANENTE
= STATION D'ÉCHANTILLONNAGE
20 372
55 458
22 869
31 393
58 522
35 661
79 563
57 248
114 497
47 007
96 209
22 200
90 893
113 824
119 966
130 883
139 818
128 300
96 427
110 871
128 164
75 052
86 168
41 471
48 136
49 074
37 994
67 368
13 419
15 060
31 673
42 329
29 067
23 404
43 100
21 515
8 420
25 072
63 718
16 148

Carte 1

Graph 1

Growth in the number of households in the Montreal region by zone, 1976-1986



Map 2


15 000 et moins
15 - 35 000
35 - 70 000
70 000 et plus
HAUSSE
BAISSE
COURONNE NORD
LAVAL
CUM EST
CUM CENTRE
CUM CENTRE OUEST
CUM OUEST
CUM SUD OUEST
LONGUEUIL
COURONNE SUD
5 km

Carte 2

VARIATION DE LA POPULATION DANS LA RÉGION DE MONTRÉAL, 1986-2001
Scénario de référence

Graph 2 and accompanying tables

Growth in the number of households, Montreal CMA



Croissance de la population totale dans la région de Montréal (1971 à 1986)

	Population				Variations (%/an)			
	1971	1976	1981	1986	71-81	71-76	76-81	81-86
Ville de Montréal	1,252,995	1,118,743	1,018,610	1,014,945	-1,9	2,1	-1,8	-0,1
CUM-Centre	1,259,405		1,005,695	981,607	-2,2			-0,5
CUM-Est	226,585		273,200	283,229	1,9			0,7
CUM-Ouest	473,150		481,225	487,748	0,2			0,3
ST: CUM	1,959,140	1,869,641	1,760,120	1,752,584	-1,0	-0,9	-1,2	-0,1
Laval	228,010	246,243	268,335	284,164	1,8	1,6	1,8	1,2
Rive-Nord	143,545	167,599	230,575	255,169	6,0	3,3	7,5	2,0
ST: Couronne Nord	371,555	413,842	498,910	539,333	3,4	2,3	4,1	1,6
ST: Couronne Sud	412,510	519,000	576,725	599,768	4,0	5,1	2,2	0,8
T: Région métropolitaine de Montréal	2,743,200	2,802,485	2,835,755	2,891,685	0,3	0,4	0,2	0,4

Source: Statistique Canada, recensements

Graph 2 and accompanying tables (cont.)


RÉGION MÉTROPOLITAINE DE MONTRÉAL, 1971
Découpage en 9 sous-régions
LAVAL
0
5
10
Kilomètres

Un Bilan Global de l'Urbanisation dans la Région de Montréal par Sous-période

	Augmentation de Population	Augmentation du Nombre de Ménages
Région métropolitaine		
76-81	20 278	100 838
81-86	58 850	79 315
Zones non-viabilisées		
76-81	104 156	45 252
81-86	46 215	24 775
Zones viabilisées		
76-81	-83 878	55 586
81-86	12 635	54 540

Source: Compilé à partir des données du tableau 1, p.50, contenues dans Barcelo et al. Option préférable

Graph 3

Manufacturing employment in the Montreal area



Map 3


1000 et moins
2 - 5000
HAUSSE
BAISSE
LAVAL
ET
COURONNE
NORD
CUM EST
CUM CENTRE
CUM OUEST
CUM
CENTRE OUEST
CUM
SUD
OUEST
LONGUEUIL
ET
COURONNE
SUD

Carte 3

VARIATION DE L'EMPLOI MANUFACTURIER DANS LA RÉGION DE MONTRÉAL, 1986-2001
Scénario de référence

Graph 4

Tertiary employment in the Montreal area



Map 4


LAVAL ET COURONNE NORD
CUM EST
CUM CENTRE
LONGUEUIL ET COURONNE SUD
CUM CENTRE OUEST
CUM SUD OUEST
CUM OUEST
HAUSSE
13 - 25000
25 - 30000
35 - 40000
50 - 58000
5 km

VARIATION DE L'EMPLOI TERTIAIRE DANS LA RÉGION DE MONTRÉAL, 1986-2001
Scénario de référence

Carte 4

Map 5



Map 6

LES DÉPLACEMENTS VERS LE CENTRE-VILLE
TOUS MOTIFS, TOUS MODES
Carte 6

Map 7


AXES PRIORITAIRES DE TRANPORT COLLECTIF ET DE DÉGAGEMENT POUR LA CIRCULATION
ARTÈRES DE DÉGAGEMENT VISÉES
LIGNE DE MÉTRO
mars 1989



Samuel Schwartz, New York

Samuel Schwartz is the Chief Engineer/First Deputy Commissioner of the New York City Department of Transportation and is presently overseeing the Department's 5 billion dollar, 10 year programme to reconstruct the City's streets and bridges. Prior to his promotion to First Deputy Commissioner in February 1986, Mr. Schwartz was the Department's Traffic Commissioner. As an Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau of Planning and Research, Mr. Schwartz developed the 1980 Transit Strike Contingency Plan and popularized the term "gridlock". Educated at Brooklyn College and the University of Pennsylvania, Mr. Schwartz is also the author of numerous articles and papers on transportation and urban planning. Among his many awards is the Public Service Award, which he received in 1985.

The following is an account of Mr. Schwartz's presentation at the Forum. It was transcribed and edited from a video tape of the proceedings.

I'd like to focus on Dr. Soberman's prescriptions for the future: reducing the number of vehicles entering the city by more reliance on public transit; using existing roads and streets more efficiently. As an aside, the problem of parked service vehicles isn't written about in the literature very much.

Metro and Toronto are broadly comparable to the City of New York and the five boroughs which were formerly suburbs of Manhattan. New York's real population is about eight million, and the daytime population is about ten million. In terms of registered vehicles Toronto's ratio of registered vehicles per population is very high. New York has only two million registered vehicles. Manhattan's auto ownership is one per seven or eight people. Metro has much less highway mileage than New York. Toronto has the second highest modal split after New York. New York's modal split is over 88% in the 2-hour peak.

Manhattan has tremendous density which occasionally creates gridlock. The gridlock problem less now than at beginning of decade. We have two different kinds of problems: portal problems from Queens, Brooklyn, and New Jersey at peaks, with twenty river crossings into Manhattan; midday congestion is worst in midtown and lower Manhattan, partly because of midday pedestrian activity as well as commercial and service vehicles.

Transportation systems management means getting more out of the street system. The Institution of Traffic Engineers toolbox includes turn regulations, removal of curb lane parking, and reduced spread of travel times. The spread of speeds is more important than improvement in average speeds, because it's the reliability that is very important in public transportation.

Vehicles in motion are more important than numbers of vehicles. Reduced numbers in a given section mean vehicles are moving more swiftly through it. Volume is not a very good measurement of urban traffic congestion. Other techniques include contraflow lanes and movable centre expressway barriers, though bicycle lanes didn't work.

We've gotten far more aggressive with enforcement. We have a no exception towing policy (including diplomats and public officials), which generates $230 million from parking tickets, $300 million in total per year including towing. It's important to get the enforcers to carry out the desires of the transportation professionals. Traffic isn't a priority with police.

In New York, traffic control is no longer done by police. The traffic department writes moving violations as well as determining priority areas for towing. As a result, street speeds of under 4 mph have increased to 6 mph during the decade. Illegal parking has dropped by two thirds and is now down to the hard core. We now have a moving violation for cars that are not moving in a moving lane to get the 'car sitters'.

Metering of high density sectors involves computerization of all signals. The computer senses impending gridlock and slows entry of vehicles into the zone while increasing the egress out of the zone. The concept, again, is vehicles in motion. Our various computer systems are being integrated to be able to see where a problem is beginning to erupt.

Regarding increasing transit usage, New York's off-peak transit ridership into the central business district is rather poor. In fact, 3.7 million people entered the central business district in 1948 daily, compared to 3.4 million today. The mass transit usage has dropped from 81% to two thirds. The number of vehicles increased from 19% to 32%, an increase of 400,000 vehicles. A capital program has removed graffiti from subway cars. Park and ride facilities have been increased. Simply rebuilding the transit system won't take drivers out of their cars.

Our second attack, called SMART (Strategies for Mobility Access and Reduction), is to go out to corporations to encourage less use of motor vehicles through eliminating tax deductible travel expenses and parking subsidies, such as a free space. Transit subsidy has yet to become tax deductible.

The answer lies with fewer vehicles coming into the city. The motorist is a very stubborn person. This could ultimately mean full restrictions against car access. These ideas include congestion pricing. A proposed $10 access windshield sticker was strongly opposed. The second approach during the 1980 transit strike was to ban driver-only cars from the central business district, with a three person minimum for cars on expressways. Some highways did better during the transit strike than on a normal day. An attempt to force single occupant vehicles to use the toll bridges failed through a threatened lawsuit.

It's very hard to fight the auto lobby to reduce the number of vehicles; 2.4% of the people bring in 54% of the vehicles. Service vehicles now comprise more than half of all vehicles parked on city streets, the single largest group of vehicles. We're considering allowing trucks but not service vehicles to park at the curb or charging service vehicles more for curb space than commercial garage rates. We're leaning toward increasing the fine levels, instead.

Session 6

Quality of Life and The Land Use Process

Toronto has developed a reputation over time as a relatively safe, clean and liveable city. Today, it is facing new challenges to its environmental quality and urban health. How do we respond to these challenges and gain relief from the hustle and bustle of everyday life? Toronto's reputation for liveability is on the line.

Moderator: **Beate Bowron** *(Senior Economic Development Officer, Economic Development Division, Planning and Development Department, City of Toronto)*

Trevor Hancock, Toronto

Trevor Hancock is a public health consultant working for local and national governments and the World Health Organisation. Dr. Hancock's main area of work is healthy city policy, health promotion and health futurism. A former Associate Medical Officer of Health for the Department of Public Health, City of Toronto, he is involved in 'Healthy City' projects in several countries as well as in Toronto and across Canada.

Quality of Life and The City

Quality of life, like health, is an elusive concept. We all know what it means, yet we are hard put to agree upon it and define it.

Quality of life and health have more in common than the fact that they are elusive concepts; they are also analogous, if not synonymous. Indeed, a recent Federal publication (Health and Welfare, 1986) which outlined Canada's strategy for achieving 'Health For All' – the overall social goal of the World Health Organization – came close to equating health with quality of life:

> *"Today we are working with a concept which portrays health as a part of everyday living, an essential dimension of the quality of our lives. 'Quality of life' in this context implies the opportunity to make choices and to gain satisfaction from living. Health is thus envisioned as a resource which gives people the ability to manage and even to change their surroundings."*

Having said that quality of life is an elusive term and difficult to define, let me attempt to define it. Or rather, let me quote someone else's definition, a definition specifically developed in the context of the urban setting. In her excellent brief monograph 'Rating Places' Susan Cutter (1985) defined quality of life as:

> *"An individual's happiness or satisfaction with life and environment including needs and desires, aspirations, lifestyle preferences, and other tangible and intangible factors which determine overall wellbeing."*

and went on to say:

> *"When an individual's quality of life is aggregated to the community level, the concept is linked to existing social and environmental conditions such as economic activity, climate or the quality of cultural institutions. It includes both tangible and intangible measures reflecting local consensus on the community's values and goals".*

Quality of life is obviously not a simple concept. It is perhaps best thought of as a hierarchical concept, as expressed in Maslow's hierarchy of needs (1950). Our most basic needs are food, water, shelter and other fundamental prerequisites for health; they are the 'sine qua non' of a life of quality. In community terms, it would be fair to say that a community that fails to meet the basic prerequisites of health for all its citizens cannot be said to have a high quality of life or be healthy.

This introduces into the concept of quality of life the issue of equity – basic fairness or social justice. Since this will be discussed by Marvyn Novick and others at a later session, I will not explore it here and now. However, I want to stress that the issue of equity is fundamental to quality of life.

Once basic needs have been met, Maslow's hierarchy goes on to suggest higher levels of needs including safety needs, a need for belongingness and love, esteem needs such as a desire for mastery or achievement, prestige or success and finally self-actualization, the need to become everything that one is capable of becoming.

Ultimately then, quality of life is perhaps about universal self-actualization! We might then think of a self-actualizing city, or to be more precise a city that permits and indeed encourages all its citizens to become everything they are capable of becoming.

While this may be in a very real sense what quality of life in a city is all about, it is perhaps a rather cosmic concept. So, keeping in mind this ultimate expression of quality of life, I shall return to that with which I am most familiar, namely the concept of health as an expression of quality of life, and thus to the concept of the healthy city.

As should be clear by now, quality of life is about many things, one of which is health. In those batteries of indicators that have been assembled to describe quality of life, health is but one indicator, along with such things as crime levels, education, cultural facilities, income, unemployment, housing, environmental quality and so on.(1)

While it would appear that health is a subset of quality of life, this is because what is usually measured in these batteries of indicators is not health but death, disease or in some cases merely hospital beds – as if the presence or absence of hospital beds had very much to do with health.*

When we start to think about health in a more positive sense, it soon becomes apparent that we understand health in a much broader sense – as both the World Health Organization (1986) and Health and Welfare Canada (1986) have expressed it, it is a resource for everyday life. And it also becomes clear that the fundamental determinants of health are very broad-based: not only the meeting of basic needs – peace, food, shelter, work, education, income and a high quality physical environment (WHO, 1986) – but a stable and nurturing family environment and an educational system which foster in people a sense of personal efficacy, self-esteem and mutual trust that enable them to develop the coping and social skills necessary to establish strong social support networks (Sagan, 1987).

When we talk to people about what it means to them to be healthy, they do not talk much about death, disease or the presence or absence of hospital beds. What they talk about – what *we* all talk about – is things like being able to get around, having a job we enjoy, having family and friends, having time to enjoy life, living in a good quality environment – in short, having a high quality of life. And we recognize that having good health is one of the keys to having a good quality of life, if not synonymous.

What most interests me, however, is how that concept evolves further when we talk not about the health of an individual but about the health – and quality of life – of a city and its citizens. That is what the Healthy Cities movement is all about, and that is what, I believe, this Conference is all about. I hope we could all agree that, in a Maslowian sense, a healthy city is:

> *"One that is continually creating and improving those physical and social environments and expanding those community resources which enable people to mutually support each other in performing all the functions of life and in developing to their maximum potential."* (Hancock & Duhl, 1988)

Presumably, such a city would have a high quality of life.

The Healthy City Movement

Questions about the definition, concept and practical meaning of 'a healthy city' are central to a rapidly snowballing social movement that has its origins here in Toronto.

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* In reality, the number of hospital beds reflects the wealth of the nation, its commitment to an institutional health care system, the practice and admitting patterns of physicians, and so on. While one could argue that a healthy society would actually have fewer hospital beds, in fact the two are probably unrelated.

In 1984, to mark both the Centennial of the Board of Health and the City's Sesquicentennial, the Local Board of Health co-sponsored (together with the Canadian Public Health Association and Health and Welfare Canada) an international conference – Beyond Health Care (1985) – to begin to explore the concept of healthy public policy – public policy in non-health sectors that contributes to (or detracts from) health.

In association with that conference, the Board of Health also hosted a one-day workshop – Healthy Toronto 2000 (1984) – which began to consider what it would take to make Toronto a more healthy city by the year 2000. (One of the keynote speakers we invited to that workshop was Len Duhl, who is here today as part of this panel.)

The concept of the healthy city struck a resonant chord with Ilona Kickbusch, Regional Officer for Health Promotion for WHO in Europe. Recognizing the potential in the concept, she initiated a European Healthy Cities project in early 1986 which has grown in three years to involve thirty project cities, hundreds of other towns and cities throughout Europe, and has inspired the creation of healthy city projects in Canada, Australia, and the United States.(2)

Here in Toronto, the process has continued. In the Fall of 1988, the Board of Health approved the report of its Healthy Toronto 2000 Subcommittee (1988), and this report was subsequently unanimously approved by Toronto City Council in January 1989.

At the same time, recognizing that the City's health is dependent upon the work of many different Departments, a multi-departmental Healthy City Workgroup proposed a Healthy City Office. In May 1989, Council approved the establishment of this office, with three full-time staff, to develop and coordinate a City-wide Healthy City project.

A Vision of a Healthy City

'Healthy Toronto 2000' lays out a blueprint for how to make Toronto the healthiest city possible. But one of the most important things that occurred in the preparation of the report, and that has been an important starting point for many of the healthy city projects throughout the world, was the development of a shared vision of what a healthy city or community would be like (Appendix 1).

Developing a vision of a healthy city begins with the recognition that the people who live and work in the city are in the best position to judge what is and what is not 'healthy' about their lives, what does or does not contribute to the quality of their lives and what a more healthy community or city would be like.

As a result of having conducted vision workshops and similar exercises in Canada, Europe, Australia and the United States, I am now in a position to make some generalizations about what people consider to be important to the healthfulness of their city and the quality of their lives. Like all generalizations, these are flawed. We have always recognized that each city, town, village or community will have its own unique approach to what makes for a healthy community. Indeed, one reason for encouraging different communities to do their own vision workshops is so that they can develop their own unique answer; only by sharing and owning their own vision will they be able to share and own the actions that must follow to attain their vision. The vision then becomes a sort of 'story' to be told and shared.

A good example of the uniqueness of different city visions comes from Canberra, the Federal Capital of Australia. There were two unique aspects of the vision workshop that I conducted there in 1988. First they were the only group I have worked with who did not have a concern with the physical environment as a central feature of their vision. Only when you realize that Canberra is a planned city — it feels a bit like Ottawa with aspirations to be Washington — with no primary industry, no obvious slums, and a beautiful park-like setting in a bowl of hills, do you realize that the physical environment is not a big issue in Canberra.

Second, only if you realize that as a federally administered territory, Canberra has no directly elected Mayor and Council but is administered by the Minister of Territories and his bureaucracy, do you understand why democracy and citizen participation in decision-making were, uniquely, central to the vision of Canberra as a healthy city.

Be that as it may, I will make the following generalizations about peoples vision of an ideally healthy city or community.(Table 1) What comes through very strongly, usually as the first priority, is the quality of the physical environment – both natural and built – and the commitment to conserving and enhancing that environment.

A close second is the issue of economic vitality, on the one hand, and a commitment to equity and the meeting of basic needs for all. The third category is concerned with the nature of the community itself – what Len Duhl calls the "soft infrastructure" – and in a telling phrase from a Toronto workshop, a sense of being a family, not just a community. This category also recognizes that we need both informal and formal support systems.

Good government clearly emerges in the workshops as a two-way process – an active citizenry and a responsive government. Finally, a set of issues that speak to the quality of life and the achievement of full potential takes the issues of basic needs further, calling for quality in education, food, work and leisure.

Building healthy communities is not just a matter of bricks, mortar and asphalt, not just the development of the hard infrastructure of sewers, waterlines, hydro, housing and roads. People don't talk about density, downzoning, re-knitting, intensification or modal splits; they talk about walkable, livable, green, healthy or sustainable cities and about the quality of life. Clearly then, the health of a city and the quality of life of its citizens is not a matter for the Department of Public Health alone, or even for city government as a whole, acting on its own. That is why we have established a multi-departmental workgroup to guide and manage the City's own Healthy City Initiative, and why that workgroup is chaired not by the Department of Public Health but by the Department of Planning & Development. And in a city like Toronto, it must involve not only the private and voluntary sectors and the citizens of the city but the combined efforts of all the jurisdictions of Metro Toronto and its surrounding municipalities.

Quality of Life – Principles for Urban Planning

The challenge facing us at this Conference, I believe, is how to introduce quality of life principles into urban planning. In an attempt to boil things down to their basics and keep it simple, I suggest that there are three key strategies that the City should follow. But first, these strategies need to be recognized as part of an ecosystem approach, recognizing that the human ecosystem comprises both physical and social components that have to be integrated. Thus, for example, housing has both a social and a physical function and must be developed with both objectives equally in mind; the same applies to transit, roads and the rest of the 'hard' infrastructure.

1. *Pay as much attention to the soft infrastructure as the hard infrastructure.*

   The 'soft infrastructure' can be thought of as including economic development and the provision of real, healthful jobs that pay a living wage; the formal provision of education, health, social and recreational services by both governmental and non-governmental agencies; and – of equal importance – the development of those informal social supports and networks upon which we all depend for our health and well-being; together with the sense of tolerance and fairness that ensures respect and social justice for all. Since much of this touches on the realm of social equity, I shall leave it for Marvyn Novick and the other speakers in the next session to further develop this theme. However, I want to stress the point that we need to do good social planning in order to improve health and quality of life by enhancing those mechanisms which encourage a high sense of self-esteem, a good family life, the development of social and coping skills, and supportive social networks.

2. *Design clean, green, quiet, human scale and sustainable urban ecosystems*

I have deliberately placed this point second, because it has been the traditional concern of urban planning – or at least four-fifths of it has – and I want to emphasize the importance to quality of life of the social sphere.

However, too little attention has been paid to the fifth of my adjectives, namely 'sustainable'; many would probably argue that all five have been given too little attention. Sustainable development is a term that is finally gaining some currency, and we are going to hear a great deal more about it in the years to come. While we have heard a great deal about environment, we have heard next to nothing about ecology and a view of the city as an ecosystem.

The concept of sustainable development – even allowing for the fact that those two words may be incompatible – has been given a great boost by the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). Not only has Canada been a key supporter of the Commission on the world stage but, as a result of the report of its own National Task Force on Environment and Economy (1987) a series of national and provincial 'round tables' on environment and economy has been established. Now, and not a moment too soon, the concept of sustainable development is beginning to be taken seriously by local governments and their citizens. The first stirrings of a move towards a sustainable development strategy are underway at Metro level right now, and this was also a key recommendation of Healthy Toronto 2000.

We are going to have to learn to design communities, towns and cities so that they are sustainable — so that they do not utilize resources and environments in such a manner that the ability of future generations to meet their own needs is compromised. And sustainability must be linked to equity, because it is those who have the lowest income who will suffer most from shortages and who experience the worst environments.

There is not the space here to spell out in detail all of the implications of a sustainable development strategy, but it is essential that present and future development and redevelopment of the City be done in a sustainable manner. One writer who has outlined some of the implications in terms of criteria for design is Malcolm Fitzpatrick (1978). He suggested four basic criteria which could be used to evaluate projects.

> *"The first criterion is whether there is minimum intrusion into the natural state... minimizing alteration of the ecological system is desirable for maintenance of equilibrium and long-range health.*

> *The second criterion is... that there should be maximum variety... it appears that the availability of choice and the ability to choose are critical to mental and physical health. Variety in a built environment means providing a range of environments in which people are able to make a choice...*
>
> *The third criterion states that one must close the system to the maximum extent possible... for the ecological system to be self-perpetuating, the output from one part of the system must become the input to another part... it is dangerously foolish to believe that the environment is a large sink, sorting out the harmful wastes and returning only the beneficial ones for man's use.*
>
> *These three criteria based on ecology and public health have to be followed in the order given...*
>
> *The fourth criterion states that there must be an optimum balance between population and resource use... this criterion may be taken, for now, as one to evaluate the effectiveness of the first three criteria."* (Fitzpatrick, 1985)

The quality of life of this and future generations depends fundamentally upon our ability to develop and apply criteria, such as these, to urban planning and development.

3. *Involve people who live in a neighbourhood or are likely to live or work in a new development in its development, functioning and evaluation*

   This principle flows from Maslow's identification of our needs for self-esteem and self-actualization, from the definition of health promotion (the fundamental concept underlying the healthy cities project) that it is "the process of enabling people to increase control over and improve their health" (WHO, 1986; Health and Welfare Canada, 1986) and from a commitment to democratic principles. The intriguing possibility is now being contemplated that the sense of self-esteem that flows in part from meaningful participation and control over the circumstances of one's life might actually have an effect – via the neural and hormonal systems – on the immune system and thus on our health.

   The principle of involvement also flows more directly from the fundamental precept of community architecture in Britain, which is that those who are going to live and work in the environment are in the best position to understand its problems and their needs and are also in the best position to contribute to the solution of problems and the development of the optimum environment.(3)

> This principle underlies the Healthy Cities project, and, more specifically, the vision workshops. They are an attempt – seemingly successful – to understand how people would define their ideally healthy community, in their own terms. There are a number of important implications of this principle. If the people who live and work in the community in question are in the best position to define what their ideally healthy community would be like, and if a broad consensus on this can be achieved, it follows that they should be involved in the design of the community along those lines, and that designers, architects and planners should be working with them to meet their self-defined needs. If what people want is human-scale housing, opening windows, and so on, why don't we build houses and offices that way?
>
> It also follows that the people who work and live in the community are in the best position to judge the relative success or failure of the community. We need to develop indicators that are based upon the community's own definition of what its ideally healthy state would be, and we need to ask the community how they would define and evaluate the relative success or failure of the community, using their own self-defined criteria and indicators. Equally importantly, the community must then be involved in making adjustments, based upon the results of that evaluation.

This brings me to my final point, namely, the need for urban planning to develop a process of outcome assessment. Surely, if urban planning and design is successful, it will enhance the health and quality of life of the residents of the community. If we are to take seriously the rhetoric of quality of life, then we have to take seriously the need to assess the outcome of our urban development in terms of the health and quality of life of the inhabitants and to do so in partnership with them. Furthermore, we have to pay particular attention to the quality of life of the most disadvantaged, those who have little or no ability to purchase quality of life. ***Our success as a City should be judged by the quality of life of our most disadvantaged populations.***

In closing, I want therefore to send out a challenge to the City of Toronto, a challenge to incorporate citizen-developed health and quality of life criteria in the development, monitoring and evaluation of the new Ataritiri development, the Railway Lands and other developments, both large and small. These health/quality of life criteria should be based upon social equity and the soft infrastructure, urban ecosystem management and citizen participation, as outlined above. If Toronto is to maintain its reputation as a livable and perhaps even as a healthy city, it must take its own rhetoric seriously and measure its successes and failures in terms of the health and quality of life of ***all*** its citizens. Now that would be a world class city!

Table 1
Elements of a Healthy City, Based on Vision Workshops in Canada, Europe and Australia

A. The Natural Environment

1. A pollution-free environment (air, water, soil, noise) — commitment by government, industry and public to pollution control.
2. Resource and environmental conservation — recycling, energy conservation, etc.
3. Green space, nature, parks and wilderness.

B. The Built Environment

4. Human-scale, attractive buildings and neighbourhoods, — where all the needs of life can be met locally.
5. Easy mobility in an accessible city, — lots of opportunities for walking and cycling, good public transit, full access for the disabled.
6. Safe streets, parks and housing.

C. The Economy and Social Justice

7. A vibrant, diverse economy, — job opportunities for all, and resources for those in need.
8. Basic human needs met for all, — food, shelter, work, education/literacy, income.

D. The Community and its Services

9. A caring, sharing community, — family to each other.
10. Tolerance, respect and celebration of diversity.
11. A peaceful community, non-violent.
12. A broad range of supportive social services, — both formal and informal.
13. A wellness oriented health care system.
14. Extensive recreational and fitness facilities, — indoors and outdoors.

E. Good Government

15. A responsive city government, — a well planned and managed city.
16. An active and involved citizenry, — voluntary service, involvement in city government, lobbying, etc.

F. Development of full human potential

17. Lifelong learning opportunities.
18. Work as a source of health, — flexible, meaningful, high quality work environment.
19. Healthy food widely available.
20. Relaxed, stress-free, slow paced life.
21. Equality of opportunity, — human rights respected for all.
22. Extensive cultural opportunities, — accessible art, music, theatre, etc., include free events, festivals, fairs, etc.
23. Preservation of historical roots.

Notes

1. Readers interested in a more in-depth discussion of social/urban/quality of life indicators are referred to:

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2. Those who want to learn more about the Healthy Cities movement should contact:

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Healthy Cities Project Office
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Ashley Files
Office of Health Promotion & Disease Prevention
Department of Health & Human Services
Washington, D.C.
U.S.A.

3. For a full description of the community architecture movement in Britain, see Wates, Nick and Knevitt, Charles (1987), Community Architecture., London, Penguin.

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Appendix

Postscript: Where It All Leads - A Vision Of A Healthy Toronto

At an early stage in our work, we set out to develop an image, a vision if you prefer, of our eventual purpose. What would a healthy Toronto be like, we asked ourselves, over 200 members of the Department's staff and 15 community groups. From their answers, we have compiled the following scenario, written as it it were a report on the state of Toronto in the year 2000. We offer it as a guide, and perhaps an inspiration, to the people of Toronto and the staff of the Department of Public Health as they work to make Toronto the healthiest city possible.

The State of the City Report, Toronto, February 2000 A.D.

Today the City of Toronto celebrates its 166th birthday and a new millennium. We will use this occasion to reflect on our progress of the past twelve years. In 1988 we adopted the healthy city strategy and started work on making Toronto a prime healthy city by the year 2000. Back then, we envisioned an ideally healthy Toronto.

What was our vision? Have we attained our goals? What challenges do we still face? Before we begin let us commend the foresight of the civic leaders of the 80's who realized that we must always strive, as individuals, as communities and as a City. Thanks to their initiative we are much healthier than we were, no small achievement!

But what about the vision created twelve years ago, beginning with the physical environment. People wanted a wholesome environment, free of pollution, quiet, green and healthy. They wanted fresh air indoors and out, clean water to swim in, pure water to drink; they wanted effective and safe waste disposal, safe work places, uncontaminated food and air free from tobacco smoke and car fumes. They imagined attractive beaches, edible trout in the rivers, greenery, waterfalls and fountains.

Of course, they did not imagine that this would all just happen. They anticipated a sensitive community committed to improving, protecting and preserving the environment, and responsible integration of the built and natural environments. We would care for our urban ecosystem, they hoped, though appropriate community technology: recycling garbage and waste; an ecologically sound sewage system; quiet, efficient and nonpolluting public and private transport; a local food production and distribution system using few chemical additives; a responsible integration of architecture and environment.

People wanted neighbourhoods built to human scale, fewer highrises, more lowrises and restoration of old buildings. They imagined parks, gardens, trees, grass, community gardens, vegetable plots, sunshine, outdoor recreational facilities and community shopping areas. The ideal neighbourhood would be readily accessible to the disabled, the young and the elderly.

The health visionaries of the 1980's anticipated appropriate and affordable housing for all, provided in a humane, comprehensive and integrated fashion, housing of high physical quality, including co-ops and supportive housing for seniors, the disabled and others with special needs. They saw housing beside shopping and recreational facilities, mixing old and new neighbourhoods for variety and interest.

The planners foresaw an integrated, efficient and effective transportation system, one that encouraged pedestrians, bicycles, and public transit and that reduced the use of cars in the inner City. However, they believed that people should be able to get around easily, and that good rapid transit (surface or air) between major centres was essential. The benefits would be reduced air pollution, home and work in closer proximity, less congestion. They saw a reliable, hasslefree, people-oriented transportation system producing a totally accessible City.

They believed that these benefits would come about when raised civic consciousness resulted in participatory democracy, and neighbourhoods would be empowered. There would be a heightened sense of community, of concern for others and a resurgence of volunteer and selfhelp groups. City Hall would be open and interactive.

A caring and sharing community would see itself as a family with support groups, volunteers, and community networks. It would accept differences, and celebrate diversity, close-knit multigenerational families and neighbourhoods. Those in trouble would be helped and cared for within the community. People would feel relaxed, happy, safe, secure and loving; interdependence and diversity within neighbourhoods would be the rule.

Basic needs would be met, and hunger and homelessness eliminated. Work would be available to all who wanted it; there would be equal opportunity in employment and education and the social stigma attached to welfare would be removed. People would be given a handup instead of a handout. Everyone would have enough money to live with dignity and self respect.

Toronto has always been a safe city, and safety remained a priority. They recognized that feeling secure is the result of a nonviolent community in a world where violence and the threat of nuclear war had been reduced or eliminated. Nonviolence meant not only safe, clean, and well-lit streets; but also an end to physical and sexual violence and the exploitation typified by prostitution and pornography. Essential to the creation of a peaceful community were nonviolent programming on television and at movie theatres, and a society where diversity is accepted, where people show respect and where the environment is safe and nurturing.

Security and well-being also stem from a healthy and humane work life. Work would be important, the planners believed, but more flexible, and varied, including part-time and shared work, more leisure, more recreational and service facilities at work, and better daycare. The ideal was meaningful work in a friendly, participatory and cooperative atmosphere. A shorter week and flexible hours would ensure work for all. Work would be a source of health, with people seen as ends rather than means.

All these changes would create a need and an opportunity for learning. People would realize their full potential by learning and living.

In the ideally healthy Toronto, people would be motivated to adopt healthy lifestyles. The physical and social environment would contribute to balance with less stress and enhanced mental well-being. Proximity to work, school and play would produce a less rushed and hectic life, with more time for physical activity, relaxation and community involvement. This healthy lifestyle would be enhanced by stringent controls on smoking in public places, policies promoting healthier foods in restaurants, exercise breaks at work and responsible sexual behaviour designed to reduce teenage pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases.

The healthy city would focus on nutrition, not only to prevent hunger but also to ensure that wholesome food would be readily available in stores and restaurants. In the year 2000 there would be less junk food and fewer additives.

Recreational opportunities would highlight the healthy Toronto of the future with open space, beautiful sites with flowers, trees and plants, bicycle paths, jogging tracks, and skating rinks. Quiet and peaceful green areas would complement high quality recreation facilities readily accessible in each neighbourhood.

A healthy and fit life would be supported by a superior health care system. A wide range of high quality, available services, would emphasize health promotion, disease prevention and community rather than institutional care. This restructured illness system now a wellness system, would control most health problems.

Public Health would aim for quality of life, particularly for those with special needs. Improved services would facilitate self-sufficient lives. Seniors would enjoy a dignified retirement with opportunities and options. Daycare would be available so that all children would receive the best care.

In short, health for all.

Well, that is what they wanted, in 1988. Now let us look at what has actually happened in the intervening twelve years, and how we have progressed in our efforts to make Toronto a healthier city. Today we can say...

(Editor's Note: At this point, our timewarp link was damaged by a current surge which broke our chronocommutator, and we have been unable to reestablish contact. Readers will have to wait some time for the rest of the report, which will be available any time after February 2000 A.D., from City Hall, Toronto.)

Vision of the Healthy City



David Goode, London

David Goode is Director of the London Ecology Unit and a Trustee of the London Ecology Centre. Previously he worked for 15 years with the Nature Conservancy Council, where he was Assistant Chief Scientist responsible for research in nature conservation. Since 1982, Dr. Goode has been devoted to bringing an ecological perspective to urban planning in London's environment and is one of the most prominent advocates of the need for the 'green city' in Britain and Europe. He is the author of Wild in London and co-author of Ecology and Design in Landscape.

Nature as a Factor in the Quality of Life of Cities

Sitting at breakfast today in my hotel only 5 minutes from City Hall, I noticed across the street a lady at the window of her apartment talking to her budgerigar. Holding it on her finger, she was looking out to see what kind of day it was and no doubt she was saying, "what a dreadful thunderstorm that was last night". I was reminded of the time in the East End of London when every household had a songbird in a cage in the kitchen - linnets and goldfinches caught down on the Thames Marshes by the birdcatchers and sold for a penny in Pettycoat Lane Market. That was in Victorian times, when thousands of people found themselves living in back to back houses, which stretched for mile upon mile. It is no wonder 30,000 people petitioned for a new park in the East End, and when Victoria Park was opened thousands turned up, for this was their only chance of something green. Their cagebirds were a symbol of the wild. It was the best they could do to have contact with nature. And maybe it is much the same for the lady with her budgerigar in downtown Toronto.

Trevor Hancock has mentioned that contact with the natural world is an important part of the healthy city. I would like to look into this a little further and share with you some experiences that lead me to be optimistic about future planning of cities. But first, let's look at the present state of play vis' a vis nature in cities. A fundamental consequence of urban growth is the increasing alienation between people and the natural world. Natural processes seem no longer relevant to a society which is increasingly dependent on the technological fix. The Eaton Centre may be Toronto's number one tourist attraction, but it raises some very fundamental questions about our modern lifestyle. What contact is there with the seasons in the modern air conditioned shopping mall with its built in trees? Yes, I can see advantages during extremes of hot and cold, but are we not in danger of thinking that our life can be lived travelling to work in an air conditioned car and spending our working day in a hermetically sealed office? Personally, I prefer to be able to open the window and catch the fragrance of honeysuckle growing on the terrace outside. Or hear the birds sing, as I walk to work. Sadly, we have banished nature from most of our townscapes, and the resulting environment reflects only too well the assumption that we can exist in isolation from the natural world. We are fast becoming an ego-centric species on human culture alone.

If we look at urban population growth, we realize that this is a problem of enormous magnitude. In most western countries the proportion living in urban areas is about 80%, and the percentage is rising at an accelerating rate in developing countries. The number of people living in towns and cities throughout the world now exceeds the total world population in 1990. By 2025, it is predicted that there will be 135 cities exceeding 4 million people, many of which will include cities with 20 to 30 million inhabitants. Existing trends lead us inevitably in this direction, and one of the consequences is that a vast proportion of the human race is becoming divorced from all aspects of the natural world upon which they ultimately depend. For those who are aware of the predicament it may seem impossible for the individual to do anything about it, caught as they are in the intricate web of the modern city. Whilst I have been here in Toronto, I have heard of people who are moving out. They have had enough of the city and are looking for an alternative. But that isn't the answer. Most people cannot move, and it is for us to try to find solutions which will ensure that Toronto remains a livable city.

Why is it that we have created this rift between man and nature? Because those who make decisions are unaware or don't care about nature or natural processes. Investment companies on the whole don't care about nature. They don't see it as being in their interest to invest in the environment, but I have been heartened to hear some developers in Britain coming around to the view that a good environment stimulates investment. Godfrey Bradman is on record as wishing to promote a high quality environment in London's new King's Cross development. The Chairman of the London Docklands Development Corporation also recently stated, "ecology pays" - recognizing that nature has a part to play in the docklands regeneration and that the high quality aquatic and wetland landscapes are a significant factor in attracting people to living in the area and promoting a new business district.

On the whole, and with a few notable exceptions (some of whom are here today), architects and planners don't know about ecology. Not only do they not know, but they don't realize how much they don't know. That is why we have such a legacy of planning which has been lacking in an ecological dimension. Natural resource management may be included in some planners' training, but even then how many are aware of the subtleties of ecology such that they can effectively cater for urban bird populations? I submit that for most, it would be regarded as irrelevant to mainstream planning.

Even landscape architects are guilty of ignoring ecological matters. A recent study of the landscape profession in Canada (Dunster, 1987) revealed that most designers did not consider the requirements of wildlife in the majority of urban design projects. Only a small minority of designers took this into account in the full range of projects, some whom are here today. Over 40% of the respondents felt that a lack of client demand was their greatest obstacle to designing for urban wildlife. It seems that public authorities and other clients have not yet appreciated the value placed on wildlife by many Canadians who enjoy seeing wildlife around their homes.

The professions are not entirely to blame. There are also politicians. How many of those who make day to day decisions affecting the quality of life in our cities are really concerned with the living world? Planning committees deal primarily in development, frequently making decisions with no knowledge of the ecological consequences.

Those responsible for planning and designing cities have effectively driven nature out of town - not purposely, perhaps, but through ignorance of what is possible. Those fragments of the natural world which do survive do so only by chance, and we find people in many towns and cities trying to hold on to what is left because they feel increasingly dispossessed of nature.

And so in downtown Toronto we now have a piece of symbolic countryside, where a group of concrete cows lie contented on a patch of grass so worn that it may soon be replaced by plastic turf. Attractive as they are, these cows epitomise the sterilization of our cities.

All this has happened despite the fact that many people do care about the environment. We know that people want a "breath of fresh air". You only have to see the hundreds of people taking ferries to the Toronto Islands this past weekend in a ritual of spiritual refreshment. Equally, small green squares in the downtown area, such as St. James or Berczy Park, are full of people sitting out on the grass at lunchtime. Moss Park and Allan Gardens, too; these places are much appreciated.

Advertisers know that people enjoy places that are green and wild. They use the symbols to the full. Vacation brochures tell you to get away from it all to 'unspoilt' scenery and wilderness. They know that people will pay for that. Unspoilt says it all. It is clear that people have a need for wild, a place to go for sanctuary or solitude. This is particularly so in the city - a place to experience wilderness in the city. Not just parks but a host of other greens spaces, such as community gardens, city farms, town squares, nature parks, and roof gardens - they all contribute to quality of life.

I know that we could do a great deal more to make cities livable; there are plenty of examples to draw on. Either we protect surviving vestiges of the wild or we create completely new opportunities for nature to exist within an urban setting.

How do we do this? A first step is to ensure that there is adequate knowledge of the wildlife resources of the city. Comprehensive ecological surveys have been carried out which provide an inventory of habitats as a basis for planning in London and West Berlin. In London this provides a data-base for day-to-day decisions by the London Ecology Unit. The Unit is also assessing all the sites for their nature conservation value on a three tier system. Sites of London-wide importance are referred to as Metropolitan Sites, of which 114 have been identified within the 1500 km2 of Greater London. Others are identified at the borough and local level. Maps showing these sites are provided for local planning authorities and in many cases these categories are now being included in local plans.

The Unit also identifies areas of deficiency of natural vegetation, where special measures need to be taken to create new habitats. This approach is carried out within a strategic framework for London as a whole, which is endorsed by the London Ecology Committee of local authorities and national agencies. In this way, human well-being is catered for through the planning process.

Another approach is through landscape design. Naturalistic approaches to planning are becoming more widely accepted, and it is heartening to see the green deserts and lollipop trees of our townscapes being replaced by more natural habitats. Urban forestry is also becoming more accepted, and some new towns such as Warrington have been built within new landscapes designed on an ecological basis.

There are even opportunities within existing towns and cities for habitats associated with buildings. This has been pioneered in West Germany where the techniques for green roofs are now well established. Not only are there advantages in attracting more wildlife but the rooftop habitats have a valuable role for insulation and retarding storm water run-off. Some of the buildings in downtown Toronto would lend themselves well to such treatment. How about a wood on the roof of the old Stock Exchange? If not there, then maybe the City should promote a competition for the best new 'natural' habitat on a Toronto rooftop. I can visualize the hanging gardens of Toronto which could well be of real value in the quality of life in the central businesses district.

There are lots of opportunities for Community Gardens and Nature Parks too. Why is it that Toronto's Ecology Park on Madison Avenue is still the only example of a newly created wildlife habitat? The International Green Cities conference two years ago here in Toronto showed that lots of people care. There are the urban wilderness gardeners and many other groups keen to develop such areas. Surely, this is something that could be actively promoted as part of the Cityplan 91. If local people can be actively involved then such projects will play an important part in restoring quality of life. Many people wish to have something that they care for, and gardening brings people firmly back in touch with nature and the soil.

I could go on with other examples: retaining all the vestiges of the original landscape instead of simply covering it with a 20th century veneer, which disguises all the intricacies of the past. Then there is the waterfront with all the potential that has been lost, because the town has ignored its special character. I believe that Toronto has deprived itself of a wonderful relationship between the city and the lake by all the ad hoc building that has occurred. And, of course, the expressway simply cuts the whole lakefront off from the rest of downtown. Even now, it might be possible to produce an imaginative scheme for parts of the waterfront that have not been developed, but it will be essential to retain as much open space as possible, and efforts should be made to bring some natural qualities to the waterfront to balance the existing built development. It shouldn't be necessary to have to go to the Islands to see reeds growing in the water.

I would like to end with a story about a small area in London where we have restored the quality of life. A patch of derelict land behind King's Cross station which was a refuse dump for many years has been converted into an ecology park, where local people can go to enjoy contact with nature. I well remember going to a meeting in the local community centre to explain our plans in 1983, when it was uncertain what reception I might receive. This was a rundown inner city neighbourhood with bad housing and high unemployment. Yet plans for an ecology park were received enthusiastically. One lady commented that "this is the first beautiful thing that has ever happened to us here". The park was a success because local people were involved right from the start. A barbecue was held by the local community to launch the project and many local children planted trees. Because they took responsibility for the park, there has been no vandalism.

Children from local schools gain enormously from such places, both emotionally and intellectually. I witnessed one small boy looking into a jam-jar of water full of wriggling pond life say, "Blimey, there's things, what live here". And the children take their parents to the park in an evening to go 'pond-dipping' which means catching the pond life and finding out what lives there. I saw one grandfather taken along in such a fashion and he was soon identifying dragonfly larvae, when he had never had any interest in wildlife all his life.

The Camley Street Park at King's Cross shows what is possible. It is used by all the local schools every day during term time and in the holidays there are children's clubs run by the park staff. But it is more than an educational establishment. It is an important place for the whole community.

Further success in ensuring a good quality of life in cities requires this kind of community involvement: the bottom up approach where local people care for their local patch. They need a place that they can take responsibility for, and it helps to re-establish their roots. Maybe it helps to restore self esteem, too.

But this kind of action can only be effective if the local bureaucracy acts as a facilitator. City Hall has to provide the right framework for local action to be effective. Otherwise, people find themselves banging their heads against brick walls. So, City Hall needs to provide the right policies and programmes for greening to occur. One way in Toronto would be to set up a sub-committee of the Council which would include elected officials, officers of planning and parks, and, of course, representatives of the local neighbourhood groups and urban wilderness gardeners to deal with ecology Such a Committee could have a profound effect on the future environment of the City.

Finally, may I draw your attention to the logo for this Conference. It seems to sum up present aspirations for the downtown. Thirty six city blocks and only one is green! The real plan will have to do a good deal better than that. Bring more country into the city to heal the rift between mankind and nature, and we will go some way to maintaining quality of life in Toronto. It might also help to restore our global sanity.

Len Duhl, San Francisco

Len Duhl has been Professor of Public Health and City Planning, and Professor of Psychiatry, at the University of California (Berkeley) since 1968. His primary focus of concern has been on the planning and policy of cities, to improve the quality of life and health status of individuals, families and groups in the United States, Canada, Europe, and the developing world. His main activity for the last five years has been the "Healthy Cities" programme of the World Health Organisation (WHO) which he helped to develop in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

Wholeness in Health and Community

My concern with the quality of life in the city comes from dealing with many health or urban development issues, separately and as a whole. This city is a complex place to be dealt with as a total organism. [1]

The origins of my interest in cities goes back to several experiences.

- One was growing up in New York, and weekly visits to all corners of it, with my father. The experience of walking the city gave me a grounding. Al Jacobs [2], in his wonderful book, Looking at Cities, tells of how to look at a city, by, seeing, smelling and hearing. To me it is like a physician who examines a patient. It is getting from history and observation and examination enough to tell what has to be done. The only way to see a city, is from all it's vantage points, from all viewers, users and participants in it's life [3].
- Another was working with Erich Lindemann, a psychiatrist as we developed and did the study of the West End of Boston [4]. This was a look at the impact of urban renewal on an Italian-Sicilian population. The social and personal costs of increasing the tax base of the population was very high has stayed with me for years. The West End taught me that what developers were doing to a city. To increase it's tax base and improve the slum-like area, was also detrimental to it's people. Slums were more than old and dilapidated buildings. For some the west End was a home, a networked community of Sicilian Italian, lived together in mutual support and community.

- A third experience was working in the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, where I tried through the Model Cities and other program to increase the social concern of what was a purely housing, planning and financing agency.

- Still another was visiting, with my students, three cities in Canada, and seeing how each dealt with the complexity of urban issues. Returning again and again to Toronto, I could see the development of the outstanding Healthy City program. My colleague and good friend Trevor Hancock has outlined the concept and history of Healthy Cities [5].

Community, what does that mean?

I came to concerns with the urban world from my interest in health and mental health. All of us are aware, use and need health and medical services. However, it is the quality of life that determines if we are healthy.

I found that health is directly related to many factors in addition to medical care. It involves participation, for involvement itself is health giving. It relates to communications and being part of a network of supporting people. It deals with the diverse needs of populations, who have a variety of cultures, values and beliefs. It is concerned with how people are knit together as part of the larger community [6]. We must face questions of power, control, and involvement. Who rules? Health is the ability to command events that effect our lives.

Community involves the rich and the poor. It connects the haves and the have-nots in an intricate web of interconnectedness and interdependence.

We recognize the critical need to see that the governance of difference is critical in the health field and in the community large. Governance is not government. Rather, it is the collection of rules, culture, and unconscious behavior that allows us to perform all the functions of life in the community. This is what I call the "soft infrastructure".

In contrast to the hard infrastructure, the streets, roads, water and sewage, the soft infrastructure deals with behavior. In may ways it is the language used to mediate between the parts. Unfortunately the language used is most often that of money and economics. We discuss the economic bottom line, and efficiency. The needed language is one where all parties in the community family, though unique and with special interest work together for the common good [7].

With this orientation that is wholeness of community, the many decisions involved in a plan for the city's change is part of health's concerns. I therefore would like to direct you to several interrelated issues.

- Efficiency is a way to save money. It forces us to become non-redundant. Non-redundancy is not efficacy. Efficacy, or meeting the totality of needs is quite different from efficiency. A diverse, multicultural city requires redundant health and other services.

- In our population are many people who are unfortunately redundant. "We do not need them!" At least that is what some people infer by their actions. Our modern society increasingly needs less and less people to perform the "thinking" and "conceptual" functions. More and more people are relegated to service functions, which "can be done by anybody". Production follows low cost, to the developing world. A society that sees it's people as redundant ignores the wholeness of community.

We talk of wholeness in the city, and we let a cancer grow. We see violence and crime, drugs and poverty, homelessness and AIDS, and act as if it is not us. "It is they....it is those people, certainly not us." They're the superfluous and redundant ones. Those we do not need to make our society work.

"They do not deserve the things our society has to offer!" is what we imply and do. They have less education, less food and health, in part because they are poor. They can not use the system. In the United States the health system is breaking down and even the rich can't make it work. Perhaps now, what has happened for so long to "them" is now happening to us, we can do something about it. The crime, and violence are now part of life in heterogeneous and diverse cities. It is almost a given.

I have not frequently heard the word community in this meeting. Often when I go to medical meetings I hear about cases. I don't hear about people and families. In cities, mostly I hear about buildings and business, money and transport. Perhaps jobs. All too rarely people.

- A community is like an organism. If any part of the organism is not working, is ill or diseased, it effects the whole. In a human being a cancerous liver effects the total health of the person. The community is similar. Thus poverty, hunger, homelessness are concerns of the whole.

- The disease is not "them". Rather it is that part of our so-called community is sick. It makes our whole community sick. We can not separate the part from the whole.

As I mentioned, the West End taught me about community. But it taught me much more. I learned that every act in the city effects the well being of people who live and work in it. I found that most of these actions and experiences were contradictory. We spout, "Ethics", and we see rip off artists all around us. We talk of the needs of people. We see some developers ignoring the people who live and work in the community. We see fancy yuppie communities replace so-called slums. We see transport to and from work, and little for the children, the old or the sick.

No society can exist unless there is a concern with reciprocal maintenance. This means that we must take care of that which cares for us. It is a concern with the environment and it's current pollutions. It is also about people and institutions which are important to the total community welfare.

We owe ourselves information. Most of us do not know much about our community, the underling nature of the problems and alternate solutions. Though schools are our official educators, the media and our politicians are the continuing educators of all the people. We must inform. We must educate. We must reframe issues in new ways, so people can understand and then act. I challenge the media, to inform and educate the people of Toronto!

The quality of life therefore is not a separate decision from those of economics, or building or transport. It is the same issue.

What values should determine all of our actions? It implies values for all actions. It means a careful look at the issues of the city. It is a political process that I hope your program continues to be. It must involve everyone.

The central question in any city is the glue which holds the various fragments, pieces and parts together. This glue, is culture, history and the rules or constitution by which people work out and resolve their issues.

In any community we need leadership that responds to meeting the needs of people. Why must the idea of entrepreneurship deal only with business? Why can it not deal with organizing social and community programs. These new leaders, social entrepreneurs [8], need all the skills of their business counterpart. In addition, there is a core set of values, ethics and morals which are community oriented.

Leadership of the future will not be that of control. Rather the function of leadership will be to aid in the education of the public. It will try to find new reframed answers to old problems. Systems and ecological answers are needed for all the old problems of design, housing, streets and construction. Denial of human needs or ecological and environmental considerations will lead to the death of the city.

We must walk the streets, met all the people and hear their stories. "Planners learn from data. The community learns from stories" [9]. Our ultimate goal is a whole community that meets all the needs of people, from conception to resurrection. People need to belong.

There is an underlying devisiveness and fragmentation in our cities. Money is not the solution. We need new ideas, a reframing of ussues and new ways to deal with the emerging problems.

The Healthy City program tries to make the whole city healthy. It must be part of your total plan. Being whole is healthy.

[1] Leonard Duhl ed., The Urban Condition: People and Policy in the Metropolis, Basic Books, New York, 1963.

[2] Al Jacobs, Looking at Cities, Harvard, Cambridge, 1987.

[3] L. Duhl and T. Hancock, a Guide to Assessing Healthy Cities, WHO Healthy Cities Papers No. 3, the WHO Healthy Citieis Project Office, FACL Publishers, Copenhagen, 1988.

[4] Marc Fried, Grieving for A Lost Home in Leonard Duhl, op cite.

[5] T. Hancock and L. Duhl, Promoting Health in the Urban Context, WHO Healthy Cities Papers, No. 1, FADL Publishers, Copenhagen, 1988.

[6] Len Duhl, Health Planning and Social Change, Human Sciences Press, New York, 1986.

[7] L. Duhl, The Mind of The City, Environments, vol. 19, No. 3, pp 1-13, Summer 1988.

[8] L. Duhl, The Social Entrepreneurship of Change, Pace University Press, New York, 1989, in press.

[9] John McKnight, Northwestern, personal communication.

Tjeerd Deelstra, Delft

Tjeerd Deelstra is Director of the Urban Environment Programme at the Delft University of Technology (DUT) and founder and first Director of the International Institute for the Urban Environment at Delft, an independent institute working for UNESCO, WHO, the Council of Europe, and national and local authorities. Since 1970, he has been Associate Professor in Environmental Planning and Design at DUT and has written and lectured extensively around the world on environmental issues.

The following is an account of Prof. Deelstra's presentation at the Forum. It was transcribed and edited from a video tape of the proceedings.

I would like to embark upon my comments with a simple philosophy about the stages of urban planning from the point of view of the environment. People build cities for economic and social reasons and begin with basic issues of safety. Examples are earthquakes and spring tides. We have regulations in cities for dealing with fire and safety. That is the first, basic stage.

The second stage came into being, when the bigger cities began to develop in the west European industrial areas, mainly in the last century, and when there were major diseases and explosions. We began to introduce sewage systems, better light entrance into buildings. These concerns are now normal ingredients in city planning, at least in the developed world. The third world countries are still struggling with this problem.

The third stage began when we became aware, about fifteen years ago more or less, about chemical pollutants, smog. You in Toronto are still struggling with many of these problems, like transportation of dangerous wastes, distances between industries that could explode, and so on.

Now, we are entering the fourth stage of what is called sustainable development, a new, fresh approach which is very stimulating but necessary. At the global context we know that there are limits to the quality of life in relation to pollution. We have to work on cities, so they can last and work with their resources, so life will still be pleasant and possible.

This new look at cities was developed in a 1970's UNESCO healthy cities project, an ecological view of cities. Look at cities as systems dependent on incoming flows of energy, water, raw materials, products, and people from other places. Out of those cities comes another flow of goods, products, and wastes. Normally, though no longer acceptable, city planning has been concerned about extracting resources for growth and development and removal of wastes. The new sustainable concept thinks about the city as having to manage its hinterland, where all these bad things are being dumped.

The idea is to think about the resources in the city, to work with them, and to look at wastes as raw material that can be used again. There is a lot of technology available, and it will heavily influence land use planning in the traditional sense. The more conventional way to look at cities in developed countries is an arrangement of buildings in space. Our land use planning systems and laws in developed countries are based on that view.

A new way would be to make a balance of the flows entering, leaving, and circulating in the city and to calculate and rearrange the streams to gain maximum use of the flows including maximizing the length of the flows within the system. Much more could be discussed in terms of detail.

The Hancock health model of the city is a much simpler model of a city based on nature which is basic for all life. In that natural system is an organized system of housing, roads, and infrastructure in terms of flow management. Then, the third subsystem of the city is its human beings. Traditionally, three types of disciplines are at work: the biologists and the naturalists on the first subsystem, the engineers and planners on the second subsystem of infrastructure and urban fabric, and the medical doctors, sociologists, and psychologists on the human ecosystem within the more complex urban ecosystem.

The three subsystems should be united, in practice, through working teams to produce quality for the city's inhabitants. This will produce a revised vision of green areas, not just decorative open space for inhabitants but corridors for birds and animals, insects, and so on for migration. You begin to understand the importance of green for city climate, wildlife habitats, that nature has a function in waste recovery, food, and wood production, another view of the social meaning, the healing impact for mental diseases, and educational value apart from conventional sports and recreation.

These ingredients could be used to form an intriguing image of the city, because the green infrastructure is related to natural conditions. Artificial elements can be introduced, as well, not a romanticized, untouched rural system. A city with great experiential, sensual value is very important.

Finally, environmental planning is a dimension of a structural plan for city development. An up-to-date city needs to have a stream inventory, its volume and quality. Waste and traffic flows must be inventoried in order to be efficiently manipulated. Efficient management will reduce pollution through preventive action to make a really clean and workable city.

Trevor Hancock mentioned pilot studies, which I support. There are unique opportunities: Don River, the nearby St. Lawrence area. These two project areas should have new approaches for evaluation. There should be a real choice for the city's infrastructure as a whole. It's not enough just to work on specific areas. From walking around I have the sense that Toronto is a typical pioneering city, a business district here, a shopping centre there. There are some nice living areas which are framed in by high rise.

It is a nice chaos, and I ask myself whether I can implement a European model with squares and such. This is a crucial point in Toronto's development because the city will grow, and there is money and commitment. The city should find new visually coherent structures as in San Francisco. Call it 'grandeur'. Every good city is memorable to its visitors, whether New York's Central Park, Venice's water's edge, or Edinburgh's mountain and loch. The same applies to Amsterdam, London, and Paris. Bad cities are mostly cities that lack a clear picture. In practice, it's also important to be able to find your way around.

I miss this clarity in this city. Since Toronto is at a crossroads, it needs to be addressed. Nature should be an essential element of it. For example, the ravine system and the Don River and the waterfront, also the stone elements, the built-up areas, through concentration for efficiency. Cities are art forms as well as systems.

Session 7

Planning to Achieve Social Equity

The widening gap between the lives of the City's rich and poor has recently emerged as a focus of attention. Gourmet restaurants and luxury houses proliferate while hunger and homelessness have become serious problems. Torontonians have strived for a community based on opportunity, fairness, shared responsibility and dignity for all. Yet there is little doubt that this goal is in jeopardy. This session challenges planners to renew the commitment to social equity and social justice.

Moderator: **Earl Miller** *(Manager, Community Services Policy, Policy and Strategic Planning Division, Planning and Development Department, City of Toronto)*

Marvyn Novick, Toronto

During the last two decades, Marvyn Novick has been a leading contributor to the social policy field in Canada. He is currently Professor of Social Work at Ryerson Institute of Technology in Toronto, after serving for six years as Dean of the Faculty of Community Services. A former senior programme director with the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, Professor Novick's main concerns have focused on the impact of economic and social disparities on children, families, and youth. He has argued vigorously for active government initiatives to promote equal life opportunities for all Canadians.

Growing Disparaties Within Growing Aggregates

A malaise hovers over the City of Toronto. The general indicators point to positive trends. The realities within these indicators are more troublesome. At the heart of the malaise is confusion and concern over what kind of city Toronto is becoming.

The aggregate economic profile of Toronto in the eighties points to unparalleled prosperity and achievement. From 1983 to 1988, record levels of wealth were generated in Ontario, largely centered in the Toronto region. The gross provincial product rose from $150 billion in 1983 to $240 billion for 1988 – a gain of $90 billion in six years. During this period, the unemployment rate in the Toronto CMA dropped to 3.7% by 1988. Economic analysts proclaimed that the Toronto region had become a 'full employment' economy.

Along with its prosperity, Toronto has sought global recognition for itself as an emerging international centre of economic and cultural significance. The promotion of Toronto as 'world class' has been persistent. State of the world facilities have been developed (or on the horizon) for professional sports, ballet and opera, exhibitions, and broadcasting. The corporate energy of the City is now directed towards securing two major world events – the summer Olympics for 1996 and an accredited world exhibition in the year 2000.

Toronto has also pursued a strong set of international relations with other centres of global capital and trade. Twinning agreements have been signed, and exchange visits have become more frequent. City Council has explored the idea of establishing an international urban institute in Toronto, so that other world cities could benefit from the Toronto experience.

National cities, such as Toronto, relate to and serve many constituencies. They are significant to their regions and their countries, and have a positive contribution to other developing cities of the world. At issue is not whether multilevel relationships should exist, but who is served and who benefits from these relationships.

National cities invariably reflect in their development the prevailing currents and trends of national forces. Since 1984, Canada has pursued a right wing agenda of market driven economic growth. The Mulroney government has offered Canadians the promise of prosperity and jobs, if private sector forces could be given unconstrained opportunities to operate. The role of governments has been redefined to that of host and booster of market forces.

Nationally, we have witnessed substantial privatization of public enterprise, the dismemberment of Canadian public institutions in transportation and broadcasting, the early stages of dismantling the welfare state of Canada, the erosion of regional development programs to less advantaged parts of Canada, the reductions and commercialization of foreign aid to dependent countries, generous tax reductions to advantaged and affluent Canadians, minimal screening of foreign takeovers of domestic enterprise, and continued reductions of corporate contributions to public revenue. The ability of Canadians to manage their economic and social future has been further constrained with the imposition of the Canada – U.S. free trade agreement.

Any serious discussion of planning for the City of Toronto must recognize the extent to which national policies shape and constrain the urban form. The statutory instruments of municipalities, regulation and provision, cannot compensate for or reverse the structural impacts of Ottawa's right wing agenda for Canada.

If too much wealth is allowed to concentrate among executives, owners, managers, market professionals, and the beneficiaries of intra-familial transfers, then the inevitable outcome will be serious distortions in the price structure of regional housing. Supply and demand is too facile an explanation for the explosion of housing prices in Toronto. There must be the income and wealth levels within the population necessary to sustain the high price of Toronto housing and the high volume of housing sales, which took place before interest rates went up.

It is self-serving, and potentially racist, to attribute the responsibility for housing prices to off-shore Asian buyers. If high income groups benefit from higher wage and benefit gains, significant reductions of top tax rates, limited tax claims on profits and wealth, capital gains exemptions, and increased exemptions for succession duties and small business transfers, then excessive wealth concentrations emerge which distort commodity values, such as housing. The housing market may become robust, general indicators can point to prosperity, but the balance sheet of relative benefit is submerged in the aggregates.

The pursuit of social equity requires a disaggregation of general indicators to examine the content and distribution of gains. Crude or raw economic growth can distort our perceptions of relative states of societal well-being. Market ideologies and perspectives are of limited value in pursuing social equity issues. Market anthropologies (or doctrines of what it means to be human) are quite pessimistic in their assumptions of how human progress can be achieved. They contend that collective gain is optimised, when competing forces can determine who succeeds and who fails. It is only at the precipice of survival, when winners claim their due and losers are driven out, that market standards of efficiency emerge. Thus, disparity, or inequality of life chances, is a necessary outcome of market driven societies, in which the role of government is constrained and reduced.

Market advocates would have us believe that winners and losers reflect competing tests of efficiency and excellence. Clearly, the quality of performance is one criterion of market success. But, the market is ultimately based upon who prevails and who is forced to withdraw. This is very often a test of the social power, political influence, and the prior command of economic resources, which participants bring to market relations. Market outcomes inevitably reflect structural distributions of advantage which precede market relationships. These advantages may be based upon class, gender, race, familial status, age, or disability. Thus, market outcomes reveal differentials of collective empowerment, as well as differences in individual performance.

A review of national patterns during the eighties reveals growing disparities among Canadians during a period of aggregate prosperity and gain. These disparities are one source of the growing malaise about the future of Toronto.

The disaggregation of indicators reveals the following trends and patterns:

a) In February of 1989 the official unemployment rate for Canada was 7.5%. Only four cities in Ontario (Toronto, Hamilton, London, and Ottawa) and Halifax were below this rate. All other major cities in Canada had unemployment levels above 7.5%. In 1988, the Canadian economy was completing a five year period of growth. These were, therefore, good times for the country, a period of peak performance. Unemployment was down to 3.7% in Toronto. The best a market driven economy could provide other Canadian cities were recorded unemployment levels of: Vancouver (9.3%); Edmonton (9.1%); Winnipeg (8.4%); Montreal (9.2%); and St. John's (11.5%).

In the period of 1985-88, the gap between unemployment levels in the above cities and Toronto grew as follows: Vancouver (from 1.96 to 2.51); Edmonton (from 1.79 to 2.46); Winnipeg (from 1.29 to 2.29); Montreal (from 1.72 to 2.49); and St. John's (from 2.21 to 3.11). In 1985, the largest non CMA regional gap in Canada was 3.36, between Newfoundland and Central Ontario. By 1988 the gap in unemployment rates between these regions grew to 4.33.

b) While unemployment was reduced during the eighties, the quality of jobs created deteriorated. From 1983 to 1986, nearly 35% of all jobs created in Metro were part-time jobs. National employment accounts do not differentiate job quality. A dead end job of 15 hours a week in a fast-food outlet is registered as one job in national totals, equivalent in the job count to a full-time professional or unionized job with decent pay, benefits, and career opportunities.

c) The gap in wages increased between 1981 and 1986. Differences can be seen in the shift among the five largest sources of jobs by wage levels during this period.

Wages and Volume of Jobs

Rank	**1981**	**1986**
1	$13.53 — $15.58 (966,000)	less than $5.24 (1,096,000)
2	$15.59 — $19.41 (963,000)	$15.59 — $19.41 (1,020,000)
3	$6.77 — $7.97 (918,000)	$13.53 — $15.58 (982,000)
4	$10.44 — $11.87 (898,000)	$11.88 –- $13.52 (947,000)
5	$9.23 — $10.43 (896,000)	$7.98 — $9.22 (914,000)

Source: J. Mules, G. Picot, T. Wannell, Statistics Canada as reported in Perception , Canadian Council on Social Development, Spring 1989.

In 1986, the largest source of jobs in Canada were at wages of less than $5.24 an hour. The poverty line for a single adult in 1989 (population over 500,000) is $12,037. A full-time job (40 hours a week) would have to pay at least $7.25 an hour for any individual to live 25% above the poverty line. The Ontario minimum wage will be raised in 1989 to $5.00 an hour.

The 1989 poverty line in Toronto for a single parent with two children is $21,245. After deducting federal income transfers, this parent would have to receive $11.80 an hour (full-time) to be 25% above the poverty line. Only 3 of the 5 job categories in 1986 (even when adjusted to 1989 levels) paid family wages.

d) Occupational income disparities have grown between 1985 and 1987.

Occupational Category	Cumulative Compensation Gains (Unadjusted) 1985 - 1987
Senior Executives	+ 43.7%
Managers	+ 22.6%
Salaried Workers	+ 12.7%
Hourly Workers	+ 8.4%

Source: Research Department, Canadian Union of Public Employees, August 1988

e) Intergenerational income disparities grew significantly between 1981 and 1986.

Changes in Average Income
1986 Dollars (Constant)

	Families			Unattached Individuals		
Age Cohort	1981	1986	Change	1981	1986	Change
15-24	$28,402	$23,410	-17.6%	$15,226	$12,928	-15.1%
25-34	37,730	36,837	-2.4%	23,106	20,913	-9.5%
35-44	44,858	44,681	-0.4%	25,576	24,428	-4.5%
45-54	49,126	49,619	+1.0%	21,761	22,929	+5.4%
55-64	42,042	42,923	+2.1%	16,670	17,036	+2.2%
65+	27,262	28,732	+5.4%	12,578	12,888	+2.5%

Source: Trisat Resources Ltd., Ottawa, January 1988 (from Statistics Canada data)

f) The economic well-being of average income families increasingly depends upon the earnings of both husband and wife in order to protect and sustain their standard of living. Young families with children are financially stretched to their limits.

Husband – Wife Contributions to Average Family Income 1984 Dollars (Constant)

Year	Average Family Income	Husband's Contribution	Wife's Contribution	Other Contribution
1971	$31,260	24,290 (77.7%)	4,610 (14.7%)	2,360 (7.6%)
1979	38,670	27,510 (71.1%)	7,780 (20.1%)	3,380 (8.7%)
1984	37,990	25,610 (67.4%)	9,550 (25.1%)	2,830 (7.4%)

Source: Canadian Social Trends, Statistics Canada, Winter 1986.

In 1987, 68.9% of all families with children under 6 were supported by earnings from both husband and wife. During the eighties, family allowances and child tax credits have been de-indexed. Major expansion of day care services has been deferred. Significant intragenerational inequities are emerging between adults with children and adults without children within the same age cohort. The crisis becomes more profound when average housing costs in the Toronto region are 5 to 6 times in excess of the average income of families in the 25-34 age cohort.

g) Even with the substantial economic growth of the eighties, national child poverty levels in 1989 remain at the 1,000,000 level, where they were at the beginning of the decade. In Ontario, over 300,000 children live in poverty; in Metro, the estimate is about 75,000. New welfare reform measures adapted by Ontario may reduce the use of food banks by poor families. These measures will have a minimal impact on levels of child poverty in Ontario.

Serious inroads on the elimination of child poverty depend upon the availability of family wages in the labour market and significantly upgraded income security programs from the federal government. The persistence of child poverty has a dual impact on its victims. It creates inequities in the life quality of children as they grow up and unequal life chances for children, as they proceed to adulthood. Chronic child poverty increases the risk of intergenerational disadvantages and underclass formation.

The national trends point to serious segmentations in the social structure of Canada with more concentrations of advantage and disadvantage. These trends are evident in Toronto, where affluence and despair have come to co-exist. It is a city in which fewer students now attending Toronto high school will be able to remain in Toronto and raise their families.

As disparities increase, the symptoms associated with concentrations of disadvantage surface. The public worries about problems such as youth gangs, violent crimes, and drugs. More responsibilities (and tax dollars) are assigned to the police in the hope that they can contain the symptoms. Problems arising from social disadvantage are redefined as law enforcement issues. The U.S. experience during the last 25 years demonstrates that more law enforcement is the least cost-effective way to deal with structural inequities.

We should remind ourselves that Toronto first acquired international attention in the seventies not as a 'world class' city, but as a 'people city'. Toronto was a place with a rich diversity of people, comfortably housed in liveable neighborhoods. The marvel of Toronto were its positive differences from other global cities, not its similarities to 'world class' centers. This was a city with a model urban structure and a high standard of public services. Toronto was praised not for its 'prestige' facilities and events, but for the quality of daily life which its people enjoyed.

Young families with children at many income levels could be found in all neighborhoods of the city, including the downtown core. On a personal note, we were able to raise our four children in the centre of the city as tenants on a mainstream income. In 1972, there were 45 children on our street of varying ages. By 1988, when we moved, less than 10 children were living on the street.

The broader issue is whether Toronto will become a city of disparities, with three classes – the affluent, adults without children, and the poor. Or does Toronto still aspire to be a 'people city' with a healthy mix of families with children and diverse income groups.

Promoting Social Equity

A discussion of growing disparities in Toronto presumes that this has become an issue of public and political concern. There is a right wing perspective, which would question whether Toronto should endeavour to include an economic and social mix in its future. They might argue that cities should aspire to an urban structure, which optimises the functioning of market forces. Cities should discover where their comparative advantage rests and capitalize on these assets.

As a national centre (and possibly a continental centre with free trade), Toronto is strategically situated to serve head office, financial, public administration, and professionally-intensive enterprises. Attracting and retaining high wage sectors requires state of the world life style amenities, safe streets, and a regional transportation structure. The goal of a social mix should be pursued over the greater Toronto region, with each municipality contributing to this mix relative to its requirements and capabilities.

The right wing agenda for Toronto would locate the public interest of the city with its market role. Planning and public provision would reflect this priority. The city would belong to those who contributed to its economic function. Public and supportive housing would ensure the continued presence of marginalized populations in Toronto. Social despair would be viewed as either a threat (in which case more police would be deployed), as an embarrassment (for which periodic welfare reform would be promoted), or as part of the panache and risk associated with a 'world class' city.

There can be no serious discussion of social equity, until the vision of Toronto's future is debated. The planning and development of cities is not a technical exercise, based on the inherent wisdom of the urban professions. Cities reflect and contribute to the prevailing ideologies, values, and struggles of their times. Plans are rarely neutral.

Each concept of a city's future should be assessed to determine who benefits and who is excluded. Too often, right wing advocates subsume the considerations of social equity to the presumed imperatives of economic necessity. It would be nice to pursue this, they say, but you can't. Most of the social disparities which have emerged nationally during the eighties can be traced to the self-certified wisdom of right wing dogma, defining for us what is real and what is possible. Class agendas are thereby camouflaged as the public interest.

Social equity is not unitary, but partisan. It grows out of what people believe in and are willing to struggle for. Concept of a city's future must meet reality tests of feasibility. The role of the urban professions is to identify the conditions under which particular visions are achievable and thereby expand the range of democratic options. It is important that experts make their own beliefs and preferences explicit, so that professional advice can be differentiated from partisan commitments.

Allow me to offer my own perspectives on social equity. I categorically reject the pessimism and privilege of right wing doctrines. Social equity, for me, means more than the compassion of the strong for the weak. It also goes beyond the guarantees of due process and fair treatment.

In my judgement, social equity is grounded in a positive concept of democracy, as articulated by the late political philosopher, C. B. McPherson, a renowned world thinker and longtime resident of Toronto. Professor McPherson contended that the fundamental premise of democracy was the inherent capacity of people to exercise moral judgment and contribute their creative talents. The fundamental promise of democracy was to enact those conditions, whereby people could develop and demonstrate their inherent equality. The social equity test of a democracy would therefore rest on the extent to which structural disparities were progressively diminished and equal life chances made accessible to all.

A vision of Toronto which promoted the democratic objectives of equal life chances would be a city with a healthy mix of people, who could benefit from the rich resources and opportunities which Toronto has to offer. It would be a city whose collective identity and stature would once more rest upon its inclusiveness, diversity, liveability, and quality of daily life. It would be a city that would reverse its population decline of the last twenty years and welcome a new generation of younger families from all income backgrounds to become a part of its future.

A central planning objective for the next decade would be to restore and enrich the legacy of Toronto as a 'people city'. A commitment to 'people city' would be a clear statement by Toronto residents that they reject the segmentation and disparities which have surfaced in Canadian life. They would signal their determination to create in Toronto a national centre and a microcosm for the country, in which social equity and the public good are afforded an equal status to the pursuit of private wealth.

The struggle for social equity would have to take place at many levels. The process of planning would recognize that cities can play a broader public role in determining their own future and in shaping national destinies. The assumption that city planning is local in character would have to be challenged. The urban structure is moulded by the impact of national policies. The imposition of a right wing agenda on Canada inevitably leads to pressures to pursue market driven futures for Toronto.

City planning would include the monitoring of national policies and public education on what these policies mean for social equity and the quality of city life. There is no reason why the content of city policies must be confined to the statutory mandates of local governments. Statutory mandates constrain what local governments may enact, but they do not limit what cities can discuss, propose, and pursue.

City governments are not constrained from developing national relationships. Other major cities in Canada are also experiencing the social stress of disparities. The struggle for social equity can include national coalitions of urban governments to identify common concerns for the future of their cities and their country. Cities don't require provincial mandates to pursue collective objectives beyond their borders. What they require is the emergence of a new politics and public leaders, who recognize the profound impacts of national policies on city life.

The struggle for social equity within Toronto, and Metro will call for a re-alignment of municipal priorities and policies. City planning would focus on the following areas:

a) A substantial population increase for the City of Toronto (by at least 25%) to include significant numbers of young families with children from all income levels.

b) An approach to economic development which stressed the quality of jobs either preserved or created; these would be jobs which provided family wages and benefits. The promise that a new venture would create 'jobs' would no longer be deemed sufficient or desirable. The city may wish to rid itself of the growing number of inferior jobs in Toronto by arguing for a regional minimal wage of $7.25 an hour, to ensure an adult a standard of living 25% above the poverty level.

c) A critical review of Toronto's neighborhood structure and housing patterns. The present configuration of housing forms in the city is inherently exclusionary. A city with a healthy mix of people requires a healthy mix of housing in its neighborhood. This means neighborhoods which include low and medium rise multiple dwelling units – duplex/triplex conversions, apartments and flats, and low rise apartments, both within neighborhoods and on arterial roads. This will be the most difficult challenge for planners to achieve. At issue is who speaks for the interests and well being of those who are currently excluded from becoming part of Toronto's neighborhoods. A new reform strategy would affirm that Toronto's neighborhoods are public places and therefore accessible to a broader range of social groups. The role of planners would shift from being the brokers of established neighborhood interests against developers to becoming advocates of social equity and the public interest.
A participation strategy to create inclusive neighborhoods in Toronto would bring together residents and popular sector organizations committed to social equity. Neighborhood participation would mean the right to belong and not just the right to protect. Neighborhood planning would seek out a healthy balance between accessibility and preservation.

d) The recognition that public transit is an essential urban good, which enables cities to intensify population growth, confers efficiencies of scale for public services, and promotes social inclusiveness as a redistributive benefit to mainstream and low income populations. There has been a tendency in Metro to view public transit as a government provided market commodity. At present, transit is priced to meet 68% of operating costs. A city that sought to be more affordable might consider reducing the user contribution to 50% of operating costs. Such a reduction could occur through a freeze or adjustment of fares until the 50% level was reached.
Similarly, overdue capital improvements to the system would be assigned a high priority for acceleration. Congestion at the Bloor/Yonge Station has been an identified problem since the beginning of the eighties. Congestion has yet to be alleviated in 1989.

e) The realization of affirmative employment objectives by the year 2000, so all levels of municipal employment and public life reflect gender proportions, developmental differences, and the ethno-racial diversity of Toronto's people. Included in affirmative objectives would be model employment options, which enable parents of younger children to balance the responsibilities of work and family life.

f) The strengthening of community life in local areas of the city through municipal support of cultural enrichment activities and cooperative enterprise development. The quality of a city is enhanced by the opportunities people both create as well as consume. For many people on modest incomes, the price of Toronto's cultural and leisure attractions hase become unaffordable. There is a need to review the pricing system of cultural amenities in Toronto, which are major beneficiaries of public funding, to determine their social use and accessiblity patterns.

g) Building into the process of city planning the empowerment of historically under-represented populations and sectors. City planning has too often been viewed as the domain of land use, financial, corporate, and home ownership interests. Popular sector organizations, such as churches, community associations, ethno-cultural groups, labour, women's coalitions, and human service agencies, have much at stake and much to offer in building the political will for a 'people city'. They tend not to have the financial resources to purchase expert professional services to reflect their perspectives and commitments.
A strategy to promote inclusive planning would have the city regularly commission popular sector groups (at a fee for service level equivalent to what is paid to market consultants) to address pressing problems and propose appropriate directions. Popular sector organizations might also be commissioned to develop coalitions, which pursue social equity objectives of the city.

Toronto is well positioned to be a leader in the struggle for social equity, as part of the 'people city' vision. The city has an outstanding record in the provision of public services and its support of neighborhood development. The political culture of Toronto values participation and diversity. The reform movement of the seventies captured that spirit and gave it political expression for a brief period of time.

The struggle for reform in the nineties will need to discover its own spirit and strategy. The issues of social equity and liveability have become far more complex. In the seventies, the call was to preserve what we valued. The challenge of the nineties is to create what we believe in.

Max Beck, Vancouver

Max Beck is Director of the City of Vancouver Social Planning Department. Educated at the University of British Columbia, Mr. Beck was previously a Director of the Vancouver Inner-City Service Project and the Opportunities for Youth Programme. Prior to his current appointment in 1981, he was Regional Director of the Department of Secretary of State in British Columbia and the Yukon Territory.

The following is an account of Mr. Beck's presentation at the Forum. It was transcribed and edited from a video tape of the proceedings

Can social issues really be part of a land use plan? On balance, they are. The question before you is: what kind of a city do you want to be? a city concerned about land and the arrangement of buildings or a city concerned about people? I come from a city that's concerned about people, frankly, a city that puts people first, a city that is concerned with how anything affects the lives of people.

Novick has said some very provocative things about how the community has changed. Do we want to be a city of the rich and the poor, or do we want to be a city that's available to all segments of the community. In particular, do we want to have families with children in the downtowns of our cities, or do we want to close our schools and not serve that part of the community any longer?

You need something in your structure that recognizes the importance of people, and I don't see that in Toronto. You have to have a social plan or make sure that social concerns are an integral part of any city plan. You have to stop thinking that social questions are dealt with by other levels of government. Frankly, a lot of people questions are for local government, and you have to take a strong advocacy position. I've heard about Toronto's multi-cultural, multi-racial character, but I don't see a broad range of people present here.

What is social equity? It's deciding what kind of a city works for people. Our community doesn't deliver equal life chances to people. We want to assure that the benefits and costs of life in the community are fairly and humanely distributed among all segments of the population. We want to assure that change improves the lot of those already disadvantaged, not worsens it. Above all, social equity must be something that's practiced, something that's done - not just a few nice words in a plan. It must be something that we practice every day, that we look at every day, something that has genuine substance to it.

Everybody thinks they really know what people and their problems are all about. People are not always quite that simple. Sometimes, a concentrated point of view on people issues is a good thing even if politicians feel they know the problems. I think you have to have some kind of department or structure that is a people department, as do Vancouver, Victoria, and Halifax. Our department is concerned with all the major social and cultural issues. We report directly to Council. We're the ones that Council turns to if there's a problem. Toronto's organization chart lacks any department exclusively devoted to people.

You should have some kind of social plan. Vancouver doesn't have a comprehensive social plan, partly because of the social planning comment in all city documents. Virtually every plan at every scale has a social component. As Zeidler pointed out, when you 'screw up', buildings don't complain, land doesn't complain. It's the people, who come and complain.

The city must show real leadership on local social issues. The national agenda isn't very responsive to social problems. For example, day care gets put on before elections, then is quickly taken off afterward. The federal government isn't redistributing wealth; they're redistributing scarcity. We have to worry about the provincial governments, as well. The issues at the local level include housing, day care, drugs - these are issues that can be dealt with at the local level. McAfee has told you about Vancouver's bold new housing initiative. We're quite aware that we have to work on many of these issues ourselves and taken leadership on them.

You have to take a strong advocacy role. A major issue is deinstitutionalization. My first exposure was to the 'pest house', later followed by the mental hospital in North Bay, Ontario. Now they've put these people back on the streets, without putting the necessary resources into the community. A pet peeve is about knives. Why are people allowed to carry knives in the community? It's a major cause of death in our cities.

Another issue is the need for strong support to key community groups. In our community, the Downtown Eastside Residents' Association has emerged as the strongest advocacy group in the city - with public financial support. Homelessness is not very common in Vancouver. During our cold snap last winter, we went looking for people sleeping on the street, and we couldn't find many of them. We've done several things: we've preserved 6,500 units of upgraded flop house accommodation; Carnegie Centre is a skid row drop-in centre, which has several thousand visits daily; 1,000 meals and showersare provided daily.

Two final comments: can you afford social equity? In medical care, the country that spends the most is the United States, who spend about $2,000 per capita or about 11% of gross national product. That's a lot of money. Britain spends only about $700 per capita annually on medical care, about half as much of GNP. The American medical system is not well distributed. Britain is a good example of a medical system that is well distributed.

My final comment is a suggestion that we must think long and hard about what kind of a city does Toronto wish to be? Do you want to be a 'world class city'? If you do, I think you're getting there, but I'm not sure you want to get there. When I think of world class cities, I think of cities that are characterized by high crime rates, drug epidemics, massive income disparities, very poor housing, homeless persons on the streets if not dying on the streets, the commercial centre tends to take advantage of other regions and exploit them, incredible environmental pollution, traffic at a standstill, and an over-reliance on the police to solve the social problems.

I'm not sure that's what you want to be. In Vancouver, the downtown area is not dead, the low income groups are here, there are excellent community-police relations, and we are very concerned and respectful of the environment that we live in. We had a wonderful World's Fair, and, for a while, we went around saying we wanted to be a world class city. Six months later, we woke up and decided no we don't want to. Now, we're quite happy to be a Canadian city and perhaps even quite happy just to be Vancouver.

The question you want to answer is: do you want to be a world class city, or a Canadian city, and do you want to be a city that puts people first?

Madeleine Blanchet, Quebec

Madeleine Blanchet is President of the Quebec Government Council of Social Affairs. A graduate of four universities, including the Harvard School of Public Health, Dr. Blanchet was previously Director of Studies on Health Status for the Ministry of Social Affairs, Quebec before being appointed to her present position in July 1980. The author of over 30 articles and publications, she was awarded 1980 'Woman of the Year' for her contribution to the promotion of women in the field of health.

As I was reading in today's newspaper, "the Western world economic think tank, OECD, puts Canada at the bottom of class when it comes to mastering its budget deficit", a question came up to my mind. How would large cities like Toronto and Montreal rank in terms of achieving social equity between their citizens?

Because the contrasts between the rich and the poor have always been a prominent factor of violence in a city, no city planning can be done without taking matters of social equity into consideration. This is not a virtuous exercise anymore but an ethical duty for politicians and administrators.

The planning of the future of our large cities include dealing with revitalization of poverty areas, prevention of drug problems, prostitution among adolescents, and finding solutions for homeless people. Otherwise, an increase in violence and crimes of all kinds will make our cities become unsafe places to live in, no matter what the number of parks and leisure facilities is. Families with children will escape towards suburbs as they have already started to do in the last decade, and, you will agree, a childless city is a dead city.

The trends of living in suburbs have been extensively documented by the Council of Social Affairs in its recent report on social and demographic development entitled 'Deux Québecs dans un' (Two Quebecs in one). On the one hand, there is a middle class and upper-middle class population living in the suburbs of cities and towns. These suburbs are essentially composed of families with children and adolescents but with very few elderly people.

On the other hand, the poorest Quebecers, who are either older citizens living on their pensions or unmarried mothers of young people living on welfare and part-time jobs have moved to the inner part of large cities. Some of these young people are still living in rural areas in a permanent jobless situation. There is not only 'Two Quebecs in one' but also 'Two Montreals in One'. In the Montreal metro area the contrasts between communities are striking.

The 'donut' shape of development is more evident there. In the dough of the donut, the suburbs of Montreal, live the affluent communities whereas the hole of the donut, the core of the city, houses the poorest families, the elderly citizens, and the poorest immigrants. This hole also houses mentally disturbed people who have been transferred from institutions to the community with little support.

Actually, the city of Montreal itself ranks poorly among the various cities of the province, when we take into account the demographic and social indicators, including health status indicators. Furthermore, the situation has been deteriorating over the last two decades. It was time to react since the election of the Rassemblement des citoyens de Montréal in 1968. The planning department of the city of Montreal has been moving towards a radical change. As Mrs. Michèle Jodoin pointed out yesterday, a global approach to the problems is being developed to find the best solutions.

When the Doré administration took over this global planning, it was found that part of the analysis had been done. Inequalities in health status have been very well documented in the Montreal metro areas. A number of social scientists and economists from various universities have demonstrated its persistence over the last decades.

The Canadian Institute for Social Policy has shown the gap between the rich and the poor communities: eight years in life expectancy at birth and fourteen years in healthy life expectancy; twice as many children die in their first year in the poor areas as compared to the rich ones; and three times as many babies at low weight in the poorest areas as compared to the richest.

As pointed out by Professor Marvyn Novick, the Canadian Council on Social Development has shown that poverty among children remains what it was prior to the 1982-83 recession despite the sustained economic growth which characterized the past six years in Quebec as well as in Canada.

Obviously, the goal of equal chances of life from birth has not yet been reached despite thirty years of universal health insurance in our country. There are many explanations to the fact that one child out of five is born and raise in poverty.

On one hand, powerful social trends have brought in more single parent families who have been invading the poorest areas of large cities, and, on the other hand, the health and social systems which have been on the pressure to control their expenses since 1977 are by and large unable to offer adequate support services to unmarried mothers and young parents living just above poverty level.

An entirely new approach had to be found. I will describe it briefly. This approach is now under way in the three lowest income areas of Montreal: Centre- sud, Hochelaga-Maisonneuve and Pointe-St-Charles. This is basically a community improvement approach consisting of three endeavours. The first one is to work on stimulation of employability among potential workers. Some of them belong to families where nobody has ever earned money for generations, others are single mothers who have left the school system too early to find a job, and the others are immigrants with little education. All of them lack for one thing: employability.

The second endeavour is to find suitable jobs for people who do not even know what it is to work for a wage. Most of the enterprises created are tiny ones, consisting of three or four employees. These enterprises are generated by the neighbourhood itself in response to the demand by the local community leaders. The third endeavour is the renovation of living quarters, the streets, and the parks. Many local jobs are created in this area in order to achieve these three goals.

Where does the necessary money come from? It comes from a joint arrangement between the provincial government and the various local organizations leaders. In two instances, subsidies for the co-ordinating agencies themselves come from the provincial government. Much of the viability relies on the good will of the local leaders who have been devoting their free time to achieve the goal of reducing unemployment as well as revitalizing the principal aspects of the inner city.

At this point, it is too early to evaluate if this global approach will be more successful than the past 'face lift' attempts. It would also be quite naive to believe that the expansion of such an approach to poverty will be the final answer to all social inequities. Nevertheless, the advantages of such a holistic approach are obvious.

There are only gains to be made by working on the 'milieu de vie'. When the physical aspects of their living quarters are being renovated, people feel better. Life seems brighter and they look for a better future with an optimism which was previously lacking in the deprived areas. The 'empowerment' of people becomes a reality when they feel proud of their achievements.

I will conclude by quoting Mr. René Dubos, the great ecologist who used to repeat: "Plan globally, act locally". This is our new philosophy in order to achieve a full development of people and their communities.

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Eisse Kalk, Amsterdam

Eisse Kalk is Head of the Department of Community Relations in the City of Amsterdam, a position he has held since 1981. Previously, he was Director of 'Workgroup 2000', a non-profit organization, which gives support to citizen groups and community organizations. An urban planner by background, Mr. Kalk is a graduate of the State University of Groningen, the College of Europe in Bruges, and the Department of Public Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh.

The following is an account of Mr. Kalk's presentation at the Forum. It was transcribed and edited from a video tape of the proceedings.

My dear fellow citizens, I would say, as we have that kind of relationship, Amsterdam and Toronto. Let me add my praise to the work Toronto is doing, to the people who are not despaired of all the problems and are still fighting for the city. Having said that, I want to change my intonation. Among friends, the best thing to do is to tell the truth the way you see it.

Marvyn Novick's analysis is the right kind of analysis. An analysis of Amsterdam would not differ. There are many similarities: right wing governments, budgetary cuts. We too have to face a free trade area called Europe '92, which is mainly for the benefit of the businessmen, not for ordinary people.

The number of homeless is increasing, and the waiting lists have increased from 40,000 to 60,000 in just five years. The income disparities and unemployment are becoming larger and larger. Within the welfare states of Western Europe, there's talk about a bipolar society. The Germans call it the two-third kind of society, where one third of the people take care of the other two thirds, who don't have a job. In Britain, they simply talk about a growing underclass, as depicted in the film, 'Sammy and Rosie Get Laid', which shows what Margaret Thatcher's Britain is really about.

You don't have to be a bourgeois to see what's going on around you. The situation in Europe as a whole is fairly grim. In Amsterdam, the situation is grimmer than in Toronto. While you are boom town number one in this region, the average unemployment in Amsterdam is 25%, and there are neighbourhoods with unemployment levels at 40-50% with over 60% of people living on social security.

No distinction is made between affordable and social housing. Ninety per cent of the housing stock is rental, 55% of which is social or public housing, mainly owned by nonprofit housing associations through the city housing authority, which owns 30,000 units. Public housing isn't necessarily associated with government. It should be primarily associated with nonprofit housing associations, one of the major achievements of social democracy in our part of the world.

The role and attitude of government and community organizations toward developers differ from Toronto, as well. The developers had not been in town for about ten or fifteen years. They have been back for the past three years. We do need private developers again, and we're making all the mistakes we possibly could make.

How do you tackle the inequalities? A brief mention of the items we are working on includes 4 methods. We're trying to make a modest contribution to the income situation of our residents, such as low income real estate tax reduction for owners and renters. We are fighting to protect our rent subsidy system, so the lowest income people will only pay 10% of their income for rent. A national demonstration against the Housing Act in Rotterdam represented homeless, government officials, and organizations.

Secondly, in the field of housing, it's not good enough, as John Sewell said, to praise Toronto's housing record from the American perspective. When compared to Europe you have a poor housing record. Northwestern Europe is a much better comparison. In Amsterdam we have eighteen nonprofit housing associations. Together, they own 150,000 units, adding 7,000 units per year, with another 3,000 per year being bought up on the private market and renovated under a redistribution system. The housing association and nonprofits are being given more of a say in the redistribution process, within the broad limits and rules of the Citywide regulation. Where necessary, we also make deals with developers about mixes of affordable and market rental but also about rental and home ownership under deed restriction, anti speculative controls.

There's no NIMBY syndrome. There are specific housing projects geared to specific needs: halfway houses, homeless, youth, battered women, exconvicts, and drug addicts. The attitude is to reach out to people using drugs, not to add a hundred policemen. The number of drug addicts on the streets has been reduced from 10,000 in 1981 to about 6,000, plus 1,000 people from France and Germany. The average age of drug users is increasing. The outreach program, i.e., the way that society deals with minorities, is proof of how democracy deals with the larger issues.

Thirdly, two major efforts are underway in the areas of education and mediation for jobs for people. In the past 3-4 years, we have an 8% increase in investment in the city, while unemployment continues to grow. The fourth element is decentralization of government. Amsterdam will have 16 district councils in a city of 700,000 people. Each of these district councils will have their own bureaucrats at the 500-1,000 level. Then, red tape can be cut and more outreach accomplished.

Fifth, what do we do with developers and planning? Amsterdam has a long tradition of citizen participation, what Americans have dubbed 'coproduction' for urban rehabilitation plans. This still goes on with 10-15 years of urban rehabilitation ahead. I'm sorry that citizen participation is discussed in Toronto in the past tense. Coproduction and working together can apply to private developers, as well, as Amsterdam has learned from its mistakes.

Let me give two examples. At the project level, the Heineken brewery was relocated after 100 years. Five developers made redevelopment proposals. The active community supported the approach, and it appeared that Heineken had made a deal with community council for providing a day care centre. This public benefit was rejected by the community organization and the district council in favour of the ordinary public planning process, followed by district council decision, followed by discussion with Heineken and the developers. The new planning process is now underway with all the parties involved around the table, from Heineken to small businessmen, to community organizations, and several citywide organizations. The next stage will be selection of guidelines, followed by allocation of land uses through an open process, when the developers will be invited back to advise on alternative costs in a clear and understandable way. The city government must set the rules and regulations for dealing with developers.

One more thing. Choice must be made by City Council. Citizen-driven planning must have the right conditions, where community organizations become equal partners with developers and city planners. You've got to give them their own experts, as we are doing. You might set up training courses for community activists to explain how developers work. Otherwise, you won't recapture that particular quality that once characterized this city. It would be useful to add pilot projects to this exercise, such as the Molson brewery relocation. If you still aspire to the '96 Olympics, which I wouldn't advise, at least you should build the Olympic Village, with social housing, to be ready in 1992, built with the same frenzy which your people are expending on your beautiful Dome Stadium.

Michael Shapcott, Toronto

Michael Shapcott is a Community Development Worker for the Toronto Christian Resource Centre, a multi-service community centre in the down-town east end of Toronto. Involved in streetwork, advocacy, and community organization for homeless people and low-income tenants in the inner-city, Mr. Shapcott previously spent a decade as a professional journalist, working as a reporter, editor, and columnist at several newspapers in Ontario and Alberta. He is currently active in many anti-poverty groups and community organizations and is a member of the Downtown Community Advisory Board of the City of Toronto Board of Health.

It is impossible to talk about social equity without talking about social, economic, and political inequality. At the same time that our City is moving towards what some call a 'world class city', Toronto is rapidly becoming a City of two classes. Elite individuals and corporations are gaining unprecedented wealth, the poor are growing in geometric proportions, and middle income earners are being forced down.

Toronto is not simply in a malaise - as Prof. Novick has suggested in this paper. The City is in its worst poverty crisis since the Depression of the 1930s - and everything points to the misery growing more profound. This is not the pessimistic cry of a professional defeatist - all the indicators show the growing grip of poverty.

Consider the dramatic growth in hunger in Toronto. In 1983, a number of groups came together to form the Daily Bread Food Bank - a charity warehouse. By 1985, Daily Bread was feeding 20,000 women, men, and children. Earlier this year, the agency estimated that it was feeding more than 80,000 people. And those figures don't include many people who use programmes that aren't directly connected to Daily Bread. At the centre where I work, we have a daily noon meal for poor and homeless people. Our soup kitchen isn't part of the Daily Bread programme. It's not unusual for us to feed 75 to 100 people a day.

What does this mean? It means that in Toronto - the richest city in the richest province of Canada – perhaps 100,000 people a month are hungry and are forced to line up for food every month. I want to assure people from out-of-town that there is no shortage of food in Toronto. Our grocery stores are packed full, and our many restaurants offer menus to tempt almost every palate. We've got enough food in this City - but a large and growing number of people are going hungry because they are too poor to buy food.

The 100,000 or so people lined up at foodbanks represent only the visible tip of the poverty iceberg - the great mass of the poor and near-poor in Toronto are hidden, scraping by with equal measures of charity, denial, and scrimping.

Toronto's growing poverty crisis is having a staggering effect on the lives and health of our residents. While I don't have time to list all the resources, there have been many government and community studies in recent years that provide the facts.

At the root of Toronto's poverty crisis is our housing crisis. Our rental vacancy rate has been almost zero since 1981. Private developers dramatically withdrew from affordable rental housing construction in 1973 - that's a dozen years before the provincial government first imposed rent controls on new rental construction for those of you who want to draw a link between rental controls and new construction. A 1988 provincial report, using 1981 figures, estimated that almost one in every three tenant households in Metro Toronto is in a housing affordability crisis. The same report estimated that perhaps 50,000 Metro households are teetering on the brink of homelessness. A 1988 study estimated there were as many as 20,000 homeless people in this City. Gentrification led to a net loss of 11,000 units in the City from 1976 to 1986.

Toronto's housing crisis is killing Torontonians. Every year, the homeless die in many gruesome ways. Homeless people freeze to death every winter, homeless people have been beaten to death, they have died after being trapped in fires in abandoned houses they were using as squats, homeless women have been raped and murdered - and many homeless people take their own lives in desperation. But the body count among the homeless is only the tip of the housing crisis iceberg. Low-income Torontonians, working Torontonians, even middle-income Torontonians are being squeezed dreadfully.

What are the root causes of this growing poverty crisis, this growing housing crisis? The roots of the poverty crisis are in government and private sector decisions over the past several decades. The rapid withdrawal of the private sector from affordable rental construction sixteen years ago is a significant factor, so too is the continuing reluctance of governments - mainly federal and provincial - to adequately fund new non-profit construction. In its 1989 budget, our national government allotted only $1.7 billion on housing for the entire country - that's less than the federal government spent back on housing in 1983. It's less than the federal government will spend in 1989 on courts and police. The story is much the same at the provincial level. In the most recent provincial budget the government announced that it would spend a little more than half a billion dollars for the Ontario Ministry of Housing. The budget for provincial courts and police is almost one billion dollars. Our federal and provincial governments spend almost double the money to arrest and imprison Canadians that they spend to house Canadians.

The City of Toronto has a somewhat better record in housing construction. Cityhome - Toronto's non-profit housing agency - has been innovative and a positive model for other municipalities. But Cityhome's gains have been surpassed by overall losses due to gentrifaction, the growing affordability crisis, and Toronto's land use policies and practices.

Toronto's land use policies and practices have been particularly destructive. One culprit needs to be singled out: the almost unprecedented wheeling and dealing - most of done in secret - between developers and municipal politicians. The situation was so bad that developers and their lawyers have been seen giving hand signals from the public galleries down to their cronies on Council, telling them which way to vote. Last fall, David Lewis Stein of the Toronto Star - stated:

> *"It seems as if the politicians on this City Council are entirely too ready and eager to accommodate developers and not nearly concerned enough with the needs of ordinary people... maybe this is the worst City Council since the old, pre-reform days of the 1960s."*

The development disaster on Toronto's harbour is one concrete result of this high-stakes poker game. Harbourfront was to be a 'people place' with a promise of parks and other community space. Today, it is a high-rise wasteland of over-priced condominiums and boutiques. Then there's the Bay-Adelaide project. The developers and City politicians were so anxious to ram through this project - with its tens of millions of dollars in bonuses to the developer - that Council sat until three o'clock in the morning just days before the November 1988 municipal election. I can assure you that City Council has never sat until 3 a.m. to rush through an affordable housing project.

Toronto's voters delivered their verdict in November of 1988. Voters agreed with David Lewis Stein's assessment and elected several new councillors who promised to pay more attention to the needs of people - instead of the whims of developers. It's too early to say whether the new Council will fulfil its promise, but the voters issued clear instructions.

That brings us to 1989 and the beginning of the process to build the 1991 Central Area Plan. It is to the current Council's credit (and City Planning staff should also be applauded) that Council decided that 'social equity' would be the number one priority of the 1991 plan. But if Council wants to make social equity a reality, it must accept several fundamental principles.

First, as Prof. Novick clearly states, we have to cure our addiction to the market. We can't defer to market ideology and achieve social equity. Markets are fundamentally inequitable.

Second, Toronto must stop the secret, high-stakes poker game that has passed for planning. Most of the people have been excluded from some very significant planning decisions in recent years. Either we make the bargaining table a great deal bigger to include more people, or - better yet - we get rid of the table altogether and stop the wheeling and dealing.

Third, Toronto must ensure that rich corporations and individuals pay their fair share. As other speakers at this conference have noted, Toronto cannot escape national forces. Canada's federal government isn't likely to drop its current tax policy to shift taxes from the rich to lower income Canadians. But the City - and Metro - can do something. For instance, shopping malls and commercial high-rises are the major beneficiaries of public transit and road improvements. But they pay nothing - not one penny - towards the cost of these multi-billion dollar schemes to bring shoppers to their stores and workers to their offices. Make the rich pay - there is truth in the old slogan.

Let's not forget that other old chestnut - power to the people. It does no good to talk about social equity if the poor and middle-income people continue to be largely shut out. City Hall should be decentralized, with real power flowing into the neighbourhoods. Toronto already has a proud tradition of strong neighbourhoods. This should be encouraged in concrete ways. Other cities have taken important initiatives. Montreal recently started to decentralize its city operations, and Vancouver has a strong reputation for involving its people. The Greater London Council in England was so successful in empowering its population that the entire municipal government was abolished by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. I can think of no better tribute to a city, its planners, and its politicians.

Incidentally, giving more power to the people doesn't mean that the city should give up any of its power to control the future growth of Toronto. Mayor Art Eggleton suggested, at the start of the Cityplan '91 Forum, that we need less government - a more streamlined government. It's true that developers, speculators, and their friends want less government - but the people won't be well serviced by reducing the power of government. We're not asking for City Hall to give up any of its power - we're asking that power be shifted into the community for the benefit of people.

Toronto can feed its people. We can provide good housing. We can ensure decent jobs, good public transit, a vibrant cultural life, adequate childcare - and all the other necessities and niceties of urban life. We are doing some of this. We can do a much better job. We have the resources. Our problem is that the resources are held by a few for their own interests - and not in the interests of all the people.

Yesterday, one of Toronto's pre-eminent planners - Joe Berridge - told this conference that it's time to put our City's plutocracy to productive work. I couldn't agree more and I think that it's a suitable point to underline - and a good way to end my comments.

But let me issue one caution. Joe Berridge mentioned Toronto's almost completed domed stadium as a positive example of the plutocracy at work. It's not. It's more of the same old thing – they're getting rich at our expense. Don't think that all those corporations pooled their five million dollars each to build the domed stadium because they love baseball and want to give a gift to the fans of Toronto. Stadium officials admit that McDonalds stands to make $408 million in gross revenues over the next decade from its hamburger monopoly. Not bad for a $5 million stake. What did the people get? A baseball stadium we don't really need. Sports facilities, according to a recent Toronto Star poll, are very low priority for Torontonians.

Instead of encouraging the corporate sector to fund multi-million dollar extravaganzas that serve mainly to line corporate bank accounts – such as the domed stadium, the 1996 Olympics, and Expo 2000 – let's insist that the plutocracy invest in the real needs of Torontonians: non-profit housing, non-profit childcare, environmental clean-up, and other priorities. Toronto should make people its first priority in both public and private spending - and especially as more items in the public sphere are privatized. The City has levers to make this happen. It should use them.

Toronto even has a very good blueprint to show the way ahead. It's called 'Healthy Toronto 2000' a report endorsed unanimously by City Council. Now is the time to move aggressively to implement it. If people were the first priority in public and private sector activities, then we wouldn't simply have to talk about 'social equity' - we would have gone a long way towards achieving it.

Session 8

Seeking Better Architectural Quality and Urban Design

Planning and urban design guidelines can ensure that development will fit into a context and provide for orderly growth. But these tools are not enough to help us achieve quality in the design of each new building. This session will draw on the experiences of internationally respected architects to illustrate how Toronto can leave a stronger design legacy for future generations.

Moderator: **Marc Baraness** *(Director, Architecture and Urban Design Division, Planning and Development Department, City of Toronto)*



Josef Kleihues, Berlin

Josef Paul Kleihues is a consultant architect with over 25 years of international experience and Chairman of the School of Design and Urbanism at the University of Dortmund, West Germany. Previously Director of the Internationale Bauausstellung (IBA) in Berlin, Professor Kleihues was responsible for attracting many of the world's leading architects to design social housing in the redevelopment of Berlin, the quality of which has received the highest level of praise at an international level.

Topic One: The European City and the City of the New World: Like and Unlike

When we leave Europe to visit the USA or Canada, we leave the so-called 'old world'... and encounter the so-called 'new world'. When I return from this journey, my sons and daughters will probably ask me, "How did you enjoy the new world?" And I shall answer, "the new world is different but I enjoyed it and I greatly enjoyed Toronto".

But let's be serious. What is the difference between the European city and the city of the new world: like and unlike?

First of all I would say that the European city represents continuity. Here, in the new world, there is much more evidence of flexibility. The European city is determined by political factors. The city of the new world is determined far more by economic factors. With a few exceptions, the pattern of the European city is hierarchical in nature. The grid for the city of the new world is organized in a manner which is essentially much more balanced. European cities are planned slowly (often too slowly). The cities of the new world are built more quickly and with a much more tough-minded attitude. The different philosophical poles of the two worlds could be described in the following way: the one is more idealistic in its orientation, the other more empirical. The political pole could be described as more socially oriented in Europe and as more individualistic in its orientation in the new world.

I admit that these are very aphoristic statements. Of course, they have to be examined and analyzed in depth. Nevertheless, we must recognize that differences of this sort do exist and that it makes no sense for the European to be envious of the new world or *vice versa*.

Rather than attempting to imitate each other, I think that it is far better that the culturally different positions, intentions and theories respect and enrich each other. I shall come back to this in Topic Seven.

Topic Two: The Destruction of the European City

For many centuries critics and historians spoke about the tradition of the European city and of the European city as a convention. They spoke about the tradition of urban design and development and respected its different intentions and results. And they spoke of the European city as a convention, well aware of each city's specific character. After World War II, however, and the rapid growth of many cities, it became ever more the case that the practice of urban design was forgotten and the European city as a convention began to disappear.

Without going into details, as a result of this development, at the end of the sixties many young architects, critics and historians began to complain about and to lament the *destruction of the European city*. And slowly but surely, calls could be heard (mainly from young architects) for the "*reconstruction of the European city*". While this was an understandable reaction, it soon became strongly nostalgic and even reactionary in nature. This was the reason why I added the qualifying adjective, "critical" to "reconstruction" and this then became the theoretical basis for the IBA's programme of new buildings. The "critical reconstruction of the city" meant that traces of history within the City should not be forgotten, that the two dimensional city plan should be preserved, and that its architecture and urban design should be enriched with new interventions.

Topic Three: Berlin: Some Statistical Data

Berlin has approximately 2 million inhabitants (1.5 million in East Berlin). Between 50 and 51 percent of the households are single person households. Eighty percent of the population lives in rented dwellings. Only 20 percent own their own house or apartment. On the average, each person has 38 square metres at his disposal. (This is more, by the way, than anywhere else in the world.) Clearly, therefore, when one speaks about Berlin, one is speaking about a city of tenants. One should also know that in Berlin tenants pay less than 20 percent of their net income for rent. Eighty percent of the new apartments which are being built are still part of social housing projects. Social housing apartments have a high standard. Not including the site, the costs per apartment amount to 150.000 to 220.000 DM (US $75,000 to $110,000) per apartment. All apartments which were constructed by the IBA were part of social housing projects.

Topic Four: The IBA: Statistics and Organization

The IBA was carried out in six different demonstration areas. Two demonstration areas were chosen as locations for exemplary urban rehabilitation (Luisenstadt, S036). Four demonstration areas were chosen as locations for an exemplary critical reconstruction of the city (Südliche Friedrichstadt, Südlicher Tiergarten, Prager Platz, Tegel). The programme for the critical reconstruction of the city (the new building section of the IBA) contained about 6,000 social kindergartens, gardens and parks and several special buildings, which included a science centre, a phosphate clarification plant, and the Humboldt Library. In addition to this, of course, was the 'master plan' which served as the basis for the critical reconstruction.

The building costs in their entirety came to more than US $1.5 billion. The costs of running the projects came to US $42 million. The organizing office of the IBA (Bauausstellung Berlin GmbH) was an independent company with two directors in charge of planning: Hardt-Waltherr Hämer (Albau IBA) and Josef Paul Kleihues (Neubau IBA). The IBA began in September 1979 and came to an end in December 1987.

Topic Five: The IBA's Background and Methods - Slides

Topic Six: Results of the IBA - Slides

Topic Seven: Toronto: Three Recommendations

Each city has its own character and its own problems. Toronto is not Berlin. As the basis for *our work* we had to analyze Berlin's character and problems in order to be able to draw up *our master plan*. Although one has to respect the different situation in Toronto, I think that as the basis for *your work* here it is useful to recognize that from time to time every city needs a clearly defined programme: a master plan which defines the two dimensional and three dimensional development in those areas of a city where development has to be carried out; and the participation of some outstanding urban designers and architects.

So, please allow me to make three recommendations which should be valid irrespective of whether or not the Olympic Games come to Toronto.

Recommendation Number One

I need not repeat that urban design and architecture includes a great variety of aspects: political and social, philosophical and aesthetic, economic and technical and many others. A programme, therefore, must be simple, clear and understandable to all. It has to focus on the projects which you want to see realized

– housing, office buildings, trees and parks, etc. - and it must be sure to define clearly the different areas where the city wants to demonstrate new examples of urban design and architecture.

Recommendation Number Two

We must recognize that parallel to the destruction of the European city was the destruction of many of the cities of the new world.

Allow me to explain this by citing two examples. For over a century the historical grid of the modern city, divided into different lots and built up by many different builders, had been respected. After World War Two, however, architects and developers began to build houses in all directions jumping back from corners, making the most incredible contortions and so on. Even worse was a development whereby three or four blocks were joined to form a neighbourhood with greenery and other supposed 'attractive' features. What this really did, however, was to kill the spirit of the city.

This is the reason why the city has to define its master plan before it starts to build. The city has to be careful and tough in defining its two dimensional plan - the 'planimetry'. It has to define the three-dimensional order of the city and force the architects and developers to respect this.

Recommendation Number Three

Involve some outstanding urban designers (I am not referring to city planners) and architects.

Toronto is a metropolis. It fulfils the three conditions for this. Toronto has political and economic power. It is innovative in the fields of science and art. It is an international city. But, the quality of urban design and architecture, the quality of life in the inner city, is becoming ever more important. This means that one more condition of a metropolis must be fulfilled: there must be a loveable and liveable inner city.

Whether or not this is a success is up to Toronto.



Peter Bosselmann, San Francisco

Peter Bosselmann is Director of the Environmental Simulation Laboratory, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California at Berkeley. A graduate of Karlsruhe, West Germany, and the University of California at Los Angeles, Professor Bosselmann is particularly noted for the use of video films in his urban design research on city scale and microclimate. This work formed the basis for new height and bulk controls in downtown San Francisco, the citywide sunlight ordinance, and a standard for building induced wind velocities.

I am asked to speak about what urban designers can do to make downtown areas livable. Struggle and conflict may be an odd way to begin such a talk on livability. My work in San Francisco has shown me that a livable downtown city is the result of people's collective will to have one. This means struggle and conflict are often unavoidable.

In the image of a city the centre plays an important role. Centres rank among the most valued of environments. It is here that old and new clash the most. New functions displace old ones, one population group replaces another. Since the rediscovery of the Inner City in the early '60s, the driving force has been the quest for extended growth.

In San Francisco, dramatic changes took place from the early 1960s, when the first high-rise buildings appeared, to the mid-1970s, when today's city emerged. A model of San Francisco built in 1935 as part of the New Deal's Work Creation Program has been updated at the Berkeley Simulation Laboratory. An animation film made of this model shows the dramatic changes that took place from 1963, when the first high-rise building appeared, to 1975, when today's city emerged. A year-by-year animation was filmed of this fifteen year period, and in the space of a few minutes we can see San Francisco literally transforming in front of our eyes. Looking back, this extended urban growth appears unavoidable and is still happening in many mid-sized and large American cities. But this rapid growth also ignored much of San Francisco's history and existing population.

These changes came under increasing protest by local neighbourhood and environment groups. Five times during the last three decades, residents collected enough signatures to qualify public referenda. All five referenda asked the citizens to limit downtown development, to keep it from spreading into neighbourhoods, to limit building size, to keep buildings from shading open spaces, and to limit the annual allowance of downtown development. The last two referenda succeeded. In 1984, the majority of San Franciscans voted in favour of sunlight to parks, prohibiting high-rise buildings from shading city-owned open spaces. Two years later, San Franciscans voted 'yes' on an annual limit of one mid-sized office building per year.

Growing numbers of San Franciscans disliked the city's continuing transformation. 'Manhattanization' becomes a bad word around San Francisco. The images of canyon-like streets and monotonous stone buildings reminded too many San Franciscans of places they had moved away from. They had come to California to enjoy the openness of blue sky, the sun, views of the ocean, and the bay. On the other hand, there was no eagerness to follow the ever-widening suburban example of Los Angeles. May people wanted to retain the image of low but densely built city with colourful, individually decorated buildings that line steep streets and cluster around hilltops.

To preserve this urban environment people spoke out at election time. A coalition of neighbourhood groups and environmental interests came together in support of limited growth. For some time in the late 60s, economic arguments were heard: downtown tax revenues are not paying for the services the city is rendering, neighbourhoods are supporting downtown against their will. In my opinion, the economic argument was not as well presented as were the environmental concerns. Depending on who funded the economic studies, the results would be different. An economic study funded by San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth would give different results than a study funded by a downtown business group. The public was confused by the statistics and the argument. But the environmental concerns were easy to understand because they related to people's direct experiences. "Yes", people could say, "the city is getting uglier, the streets colder and windier, the many smaller decorative facades are being replaced by new tall buildings looking all alike."

The act that turned the tide was the demolition of the beautiful department store, The City of Paris, on the city's main square. A store with a history almost as old as the city itself, The City of Paris was named after a ship that served as a department store when much of the city was only made of tents and huts. The list of demolished buildings is long. In 1979, a book was published called the 'Splendid Survivors', which listed and rated all historically significant buildings that had not only survived the 1906 earthquake and fire but the fifteen years of intensive rebuilding in the 60s and 70s. By 1970, there were very few of those buildings left in the downtown area.

That same year, work on a new plan for Downtown San Francisco was started. As early as 1971 the parties involved in the process were aware that planning had to address growth restrictions. It was also the year of the third referendum on downtown growth, a so-called proposition 'O' to limit new downtown buildings to a maximum of twenty floors, which was narrowly defeated.

I have dwelt on the downtown controversy in San Francisco to make sure you understand the context in which planning took place. San Franciscans are seen as being daring in controlling development. This is not because of radical policy, but, as I have tried to explain, from a long history of viewing growth close-up and trying to find a meaningful way to deal with the issues growth raises. Enough interest and importance was generated so that questions on "what makes a city livable?" need to be answered. This required measurable qualities on livability so that laws could be drafted.

I will illustrate a few examples of this work on the San Francisco Downtown Plan. First, using the WPA model mentioned earlier, we did growth projections of development under the planning controls that existed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Future downtown development would have moved west across Montgomery Street and Kearny Street towards Union Square and also towards Chinatown.

The preservation of the retail district was widely supported, but four hotel towers were on the drawing board in the vicinity of Union Square. The hotel towers could have gone up to 240 feet. We measured the loss of sunlight to the retail streets and demonstrated how the district had to be rezoned for sunlight to continue to reach sidewalks. Contrary to what most people think, San Francisco does not have a warm climate. Quite the contrary, the strong ocean wind and the fog makes most days of the year cold. Especially during the summer, temperatures rarely go up to 70 degrees. Strolling along a sidewalk or sitting on a bench can be uncomfortable unless it is sunny and sheltered. Sunlight is necessary for comfort. As a result of this study a high-rise limit line was drawn on Kearny Street.

Sunlight became the issue in Chinatown, where 160 foot height limits permitted high-rise apartment towers adjacent to a small but highly-used playground. In 1983, developers in Chinatown were looking for land in which to invest currency fleeing from Hong Kong.

We used fish-eye pictures to explain how many hours of sunlight would be lost if buildings indeed would go up to the permitted height. As a result, building heights were lowered. The same rationale was used to preserve the Tenderloin, another downtown neighbourhood filled with people who are not likely to find affordable housing anywhere else in the city. Like their neighbours in Chinatown, the people who live here are not mobile; many of them are old and poor or have recently arrived here from South East Asia.

Now, where would future downtown development go? The south of Market district around the Transbay Bus Terminal is an area without any parks to shade and where few people live. Here there was no local opposition against accommodating the next ten million square feet of office space. With ten million square feet of the city's growth concentrated in one area, some streets would indeed change beyond recognition. Early on, we did simulations to demonstrate the effect of individual and cumulative development on the existing scale of the street. We also simulated building designs that could mitigate the impact. The planners used our simulation in public communication with proponents and opponents of downtown development. They used simulation in developing the rationale for a new plan.

Our simulation aided the planning process. They provided a preview of a San Francisco in years to come that everyone could understand. The simulations made a more educated discussion possible. It is virtually impossible to predict the consequences of development in a downtown area over time; simulations help, they trigger public discussion, they force all parties to address the issues related to the cumulative effects of growth. Only with public discussion can any plan succeed.



Joan Busquets, Barcelona

Joan Busquets is Head of the Urban Planning Department of the City of Barcelona, Spain, and Professor in Planning at the Architectural School of the University of Barcelona. The author of several publications and articles on Barcelona's development, planning practice, and housing, Professor Busquets was awarded the Spanish National Prize for Planning in 1981 and 1985.

The following is an account of Prof. Busquets' presentation at the Forum. It was transcribed and edited from a video tape of the proceedings.

I'd like to present the three main ideas that lie behind Barcelona's recent development that may be relevant to Toronto, though we in Europe have much to learn from the great transformation process of North American downtowns. As an introduction, after the 1980's experience the cities will need planning in the 1990's.

The great failures of planning, mainly from the 1960's, show that we need other kinds of planning. Sharing knowledge is important because mistakes at the city level are so expensive. Planning in the 1990's will be planning for action. All cities need both short-term and long-term actions. In the new Europe, the cities are going to play a new role, larger than the nations.

If we were to tell the population of Toronto or Barcelona that cities have no future, the people would escape. Those who could will leave in a year or two. Planning is not just solving problems. Planning must talk about better alternatives and new aims in the form of big projects, to give opportunity for economic and social reuse.

It's impossible to reach a consensus on the city without proposals on the table while recognizing the tension between different social and economic forces. Unfortunately, the functional analysis aspect of planning has been forgotten as demonstrated by postwar urban development mistakes. Cities are resources. Cities are the most important fixed capital that we have.

The three key ideas behind Barcelona's development begin with the fact that development followed a political change. That doesn't mean that Franco was a prerequisite. Rather, we took advantage of the change to create a new look for the city. We built 150 squares in locations that nobody cared about. The middle class had left for the suburbs. We had to give the population the sense that the city would improve.

Second – the downtown's development, which is analogous to Toronto. Third - defining large proposals for the future of the city to raise Barcelona from a provincial to an international city, so that all the people would become proud of the city and themselves, not just the professionals, but the common people.

[slide presentation]

Barcelona is a typical, compact southern European city, its urban morphology showing great continuity over a long period of time. The plan for a city of 3.5 million people is a structure plan, but many of the ideas must be developed at the scale which the French call the 'piece urbaine'. The old town of Barcelona really has nothing to do with the new town which was built in the middle of the nineteenth century. The downtown's prospects must be analyzed in the context of the social and economic systems, the characteristics and the needs of the resident population, but also the downtown's future in the context of the entire metropolitan area. Looking at the city in what in Europe is called the intermediate scale has been very useful.

The problem of the functionalist analysis is the jump from the analysis of the single building to the scale of the city. That is the great failure of 1960's planning. The challenge is to introduce change at the neighbourhood scale, within the context of the general plan. Thus, some of Barcelona's area policies cannot be exported easily because each city is unique.

The first program was a series of specific projects. The high quality squares cost 10% more than otherwise, but the resulting local pride was well worth the expense. Now, visitors come to see the small spaces, not just the great squares. Relatively high density residential areas require high quality services and facilities for public interaction. The Mies van der Rohe pavilion of the 1930's has been rebuilt to have the real feeling of the model at 1:1 scale. The costs were partly underwritten by private sponsors.

The public sector must have the idea of the city. Then, private developers can be convinced to share the ideas, with modifications. The second program addressed intown parks. Green areas were introduced into the existing high density city, instant public facilities. One example was a new approach for an obsolete industrial site, siting the buildings at the edge with parking under the green space. Completing a park in 18 months is expensive, but sometimes it's necessary in order to change the image of the neighbourhood.

The city's expansion was designed in 1859, a matter of great pride to Barcelona. This development was the start of modern city planning, a proposal to expand a 150,000 population city by ten times. The aim is, at least, to become the capital of the Mediterranean shore. The plan resulted in 600 blocks, where 350,000 people live and the same number of people work. Market economic forces are trying to push out the residential in favour of offices. As a result, there is a double process: to improve the quality of the downtown residential areas, while making room for incoming offices. This is a reality in capitalist countries.

Within general morphological rules, all kinds of architectural styles can be expressed. This harks back to the rules of one hundred years ago. To increase residential opportunities the interior block courtyards will be kept open under a new by-law, which received unanimous consent despite the great reduction in land value. In twelve of the 600 blocks the interior blocks will be open to the public. The pilot project cost Can$500,000. In our downtown, the amenities will be produced by private developers, who benefit from their connection with the city's objectives. Elsewhere, the internal spaces will be private for the benefit of abutting buildings.

Barcelona's great projects include the arterial road system for the 1992 Olympics, the Olympic Village, the new waterfront, the new park to the north of the city, and the existing sports facilities. Our strategy was to find a new technique to encourage more public investment in the City. The solution was a completely intown Olympics. The Olympic Village will break down the waterfront barrier created by the railroads.

The new downtown for Barcelona, the new room, will be located on vacant land, not all public, for a balance between downtown and peripheral development. Retail will be integrated with the secondary downtowns at the 80,000-100,000 m^2 scale, though their composition will be geared to the local needs. The centres will be developed sequentially in order to maintain control over their development.

The second idea is the major road system. Along the waterfront, the through traffic has been partially undergrounded, so local traffic can use the surface road system to link the old town to the harbour. Most cities share the problem of accommodating both through and local traffic in the harbour area which is largely public transportation and pedestrian oriented.

The Olympic Stadium is symbolic. Its design is that of the proposed stadium in 1936, when the Olympics were removed to Berlin. The symbolism is very important to the city. The Olympic Village is located on an obsolete industrial area behind the waterfront railway barrier. The railway lines were placed underground, and 60 hectares of railway lands came into City ownership in return for burying the rail lines, along with a sewage scheme to restore the beaches and a new docks proposal as well as the Olympic Village. The rest, three quarters of the waterfront development, will follow the Olympics, though the timing isn't important. The basic infrastructure for 1992 is the main achievement, and the difficulties, such as industrial expropriation, shouldn't be underestimated.

In the secondary centres, the park and facilities will precede private development, who will pay for the public improvements through their land acquisition costs. The design guidelines will be set to assure that the developers meet the standard of the public amenities.

We must remember that, some day, the downtown we are developing will be thought of as old-fashioned. In 1888, Barcelona tore down the Citadel, built to attack the city, with great public support. Today, the new railroad citadel is being broken down. Barcelona's growth is as great as in North America, from 150,000 to 3.5 million in less than a hundred years. Now, the city is rethinking its future on the location of its origins. Continuity is important. Growth is the opportunity to transform and improve the quality of the city.

The need for physical planning doesn't outweigh social planning, but the only way that the planning can be expressed is physically. Barcelona's physical proposals must be amenable to differing political agendas. The balanced downtown-periphery strategy could be superseded by a downtown emphasis. All cities need long-term projects, such as Vienna and Budapest's joint effort for 1995. The distinctions between European and North American cities will diminish. Our cities have common themes: railways and waterfronts. You in North America know how to transform the city. With the grid pattern controlling the city, the transformation can work very well. Without the grid pattern it becomes very difficult.

The intermediate scale then becomes very useful, the best example being Rockefeller Centre. Your challenge is defining the Railway Lands prior to tearing down the Gardiner Expressway. If you want to change the 'ring' of the city, you still have to focus on a few key projects in order to start a new process for the city. Originally, we were quite naive, paying 100% of the first project. Today, we don't pay; we just convince the developers to follow the public example. A good example is the best way to immediately make clear to the developers the importance of quality.

We have paid too much attention to the single building in the past twenty years. The proposals must be integrated, particularly the various public elements, through the project approach. It's easier than intermediate scale, integrative planning. The public must have something to say for the public-private partnership to work. The developers shouldn't be expected to give the leadership and define the parameters. This public-private partnership existed in Barcelona in the nineteenth century. The proposals must be integrated, particularly the various public elements, through the project approach.

Session 9

Planning for Parks and Open Space

Toronto has an extensive variety of open spaces (including civic squares, parks, ravines, streets, and privately owned parcels), yet seems to lack a coherent and recognisable system of publicly accessible open spaces downtown. This session will address whether a "system" of public open spaces is necessary and if so, how to define a system, what can be done to better link the components of the system together, and develop a greater sense of public consciousness and civic pride.

Moderator: **Carolyn Woodland,** *(Principal of Hough, Stansbury and Woodland, Landscape Architects)*



Barry Sampson, Toronto

Barry Sampson is a partner in the architectural firm Baird Sampson, based in Toronto. A graduate of the University of Toronto, Mr. Sampson later studied at the International Institute of Design in London and at the Sorbonne in France. Among his many award-winning projects are the Elliot Lake Auditorium for the Arts and Spadina Gardens at Harbourfront, Toronto.

Being Out of Doors in the City

Reflections On 'What Can Planners Do To Create A Parks And Open Space System For The Central City That Is A Vibrant Response To People's Needs.'

I Introduction

In art and literature, being out of doors in the city away from the private realm has frequently been portrayed in a way that displays a profound ambivalence about the city itself. On the one hand, there is the fascination with the crowd, with that sense of social vitality that comes from the concentration of humanity within a relatively closed in place. On the other, there is the urge to escape, to be away from 'teaming humanity' alone in a more perfect relation to nature.

In this paper I would like to reflect on the presence of a parallel ambivalence in the concepts of parks and open space used in contemporary planning. I would also like to consider how the idea of a parks and open space system might be broadened to encompass places for being out of doors, with the crowd, within the city as well as those intended for relief from the crowd, for being away from the city.

II Parks and Open Space versus Public Space

1. Why the terms 'parks and open space' rather than 'public space'?

In the language of planning the term 'open space' usually encompasses parks as well as outdoor places used by the public that are privately owned. Thus planners prefer not to use the term 'public space', as it implies public ownership and a degree of open access that cannot be assured with spaces in private ownership.

They are nonetheless concerned with the broadly defined category of open space because it is thought to be of significant value to all citizens. Indeed, municipal planning legislation since the fifties has encouraged the creation of landscaped open space within private development, and public streets have on occasion been closed to facilitate its creation. Developers have similarly promoted the desirability of their projects on the basis of the new open space they provide.

However, the extent and limitations of the benefits offered by such quasi-public places is often put to the test in times of conflict between the intentions of public users and those of the landowners. Indeed, I have seen the rapid eviction of sidewalk protesters from the privately owned plaza around Commerce Court even though the line between it and the public sidewalk is indistinguishable.

In my own view, open space planning policy should focus primarily on the creation and enhancement of outdoor places for which public access and use is equal for all and is guaranteed, either by public ownership or by legislated right. While I do not propose to substitute the term 'public space' for those of 'parks and open space', it might be useful to consider where the terminology came from and what are its implicit values.

2. What are the roots of the terms 'Parks' and 'Open Space'?

The classic image of the park with its expanses of clipped grass and its trees is the offspring of that product of aristocratic culture in Britain and Europe, the private park. Such parks were characterized by large enclosed pieces of ground, usually with woodland and pasture attached to a country house. With the rise of the new mercantile and industrial classes, many of these estate parks became available for public use.

Thus, the term park which we now associate with the city has its roots in the country. The famous Regent Park development in London involved the transformation of a Royal hunting forest, a park at the westerly edge of the city. So successful was the Prince Regent's development enterprise that Regent Street with its Piccadily Circus became the new centre of the city.

The term 'open space' appears more recently and evokes little in the way of specific images. Although more abstract, it is not necessarily more neutral, as it implies an opposition - to built up or closed space. It thus implicitly confronts the city's tendency toward a fabric that is dense and continuous.

Francoise Choay, in her text The Modern City: Planning in the 19th Century, attributes the notion of open space - as a void in the city fabric - to Baron Georges Haussmann. As prefect of the Seine from 1853 to 1870 under Napoleon III, he was responsible for the transformation of medieval Paris into a modern city. Referring to himself as "the artist of demolition", Haussmann cut the modern day boulevards through the city and left or carved out the voids whose purpose it was, in his view, to embellish the city and to provide for the health and recreation of the labouring classes.

He was the first to approach the planning of the city in a comprehensive and systematic way. In this regard Les Promenades de Paris published by his assistant Alphand represents a remarkable post facto Official Plan, detailing and co-ordinating all of the technical and design elements associated with the urban structure of the city.

III The idea of a Parks and Open Space System

I would like to see a similarly clear and comprehensive document outlining Toronto's idea of a parks and open space system and describing its constituent elements.

1. What is implied by the word 'system'?

The Oxford dictionary defines the word 'system' as being: "a complex whole, a set of connected things or parts, an organized body of material or immaterial things". Thus, an open space system is clearly made up of constituent parts with an organized interrelationship. There is also a strong implication of interconnectedness, although one might argue connection could be other than by physical means. We will return to the issue of connection later.

2. What are the constituent parts of an Open Space System?

Haussmann devotes a considerable portion of his Memoirs to a history of gardens before enumerating the different types of open space comprising the system of "Promenades et plantations" of Paris. These include promenades like the famous Champs Elysees, large parks at the periphery of the city such as the Bois de Boulogne, smaller public gardens such as the famous Luxembourg gardens, and squares (ie. plazas) at intersections of major roads, such as Place St. Michel. Some of these existed before "Les Grands Travaux", others had to be created.

It would be useful to similarly set out a typology of open space for Toronto. These should be described not simply according to functional categories or those based on size but should delineate characteristic differences in their spatial structure, respective roles, and interrelationships.

My typology is relatively course grained and could no doubt be substantially improved upon but is as follows:

Green or Garden Spaces (big and small) usually public parkland – These are largely defined in space and character by elements of the natural world: grass, trees, earthen banks, etc. From within them or at their edges ones appreciation of the elements and enjoyment of seasonal change is enhanced or even amplified.

They could be subdivided according to significant differences in scale and general spatial character, e.g:.

- 'edenesque' - those whose natural character is extensive and totally enveloping (that engender a sense of a separate world from the city eg. Toronto's valleyland parks)

- 'gardenesque' - those that are smaller and involve obvious human cultivation (note in using this term I am not referring to the historical landscape style called "the Gardenesque")

Open Gathering Places (plazas, and squares) – These are largely defined in space and character by manmade, built-up elements. The adjective 'open' is not intended to mean lack of enclosure but rather to indicate that, however they are enclosed, such spaces are none the less open to at least one public street.

Thus they are 'visible' places where spontaneous gatherings are likely to occur. They are the places where one is likely to encounter the crowd on a day to day basis. They are also likely venues for public events and celebrations. In this regard they are akin to the gathering place of ancient cities in Greece, the 'Agora'.

Enclosed Gathering Places (courtyards) – These are also largely defined by manmade, built-up elements but are not open to the street. Visually out of the way, they are likely to offer quietude and with their encircling walls of buildings or planting, shelter from the wind. Thus, they are usually quite good at providing sun traps and extending the period when it is comfortable to be outside. Since they also typically offer a sense of distance from the crowd, their use for public events and celebrations is likely to depend upon a greater degree of activity programming.

Forecourt Spaces (usually to individual buildings and complexes) – These are essentially minor places of public activity and primarily formal settings for adjacent buildings and complexes. They are open to the street and adjacent to the public sidewalk. Like enclosed gathering places, they can be modifiers of the microclimate.

However, they are generally semi-public and often undermine the consistency of development patterns defining the space of the street. In this regard, they may not always serve a useful public purpose. Nonetheless, if of high quality and designed to play a subsidiary role to the street, they may enhance the public activity and amenity of it.

Promenade Spaces (streets, boulevards, pedestrian lanes, linear parks, etc.) – These are linear in their spatial character with an emphasis on movement. They could be defined by greenery or built elements and would include streets and roads. The latter are often defined both by buildings and tree planting which, when mature, create shady arcades over the pedestrian sidewalk. In many instances, it is the trees that lend spatial grandeur to streets. Other promenade elements would include walkways along unique edge conditions such as waterfronts, pedestrian links and recreational pathways.

Ancillary Open Space Amenities (cemeteries, water reservoirs, hydro easements, school yards, etc.) – As with every typology we need a catch-all category for those elements with a specialized purpose but which nonetheless may provide significant secondary potential as open spaces. For example, cemeteries which are commemorative and ritual spaces are often used for contemplative promenade and recreation. In Toronto water reservoirs are typically grassed over to form manmade plateaus that are popular for kite flying, field sports, jogging, and promenading. In some cases these are intensively used and are revered as landmark places.

3. What Key Roles Do Such Open Spaces Play and Why Do They Differ?

Spaces for public gathering are the 'living rooms' of the city. In them the populace comes together to celebrate events and demonstrate political viewpoints. In the western city these have most often occurred in squares and plazas, where buildings provide a backdrop and sense of containment - a kind of urban theatre. The windows, doors balconies, exterior stairs, and ledges of buildings form the box seats from which to view the spectacle unfolding within the space.

Often such events and spectacles involve processions. Thus the street, the place of procession, becomes intimately linked to the square, the final destination for gathering. It is therefore not surprising to find that the street as well as the square tend to be the places of informal gathering and spontaneous performance on a day-to-day basis. Yonge Street, Queen Street West, City Hall Square are the spaces in which individuals and groups make their appearances and in which people assemble to socialize, to perform or witness performance, and to act out or consider the politics of the day.

Green Spaces also play a social role of course. One need only go to a boccie court, children's play area, or ball diamond to be assured of that. Indeed, celebrations sometimes occur in them, such as the religious festivals which are celebrated yearly in the amphitheatrical valley area of Trinity Bellwoods Park.

As I have noted before, a more important role historically ascribed to green spaces has been the assurance of the health and well being of the populace. As open space they were to ventilate the city and provide places of retreat and contemplation away from the crowd. Significantly, a book from my library entitled Toronto Past and Present until 1882, published in 1884, contains a chapter entitled "The Lungs of the City,: Toronto's Parks, Public Gardens, Summer Resorts".

This role is not simply a bygone preoccupation arising out of the unhealthy conditions of overcrowding and poverty associated with the nineteenth century industrial city. It finds its contemporary equivalent in an emphasis on recreation and physical culture. The importance ascribed to it can be seen in the way that outdoor and indoor sports facilities often dominate the design of parks. Similarly, one can observe that a very significant portion of municipal parks and recreation budgets in Ontario are devoted to sports and organized recreational activities as compared to horticulture or cultural activities and events.

The intellectual traditions that underpin this concept of green spaces as antidote to the 'crowd' and the unwholesomeness of the city often lead to a concern with the total quantity of green space and not necessarily its quality, but bigger is not always better. I would argue that the design quality of green spaces like that of gathering places, can influence their effectiveness. To illustrate this point I would compare Trinity Bellwoods Park, once a deep creek valley as well as the original site to Trinity College, with Buttes Chaumont Park in Paris, which is smaller and was originally a gravel pit.

One of the reasons I think parks like Buttes Chaumont touch a chord is they reestablish a relationship of some intensity between the urbanite and elements of the natural world. It, of course, does this in a romantic, mythic way, whereas some of Toronto's successful ravine parks do it in a more straightforwardly ecological way. In either case, I personally think that, as we in Toronto become ever more distant from the rural hinterland, this edenesque yearning is likely to increase in importance.

Frederick Law Olmsted perhaps understood this best when designing Central Park with Calvert Vaux. Even before the city had actually arisen around the park he designed a place of contrast, an artificially 'natural' world. As compared to contemporary parks which are zoned into passive and active activity areas he located field sports in the 'meadow', presumably as they were when invented. Such places of activity were always to be contained within the larger landscape idea of the park.

This brings me to a role that the entire system of parks and open space inevitably fulfils - that of providing spatial and temporal reference points of some durability within the ever changing cityscape. Not surprisingly, memorials to commemorate events of importance to society are traditionally located on public boulevards, along streets, and in parks and open spaces.

Assumed to be permanent once installed, memorials to the past are also understood to represent the cultural values and sensibility of the city of the present. Thus, the artistic merits of individual pieces, whether monuments or other kinds of public art often become an issue of lively debate affecting their placement and even their popular acceptance. In this regard the parks and open space system can be considered to also constitute the outdoor museum and art gallery of the city.

The memory of the city can also be evoked by the design of parks and open spaces themselves. This was a major objective of an entry to the Trinity Square Park design competition, which my firm prepared with Floyd and Gerrard Landscape Architects in 1983. It proposed to restore a fragment of Taddle Creek, which disappeared from Toronto's urban landscape long ago, and situate the restored Trinity Church on a new plaza overlooking it.

In these ways streets, parks, and open spaces can contribute to one's mental map of the city. They provide locations for recurring events and settings for landmarks by which one navigates and understands the city. To the visitor they may evoke the city's 'spirit of place' to a degree that transcends their intended role within the 'system.'

4. Does the Quality of the Open Space System Depend on Interconnection of its Parts?

Whether or not one sees interconnected parks and open spaces as a necessary goal of the system depends on whether one considers streets and roads as part of it. I have already discussed the role of streets as promenade spaces. Let us consider why most Official Plans do not include streets and roads as part of the open space.

The modern movement in architecture and planning saw the city as being made up of separate component 'systems'. Inspired by the sciences, especially biology, it emphasized classification and analysis of each according to what was thought to be its primary function.

Thus, streets and roads came to be identified in most Official Plans of the 1950's and sixties as movement systems. Similarly, parks and open spaces were identified as functionally distinct - their purpose being recreation. The result, naturally enough, was an urge to physically separate streets from open space and extend the latter as a parallel interconnected system. By contrast Haussmann and Alphand's 19th century designs for Paris and Olmsted's plans for Prospect Park in Brooklyn intertwine tree lined boulevards – for circulation and promenade – with open spaces for public recreation.

While this prejudice has in large measure been put to rest in Toronto, a significant residue remains. This is revealed in a reluctance to give due value to the street as a place of social and recreational activity. The very extensive recent streetscape efforts on the part of the City of Toronto implicitly recognize this fact, but the street is still not an acknowledged part of what is thought to be the open space system of the city.

Recently the City passed in principle two proposals for over street bridges that will interrupt the Bloor and Church Street view corridors. The sidewalks of arterial roads over which Metropolitan Toronto has jurisdiction are often particularly cramped and mean. Metro has typically given absolute primacy to the imperatives of traffic engineering and only recently reluctantly agreed to allow tree planting along its arterials.

The Councillor Richard Gilbert proposal to redevelop the main streets of the city both to provide housing and improve their quality as street spaces may lead to an important shift in understanding at the Metro level. It certainly presents a unique opportunity for both Metro and the City of Toronto to initiate planning and design policies that recognize the social and spatial value of streets and roads.

A residue of separateness can also be seen in the open space system itself. Connectors of mediocre quality have sometimes been created on an ad hoc basis in response to incidental opportunities to enlarge or to create an extended pedestrian only system. Often these lack a clear design character or spatial quality.

In some instances small localized open spaces and subtle street-based open space sequences seem to have been undervalued, and through neglect their spatial integrity has been allowed to dissipate. An example of the latter is the decline of the Clarence Square Wellington Street Victoria Square ensemble at the west end of the downtown core of Toronto. A similar but more dramatic example of the former is the complete disappearance of Montreal's Victoria Square, which is now nothing more than a name to a subway stop.

In considering what constitutes a system of parks and open space one should note the capacity of human memory to interconnect physically separated experiences. In this regard physical interconnection may be less important than strength of experience. This raises fundamental issues of design both in regard to the strength of idea underlying individual parks and open spaces as well as the quality of subsidiary elements that inevitably recur throughout the system.

The design of large and small elements, whether unique or recurring, can have great impact. The paving, furnishings, pavilions, bridges gates, and landscapes out of which a park or open space is created contribute not only to the level of amenity offered by parks and open spaces but also to a sense of urbanity of civic pride, characterizing the City itself. To the extent that they also stimulate the imagination they may invigorate our spiritual lives as well as our bodies.

In the past, Toronto parks have seen the installation of some gracious as well as commodious park pavilions. Although perhaps less sophisticated, they can be compared to the art nouveau glass canopied pavilions and entrances of Paris that have become known to tourists around the world as symbols of the French 'belle epoque' and the urbanity of that city. To a significant extent, however, the built elements and landscapes that were developed in Toronto in the latter half of this century have been undistinguished, and many in my opinion should be subjected to a programme of redesign and landscape intensification.

Recently, Toronto has undertaken design competitions to ensure the highest possible quality for some of its new parks and open spaces. These include a very promising design by Natale Scott Browne Architects for a newwaterfront park which one hopes to see installed in the near future. Competitions are not, of course, the only vehicle for achieving new parks and open spaces of high quality nor for upgrading existing parts of the system. What is essential is an ongoing and systematic commitment to design ideas that provoke the mind and installations of a quality in both concept and construction that can withstand the test of time.

5. Conclusion: Open Spaces Are Not the Lungs of the City But its Embrace

Parks and open spaces mean more to the city than a system of recreational facilities and centres of physical culture. Neither are they simply an antidote to the congestion of the city. If they are places to get away, they also are places to be together. They are not the lungs of the city but rather its embrace. They take a variety of forms and serve a host of needs that are fundamental to the very idea of the city.

It therefore seems ironical that parks and open Space may be made of the most perishable of materials - space, greenery, and walls without roofs. They are inevitably a collective enterprise that must be shared and valued by generations.

Thus, the Official Plan is most certainly the appropriate place and its rewriting a useful time to take stock of the parks and open spaces we have created and to reshape the conceptual models that will guide the future evolution as a system. While Official Plans are normally about 'land use', I would like to see the incorporation of a descriptive rather than a functional typology, one that defines criteria for the spatial structure, physical character, role and interrelationship of parks and open spaces with other elements of the city. As I have indicated, it should acknowledge the inevitable open space use of streets and roads. It should set out measures to improve their spatial quality and to enhance their role as the primary interconnecting armature for the system. I would also like to see policies which govern the design, placement, and maintenance of public art within the system.

In addition, I would like to see a method of inventory for all of the constituent elements of the system. It might take a form somewhat like Alphand's Promenades de Paris but would include an outline of precedents and design ideas as well as a procedure for recording and situating individual elements within the three dimensional context of the city. This might involve systematized mapping techniques, three dimensional or computer modelling.

In concluding, I would like to read a quotation contained within an unpublished manuscript by Michael Dennis which was brought to my attention by Vladimeer Oustimovitch:

> *Come what will, our squares open squares will remain forever imperishable. Buildings, towers, palaces, may moulder and crumble beneath the touch of time; but space - free, glorious open space - will remain to bless the City forever.*
>
> Samuel D. Ruggles, the builder of
> Gramercy Park, New York, N.Y.



William Hollingsworth Whyte, New York

William H. Whyte is a distinguished observor and commentator of architecture, urban design, and the use of urban spaces. As critic and teacher, William Whyte has focused on how to make cities more livable. To this end, he has used television and time-lapse video photography to make "designs of public spaces speak for themselves". Perhaps best known for his work as head of the Street Life Project in New York City, Mr.Whyte was recipient of The American Institute of Architects' 1983 Institute Honor. His most recent book, City: Rediscovering The Center, published this year, has earned wide praise and provides a compendium of insights of the urban environment, gleaned over two decades of observation.

The following is an account of Mr. Whyte's presentation at the Forum. It was transcribed and edited from a video tape of the proceedings.

I was very tickled with two points made by Sampson, which I now wish to appropriate as my own. First, the street as a connector. The most important, the most vital open space in the city is the street, most particularly the street corner. These are the great connectors. Secondly, Frederick Law Olmstead made a statement relevant to our concerns about systems of parks. He was asked by New York politicians to build a big wall around Central Park. Olmstead was furious. He was particularly hateful of black iron fences. He said scoldingly, "There is an outer park and an inner park". This is just as true today, if not more so. The surrounding streets and neighbourhood are just as vital to the inner park as parts of the inner park.

I want to take a very broad view of open space, which we use in the city. Toronto has some very fine spaces indeed. It is extremely difficult to design a space that will not be popular with people. The components of a really successful space are a set of simple basics. The most important space for an open space is the surrounding streets, the immediate relationship of the space to the street. Avoid the sunken or raised plaza if at all possible. By and large, an open space should be kept at street level.

Second - sitting. People tend to sit most where there are places to sit. I did a tour of downtown Toronto's open spaces. I was particularly struck by the generosity of Nathan Phillips Square, the long benches and their siting. The benches were in very good use. Threesome and foursome groupings require that one person be standing. It's not comfortable, but it's sociable. Benches at right angles are very functional for people in groups. Architects all too often use benches in a modular form, to punctuate architectural photographs or plans, having little or no relationship to any pedestrian flow.

Movable chairs are one of man's great inventions. The chair itself is a form of recreation. Watch how people move chairs. My guess is that they're exercising their sense of independence. Movable chairs make stiff situations much more congenial. Incidentally, the record on vandalism of movable chairs is absolutely excellent.

One other point, before we go on to some of the broader trends. On systems - the insistence on green systems obscures the importance of the streets. Furthermore, with very few exceptions, usage is highly local; generally, 80% of park users will come from within two or three block radius. This is good news. It attests to the great depth of demand for good open space. We worried in New York that incentive zoning would create a surfeit of successful places. There's nothing to worry about. Each one creates its own constituency.

So much for the more conventional idea of open space, before I go on to examine the broader kinds of open spaces. We have a lot of bum, failed open spaces in this [i.e., U.S.A.] country. It is the rare open space that can't be reformed, one example being the Bank of America plaza in San Francisco, whose sculpture is known as 'banker's heart'. It will take some doing, but there are very few spaces that can't be redeemed.

Now for some trends in American cities. There is a great tendency in many American cities to go down, down, down. There is almost a holy war going on against the street. Planners are putting the streets into upper level walkways, underground in subterranean concourses, almost everywhere except at street level. Dallas is an example of how American cities have failed to understand the models of Toronto and Montreal. The visitors don't go back with the context that makes these features work. They don't go back with temperatures at fifteen to twenty degrees below zero. Dallas has a perfectly lovely winter climate, where you can go out without a coat on.

It becomes a civic cause. They will tell you in Dallas about their systems, the ability to go any place in downtown Dallas, without ever once going up on the street. The only question to ask is why? People get used to these artificial climates, like artificial blue cheese salad dressing in underground concourse salad bars. After you get used to it, you lose your taste for the real thing.

Charlotte, N.C. drew the wrong lesson from Canada. Once you start on an overhead walkway system, there's no end to it. One of the consequences is the two-level social city. Up above, the parking lots serve the middle income whites. Down below, the bus stop is for low income blacks, who cannot afford cars and have to use the municipal transit. It's a very unfortunate state of affairs, as they now realize. Cedar Rapids, Iowa has elevated walkways to stop grade level pedestrian congestion. What pedestrian congestion? What they desperately need is some pedestrian congestion.

We used to think of the city as a series of open spaces. More and more, they are enclosed spaces. In many ways, smaller cities have an inferiority complex. They want a 'quantum leap' (when you hear that phrase, watch out!), and that's the appeal of a suburban shopping mall, transplanted to the centre of town. The form of the suburban mall is borrowed and put where it doesn't belong. Stamford, Connecticut has a three-block mall which is very successful on its own terms but has ruined its surroundings.

Utilities are among the worst disfigurers of downtown in terms of their blank walls. If you set out to design a dangerous space with nooks and crannies for muggers, you couldn't design a better example than the FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C.

Street level in Houston, whose attraction is its lifestyle, is one hell of a mess. You drive into the downtown from the highway directly into the parking garage, thence by walkway into your building, eat there, work there, go back at night, without ever having to set foot in downtown Houston. And why would you want to?

The worst new project in the United States is Lafayette Place in Boston. Most of these closed-in fortresses are supposed to be the only practical way to cope with the city. The hard-nosed types say that the only way to get the middle classes back into the city from the suburbs is to promise them security. One of the great problems of enclosed internal spaces is the lack of orientation. You don't know where north is. That's the reason for those 'you are here' signs. Where is 'here'?

Another aspect of the city is parking. The centre of Dallas has more parking than there used to be. Dallas has the highest number of parking spaces per capita of any city in the United States, yet people feel the need for more parking. The average walk is 1.5 blocks. If we could extend the average walking distance by no more than a block, we would have a revolution in American land use. In Houston, we have now come to the reductio ad absurdum. There is more parking there than there is Houston. It also applies in a number of smaller Midwest American cities.

Now for the good guys. On the matter of sun and light, there is good news. A tale of two parks: Manhatten's Paley Park, one of the grandest open spaces in the world, 32 by 100 feet. Most of the park's sun has been lost by abutting development, though most of the best remaining light is bounce light. Often, the sun comes in at too high an elevation. That's why landscape architects use honey locusts, to reach up and grab the sun, to create the illusion

Greenacre Park on 51st St. in Manhattan is a Paley Park 'knock-off', privately endowed as is Paley Park, though somewhat larger, 45 by 100 feet. We on the Greenacre Park foundation wanted to secure the sky vault. The Internal Revenue Service eventually approved the concept of an urban landscape easement to forestall shadowing by development of sliver buildings and to preempt large scale assembly on the block.

I want to end on this note: the street is the river of life of the city to which we must attach all of our open space plans.

George Williams, San Francisco

George Williams has been Assistant Director of City Planning for the City and County of San Francisco for the past fifteen years. A graduate of the University of Utah, Stanford Business School, and Harvard Law School, Mr. Williams previously practiced land use law and was a partner in a planning consulting firm. He is the primary author of the Downtown Plan for San Francisco which created a number of new techniques for developing downtown open space.

The San Francisco experience in open space planning might be entitled 'Developing Public Open Space in an Era of Declining Public Revenues'. Because of voter imposed limitations on local taxing powers, cities in California have had increasing difficulty funding public open space. (By public open space we mean parks and recreation facilities as well as natural open spaces.)

In the 1970's, the San Francisco City Planning Department prepared a recreation and open space element of the Master Plan. It had three major components:

1. Acquisition of undeveloped hill tops. Hill tops in San Francisco are as important as the ravines are to Toronto. A number of them were in private ownership and threatened with development.

2. Development of new parks on the waterfront. Like Toronto, one edge of San Francisco City which fronted on San Francisco Bay had been developed for maritime and industrial uses, many of which had become obsolete. The plan called for some of this waterfront area to be developed with parks and recreation facilities.

3. Acquisition and development of new parks and recreation facilities in a number of lower income neighbourhoods in the inner city which were deficient in parks and recreation facilities.

We had developed this open space plan with a lot of citizen involvement. There were different groups of citizens interested in different parts of the plan. Their interests tended to be local - a particular hilltop, a particular part of the waterfront, or a particular inner city neighbourhood. We concluded that very little of the open space plan would get implemented if each project had to go by itself into the budget battle. Funding for open space in the past had always fared badly in the annual budget competition with police, fire, and the various other competitors for the increasingly limited tax dollars. We decided that the open space advocates would never be stronger than they were at the completion of the plan. We would never be able to call out the troops year after year as funding was sought for each individual project. So we decided to try to get a permanent funding mechanism established. It called for a portion of the real property tax (10 cents per $100 of assessed valuation of real property) to be set aside in a special fund which could be used only to implement the open space plan. This was presented to the voters and it lost, getting only 38% of the vote.

We did an analysis of the vote and concluded that we needed to broaden the base of support. Even though the measure coalesced the supporters of the plan, there were too many neighborhoods of the city that were not benefited. These were neighborhoods away from the waterfront, with no hill tops to acquire, and with an adequate amount of parks. However, many of them had parks that were old and tired and in need of renovation. So we sought to broaden our base of support. We expanded the list of things the special fund could be used for to include renovation of existing parks and took the proposal back to the voters. It passed with 58% of the vote. The program began generating up to $10 million a year, and we implemented almost all the projects in our open space plan. We revised the Plan in 1986 and added more projects to carry out. The funding program had been so successful that when it went to the voters last year for extension for 15 more years 78% of the voters voted in favour of it.

That experience may have some relevance to your plan for Toronto. Recognize that you may never have greater citizen interest than you will have when you complete your central city open space plan and that you will have difficulty sustaining that interest over time. If you have the opportunity to develop a permanent funding mechanism to implement your plan, you should take advantage of the moment.

The other planning experience that might be relevant to your plan was the open space component we developed as part of our new Downtown Plan. Since 1968, we had given rather substantial density bonuses for pedestrian arcades, plazas, and public observation platforms on the top of new buildings. When we started the planning for our new Downtown Plan in 1981, we did a hard analysis of the kinds of spaces we were getting.

[Slides of arcades, Bechtel, Bank of America and Zellerbach plazas.]

We were getting dark, windy, unpleasant arcades that pulled the retail uses away from the street. We were getting shady plazas, windy plazas, and some plazas that were beautiful to look at but not comfortable to be in, because there was no place for people to sit. The public observation platforms were no longer open to the public.

We then did user surveys. We talked to people using downtown parks and open spaces to find out what they liked and didn't like about them. We heard that sunshine was very important to their enjoyment of the space. Given San Francisco's temperate climate, the difference between sunshine and shade is often the difference between comfort and discomfort. We also learned that shelter from the wind was very important to enjoyment of the space. Some bustle, a place where one could quietly munch an apple or read a book.

Other spaces were valued because they were in the center of the passing parade, where people watching was at its best. Most of the popular places were close to places where inexpensive carry out food could be obtained. We also learned that almost all of the people walked less than 900 feet to get to the open spaces.

Our staff were familiar with the writings of William Whyte. We brought Mr. Whyte to San Francisco to consult with us so he could critique our plan as it was developing and give us the benefit of his unique insight and national experience. We also asked him to use his messianic oratorical skills in presentations to the City Planning Commission and to a downtown planning support group called SPUR so they could also benefit from that insight and experience.

The planning staff then prepared an open space net work plan that contained all the elements described by Barry Sampson in his paper. We very much regarded streets as part of the open space network. We identified streets where the pedestrian volumes were greatest and called for special treatment of them: improved paving and street trees, and proposals for widening the sidewalks at special locations, and installation of small sitting areas and public art.

We took a close look at the many service alleys that ran behind downtown buildings and bisected the large downtown blocks in a random pattern. We concluded that some of them were no longer needed for building services and could be closed and converted to full-time pedestrian malls. Others had only limited service use and could be made into a lunch time (11 a.m. to 2 p.m.) mall so adjacent restaurants could put out tables and chairs when the weather was nice.

Part of our downtown plan called for redirecting the growth of the high density office district into an obsolete warehouse section which had no large public park. Our plan called for creation of a public park in that area. We were also aware that as new buildings were built in the downtown the parks that did exist would become more and more crowded. We needed to provide additional open space which was truly usable by the public.

We concluded that, given budget constraints, it would be very difficult to get any funds appropriated for downtown open space out of the City's general revenues. It was clear that the only way to get the open space was through requirements imposed on new downtown buildings. We decided to impose an impact mitigation fee of $2 a square foot of office space to go into a special fund to create a new public park in the office growth district.

We decided to abandon the density bonus system because the buildings which were created were too large and out of scale and because we adopted the principle that if an amenity is worth having, it should be required, rather than our having to buy it with a density bonus, in effect. Therefore, we adopted the rule that new downtown development should provide one square foot of usable public open space for every 50 square feet of development.

We concluded from our studies that we should develop a variety of kinds of downtown open spaces, many of them outdoor spaces, such as parks, plazas and gardens, but also some indoor ones, such as green houses and atriums, for use when it was cold or wet outside. We even allowed things we call 'snippets' – small, unused portions of the development site that can be turned into seating areas. We then formulated standards related to shelter from wind, sun exposure, amount of seating, and access to foot service and toilets. We also were concerned that the space be truly accessible to the public. Rooftop gardens are an eligible open space, but if they are high in the building there must be a dedicated elevator to get to the garden so it is more easily accessed by the public. We also developed a sign with a distinctive logo that must be prominently displayed on the building. It identifies the space as a space the public has a right to use, describes where the space is, the hours it is available, and a number to call if maintenance is needed (we want the public to help enforce the requirement that the space be properly maintained).

In some cases, because of the size of the project or its site constraints it is not possible to get a good space on the site of a new building. In these cases we allow the developer to create new usable public open space in the public right-of-way by implementing part of our pedestrian network, such as the small sitting areas in a widened sidewalk or converting a service alley to a pedestrian walkway.

We developed guidelines for each kind of space and applied to standards to each kind of space [refer to the attached guidelines]. Here are some of the results we have been getting.

[Slides of roof garens, greenhouses/atriums/indoor parks, snippets, pedestrian walkways.]

With regard to the unattractive open spaces we had been getting with the density bonus system - the appealing arcades and plazas - we adopted a new rule that allows a portion of those spaces to be used commercially (for example, for sidewalk cafes or flower stands or news stands) in order to animate them and to provide a financial incentive to the developer to retrofit the space. With that incentive and with the need for older buildings to upgrade themselves to stay competitive, many of these older arcades and plazas are now being retrofitted and are becoming, in some cases, very appealing spaces.

Torontonians are no strangers to the kinds of spaces we are trying to create. There are a number of wonderful downtown open spaces I have seen in my few days in Toronto, such as the garden next to First Canadian Place and the Trinity Square Park. I am sure Commerce Court Plaza, when the fountain is on and the sidewalk cafe is in use, is a very appealing place although I wonder what that tall wide building does to the wind - the plaza might not meet our wind standards. I think the public seating areas in the Eaton Centre arcade are very attractive.

[Nathan] Phillips Plaza in front of City Hall is truly a grand civic space. However, I find the elevated walkway surrounds it to be very unfortunate. I suspect it was intended to contain the space, but to me it is a barrier just as your elevated freeway is a barrier to the lakefront. I understand you intend to renovate the plaza in the near future. I would hope you would consider liberating the space by removing that walkway.

I appreciate the opportunity to share San Francisco's experience with you and the opportunity to explore your fascinating City. I wish you (Bob Millward) and your staff well as you are developing your plan You are dealing with a very special place.

Guidelines for Downtown Open Space

	Urban Garden	**Urban Park**	**Plaza**	**View and/or Sun Terrace**
Description	Intimate sheltered landscaped area.	Large open space with predominantly natural elements.	Primarily hard-surface space.	Wind-sheltered area on upper level.
Size	1,200 to 10,000 sq.ft.	Minimum 10,000 sq.ft.	Minimum 7,000 sq.ft.	Minimum 800 sq.ft.
Location	On ground level, adjacent to sidewalk, through-block pedestrianway, or building lobby.		Southerly side of the building. Should not be near another plaza.	Second floor or above. View terraces should only be located in places which have spectacular views.
Access	Accessible on at least one side of its perimeter.	Accessible from at least one street at Access from several locations encouraged. Park interior to be visible from entrances.	Accessible from a public street at grade or 3' above or below street level connected to street with generous stairs.	Accessible directly from the sidewalk or public corridors. Must provide adequate signage about location and public accessibility at street level, in hallways and elevators.
Seating*, Tables, Etc.	One seating space for each 25 sq.ft. of garden area. One half of seating to be movable. One table for each 400 sq.ft. of garden area.	Provide formal and informal seating, on sculptured lawn. Movable chairs desirable.	One linear foot of seating space per each linear foot of plaza perimeter. One half of seating to consist of benches.	One seating space for every 25 sq.ft. of terrace area.
Landscaping, Design	Ground surface primarily of high quality paving material. Install plant material such as: trees, vines, shrubs, seasonal flowers to create garden-like setting. Water feature desirable.	Provide lush landscaping setting with predominantly lawn surfaces and planting such as: trees, shrubs, ground cover, flowers. Provide a water feature as major focus.	Landscaping is generally secondary to architectural elements. Use trees to strengthen spatial definition and to creat peripheral areas of more intimate scale.	Terrace may take one of the following forms: • complex architectural setting which may include art works; • flower garden; • space with trees and other planting.
Commercial Services, Food		Provide food service within or adjacent to the park. 20% of space may be used for restaurant seating taking up no more than 20% of the sitting facilities provided.	Provide retail space including food services in space around plaza. 20% of space may be used for restaurant seating taking up no more than 20% of the seating provided.	Provide food service on or adjacent to terrace.
Sunlight and Wind	Sunlight to much of the occupied area at lunch time. Shelter from wind.	Sunlight to most of the occupied area from mid-morning to mid-afternoon. Shelter from wind.	Sunlight to much of the occupied area at lunch time. Shelter from wind.	Sunlight to most of the occupied area of terrace at lunch time. Shelter from wind.
Public Availability	8 AM to 6 PM Monday through Friday.	At all times.	At all times.	10 AM to 5 PM, Monday through Friday.
Other	Security gates, if provided, should be an integral part of the design.	Security gates, if provided, should be an integral part of the design.		In wind exposed locations provide glass enclosure to create comfortable environment.

Guidelines (cont'd.)

Greenhouse	**Snippet**	**Atrium**	**Indoor Park**
Partially or fully glassed-in enclosure.	Small, sunny sitting space.	Glass-covered central open space in the interior of a building or block.	Interior open space where at least one wall facing the street consists entirely of glass.
Minimum 1,000 sq.ft.	Varying sizes permitted. Min. ceiling height 20 ft.	Minimum area 1,500 sq.ft.; min. ceiling height 30 ft.	Minimum area 1,000 sq.ft. Min. ceiling height 20 ft. Area to be counted against open space requirement cannot exceed twice the area of the glass wall projected onto the floor plane.
Locate in places too shady or windy to be used as open space.	On new or existing building.	Interior of building or block.	Building interior adjacent to sidewalk or public open space.
Accessible from street at grade or 3' above or below street level. Provide several entrances from public rights-of-way.	Accessible from public streets.	On street level or 3' above or below street level. Accessible from one or more sidewalks through generous hallways. Space must be made available and inviting to the general public.	Accessible from street level. Provide several entrances to make the space inviting to the public.
One seating space for every 25 sq.ft. of floor area.	If functional for sitting and viewing, seating can be ledges, stairs, benches, chairs.	Provide one seating space for every 25 sq.ft. of floor area, one table for every 400 sq.ft. of floor area. At least one half of seating to consist of movable chairs.	Provide one seating space for every 25 sq.ft. of floor area, one table for every 400 sq.ft. of floor area. At least one half of seating to consist of movable chairs.
Interior surface may be a mixture of hard surfaces and planting areas.	Surface will predominantly be hard pavement. Add planting where appropriate.	Provide attractive paving material to create interesting patterns. Use rich plant material. Incorporate sculpture and/or water feature.	Provide attractive paving material to create interesting patterns. Use rich plant material. Incorporate sculpture and/or water feature.
Provide food service within greenhouse; 20% of greenhouse space may be used for restaurant seating occupying no more than 20% of the seating provided.	Encourage food vendors to locate in the vicinity.	Locate food service adjacent to the atrium; 20% of area may be used for restaurant seating taking up no more than 20% of the seating and tables provided.	Provide food service; 20% of area may be used for restaurant seating taking up no more than 20% of the seating and tables provided.
Sunlight at lunch time highly desirable but not required.	Sunlight to sitting areas at lunch time. Shelter from wind.	Mass buildings surrounding the atrium in such a way as to maximize sunshine in the atrium space.	Orient park to the southeast, south or southwest to insured sunlight at least during lunch time.
10 AM to 5 PM, Monday through Friday.	At all times.	8 AM to 6 PM Monday through Friday.	8 AM to 6 PM Monday through Friday.
Include large movable windows or walls to open up greenhouse in warm weather.	Credit each seat as 25 s.f. of open space. Buildings up to 100,000 g.s.f. may satisfy 100% of requirement with "snippets"; larger buildings may satisfy up to 20%.	Insure proper ventilation. At least 75% of roof area to be skylit.	Insure proper ventilation. Install heating to make space comfortable in cool weather. Construct glass wall to be fully or partially movable.

Guidelines (cont'd.)

	Public Sitting Area in a Galleria	**Public Sitting Area in an Arcade**	**Public Sitting Area in a Pedestrian Walkway**
Description	Through-block, continuous, glass-covered pedestrian passage lined with retail shops and restaurants.	Continuous, covered passageway at street level, defined by building set back on one side and a row of columns along the front lot line.	Sitting area on a sidewalk of a pedestrian-oriented street in a lunchtime mall or in an exclusive pedestrian walkway.
Size	Minimum average height 30 ft.; minimum clear area 12 ft. Only public sitting areas outside the circulation space which are buffered from it by various kinds of design elements will qualify.	Minimum clear width 10 ft.; minimum height 14 ft. Only public sitting areas which are delineated from the circulation space by appropriate means will qualify.	Varying sizes permitted.
Location	In any approved galleria.	As identified in the Pedestrian Network Plan. Other locations must be approved.	As identified in the Pedestrian Network Plan. Other locations must be approved.
Access	Accessible from public right-of-way or open space at grade or 2 ft. above or below grade level of adjoining public area.	Accessible from sidewalks or public open space at grade level or 2 ft. above or below grade. Connect arcade to public space with continuous stairs.	
Seating*, Tables, Etc.	Provide sitting ledges, benches, movable chairs and tables in areas outside the pedestrian pathway. At least one half of seating should consist of movable chairs.	Place seating and tables outside the area of pedestrian flow.	If functional for sitting and viewing, seating can be ledges, benches, chairs.
Landscaping, Design	Use rich paving materials in interesting patterns. Include sculpture or other works of art and water feature.	Arcades should be enhanced by creating attractive paving patterns with rich materials. Incorporate mosaics, murals or three-dimensional elements into wall surfaces, coffering into ceiling surface. Include plant materials where appropriate.	Use rich paving material in interesting patterns. Include plant material.
Commercial Services, Food	Both sides of galleria should be lined with retail shops and food services. Locate sitting areas near food services. Restaurant seating is not to take up more than 20% of sitting area.	Attractive retail shops, food services and restaurants should front on the arcade. 20% of sitting area to be used for restaurant seating, occupying no more than 20% of sitting facilities and tables provided.	Attractive shops, restaurants, cafes and food services should line the pedestrian walkways and lunchtime malls.
Sunlight and Wind	Mass buildings surrounding galleria in a way as to maximize sunlight into the galleria space.		Sunlight to the sitting areas at lunchtime. In windy locations provide wind baffles.
Public Availability	8 AM to 6 PM Monday through Friday	At all times.	At all times.
Other	Security gates should be integrated into overall design and concealed when not in use. At least 75% of galleria roof shall consist of skylights. Insure ventilation.		Credit each seat as 25 sq.ft. of open space.

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* *Seating dimensions are as follows:*
Height: 12" to 36"; ideally 17"
Depth: 14" one-sided; 30-36" double sided.
Width: 30" of linear seating are counted as one seat.

Commissioner Robert Millward, Toronto

Bob Millward, Commissioner of Planning and Development, heads one of the most visible and dynamic City of Toronto departments, responsible for land use and policy planning. Prior to joining the newly created City of Toronto Housing Department in 1974 as Director of Planning and Project Development, he held several positions with the New York City Department of City Planning. In 1979, Mr. Millward was appointed to a dual role with the City of Toronto Planning and Development Department as Deputy Commissioner and Director of Central Core and Waterfront. A member of the Canadian Institute of Planners, he holds a B.A. from the University of Rochester and a Masters in Urban Planning from New York University.

I would like to make some summary points and present a few impressions from this symposium that may help us go on from here.

First. Cities are unique. Every city we have heard from has very special characteristics – cultural history, political and economic energy. Each city has its strengths. Toronto has its strengths and its weaknesses. It is important to assess them as we in Toronto plan for our future.

Second. The physical characteristics of the city are vitally important. In our city the lake, the ravines, the core, the inner neighbourhoods, are all exceptional attributes that have to be addressed and incorporated in any planning we do.

Third. Some growth is inevitable – we can moderate it and we can control for it but growth and quality are interrelated. It is essential that whatever we do in this city is done well. There are lots of examples in other cities that we can learn from. I think we can and must do what we do better – that includes parks, public buildings, and certainly private buildings.

Fourth. Environment and nature are important ingredients of the city; we must look at the city as an ecosystem. I think that speaker after speaker has made that point. We sometimes forget that in the work that we do here.

Fifth. Incrementalism – that is the Toronto way – everyone says that is the better way. I think people have urged us to be bold, to think bold, to have vision. I think we should learn to do that and still implement in ways that allow us to learn incrementally as we go along. That has worked in Toronto for 150 years. I think we have to be bold, we have to be visionary, and we have to do it in ways that allow us to learn from the mistakes of others.

Sixth. The planning focus has to broaden. I think speaker after speaker, again, has told us that you can not look at land use planning alone. You have to think about health, transportation, housing, parks and people. I think this is a really important lesson and we all have to integrate this and do it in a way that we have not done it before as part of our Cityplan '91.

Seventh. I think it is an important lesson for us to really, seriously consider whether we can do some pilot projects for Cityplan '91 – different ways to do things – integrating some of these viewpoints and policies. Maybe we should look at St.Lawrence Square, some innovations in parks, the railway lands. Maybe there are opportunities to do pilot projects as part of our Cityplan '91 process.

Eighth. Techniques – we have learned a lot about techniques, linkages, what other cities have tried. We are addressing important issues in our Plan process. We realize that we are going to need innovative techniques. I think this plan process will open up our thinking about what techniques should and can be implemented in Toronto. We are going to have to explore some new techniques in more detail as we go along.

Next is the regional context. People talk about the fact that we are a city; but we are increasingly a part of the greater Toronto region. It is important that our thinking acknowledge our presence in the region and the importance of the city to the rest of the region. Last and by no means least, in my view, it is government's role to lead, not to follow. The appropriate leader in the municipal context is the municipal government. We have to deal with the issues of government funding, government cutbacks at the national and provincial level. We have to think about the role of the private sector in ways that can help us in partnerships. But it is most important that our role as municipal officials and municipal politicians be to set the stage. What this symposium has tried to do is stimulate thinking and help us arrive at solutions, then get help implementing these solutions.

Thank you very much. It has been an exceptional and stimulating symposium.